Bava Batra 79a (עט.) — the Talmud in English

“and it is blown” [

in the expression of fire]

until it is blown up” —

wait

until the fire comes

of Gehinnom,

which does not require blowing

with a bellows.

“until Midbba” —

wait

until it causes pain

the fire and afflicts

their souls

of the wicked.

And some say [

there are those who explain]: “until Midbba,” that is,

until He does

the Holy One, blessed be He,

what He wishes,

whatever He wishes to do with the wicked in the World to Come. For in this world the way of the wicked prospers, in order to drive them away in the World to Come.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: Whoever separates himself from words of Torah is consumed by fire, as it is stated [Ezekiel 15:7]:

“

“And I will set My face against them; from the fire they have come forth, and the fire shall consume them”,

that is, they emerged and separated themselves from the Torah, which is fire, and their punishment will be measure for measure: the fire shall consume them.

When Rav Dimi came

from Eretz Yisrael,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yonatan: Whoever separates himself,

separates and detaches

himself from words of Torah —

falls into Gehinnom. As it is stated [

Proverbs 21:16]:

“A person who strays from the way of understanding shall rest in the assembly of the shades”,

a person who strays from his path and separates himself from the way of Torah, which is the way of wisdom and righteousness, will ultimately deteriorate and fall day after day; he will find rest only at his death, when he will be among the assembly of the congregation of the “shades” — the inhabitants of Gehinnom.

And “shades” means only Gehinnom, as it is stated [

Proverbs 9:18]:

“But he does not know that shades are there, that her guests are in the depths of the netherworld”,

one who follows his desires and sins does not realize that his path will bring him to Gehinnom, for there — the place of those who follow desire — are the “shades,” namely Gehinnom; and those who are called and summoned to desires descend into the depths of the “netherworld,” namely Gehinnom.

We learned in the Mishna:

“One who sells a refuse heap has sold its manure”,

he has sold a pit and its water, he has sold a dovecote and its doves, and he has sold a pigeon coop and its pigeons.

The Gemara cites a Mishna from tractate Me’ila [13a] and discusses its statements, since at the end of the sugya it raises an objection from our Mishna.

a. It is prohibited for an ordinary person to derive benefit from consecrated property, both from items sacrificed upon the altar and from consecrated property designated for the maintenance of the Temple — whether items that are themselves fit for offerings and for the construction needs of the Temple, or items consecrated in order to sell them and use their proceeds to purchase offerings or construction needs,

b. Anyone who derives benefit worth a peruta from consecrated property has committed me’ila. One who commits me’ila intentionally is flogged and repays whatever loss he caused to the consecrated property. If he committed me’ila inadvertently, he pays the value of his benefit, adds a fifth, and brings a ram worth two sela and offers it as a guilt-offering, thereby attaining atonement; this is called a guilt-offering for me’ila.”

We learned there [

in Me’ila 13a]:

Every

item

that is fit to be

offered upon the

altar, but is not

fit

for the maintenance of the Temple,

such as unblemished oxen, sheep, and goats, turtledoves and young pigeons that are fit for offerings, and likewise fine flour, wine, and oil that are fit for meal-offerings and libations — all of these are not fit to be burned in a furnace for construction — if one consecrated them for the altar, one commits me’ila with them. And every item that is fit

for the maintenance of the Temple but is not

fit

for the altar,

such as gold, silver, and precious stones, if one consecrated them for the maintenance of the Temple, for the needs of constructing the Temple, one commits me’ila with them.

And even if their physical substance is

not

fit

to be

offered upon the

altar, and not

fit to be given itself

for the maintenance of the Temple,

such as milk, cheese, refuse, and grasses, if one consecrated them in order to sell them and use their proceeds to purchase an animal for an offering or the needs of the maintenance of the Temple, one commits me’ila with them.

And not only when one consecrated the items themselves, but even when one consecrated objects that contain other items, both the containers and what is inside them are consecrated, and

one commits me’ila with them and with what is inside them.

