Bava Batra 79b (עט:) — the Talmud in English

And if

according to your statement, that

in the field and the tree

the Sages and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, disagree with regard to items that he consecrated while empty, then certainly in the latter clause, where he consecrated them while full, they also disagree with regard to the field and the tree.

If so,

why does

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, switch his position

!? Granted, if they disagree with regard to a pit and a dovecote, it is possible to explain their dispute both with regard to items that he consecrated while empty and that subsequently became full, and with regard to items that he consecrated while full, as will be explained below.

However, if they disagree with regard to the field and the tree, it is indeed possible to explain their dispute with regard to items that he consecrated while empty and that subsequently became full, as you said: The Sages and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei as to whether there is misuse of consecrated property with regard to growths of consecrated property.

But how can we explain their dispute with regard to items that he consecrated while full? After all, everyone agrees that one who sells a tree has sold its fruit and what is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon !?

Rather, Rabba said,

Rabba retracted his previous statement, and said:

The

dispute

between the Sages and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, was stated specifically

with regard to a pit and a dovecote,

as will be explained shortly.

But with regard to the field and the tree,

which he consecrated while empty and which subsequently became full,

according to all opinions,

there is misuse of them and of what is inside them,

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who says: There is misuse of consecrated property with regard to growths of consecrated property.

And

the Gemara asks:

With regard to a pit and a dovecote,

concerning which the Sages and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, disagree,

if they were empty, with regard to what do they disagree

what is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar, who says that there is misuse of consecrated property even with regard to what is inside them, and what is the reasoning of the Sages, who disagree and say that there is no misuse of consecrated property with regard to what subsequently entered the pit and the dovecote?

And if they were full, with regard to what do they disagree?

What is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar, who says that it was not his intention to consecrate the water and the pigeons in the dovecote, and what is the reasoning of the Sages, who say that his intention was to consecrate the water and the pigeons as well?

a. With regard to one who transfers ownership of or consecrates an item that has not yet come into existence—for example, dates that have not yet grown—the tannaim disagree.

Rabbi Meir maintains that one who transfers ownership of or consecrates an item that has not yet come into existence effects a valid transfer of ownership, and his consecration is valid. According to the Sages, however, one who transfers ownership of an item that has not yet come into existence does not effect a valid acquisition, and his consecration is not valid either.

b. They disagree not only with regard to this matter, but also with regard to an item that exists, except that it does not presently belong to him, so that he is currently unable to transfer ownership of it or consecrate it, and he wishes to consecrate it in the future, when it comes into his possession. Such an item is also included in the category of “an item that has not yet come into existence”; according to the Sages, he cannot sell it or consecrate it.

Therefore, one who consecrates an item that does not belong to him, intending that the consecration take effect when it comes into his possession, has not consecrated it at all. Needless to say, the consecration does not take effect upon the object before the object comes into his possession, since even Rabbi Meir concedes in this case that a person cannot consecrate an item that does not belong to him. Rather, even if he consecrated it now, intending that the consecration take effect when the object is already in his possession, according to the Sages his statement has no effect, even after the object comes into his possession.

And we explain:

If they were empty, they disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages,

as to whether a person can consecrate “an item that has not yet come into existence.”

The first tanna,

who says: If one consecrated a pit and a dovecote while they were empty, there is no misuse of consecrated property with regard to the water and pigeons that subsequently entered them,

holds in accordance with the Sages, who say: A person cannot transfer ownership of “an item that has not yet come into existence,”

and therefore he cannot consecrate the water and pigeons that were not in his possession at the time of the consecration.

And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

who says: If one consecrated a pit and a dovecote while they were empty, and the pit became filled with water and the dovecote with pigeons, there is misuse of consecrated property with regard to the water and pigeons,

holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says: A person can transfer ownership of “an item that has not yet come into existence,”

and therefore he can consecrate the water and pigeons, even though at that time, when he consecrated them, they did not belong to him.

And we challenge this: Even according to Rabbi Meir, a person cannot transfer ownership of an item that is certainly not destined to come into existence.

