Bava Batra 64b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Akiva holds:

every seller

sells generously, while the Rabbis hold:

every seller

sells begrudgingly.

And when it is also said elsewhere,

that what the Gemara says in other places, where we find a ruling that a sale is made generously, is because these are the words of

Rabbi Akiva

that were stated

in accordance with his reasoning,

meaning that they were stated according to his view

that a seller sells generously—

from here

they derived from our Mishna that he holds that every seller sells generously. Therefore, all the laws stated concerning a sale whose basis is the principle that a seller sells generously were attributed to him.

And we challenge this:

From where?

How is it proven from our Mishna that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree over the principle of whether a seller sells generously or sells begrudgingly?

Perhaps

they disagree in our Mishna over another principle:

Rabbi Akiva holds: A person does not want to give his money

to a seller

and have others trample through it—

the buyer is unwilling to pay for a house through which the seller will have a path and passage in order to reach the pit and the cistern. And the seller knows that the buyer purchases it on the understanding that he will have no passage through the house to reach his pit and cistern. If the seller had wanted to retain the path for himself, he should have stated this explicitly in the deed. Since he did not state it in the deed, it is clear that he agreed to sell to the buyer without retaining a path for himself to the pit and cistern.

But elsewhere, Rabbi Akiva may agree that a seller sells begrudgingly.

And the Rabbis hold

in our Mishna that the buyer does not object to the seller having a passage through his house, because the buyer suffers no financial loss from this. But the seller has a claim, for

a person does not want to take money and fly through the air!

The seller is unwilling to accept payment for his house and sell it in such a way that he will later have to fly through the air in order to reach the pit that he retained for himself. On the basis of this reasoning, he certainly retained a passage to the pit when he sold the house. He did not need to state in the deed that he was retaining the passage to the pit, since the pit is of no use to him if he has no way to reach it. It is obvious that if he retained the pit for himself, he also retained a passage to the pit.

But in other places, where the seller suffers no loss from the part that he retains for himself, the Rabbis may agree that a seller sells generously.

And we answer:

Rather, from the latter clause

of our Mishna it should be proven that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree over the principle of whether every seller sells generously or sells begrudgingly.

As we learned in the latter clause:

If he sold them to another—

if he sold the pit and the cistern to another person while retaining the house for himself—

Rabbi Akiva says:

the buyer

does not need to purchase

—to buy

a path for himself

to the pit and the cistern,

and the Rabbis say: He must.

Here, where he sold the pit and the cistern to the buyer, it is impossible to explain that they disagree on the principles stated above. For if Rabbi Akiva holds, as we said above, that a person is unwilling to have others pass through his property, then according to that principle the law should be that the sale of the pit and the cistern does not include the sale of a passage through his property. Yet in the Mishna Rabbi Akiva says that the buyer does not need to purchase the path, because it is included in the purchase of the pit. Likewise, if the Rabbis hold that a person is unwilling to own property without a way to reach it, then according to that principle the law should be that the purchase of the pit also includes the path to the pit. Yet in the Mishna the Rabbis say that the buyer must purchase the path to the pit separately.

Rather, it is proven that they disagree over the principle of whether a seller sells generously or sells begrudgingly. Rabbi Akiva holds that every seller sells generously, and therefore holds that when he sold him the pit and the cistern, he certainly also sold him a path. The Rabbis hold that a seller sells begrudgingly, and therefore the buyer must purchase a path for himself.

And we reject this:

Perhaps

it can be explained that they do not disagree over the principle of whether a seller sells generously or sells begrudgingly.

Rather, both the Rabbis and Rabbi Akiva take into account the two claims mentioned above: first, that a person does not wish to sell a passage through his property; and second, that a person is unwilling to own property without a way to reach it.

Rather,

they disagree in this

matter:

Rabbi Akiva holds: We follow the buyer’s intention,

for wherever the buyer has a claim against the seller, the buyer’s position is strengthened. A person does not pay money without receiving an appropriate return, and the seller knew that the buyer intended to purchase a complete property, in such a way that he would not have to purchase anything further from the seller in order to complete the transaction. Therefore, the buyer’s claims have the stronger force, and the seller’s claim is not accepted against the buyer’s claim.

And the Rabbis hold: We follow the seller’s intention!

For the holder of a document has the weaker position, and since the deed does not state that he sold him a path, the buyer must purchase a path from the seller.

But in other places, where neither the seller nor the buyer has these claims concerning a passage through the seller’s property or owning property without a way to reach it, Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis may not disagree over whether a seller sells generously or sells begrudgingly.

Rather, from this

Mishna below it should be proven that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree over whether every seller sells generously or sells begrudgingly.