How so?

a. If

one consecrated a pit,

and at the time of the consecration the pit was

full of water.

The pit itself is consecrated for its monetary value, and likewise the water inside it becomes consecrated, and one commits me’ila with the pit and with the water inside it.

b. And likewise, if one consecrated

refuse heaps full of manure,

they are consecrated for their monetary value, and one commits me’ila with them and with what is inside them.

c. And likewise, if one consecrated

a pigeon coop full of pigeons,

the pigeon coop itself is consecrated for its monetary value, and the pigeons are fit to be offered on the altar; one commits me’ila with the pigeon coop and with the pigeons inside it.

d. And likewise, if one consecrated

a field full of grasses,

they are consecrated for their monetary value.

e. And likewise, if one consecrated

a laden tree,

bearing

fruit,

they are consecrated for their monetary value, and

one commits me’ila with them and with what is inside them.

This applies specifically if they were full at the time of the consecration,

but

if he consecrated them while they were empty and they subsequently became full, one commits me’ila with them, but one does not commit me’ila with what is inside them.

How?

1. If

he consecrated an empty pit and afterward it became filled with

the pit

water,

the pit is consecrated, and one is liable for me'ila through it, but the water is not consecrated. 2. And likewise, if he consecrated

a dump

that was empty

and afterward it became filled with

the dump’s

manure,

the dump is consecrated, and one is liable for me'ila through it, but the manure is not consecrated.

3. And likewise, if he consecrated

a dovecote

that was empty

and afterward the dovecote became filled with

the dovecote’s

doves,

the dovecote is consecrated, and one is liable for me'ila through it, but the doves are not consecrated.

4. And likewise, if he consecrated

a tree

without fruit

and afterward the tree bore

the tree’s

fruit.

5. And likewise, if he consecrated

a field

that was empty and

afterward it became filled with

the field’s

grass,

the tree and the field are consecrated, and

one is liable for me'ila through them, but one is not liable for me'ila through what is within them,

since the fruit on the tree and the grass in the field were not consecrated.

These are

the words of Rabbi Judah,

who holds that there is no me'ila through growths of consecrated property, even though the consecrated property caused the fruit and grass to grow.

Rabbi Yosei

disagrees and

says: One who consecrates the field

and afterward the field becomes filled with grass,

and

likewise one who consecrates

the tree is liable for me'ila through them and through their growths, because they are growths of consecrated property,

and since they derive from the body of the consecrated property, they are consecrated like it.

It was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi said: The words of Rabbi Judah appear

when he says: If one consecrated them empty and they became filled, one is liable for me'ila through them but not through what is within them—

in the case of a pit and a dovecote.

And

the

words of Rabbi Yosei

appear when he says: If one consecrated them empty and they became filled, one is liable for me'ila through them and through what is within them—

in the case of a field and a tree,

and the Gemara explains this shortly.

It initially entered our minds that when Rabbi said “appear,” he meant “appear to me”: Rabbi said that Rabbi Judah’s position regarding a pit and a dovecote appeared and seemed correct to him, while, conversely, Rabbi Yosei’s position regarding a tree and a field seemed correct.

And we challenged this:

What is this?

For it is impossible to say so.

For

granted

that what Rabbi said was:

“The words of Rabbi Judah appear in the case of a pit and a dovecote,”

this can indeed be understood.

For this wording implies that Rabbi Judah’s position appears correct specifically in the case of a pit and a dovecote;

this implies

[that is, it implies]

that he disagrees

even

regarding a field and a tree,

where one is not liable for me'ila through what is within them, and Rabbi said concerning this that Rabbi Judah’s position does not appear correct.

Rather,

when Rabbi said:

“The words of Rabbi Yosei appear in the case of a field and a tree; this implies,”

it is implied

that he disagrees

with Rabbi Judah also

in the case of a pit and a dovecote.

