Bava Batra 45a — the Talmud in English

If the seller has

the seller

another piece of land [that he has not yet sold, in addition to the land he sold to the buyer], then this cannot be said, because:

For

The seller’s creditor

would collect from that other land [he would return to the additional land]

to collect his debt, and not from the land sold to the buyer. After all, one does not collect from encumbered property when unencumbered property is available. If so, the seller has no personal interest in the testimony!

?

if he does not have other land [and if he has no other land],

what difference does it make to him

what difference does it make to him!?

What benefit does he have from the land remaining in the buyer’s possession? In either case, he will not pay, since he has nothing. So what personal interest does he have in testifying that the land should remain with the buyer rather than with his creditor!?

And we answer:

Actually, he does not have

the seller

other land

with which to repay his debt. Nevertheless, he has a personal interest in the testimony, because he wants his creditor to collect his debt, for

the seller

thinks to himself:

“I do not want this man to be [I do not want to be, and he is referring to himself]

a

“wicked borrower who does not pay.”

Therefore, he wants his creditor to collect the debt from the buyer. And we object:

Ultimately,

what benefit does he have from this testimony? Even

with regard to the other one [the buyer],

the buyer, he

too is a “wicked borrower who does not pay,”

is he not?

After all, if the land is repossessed from the buyer, the buyer will have suffered a loss. What difference is there whether the seller causes a loss to his creditor or causes a loss to the buyer? In either case, he is a wicked borrower who does not pay!?

And we answer:

For

he is able to

say

to the buyer:

“That is why I sold it to you without a guarantee” [That is why I sold it to you without a guarantee: so that I would be exempt from every form of liability in the world]. Therefore, he is not testifying on behalf of the buyer, because only with regard to his creditor is he a “wicked borrower who does not pay.”

[I sold it to you without liability so that I would be exempt from every liability in the world]. Therefore he does not testify on behalf of the buyer, because only with regard to his creditor is he “a borrower who is wicked and does not pay.”

Rava announced, and some say [and some say]

Rav Pappa

was the one who announced:

Listen carefully, all

who ascend above and descend below [those who ascend from Babylonia to the Land of Israel and those who descend from the Land of Israel to Babylonia],

to the following ruling:

A Jew who sells a donkey to another Jew [a Jew who sold a donkey to his fellow Jew],

and a gentile comes and forcibly takes it from him [a gentile came and falsely claimed, without witnesses, that it belonged to him, and forcibly took it from the buyer]:

The law is that he must rescue it

from him

this is the law [the seller must rescue the buyer from this forced seizure], by bringing the gentile to court. As the Gemara will explain, it is clear that this was not merely an arbitrary act of force by the gentile, because he took only the donkey and not the saddle; therefore, it certainly did belong to him!

it for him

[the law is that the seller must save the buyer from this act of coercion], by bringing the gentile to court. As will be explained below, it is apparent that the gentile was not merely acting as a violent aggressor, for he took only the donkey and not the saddle; certainly, then, it really is his”

And Rava limits this ruling in two ways:

1.

And we said this only

that the seller must rescue it for him

when

it is a case

where the buyer does not recognize

the donkey,

that it is the offspring of the seller’s donkey

for then it can be said that the gentile is in the right.

But

if

the buyer recognizes

the donkey

as the offspring of the seller’s donkey,

meaning that the buyer admits that this donkey was raised in the seller’s house, then

not

is the seller required to rescue it for the buyer. Since it was raised in the seller’s house, it presumably belonged to the seller, and the gentile took the donkey unlawfully, since a gentile is generally one who acts by force.

2.

And we said this only

that the seller is required to rescue it for him

when

it is a case

where the gentile did not forcibly take

the donkey

and the saddle [the donkey and its saddle]. Rather, he took the donkey and left the saddle. In this way it is clear that he took what belonged to him, since he did not forcibly take the saddle, which was not his.

But

if

the gentile

forcibly took

the donkey

and the saddle

together—

not

is the seller required to rescue it for the buyer. In that case, we assume that the gentile generally acts by force and took a donkey and saddle that did not belong to him.

Ameimar

disagreed with Rava and

said:

Even if none of all these conditions exists [even when none of these conditions applies]—that is, even if the buyer does not recognize the donkey as the offspring of the seller’s donkey, and even if the gentile took the donkey without taking the saddle—

[even when none of these conditions applies], that is, even if the buyer does not recognize that it is the offspring of the seller’s donkey, and even if the gentile took the donkey without the saddle—

the seller is not

required to rescue it for the buyer!

