Bava Batra 65b (סה:) — the Talmud in English

However,

when he said to him

the seller said to the buyer:

“It and everything inside it”—

that he is selling him the house and everything inside it,

they are all sold,

all these household accessories enumerated in the Mishna, both those fixed in place and those that are movable, are sold together with the house. But other objects not mentioned here in the Mishna are not sold, even though he said that he was selling everything inside it, because this expression is not intended to add anything to the sale, but only objects designated for this particular house; and all these are designated for the house .

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses this matter:

Let us say

that perhaps

our Mishna

which maintains that one who sells a house does not include in the sale the movable mortar

is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir. For if

you say that our Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi Meir, he said

in a beraita cited in the following chapter [78b]:

If one sold a vineyard

he sold the accessories of the vineyard!

For example, the poles in the vineyard that serve it. From there it can be learned that, in the case of one who sells a house, Rabbi Meir maintains that he sells the household accessories together with the house.

If so, our Mishna, which maintains that he did not include in the sale of the house the movable mortar, which is among the household accessories, is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

And we reject this:

You may even say

that our Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi Meir,

and there is no basis for comparing the ruling stated by Rabbi Meir with regard to a vineyard to the ruling stated in our Mishna, because

there,

with regard to a vineyard, it can be said that Rabbi Meir spoke only of vineyard accessories that are

fixed—

those that remain permanently inside the vineyard and are never moved from there, even though they are not attached to the ground. This is unlike

here,

in our Mishna, where the mortar

is not fixed

in the ground. It is sometimes lent out, and it is not as permanently situated in the house as vineyard accessories are in the vineyard.

And we challenge this: How can it be explained that our Mishna maintains that anything permanently fixed in the house is included in the sale of the house?

But

it is explicit in our Mishna that a

key

is not sold together with the house. And it cannot be explained that the Mishna is speaking of a key that is not fixed, because a key is taught

in analogy to a door: Just as a door is fixed

permanently, and is not moved from its place from one location to another,

so too the key

is referring to a wooden key

that is fixed,

as there are keys that are never moved from the place where they are attached to the doorway of the house. Nevertheless, it is clear from the Mishna that he did not sell the key together with the house.

For if we were to explain that the Mishna is speaking of a key that is not fixed, it would be difficult to understand why the Mishna does not distinguish between types of keys: a fixed key is included in the sale of the house, whereas a key that is not fixed is not included in the sale of the house. Since the Mishna does not distinguish, it follows that all types of keys are not included in the sale of the house, even those that are fixed. This is because a key is a light object that is easy to move, and on rare occasions one takes it from its place; therefore, it is not included in the sale of the house.

If so, it is proven from what is stated in our Mishna that a fixed key is not included in the sale of the house, and that our Mishna does not follow the opinion of Rabbi Meir.

Rather, it is clear

from the words of the Mishna that

our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara cites a beraita related to our Mishna:

The Sages taught:

One who sells a house

sells the door, the bolt

the bar,

and the lock

that is fixed in the door,

but not the key,

because it is light and easy to move.

If he sold a hewn mortar

that was hewn into a stone projecting from the wall,

but not the

mortar

that is fixed,

which had been hewn, and had the status of a vessel, before it was attached to the ground.

If he sold the lower millstone

the lower part of the mill, which is fixed and is not moved from its place,

but not the hopper—

the funnel into which grain is poured in order to grind it—

and not the oven, and not the stove, and not the millstone,

since all of these are not fixed and are movable.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Anything attached to the ground has the status of the ground,

and therefore a fixed mortar, although it had been hewn and had the status of a vessel before it was attached to the ground, has the status of the ground and is sold together with the house.

When he said to him: “It

the house

and everything inside it”

are sold to you—in such a case

they are all sold.

In either case,—

even if he said to him: “The house and everything inside it are sold to you”—

he did not sell the cistern, nor the pit, nor the gallery,

since they are not part of the house, but are independent structures.

The Sages taught:

A channel

of wood or stone

that he hollowed out

and made a receptacle in it

and ultimately fixed it

in the ground, and through it he directed water to an incomplete ritual bath,

disqualifies the ritual bath

on account of three log of drawn water, which disqualify a ritual bath, since the channel had the status of a vessel before he fixed it in the ground, and its status as a vessel was not nullified by its attachment to the ground .

