Bava Batra 44b (מד:) — the Talmud in English

And the reason for the latter clause that we learned: “If he sold him a cow, or if he sold him a garment, he may testify on his behalf,” because he bears no responsibility for it, is that

specifically in the case of a house or a field

he may not testify on its behalf, since the seller’s creditor will seize it,

but in the case of a cow or a garment

he may testify on its behalf. And this is because

it is not necessary

in an unspecified case [that the borrower did not explicitly designate the cow or garment for the lender to collect from],

but even in that case

it is not liened to him

the lender, so that he may collect the cow or garment from its possessor—

And

for what reason

are they not liened to him? It is because

they are movable property, and movable property is not liened to a creditor [movable property is not liened to a creditor; only land is],

And even though

he wrote to him

the borrower wrote the lender the general wording: “You may collect even

from the garment on his shoulders [from the garment on his shoulders],”

this statement

applies only

when the lender can collect from them, in a case where

they are present in their original state [they are extant, meaning that they are in the borrower’s possession],

but when they are not present in their original state, meaning that they are not in the borrower’s possession but he sold them—

no;

and therefore, it is not necessary to say that when he liened them to him without specification, the seller may testify on their behalf—

Rather, even if he made it an apotiki [he explicitly designated the cow and garment for collection from them] also not the cow and garment in the purchaser’s possession become liened to the seller’s creditor, and the seller may testify on their behalf. And

and therefore it is not necessary to say that when he merely liened them to him, the seller may testify on their behalf—

for what reason?

As in the statement of Rava! For Rava said:

still not

are the cow and garment in the buyer’s possession liened to the seller’s creditor, and the seller may testify on their behalf.

If he made

his

slave an apotiki for his creditor,

and he sold it

to a purchaser,

the creditor may collect from it;

but if he made his

ox or donkey an apotiki, and sold it, the creditor may not collect from it.

For what reason?

Because

this one—

the lien on the slave as an apotiki—

has public notice

it is public knowledge,

and the purchaser should have taken care not to buy it; and since he did not take care, he suffered the loss.

the lien on a slave as an apotiki—

But

if this— the lien on an ox or donkey as an apotiki—

does not have public notice,

the purchasers did not know of the lien, and in order not to cause them a loss, the creditor may not collect from them.

We nevertheless ask: Why may the seller testify for the purchaser concerning a cow or garment, because they are not liened to his creditor for collection from them!?

But let us be concerned

perhaps he transferred to him [the seller liened to his creditor]

movable property along with land,

in which case even the movable property becomes liened to the creditor. And this is

as Rabba said: If he transferred to him [if he liened to him]

movable property along with land,

the lender

collects land and collects

also

movable property—

[liened to him]

movable property together with land,

the lender

collects the land and collects

And Rav Ḥisda said: And this is so when he wrote to him

the borrower wrote to his creditor, when he liened movable property along with land, that the lien was

“

not like an asmachta,

and not like the standard formulas of documents [these are documents prepared as models from which other documents are copied; they were not written for actual collection, and they have no legal substance].”

And we answer:

Here, in the beraita that we learned, “If he sold him a cow, or if he sold him a garment, he may testify on its behalf”—

with what are we dealing?

We are dealing with a case where he purchased the cow and garment from another person

and sold

them to this person

immediately,

so that it was impossible for him to borrow money in the interim and lien them to a lender.

a case where he acquired

the cow and garment from someone else

And we challenge this answer:

But let us be concerned that perhaps it was a case of

“that I will acquire”

is involved, meaning: We should be concerned that perhaps he borrowed money before purchasing the cow and garment, and liened to the lender, along with land, the movable property that he would acquire in the future. If so, as soon as the seller acquired them, they became liened to the lender. The difficulty therefore remains: Why may he testify? In such a case, he is placing them before his creditor for collection!?—

Since we are not concerned about this, can you infer from it that the Gemara’s uncertainty below, in the chapter “One Who Died,” can be resolved: If he liened to him property of the type

“that I will acquire” [that he is destined to acquire], and

he acquired and sold it, or

he

acquired it and bequeathed it, it does not become liened, because a person cannot lien an object that does not yet exist!?

And we answer: In fact, one may say that if he wrote “that I will acquire,” the property does become liened. However, the beraita, which does not take into account a lien created along with land, is not based on the reason stated above. Rather,

it is necessary—that is, this beraita is dealing

with a case where witnesses say: “

We know concerning this man

that he borrowed money

that he never had land at any time [we know that he never had land].” If so, he cannot lien movable property along with land, and therefore he may testify concerning the cow and garment that he sold.

who

acquired it and bequeathed it: it is not liened,

because a person cannot lien something that does not yet exist!?

And we nevertheless ask: Why may he testify on his behalf concerning the cow and garment? Although there is no concern that he has an interest because he would be placing them before his creditor for collection, as explained, he nevertheless has an interest, since if the claimant prevails, it will turn out that this seller sold him something that was not his,

and Rav Pappa said:

Although the Sages said: If one sells a field to another without responsibility, and a creditor comes and seizes it

from the purchaser,

he may not return to him;

nevertheless, if

it turns out that it was not his,

he

may return to him, even if he explicitly wrote that the sale was without responsibility.

But Rav Pappa said:

Although the Sages said: If one sells a field to another without a guarantee, and a creditor comes and takes it from the buyer,

from the buyer,

If so, he is a party with an interest in the testimony, so that the claimant will not prevail in his claim!?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where the purchaser recognizes

that

it is the offspring of his donkey,

the purchaser knows and acknowledges that this cow and garment belong to the seller. If so, he can no longer bring a claim against the seller, since he has acknowledged that the seller is in the right and not the claimant.

And Rav Zevid disagreed with Rav Pappa and said: Even if it turns out that it was not his, the purchaser may not return to him, the seller,

because he said to him

the seller said to the purchaser: “

For this reason I sold it to you, without responsibility,”

I sold it to you for this very reason, and explicitly wrote that I was not selling it to you with responsibility, in order to include even this case.

The substance of the matter: Ravin bar Shmuel said in the name of Shmuel: If one sells a field to another without responsibility, he may not testify on its behalf, because he would be placing it before his creditor for collection.

And we challenge this: What are the circumstances!?

disagreed with Rav Pappa and

said: Even if it turns out that it was not his, the buyer cannot return

to the seller

against him,

because

he can say to him

the seller says to the buyer:

“This is why I sold it to you: without a guarantee,”

I sold it to you and explicitly wrote that I was not selling it with a guarantee in order to include even this case.

The essential statement: Ravin bar Shmuel said in the name of Shmuel: If one sells a field to another without a guarantee, he may not testify on its behalf, because he would be placing it before his creditor.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

What are the circumstances!?