As we learned below [71a]: One who sells a field, even though he sells the field and everything in it, nevertheless does not sell

the pit

in it,

or the winepress or the dovecote

in it,

whether

the pit, the winepress, and the dovecote were

ruined—

not being used—

or in use—

the pit being full of water, the winepress full of grapes, and the dovecote full of pigeons.

And

the seller

must

purchase

a path for himself

from the buyer, so that he can use it to go to his pit, winepress, or dovecote, which he retained within the field that he sold,

the statement of Rabbi Akiva.

And the Rabbis say: He does not need

to purchase a path for himself from the buyer.

If this Mishna comes to teach that Rabbi Akiva holds that we follow the buyer’s claim—that he is unwilling to purchase from the seller in a manner that would leave the seller with a passage through his property—while the Rabbis hold that we follow the seller’s claim—that he is unwilling to own property without a way to reach it—

then this dispute was already taught in our Mishna concerning a house. And this is difficult:

Why do I need this as well?

Why did the Mishna repeat itself and explain the same dispute twice?

Rather, is it not

this additional Mishna

coming to teach us

that even in sales where neither the seller nor the buyer has these claims concerning a passage through the property or owning property without a way to reach it, Rabbi Akiva strengthens the buyer’s position:

Rabbi Akiva holds: A seller sells generously, while the Rabbis

strengthen the seller’s position, because they

hold: A seller sells begrudgingly.

And we reject this:

Perhaps

the reason for Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis even in this Mishna is as we explained above: they disagree over whether we follow the buyer’s claim or the seller’s claim, and

it teaches us

their dispute also concerning the sale of a

house, and it comes to teach us

the same dispute also concerning the sale of a

field!

And it cannot be proven from the fact that the Mishna repeated the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis concerning a field, after it had already taught their dispute concerning a house, that they also disagree in a case where neither the seller nor the buyer has these claims, over whether every seller sells generously or sells begrudgingly,

because

it was necessary:

the Mishna had to explain the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis both concerning a house and concerning a field.

For if it had taught us

that they disagree only concerning the sale of a

house,

we might have thought that only concerning a house Rabbi Akiva holds that the buyer has a claim, since he does not want others to have a passage through his house,

because he needs privacy,

as a person normally performs private acts inside his house. Therefore, we follow the buyer’s claim and say that the seller sold the house without retaining a path to the pit and cistern that he retained in the house.

But

concerning a

field—

say that this is not so:

it is possible that Rabbi Akiva agrees with the Rabbis that the seller retained a path for himself through the field, because the buyer does not have the claim that the seller causes him a loss by passing through his field. After all, private acts are not performed in a field, which is intended only for plowing and sowing.

Therefore, the Mishna had to teach us that concerning a field as well, Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the Rabbis.

And if it had taught us

that the Mishna brought the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis only concerning a

field,

we might have thought that only concerning a field Rabbi Akiva holds that the owner of the field has a claim, since he does not want others to have a passage through his field,

because trampling is difficult for him,

as trampling damages plowed and planted soil.

But

concerning a

house—

say that this is not so!

It is possible that he agrees with the Rabbis that the seller retained a path to the pit and cistern in the house, because the buyer does not have the claim that passage through the house he purchased damages the ground of the house.

Therefore, the Mishna had to teach us that concerning a house as well, Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the Rabbis.

Rather, from the latter clause

of the Mishna concerning one who sells a field, it should be proven that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree over whether a seller sells generously or sells begrudgingly:

As we learned in the latter clause of that Mishna: If the owner of the field

sold them to another

—the pit, the winepress, or the dovecote—and retained the field for himself—

Rabbi Akiva says:

the buyer

does not need to purchase

—to buy

a path for himself

from the seller,

and the Rabbis say: He must

purchase a path from the seller, since presumably he did not sell him a path.

And this is difficult:

Why do I need this as well?

After all, this dispute

is the same thing

as the dispute concerning a house. If so, why does the Mishna repeat and teach this dispute concerning a field?

And if it is to teach us that they disagree concerning both a house and a field, even though the reasons for preventing passage through them differ, we already know this from the fact that the Mishna brought the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis in its first clause concerning a field. Why did the Mishna also need to bring this dispute in its latter clause, when it had already taught it concerning a house?

Rather, is it not

this additional Mishna

coming to teach us that Rabbi Akiva holds: A seller sells generously, while the Rabbis hold: A seller sells begrudgingly.

And we conclude: Indeed,

learn from this

that Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis also disagree in other sales, where there is no claim concerning damage caused by trampling through the property and no claim concerning acquiring property without a path to it, over whether a seller sells generously or sells begrudgingly.