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

it is known

[the matter is known]

that a gentile generally acts by force,

as it is stated:

“Rescue me and save me from the hand of foreigners,

whose mouths speak deceit and whose right hand is a right hand of falsehood.”

We learned in the Mishna:

A craftsman [“craftsmen”]

has no presumptive ownership:

Rabba said: We learned this only

in our Mishna, which states that a craftsman is not trusted to claim, “I purchased it,”

when the owner gave it to him

the utensil

in the presence of witnesses,

who saw how the owner gave him the utensil to repair it. In such a case, if the craftsman claims, “I purchased it from you after you gave it to me to repair,” he is not trusted.

But if he gave it to him

for repair

without witnesses,

even though the craftsman admits that it came into his possession in his capacity as a craftsman, the law is as follows:

If the witnesses do not now see the item in his possession [“he did not see it”], he is trusted to say, “I purchased it after I received it from you,” based on the ability he had to claim, “I returned it.”

If the witnesses do not now see the object in his possession [“he did not see it”], he is trusted to say, “It is mine; I purchased it after I received it from you,” by means of a migo, since he could have said, “I returned it.”

And even if witnesses see the item in his possession [“they saw it”], so that he cannot claim, “I returned it,” he is nevertheless trusted to say, “I purchased it after I received it,” because

from [“based on the alternative claim”]

the fact that he could

the craftsman

say to

the owner,

“

That never happened” [You never gave me this utensil to repair; rather, someone else gave it to me, because you sold the utensil to him and he sold it to me]—

therefore,

when he also says to him, “Indeed, you gave it to me for repair, but now

it is purchased property in my possession,

because I purchased it from you after you gave it to me,” he is

also trusted.

trusted.

This has been explained according to the Rashbam. In the Tosafot Rid he wrote: “It appears to me that we should not read ‘from the fact that he could say, “It never happened,”’ for this expression applies only where he did not see the object in his possession. But below it is demonstrated that Rabba said that even though he saw the object in his possession, so that he could not deny it, he is nevertheless trusted.” Our teacher Shmuel wrote: “From the fact that he could say, ‘It never happened—that you did not give it to me; rather, someone else gave it to me, because you sold it to him and he gave it to me,’ when he also says, ‘You gave it to me and sold it to me,’ he is trusted by this migo.” He wrote regarding this interpretation that it has no basis: If he claimed that someone else gave it to him, why should he be more trusted than when he says, “You gave it to me”? The reason is rather that since it was given to him without witnesses, he is like someone else, and someone else is trusted without a migo. In my view, the correct version omits it . See also the Tosafot Rid there, and see further what the Tosafot and the Rashba wrote, as well as the note later in the discussion. [It should also be noted that if the Rashbam indeed means that a craftsman is not trusted to claim—even according to Rabba—“It came into my possession as a sale,” then a difficulty arises: Why did Rabba need to explain the Mishna in a case where it was given to him in the presence of witnesses for repair, and with regard to the claim “It is mine; I purchased it after you gave it to me to repair”? Why did he not explain the Mishna according to its simple meaning, teaching us that although everyone is trusted to say, “It came into my possession as a sale,” a craftsman is not trusted to claim, “It came into my possession as a sale”? For the essential presumption that whatever is in a person’s possession belongs to him, by virtue of which a person is trusted everywhere, is based on our saying: How did it come into his possession if not because he purchased it from him? We do not assume that he stole it, and therefore he is trusted to say, “It came into my possession as a sale.” It is precisely this case that the Mishna teaches us: With regard to a craftsman, we say that presumably it came into his possession in his capacity as a craftsman.]

Abaye

asked

Rabba

about his position: Even when the item was not seen in the craftsman’s possession, and it is possible that he returned it, he is nevertheless not trusted through an alternative claim because the owner gave it to him in the presence of witnesses:

If so,

even

when the owner gave it to him

in the presence of witnesses as well,

should he be trusted to say that he purchased it after receiving it!? For

from [“based on the alternative claim”]

the fact that he could

the craftsman

say to

the owner,

“

I returned it to you,”

when he says to him, “

It is purchased property in my possession,” he should

also be

trusted!?

Rabba

answered

Abaye:

Do you think

[Do you really think] that

one who deposits an item with another person in the presence of witnesses does not have to return it in the presence of

witnesses

!?

witnesses!?