Bava Batra 65b — the Talmud in English

But

when he said to him

the seller to the buyer:

“It and everything inside it”—

that he sells him the house and everything inside it,

“they are all sold,”

all these implements of the house, which were enumerated in the Mishna, whether those fixed in place or those movable, are sold with the house. But other objects that are not mentioned here in the Mishna are not sold, even though he said that he was selling everything inside it, because in this expression he does not intend to add to the sale, but only objects designated for this particular house, and all these are designated for the house.

Gemara:

And the Gemara discusses it:

Let us say,

perhaps we should say that

our Mishna,

our Mishna, which holds that one who sells the house did not include the movable mortar in the sale,

is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir. For if

you say that our Mishna is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Meir, he said

in a beraita brought in the next chapter:

“One who sold a vineyard”—

“he sold the implements of the vineyard!”

For example, the reeds in the vineyard that are needed for it. And from there it may be learned that with regard to one who sells a house, Rabbi Meir holds that he sells the implements of the house together with the house.

If so, our Mishna, which holds that he did not include in the sale of the house the movable mortar, which is among the implements of the house, is not in accordance with the view of Rabbi Meir.

And we reject this:

You may even say

that our Mishna is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Meir,

and one should not compare the law stated by Rabbi Meir with regard to a vineyard to the law stated in our Mishna, because

there,

with regard to a vineyard, it is possible to say that Rabbi Meir spoke only of implements of a vineyard that are

fixed—

those that remain permanently inside the vineyard, which are never moved from there, even though they are not attached to the ground. This is not so

here,

in our Mishna, where the mortar

is not fixed

in the ground; sometimes they lend it out, and it is not as fixed in the house as are the implements of a vineyard.

And we challenge this: How can it be explained that our Mishna holds that anything that remains permanently in the house is included in the sale of the house,

but

it is stated in our Mishna that a

key

is not sold together with the house? And it is impossible to explain that the Mishna is speaking of a key that is not fixed, because a key is

taught as analogous to a door: Just as a door is fixed

permanently, and they do not move it from there to carry it from place to place,

so too a key

is spoken of here as a wooden key

that is fixed,

for there are keys that are never moved from the place where they are attached to the entrance of the house. And nevertheless it is stated in the Mishna that he did not sell the key together with the house.

For if we were to explain that the Mishna is speaking of a key that is not fixed, it would be difficult: Why does the Mishna not distinguish between types of keys, saying that a fixed key is included in the sale of the house, whereas a key that is not fixed is not included in the sale of the house? From the fact that the Mishna did not distinguish, it follows that no type of key is included in the sale of the house, even those that are fixed. Since a key is a light object and easy to carry, and there are rare occasions when he removes it from its place, it is therefore not included in the sale of the house.

If so, it is demonstrated from what is stated in our Mishna that a fixed key is not included in the sale of the house, because our Mishna does not follow the view of Rabbi Meir.

Rather, it is established

from the words of the Mishna that

our Mishna is not in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

The Gemara brings a beraita connected with our Mishna:

The Sages taught:

One who sells the house—

he sells the door, the bolt

the bar

and the lock

fixed in the door,

but not the key,

because it is light and easy to carry.

He sells the carved mortar

that was carved into a stone protruding from the wall,

but he does not sell the

mortar

that is fixed,

which had been carved, and had the status of a utensil, before it was attached to the ground.

He sells the itztrovil,

the lower part of the millstone, which is fixed and is not moved from its place,

but he does not sell the kelet—

the hopper into which the grain is poured in order to grind it;

nor the oven, nor the stove, nor the millstones,

for all these are not fixed and are movable.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Anything attached to the ground is considered like the ground,

and therefore a fixed mortar, even though it had been carved, and had the status of a utensil, before it was attached to the ground, has the status of the ground and is sold together with the house.

When he said to him: “It”

the house

“and everything inside it”

are sold to you—in this manner,

they are all sold.

In either case,—

even if he said to him: “The house and everything inside it are sold to you,”

he does not sell either the cistern, or the pit, or the gallery,

for they are not part of the house, but separate structures.

The Sages taught:

A channel

made of wood or stone

that they carved

and made a receptacle in it,

and ultimately fixed it

in the ground, and water flowed through it into an incomplete ritual bath,

disqualifies the ritual bath

on account of three log of drawn water, which disqualify the ritual bath, since the channel had the status of a utensil before they fixed it in the ground, and its status as a utensil was not nullified through its attachment to the ground.

