Bava Batra 52b (נב:) — the Talmud in English

Since the father was not deemed credible to claim that they were his, and

as Rav Huna bar Avin sent word: With regard to items ordinarily lent or rented, if one says "

They were purchased by me,"

he is not deemed credible,

for we say that they came into his possession by way of a loan or rental—

We have thus learned that, since the father was not deemed credible and then died, we remove the property from the orphans’ possession, and this is contrary to the opinion of Shmuel!?

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult

for the statement of Shmuel!

Rav Ḥisda said:

This was taught—

that which Rav said, that the brother who conducts business within the household must bring proof—

only

in a case

where

the brothers

do not divide

anything in the world between them, even

their dough [the provisions]

that they eat from a common source. In that case we say: From where did this one obtain something that his brother does not have? But

if

they

do divide

from one another even only

in their dough, say:

This brother

from his dough,

which they apportioned to him,

saved [saved].

he saved].

We further interpret that which Rav said, “He must bring proof”:

Proof of what?

How can the brother bring proof that the items are his?

Rabba said: Proof through witnesses,

who testify that he purchased them with his own money.

Rav Sheshet said: Proof through validation of the document,

that is, he should produce an hanpak [a court certification that the document is not forged]. We rely on the assumption that the court would not have validated the document unless it had investigated the matter and found that he was indeed the owner of the money.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

Here it is Rav, and there it is Shmuel; here it is Rabba, and there it is Rav Sheshet; in accordance with whom does the master hold [There are several approaches here: the approach of Rav and the approach of Shmuel, as well as the approaches of Rabba and Rav Sheshet regarding Rav’s opinion. In accordance with whose view do you hold]?

there are several approaches here: the approach of Rav, the approach of Shmuel, and the approaches of Rabba and Rav Sheshet in explaining Rav’s view. Which one do you hold?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rava:

I know a beraita [I know a beraita]

I know a tannaitic source,

for it was taught:

One of the brothers who was conducting business within the household, and documents and deeds were issued in his name, said: “

They are mine, for they came to me from my maternal grandfather’s house,”

he must bring proof,

in accordance with Rav. Rav Naḥman did not go on to explain whether he agreed with Rabba or with Rav Sheshet concerning their dispute over how he must bring proof.

And likewise the woman,

who was widowed from her husband,

who conducts business within the household

[with the jointly owned property her husband left as an inheritance],

and documents and deeds were issued in her name, and she said: “

They are mine, for they came to me from my grandfather’s father’s house or from my maternal grandfather’s house,”

she must bring proof.

And we raise a difficulty:

What is the meaning of

“and likewise

the woman”? It implies that the tanna came to teach us a novel point, namely, that the law is the same even with regard to a woman. But what novelty is there in this? What difference is there between her and the brother?

And we explain:

Lest you say: Since a woman derives honor from the matter,

[it is a distinction for her that the court trusts her to appoint her as a steward over the orphans]—

as people say,

“

She troubles herself on behalf of the orphans,”

that is, people also praise her for troubling herself on behalf of the orphans; and if so, we might say:

Presumably,

she did not steal from the orphans

[she does not steal from the orphans], because she does not wish to damage her good name, and the property must therefore be hers, so that she would not need to bring proof—

It teaches us

that the beraita teaches that even she must bring proof.

We learned in the Mishna:

In what case are these matters said? With regard to one who establishes possession; but with regard to one who receives a gift, brothers who divided,

or one who establishes possession of the property of a convert, if he locked, fenced, or breached anything whatsoever, this constitutes possession:

This implies from the wording of the Mishna, “In what case are these matters said? With regard to one who establishes possession, but with regard to one who receives...,” that this is what it means: In a sale or purchase, which requires “possessory evidence” [when he has no document], the law is that three years are required. But with regard to one who receives a gift, and all the other cases in which “possessory evidence” does not apply, but rather “possession establishing acquisition,” then “if he locked, fenced, or breached anything whatsoever, this constitutes possession.” And we question this:

And is it the case that

all

these matters that we mention—

one who receives a gift and brothers who divided—

are not subject to possession

for three years

!?

But surely it is obvious that possessory holding for three years applies to these cases as well, to establish his credibility in claiming that the property is his.

And we answer:

The Mishna is incomplete,

and

this is what it teaches: In what case are these matters said

that possessory holding for three years is required?

With regard to possession accompanied by a claim,

that is, possession accompanied by a challenge, and

for example, where the

seller

says, “

I did not sell,” and

the purchaser says, “

I purchased it”—

But possession unaccompanied by a claim

[because there is no denial],

such as one who receives a gift, brothers who divided, and one who establishes possession of a convert’s property, since it is merely for the purpose of acquisition

[he establishes possession merely as an act of acquisition], and the owner of the land does not deny his right: If he

locked, fenced, or breached anything whatsoever,

this constitutes possession

to acquire the field.

Rav Hoshaya taught in the tractate of Kiddushin arranged by Levi

[in the Tosefta to tractate Kiddushin, which Levi arranged]:

If he locked, fenced, or breached anything whatsoever, in his presence,

of the seller or the giver of the gift,

this constitutes possession.

And we raise a difficulty: Is it the case that

in his presence

of the seller,

yes

[it indeed constitutes possession], whereas

not in his presence

of the seller,

no,

it does not constitute possession!?

He said—

Rava explained—

this is what it means:

If the purchaser fenced or breached

in his presence,

of the seller,

he does not need

the seller

to say to him,

to the purchaser, “

Go, take possession and acquire.”

Rather, since the seller agreed to sell it to him for such-and-such an amount of money, and the purchaser established possession in his presence, this constitutes possession, because the seller is content for the sale to be effected through this act of possession, and therefore he remained silent.