And

this is not correct, for

Rabbi Yosei

in

the case of a field and a tree said

that one is liable for me'ila through what is within them, but Rabbi Yosei never disagreed with Rabbi Judah in the case of a pit and a dovecote!?

And if Rabbi intended to rule that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, he should have said simply: “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.” We would then have understood automatically that one is liable for me'ila through the growths of the field and the tree, but not through what is within the pit and the dovecote.

And if you would say

that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with Rabbi Judah even in the case of a pit and a dovecote, although his opinion was not mentioned in the Mishna of Me'ila:

And when Rabbi Yosei said in the Mishna

“I am speaking according to Rabbi Judah’s position,”

he meant: I hold that one is liable for me'ila through what is within them in all the cases, but according to your position—that you do not concede that which comes to them from outside—at least concede to me in the case of a field and a tree, whose growths are consecrated property.

Therefore Rabbi said: Rabbi Yosei’s position regarding a field and a tree appears correct to me, because in the case of a pit and a dovecote Rabbi Judah’s position appears correct to Rabbi, and not Rabbi Yosei’s:

And

this too cannot be said, for

indeed

it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Yosei said: I do not accept Rabbi Judah’s position regarding a field and a tree,

for in my view, the fruit of the tree and the grass of the field are consecrated,

because they are growths of consecrated property.

It follows that

it is specifically regarding a field and a tree that

Rabbi Yosei

does not accept

Rabbi Judah’s position;

whereas in the case of a pit and a dovecote, he accepts

Rabbi Judah’s position and agrees with him.

If so, a difficulty arises: Why did Rabbi say, “The words of Rabbi Yosei appear in the case of a field and a tree,” implying that Rabbi Yosei also disagrees in the case of a pit and a dovecote, when it can be learned from the beraita that Rabbi Yosei did not disagree in the case of a pit and a dovecote? And we answer: “Appear,” as Rabbi used the term, does not mean “appear to me.” Rather,

this is what he said: Rabbi Yosei accepts Rabbi Judah’s position in the case of a pit and a dovecote, for Rabbi Yosei disagreed with him only in the case of a field and a tree; but in the case of a pit and a dovecote,

Rabbi Yosei agrees with Rabbi Judah.

The Sages taught:

If one consecrated them empty and afterward they became filled—

one is liable for me'ila through them, but one is not liable for me'ila through what is within them,

because the consecration takes effect upon what exists at the time of the consecration, but not upon what comes there afterward.

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

disagrees and

says: One is also liable for me'ila through what is within them,

and below the Gemara explains the subject of the dispute between the first tanna and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.

He said,

that is, he explained,

Rabba: Their dispute

is between the Sages and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

in the case of a field and a tree

that one consecrated empty, after which grass and fruit grew in them.

For the first tanna holds in accordance with Rabbi Judah,

who says: One is not liable for me'ila through growths of consecrated property; therefore, one is not liable for me'ila through the grass and fruit.

And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, holds in accordance with Rabbi Yosei,

who says: One is liable for me'ila through growths of consecrated property; therefore, one is liable for me'ila through them and through what is within them.

But in the case of a pit and a dovecote,

which one consecrated and afterward became filled,

everyone

—both the Sages and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon—holds:

one is liable for me'ila through them, but one is not liable for me'ila through what is within them,

because the consecration cannot take effect upon the water and the doves, which were not yet in the owner’s possession at the time of the consecration, and consecrated property does not acquire that which enters its domain through the acquisition effected by a courtyard.

He said,

that is, he asked

Abaye

Rabba:

But,

according to your words,

what about that which was taught

at the end of this beraita:

If

he consecrated them while full, one is liable for me'ila through them and

also

through what is within them?

And Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, reverses

his position and says: Although, if one consecrated them empty, I am stringent and hold that one is liable for me'ila through what is within them, when one consecrated them full I am lenient and hold that one is not liable for me'ila through what is within them.