And if

he fixed it

in the ground

and ultimately hollowed it out,

hollowing it out after it was already attached to the ground, and through it he directed water to the ritual bath,

it does not disqualify the ritual bath,

because since he made it into a vessel when it was attached to the ground, it is not considered a vessel. It is as though he directed water through a furrow in the ground .

And we inquire about it:

Who is the author?

In accordance with whose opinion was this beraita stated, maintaining that a vessel attached to the ground does not lose its status as a vessel?

Apparently,

not

in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer, and not

in accordance with the opinion of

the Rabbis!

And the Gemara asks:

Which Rabbi Eliezer?

From which statement of Rabbi Eliezer do we learn that he does not agree with this beraita, and from which statement of the Rabbis do we learn that they do not agree with this beraita?

If we say it is Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling concerning a house,

as we learned his statement above in the beraita concerning a house: He maintains that a fixed mortar, although it had been hewn and had the status of a vessel before it was attached to the ground, has the status of the ground and is sold together with the house.

It follows from his words that he maintains that a vessel attached to the ground loses its status as a vessel, contrary to the statement of the beraita here concerning a ritual bath.

This cannot be proven from Rabbi Eliezer’s statement there, because

perhaps

Rabbi Eliezer agrees with the beraita concerning a ritual bath, and even after the mortar was attached to the ground it did not lose its status as a vessel. Rather, the reason he maintains that the mortar is included in the sale of the house

is this: Rabbi Eliezer maintains that a seller sells generously,

and therefore he maintains that although the mortar has the status of a vessel, nevertheless, since it is attached to the ground, the seller intends to include it in the sale of the house. By contrast, concerning a channel that he hollowed out and ultimately fixed in the ground, where the law of the ritual bath depends on whether the channel is considered a vessel, Rabbi Eliezer agrees that the channel is considered a vessel and disqualifies the ritual bath.

And the Rabbis maintain: A seller sells begrudgingly!

Therefore, a mortar that has the status of a vessel is not included in the sale of the house, even though it is attached to the ground.

If so, nothing can be proven from Rabbi Eliezer’s statement concerning a mortar that he disagrees with the beraita concerning a channel.

Rather,

let us say that it can be learned from Rabbi Eliezer’s statement concerning

a beehive

that he disagrees with the beraita concerning a channel.

The Gemara now cites a Mishna discussing the matter of a prosbul, and we will first provide a brief introduction concerning a prosbul:

Hillel, who was the president of the Sanhedrin during the reign of Herod, approximately one hundred years before the destruction of the Second Temple, saw that people refrained from lending money to one another as the Sabbatical Year approached, out of concern that the borrower might not repay his debt before the Sabbatical Year, with the result that the lender would lose his money, and they would transgress what is written in the Torah: “Beware, lest there be in your heart a base thought, saying, ‘The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching,’ and you look malevolently upon your needy brother and give him nothing” [Deuteronomy 15:9].

Hillel instituted the “prosbul” [pros—an enactment, buli

—the wealthy, buti—the poor]. It is an enactment for the wealthy, so that their money would not be forfeited, and an enactment for the poor, so that they would be able to find people willing to lend to them.

A prosbul states that the lender transfers to the court the right to collect all his debts. Therefore, its law is like that of one who transfers his documents to the court, which are not subject to the Sabbatical cancellation of debts. The judges or witnesses sign beneath the text of the prosbul.

The Mishna in Shevi’it [chapter 10, mishna 6] explains that a prosbul may be written only when the borrower owns land, because then the debt is considered as though it were collected by the court, and the prohibition of “he shall not press him” does not apply. Some explain the reason differently: People do not customarily lend money to one who owns no land, and with regard to something uncommon, the Sages do not institute an enactment.

And where did we learn Rabbi Eliezer’s statement concerning a beehive?

As we learned in a Mishna: A beehive

placed on the ground—

Rabbi Eliezer says: It has the status

of

the ground,

and it is acquired with money, with a document, or through possession; and movable objects can likewise be acquired on its back, as they can on land.

And one writes a prosbul on it

as though it were land: If the borrower has a beehive, although he has no land, a prosbul may be written for the lender on its basis.

For we might have thought that although the beehive is considered like land with regard to other matters, nevertheless, with regard to the enactment of prosbul it is not considered like land, because the lender does not rely on it, since it can be moved from its place. Rabbi Eliezer teaches that even with regard to a prosbul it is considered like land.