Bava Batra 43a — the Talmud in English

and this means that one partner testifies on behalf of the other in order to establish it in his possession against one from the marketplace who comes to challenge it and say, “It is entirely mine.”

And it is difficult:

why do

they testify for one another, when

they have a personal interest in their testimony?

For if they do not say that the field belongs to the partner, then they too will have no share in the field, because the challenger will acquire it; and why should the partners be believed!?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he wrote to him

one partner to his fellow:

I have no legal claim or dealings concerning

this field!

And this is as though he said to him, “I shall have no legal claim or dealings in this field, and I withdraw from being your partner; rather, everything will be yours.” Therefore he may testify on behalf of his fellow partner, since he alone is the exclusive owner of the field.

And we raise a difficulty concerning this:

And if

the partner wrote him this formulation,

what does it amount to [מה מועיל לשון זו]what benefit does this wording provide!?

[what does this wording accomplish]?!

And it was taught in a beraita: One who says to his fellow [לשותפו]to his partner:

[to his partner]:

I have no legal claim or dealings [לא יהא לי]I shall not have any

[I will have none]

concerning this field

in which we are partners,

and I have no [לא יהיה לי]I shall not have any

[I will have no]

involvement in it, and my hand is withdrawn from it—he has said nothing;

until he says this in the language of a gift!?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where they acquired it from him

through a kinyan sudar. And when, together with the utterance of these formulations, there is also a kinyan sudar, even these formulations are effective.

And we still raise a difficulty:

And if they acquired it from him, what does it amount to [מה מועיל סילוק זה להעיד לשותפו]what benefit does this withdrawal provide for him to testify for his partner!?

[what does this withdrawal accomplish in enabling him to testify for his partner]?!

And

after all,

nevertheless he has a personal interest in the testimony, because

the testifying partner establishes it

the partner who testifies

before his creditor,

so that he may collect his debt from it, in accordance with the law of a creditor holding a document who collects from purchasers; and why should he be fit for testimony!?

And we indeed find that he is disqualified for testimony for this reason,

for Ravin bar Shmuel said in the name of Shmuel:

One who sells a field to his fellow without liability [אינו מקבל עליו לשלם לקונה לו אם יזכה מערער בדין ויקחנה ממנו]he does not accept upon himself to pay the purchaser if a challenger prevails in court and takes it from him,

[he does not accept responsibility to reimburse the buyer if a challenger prevails in court and takes the field from him],

he may not testify for him -

the seller for the purchaser -

concerning it

that it is his, against a challenger who claims, “It has always been mine, and the seller sold you mine,” and

because the seller establishes

the seller the field that was taken from him

before his creditor,

who can collect his debt from it, since it came to the purchaser from the seller. And if so, even a partner who sold to his fellow cannot testify for him for the same reason!?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he accepted upon himself

the partner who sold

liability

for the sale, as he proceeds to explain.

And we explain:

Liability for whom [אחריות מפני מי קיבל עליו השותף]liability on account of whom did the partner accept it!?

[responsibility against whom did the partner accept]?!

If you say

that he accepted upon himself

general liability,

meaning that if a challenger from the marketplace comes to claim the land and prevails in court, the partner will be liable to his fellow!? This cannot be said, for if so,

all the more so it is satisfactory to him

for the partner that the partner should prevail in the field and not the challenger, so that he will not become liable under the liability; and how can we say that he may testify for him!?

Rather,

here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which the partner accepted upon himself

liability that comes to him

on his account [אחריות ממי שבא לגבות את השדה מחמתו, דהיינו בעל חוב]liability toward one who comes to collect the field on his account, namely, a creditor; and now it is understandable that he testifies for his partner, since he has no benefit from establishing the field before his creditor, for he will have to pay liability to the purchaser. What difference is it to me whether he will be a “wicked borrower who does not pay” to his creditor, or whether he will be a “wicked borrower who does not pay” to the purchaser who bought from him with liability?

[responsibility toward the person who comes to collect the field because of him, namely, the creditor]. Now it is understandable that he testifies for his partner, since he gains nothing by establishing the field before his creditor: he will have to reimburse the buyer under his guarantee. What difference is there to him whether he will be a “wicked borrower who does not pay” to his own lender or a “wicked borrower who does not pay” to the buyer who purchased the field from him with a guarantee?

And we still raise a difficulty:

And

what if

the partner withdraws

the partner

himself from it—is he withdrawn? That is, does withdrawal serve to render him fit for testimony in which he had a personal interest!?

? That is, does withdrawal actually qualify him to testify regarding testimony in which he previously had a personal interest?

And it was taught in a beraita that withdrawal does not serve to render him fit, because we say: He made a collusion in order to testify, and afterward he will return to his previous state.

that withdrawal does not qualify him, because we say that he made a collusive arrangement in order to testify and will afterward return to his former situation.