I can say that you heard from Rabbi Meir,

that a person can transfer ownership of an item that has not yet come into existence, only

in a case such as

one who transfers ownership of the

fruit

of a

date palm,

which is certainly destined to come,

as it is certain that the fruit will come into existence.

But

these,

the water that entered the pit and the pigeons that entered the dovecote,

who can say that they will come,

who says that they are destined to come? For if people do not bring water and pour it into the pit, and if they do not bring pigeons to the dovecote, the pit will not become filled with water and the dovecote will not become filled with pigeons.

And when they are not certainly destined to come into existence, even according to Rabbi Meir a person cannot acquire them or consecrate them. The question therefore arises: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that if he consecrated them while empty and they became full, there is misuse of consecrated property with regard to what is inside them !?

He said,

he answered,

Rava:

The beraita is speaking of a case where the water is indeed destined to come into the pit, and the pigeons are indeed destined to come into the dovecote.

And

you can find this with water coming by way of

a slope from

his courtyard

to

the

pit,

where there is a slope in the consecrator’s courtyard, with the pit at the end of the slope, and rainwater comes by itself into the pit and fills it.

where there is a slope in the consecrator’s courtyard, with the cistern at the bottom of the slope, and rainwater comes into the cistern on its own and fills it.

And

likewise, you can find this with

pigeons coming by way of his dovecote

from the consecrator’s dovecote

to

the

empty dovecote

that he consecrated: When new pigeons are born in the consecrator’s dovecote, they will move to the empty dovecote that stands adjacent to their own.

And

the Gemara asks:

With regard to

one who consecrates a pit and dovecote

while full, with regard to what do they disagree

the Sages and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?

He said,

he explained,

Rava: This is referring to a case where he consecrated a pit

while full, but he did not say, “I consecrate this pit together with its water.” Rather, he consecrated it

without specification,

saying: “This pit is consecrated.”

At the end of the chapter “One Who Sells a House” [71a], we learned: One who consecrates a field consecrates all of it, even those things that are not included in the sale of a field, because the consecrator intends to consecrate generously.

Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says: One who consecrates a field consecrates within it only those things that a seller sells, but he does not intend to consecrate those things that a seller does not sell.

And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with his father,

his father, Rabbi Shimon,

who says that one derives the law concerning the Most High from the law concerning ordinary property,

meaning that anything which, by default, a seller does not intend to sell to an ordinary person, he likewise does not intend to consecrate for the Most High.

Therefore, Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said that the law governing one who consecrates a pit full of water without specification is identical to the law governing one who sells it without specification.

Just as

under

the law concerning ordinary property, he can say

the seller to the purchaser:

“I sold you the pit; I did not sell you the water,”

so too,

under

the law concerning the Most High,

we say:

“I consecrated the pit,

but

I did not consecrate the water.”

And the first tanna, who says that when one consecrates a pit and dovecote while full there is misuse of consecrated property with regard to them and what is inside them, maintains that one does not derive the law concerning the Most High from the law concerning ordinary property.

Therefore, although when one sells a pit full of water he does not sell the water by default, because he sells ungenerously, nevertheless, when one consecrates a pit full of water, he consecrates its water by default as well, because he consecrates generously.

And we challenge this:

And

is it so that under

the law concerning ordinary property he does not

sell the water as well by default !?

But

we

learned

in the Mishna:

One who sells a pit—

he sells its water;

and if the water is sold under the law concerning ordinary property, all the more so under the law concerning the Most High. What, then, is the reason of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon !?

He said,

he answered,

Rava:

Indeed, we learned in our Mishna: “One who sells a pit—he sells its water,” but this law is not agreed upon by everyone. On the contrary,

the Mishna

is the opinion of

an individual,

and the Rabbis disagree with it.

But

isn't it

taught

in a beraita:

If one sold a pit, he did not sell

implicitly

its water?

Rabbi Natan says: If one sold a pit, he sold

its

water.

And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds: One who sells a pit full of water to an ordinary person did not, by implication, sell its water, in accordance with the Rabbis in the beraita. Likewise, one who consecrates it did not consecrate its water, since the law governing consecrated property is derived from the law governing an ordinary person.