Bava Batra 36a — the Talmud in English

He told me himself that a gentile said to me: I bought it from you"

the gentile said to me that he had bought the field from you —

he is believed,

because he could have said, "I bought it from you." Since he could have made that claim, and that claim would have been accepted, he is also believed regarding the claim he is making now.

We raise a difficulty against this:

Is there any case in which, if a gentile himself had said it, he would not be believed, but if an Israelite says it in the gentile's name,

he is believed

?

In other words, you cannot establish the Israelite's ownership of the land. For although, had he claimed, "I bought it from you," he would indeed have been believed, since he had held it for three years, nevertheless it is not possible to believe him on the basis of a migo—the principle that a person is believed because he could have made a stronger claim—when he claims that the gentile told him that he had bought it from you. For even if his words are accepted, and the gentile indeed told him this, that is no reason to establish the Israelite's ownership of the land, since the gentile himself would not be believed in this claim. It cannot be that because the Israelite makes the claim in the gentile's name, the gentile's claim is treated as true!

Rather, Rava said:

If an Israelite said,

after he himself had held it for three years,

"The gentile bought it from you in my presence, and he sold it to me,"

he is believed,

if the Israelite who had held the field said, "The gentile bought the land from you in my presence and sold it to me," he is believed!

!

Since, had he wished, he could have said to him,

the Israelite in possession could have said to the Israelite challenging his ownership:

"I

myself

bought it from you,"

and he would have been believed on the strength of his having held it for three years, he is therefore also believed regarding his present claim: "I know that the gentile bought it from you, and he sold it to me."

And

further

Rav Yehuda said:

One who is holding a sickle and a climbing rope

in his hand, and says,

"I am going to cut

the palm tree belonging to so-and-so, because I bought it from him,"

he is believed! What is the reason?

Because

a person is not so brazen as to cut down a palm tree that is not his—

if someone is holding tools for harvesting dates and says, "I am going to harvest the dates of so-and-so's palm tree, because I bought this right from the owner of the tree, who is not present," the court does not stop him. The reason is that it is reasonable to assume that a person would not brazenly harvest another person's palm tree.

And

further

Rav Yehuda said:

Some people make fences around a field adjoining a forest, extending the fences slightly into their fields. Beyond the fences they sow seed to provide food for the wild animals of the field, so that the animals will not come and damage the field. These fences are called "a fence for wild asses"—a barrier for wild asses—

and

one who took possession from the fence for wild asses outward,

one who sowed for three years in the field beyond those fences,

it is not—

the sowing and consumption of this produce do not constitute

a presumption of ownership

with which to claim that he bought that area. And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

he says to himself,

the owner of the field says:

"The wild asses eat everything that anyone sows there,

so the wild asses eat whatever this person sows." Thus this is not the type of possession by which people normally establish ownership, and therefore I did not bother to protest.

And Rav Yehuda said: If he consumed

the produce of the field when it was forbidden because of

the prohibition of orla,

the challenger can claim: "I did not care that he consumed the produce, since it was forbidden."

Or if he consumed the produce of the field during the

seventh year,

when all produce of the field is ownerless, and the owner of the field did not care enough to protest—

and

likewise if he consumed produce that was forbidden because of

the prohibition of mixed species

of a vineyard—

in all these cases:

it is not a presumption of ownership.

It was taught likewise in a beraita: If he consumed produce during the years of orla, the seventh year, or mixed species—

it is not a presumption of ownership.

Rav Yosef said:

If he consumed

the field's crops when they were

fodder,

meaning that he did not wait until the crops grew and became fit for human consumption, but harvested them at the beginning of their growth, while they were still fodder, and fed them to his animal—

it is not a presumption of ownership,

because he did not use the field as other people who own grain fields do. Therefore, the owner did not feel it necessary to protest, since it was evident that this person was not the owner of the field.

Rava said,

who lived in Meḥoza:

But

nevertheless,

if it is located in the valley of Meḥoza,

if the field is in the Meḥoza valley,

it is a presumption of ownership;

for the people there are wealthy and own many animals, and it is their practice to feed the crops to their animals while they are still fodder.