For it was taught:

Residents of a city whose Torah scroll was stolen may not judge

the thief—who claims, “I took it for money,” or any other claim that he has concerning the scroll—

in the judges of that city, and they may not bring evidence from the people of that city, meaning that they should not testify, “We saw that you stole it,” or testify that this Torah scroll belongs to the people of that city -

for they are all partners and have a personal interest in their testimony.

And if it is so,

that withdrawal is effective to render one fit,

let two of them withdraw themselves and judge,

let two withdraw themselves from their shares in the Torah scroll, and the court will judge on the basis of their testimony!?

And since we learned not so, it follows that even if they withdraw they cannot testify; and this is difficult according to what we explained above concerning partners: that if the partner withdrew himself from his share, he may testify for his partner against a challenger who challenges the entire partnership!?

And we answer: In truth, withdrawal is effective and we are not concerned about collusion; rather,

a Torah scroll is different,

for withdrawal is not effective concerning it, because

it stands for hearing [לשמיעה בציבור הוא עומד]it stands for public hearing,

and even when they have withdrawn, they have benefit from the return of the Torah scroll, so that they may fulfill their obligation through it.

Come and hear

from another beraita, to prove that withdrawal is not effective to render one who has a personal interest in testimony fit:

One who says: Give one hundred dinars to the people of my city [לצרכי בני העיר, לחומות העיר ולכל צרכי רבים]for the needs of the people of the city, for the city walls and for all public needs,

[for the needs of the city, its walls, and all communal needs],

they may not judge in the judges of that city, and they may not bring evidence from the people of that city—

And

if it is so that withdrawal is effective to render one fit,

why

may they not bring evidence from the people of that city?

Let two of them withdraw themselves and judge,

let two witnesses withdraw from the one hundred dinars, so that they will derive no benefit from it at all, and the court will judge on the basis of their testimony.

And we answer:

Here too—

this beraita also deals—

with a Torah scroll,

meaning that the donor specified, “Give one hundred dinars to the people of my city to purchase a Torah scroll with it”; and with a Torah scroll, which stands for hearing, they are disqualified.

Come and hear

from another beraita, to prove that withdrawal is not effective to render one who has a personal interest in testimony fit:

One who says, “

Give one hundred dinars to the poor of my city,”

they may not judge in the judges of that city, and they may not bring evidence from the people of that city.

And before the Gemara completed its difficulty, the Gemara wondered about the beraita:

And can you understand it thus [וכי אכן כוונת הברייתא שפסולים כל הדיינים והעדים להעיד]does the beraita indeed mean that all the judges and witnesses are disqualified from testifying?

[that the beraita means that all the judges and witnesses are disqualified from testifying]?

The poor take

the one hundred dinars, and

the judges -

who are not poor—

are disqualified

to judge!? But if they are wealthy, they have no personal interest in this case at all!?

Rather,

so

say

in the beraita:

They may not judge in the judges who are poor of that city, and they may not bring evidence from the poor of that city,

for they indeed have a personal interest in their judgment and in their testimony.

And here the Gemara returns to its difficulty: and if you should say that withdrawal is effective to render one fit—

why

are the witnesses disqualified, even when they are poor?

Let two witnesses withdraw themselves and judge,

let two witnesses withdraw themselves from taking a share in this one hundred dinars, and they will be fit for testimony!?

And we answer: The beraita is not dealing with one who donated one hundred dinars to the poor of that city; rather,

here too

in this beraita we are dealing

with

one who donated one hundred dinars to a

Torah scroll

of all the people of the city, who are poor—

And why does he call them—

the donor—

poor!?

Because

everyone, in relation to a Torah scroll, is poor,

meaning, people of a city who do not have a Torah scroll suffer great poverty in this regard.

And if you wish, say: In truth, it is as it is taught,

that he gave one hundred dinars to

truly poor people, and

concerning what is difficult for you—let them withdraw and testify—here, with what are we dealing?

With poor people who are imposed upon them [עניים שפרנסתם מוטלת על בני העיר]poor people whose sustenance is imposed upon the people of the city,

so that all the people of the city have a personal interest that the one hundred dinars be received, and the burden upon them be lightened.

And we raise an objection:

And what are the circumstances [

in what manner are the poor imposed upon the townspeople]!?

If a fixed amount is set for them

for all the townspeople how much they will give, then it is still difficult:

let two of them give what is fixed for them and let them judge [

the witnesses should give the amount fixed for them, and they should judge on their basis]!?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where no fixed amount is set for them [

there is no annual fixed amount for each of the people of that town], and they give according to the needs of the poor; and if the poor win this portion, the burden upon the townspeople will thereby be eased.

And if you wish, say: actually, a fixed amount is set for them

for the townspeople, how much they will give each and every year,

and

nevertheless

it is satisfactory for them

for the witnesses that the poor should receive the portion, because

once they have been relieved, they have been relieved [

since the poor have been relieved, they have relief; and why should they give their allotment].

The master said:

and become

the partners

paid custodians for one another: