Bava Batra 5b (ה:) — the Talmud in English

So that he will not trouble me,

so that he will not trouble me. If the time for repayment arrives and I do not then have money for him.

The Gemara proves this from our Mishna:

We learned:

We learned in the Mishna: If one of the partners built up to a height of four cubits, and his fellow claims that he already paid his share, he is

presumed to have paid

and is believed,

until

the claimant

brings proof that he did not pay.

What are the circumstances

in which this is speaking?

If you say

that it is speaking of a case

where he said to him,

where the defendant said to him:

I paid you at the appointed time,

when you completed the height of four cubits.

It is obvious

that he is

presumed to have paid!

There would be no novelty in the Mishna teaching this, since no one maintains that he is not believed when he claims to have paid at the appointed time.

Rather, is it not

speaking of a different case,

where he said to him,

where the defendant said to him:

I paid you within the appointed time

before you completed the four cubits.

Apparently,

it is evident that

a person may pay a debt within its appointed time,

a person may pay within the appointed time, in accordance with the opinion of Abaye and Rava.

The Gemara rejects this proof:

Here it is different,

the law here is different, because

each and every course of stones,

each course that the claimant built into his wall, even though it had not yet reached four cubits,

is its appointed time,

it is the time for his fellow to participate in the expenses, and this is not called “within its appointed time.” Therefore, he is believed!

The Gemara attempts to prove this from the latter clause of the Mishna:

Come and hear:

If he raised the wall above four cubits, and his fellow built another wall adjoining it, his fellow is

presumed not to have paid

his share of the cost of raising the wall,

until he brings proof that he paid.

What are the circumstances,

in which this is speaking?

If you say

that it is speaking of a case

where the defendant said to him,

the defendant:

I paid you at the appointed time,

after I finished building my wall, for only then did I build adjoining it and know how much I owed you, this is difficult:

why is he not believed,

why is he not believed? Is there anyone who maintains that he is not believed when he claims to have paid at the appointed time?!

Rather, is it not

speaking of a different case,

where he said to him: I paid you within the appointed time!

before I finished my wall.

Apparently,

it is evident from here that

a person does not,

a person does not tend

to pay within the appointed time,

to pay within its appointed time, in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish.

The Gemara rejects this:

Here it is different,

the law here is different. Although one might say that a person may pay within the appointed time, here we do not say so, because

he says,

he says to himself:

Who says that the Sages will obligate me

who says that the Sages will obligate me to pay the expenses of the first wall? Therefore, even if he says, “I paid you at the appointed time,” he is not believed.

The Gemara summarizes:

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, acted in accordance with Abaye and Rava,

they followed the approach of Abaye and Rava in practical halakha and believed one who claimed that he had paid within the appointed time.

Whereas

Mar bar Rav Ashi acted in accordance with Reish Lakish,

he followed the approach of Reish Lakish and did not believe one who claimed, “I paid you within my appointed time.”

And the halakha is,

the halakha is

in accordance with Reish Lakish,

for one who claims, “I paid you within the appointed time,” is not believed.

And even

if the borrower dies within the appointed time, before the time for repayment arrives, and the lender comes to collect the debt

from orphans,

from the orphans, the law is that he collects without an oath, and there is no concern that perhaps the borrower paid the debt within the appointed time.

And although the Master said: One who comes to collect

the father’s debt

from the property of orphans,

even though he has a document,

may collect only by taking an oath,

because there is concern that, had the father been alive, he might produce a receipt proving payment of the document. Nevertheless, since we have a

presumption

that

a person does not pay within the appointed time,

a person does not tend to pay within the appointed time; therefore, he collects without an oath.

They raised a question in the beit-midrash:

the Sages in the bet midrash were uncertain:

He sued

the lender,

after the time

for repayment.

And the borrower said to him,

the borrower:

I paid you within the appointed time,

before the time for repayment had arrived,

what

is the law?

The sides of the dilemma are:

Do we say

whether even

in a case

where the borrower’s claim is against the

presumption,”]]

that a person does not tend to pay within the appointed time, nevertheless we say that he is believed by virtue of

“What advantage would I have in lying?”,

for why would he lie and claim, “I paid you within the appointed time,” when he could have made a better claim [if he wished to lie], “I paid you at the appointed time,” and he would have been believed? This is the claim of migo. Therefore, even when he claims, “I paid you within the appointed time,” he will be believed upon taking an oath by virtue of the migo.”.