And if

they fixed it

in the ground

and ultimately carved it,

carving it after it had already been attached to the ground, and water flowed through it into the ritual bath,

it does not disqualify the ritual bath,

because since he made it into a utensil while it was attached to the ground, it is not considered a utensil. It is as though he directed water through a channel in the ground.

And we inquire about it:

Who is it?

In accordance with whose view was this beraita stated, that a utensil which they attached to the ground does not lose its status as a utensil?

Apparently,

not

in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Eliezer, and not

in accordance with the view of

the Rabbis!

And the Gemara asks:

Which Rabbi Eliezer?

From which statement of Rabbi Eliezer do we learn that he does not hold in accordance with this beraita, and from which statement of the Rabbis do we learn that they do not hold in accordance with this beraita?

If you say Rabbi Eliezer concerning a house,

whose words we learned above in the beraita concerning a house, that he holds that a fixed mortar, even though it had been carved and had the status of a utensil before it was attached to the ground, has the status of the ground and is sold together with the house,

it is proven from his words that he holds that a utensil that they attached to the ground loses its status as a utensil, and this is not in accordance with the words of the beraita here concerning a ritual bath.

One cannot prove this from the words of Rabbi Eliezer there, because

perhaps

Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with the beraita concerning a ritual bath, and even after they attached the mortar to the ground its status as a utensil was not nullified. Rather, the reason that he holds that the mortar is included in the sale of the house is

this is the reason: Rabbi Eliezer holds that a seller sells generously,

and therefore he holds that although the mortar has the status of a utensil, nevertheless, since it is attached to the ground, the seller intends to include it in the sale of the house. This is not so with regard to a channel that they carved and ultimately fixed, where the law of the ritual bath depends on whether the channel is considered a utensil: there Rabbi Eliezer concedes that the channel is considered a utensil and disqualifies the ritual bath.

And the Rabbis hold: A seller sells grudgingly!

And therefore a mortar that has the status of a utensil, even though it is attached to the ground, is not included in the sale of the house.

If so, there is no proof from the words of Rabbi Eliezer concerning the mortar that he disagrees with the beraita of the channel.

Rather,

let us say that it may be learned from the words of Rabbi Eliezer

concerning a beehive

that he disagrees with the beraita of the channel.

The Gemara now brings a Mishna discussing the matter of a prozbul, and we will precede it with a brief introduction concerning a prozbul:

Hillel, who was the president of the Sanhedrin during the reign of Herod, approximately one hundred years before the destruction of the Second Temple, saw that people refrained from lending to one another close to the Sabbatical Year, out of concern that the borrower might not repay his debt before the time of the Sabbatical Year, with the result that the lender would lose his money and transgress what is written in the Torah: “Beware for yourself, lest there be a base thought in your heart, saying, ‘The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching,’ and your eye be evil toward your needy brother, and you do not give him.” [Deuteronomy 15:9]

Hillel instituted the “prozbul” [proz—ordinance, buli

—the wealthy, buti—the poor]. An ordinance for the wealthy—that their money should not be canceled; and an ordinance for the poor—that they should be able to find someone to lend to them.

And in a prozbul it is written that the lender transfers to the court the right to collect all his debts. Therefore its law is like that of one who hands over his documents to a court, which are not canceled; and the judges or witnesses sign beneath the wording of the prozbul.

It is explained in the Mishna in Sheviit that one writes a prozbul only when the borrower owns land, because then the debt is considered as though it were collected by the court, and it does not fall under “he shall not press him.” And some explain the reason as being that people do not ordinarily lend to one who has no land, and concerning something that is uncommon, the Sages do not institute an ordinance.

And where did we learn the words of Rabbi Eliezer concerning a beehive?

For we learned: A beehive

resting on the ground—

Rabbi Eliezer says: It is

regarded

as the ground,

and it is acquired with money, with a document, and through possession; and movable objects can likewise be acquired upon it, as upon land,

and one writes a prozbul upon it

as though it were land. If the borrower has a beehive, even though he has no land, one writes a prozbul for the lender upon it.

For we might have thought to say that although the beehive is considered like land with regard to other matters, nevertheless, with regard to the ordinance of a prozbul it is not considered like land, because the lender does not rely upon it, since it can be carried from its place. Rabbi Eliezer teaches that even with regard to a prozbul it is considered like land.