Rav Naḥman said:

1. One who takes possession of land that is

cracked land

a field that is open and full of cracks and does not produce crops,

it is not a presumption of ownership,

because, on account of its poor quality, the owner was not particular enough to protest.

2. If the possessor took possession by means of

"a measure of grain in, and a measure of grain out"

he sowed one measure of grain and obtained only one measure of grain from it,

it is not a presumption of ownership;

since the possessor gained nothing from sowing it, the owner of the field did not feel the need to protest.

3.

But the members of the household of the exilarch

the people of the exilarch, who inspire fear among the townspeople and are wealthy:

do not establish ownership over us,

their possession of fields belonging to us does not establish ownership, because the owner of the field is afraid to protest against them.

And

even

we do not establish ownership over them

a presumption based on our having possessed their houses and fields is not effective for us. Since they are wealthy and own many houses and fields, they allow strangers to live in their houses and work their lands, so that the strangers will improve them and leave them in good condition when the owners wish to reclaim them. They likewise do not bother to protest against one who takes possession of their property, because they trust in their power to take back what is theirs whenever they wish.

We learned in the Mishna:

"And slaves" ...

their possession establishes ownership after three years, from day to day:

And we raise a difficulty: Is it possible that

slaves can establish a presumption of ownership!?

Did Reish Lakish not say:

Flocks

flocks of sheep, and likewise anything mobile that moves from place to place,

do not establish a presumption of ownership;

and a slave is mobile and walks on his own!?

He said,

he answered

Rava:

Flocks

do not establish ownership immediately,

meaning: Reish Lakish said only that flocks are unlike ordinary movable property. One who possesses ordinary movable property and claims, "It was sold to me," is believed immediately, even before possessing it for three years, because of the presumption that whatever is in a person's possession belongs to him. But flocks, which move on their own from place to place, may have entered this person's domain on their own, rather than because he brought them into his house after purchasing them.

However,

even slaves and flocks

do establish a presumption of ownership

after three years.

Rava said:

Although slaves are included among flocks, and do not establish ownership immediately, nevertheless

if the

slave is

a baby lying in a cradle, he establishes ownership immediately,

because he could not have entered on his own, and his law is like that of ordinary movable property.

And we raise a difficulty against Rava: Surely

it is obvious

that this is the law. Why did Rava need to teach it to us!?

!?

It was necessary

for Rava's statement only regarding a baby

who has a mother,

because

one might have thought

that without Rava's statement:

"Perhaps his mother

brought him there,"

perhaps his mother, who is like one of the mobile creatures, brought her son there with her.

He teaches us: A mother does not forget her child,

and if his mother had brought him there, she would have taken him out.

There was an incident involving

certain goats that ate peeled barley

barley that had been spread out in a field to dry

in Nehardea. The owner of the barley came, seized them, and was claiming a great deal,

the owner of the barley came, took hold of the animals, and claimed that they had eaten a large quantity of barley from his field.

Shmuel's father said: He can

claim

that they ate barley

up to their value, and this is based on the principle

that had he wished, he could have said,

"They are

purchased property

the goats

in my possession,"

and then he would have obtained their value. Therefore, even when he claims that they ate barley from his field, he is believed regarding barley up to the goats' value, since he could have extracted this amount by claiming, "They are purchased property in my possession."

And we raise a difficulty:

But

how can you say that he could have claimed, "They are purchased property in my possession"?

Did Reish Lakish not say: Flocks do not establish ownership

immediately, like ordinary movable property, but only after three years, like land!?

And we answer:

Goats are different, because they are entrusted to a shepherd,

the law of goats differs from that of other mobile creatures. They are more unusual than rams and sheep, and a person cannot simply take possession of them in the road. Therefore, they do establish ownership, since they do not move about on their own; rather, the shepherd watches over them.

We still raise a difficulty:

But there is the morning

when they go on their own from the owners' house to the shepherd's house,

and

likewise in the

evening

they return on their own from the shepherd's house to the owners' house. If so, goats too should have the law of flocks, since perhaps they came to this person's house in the morning or evening while walking on their own! We answer: This incident took place in Nehardea, and

in Nehardea there are many traveling thieves

thieving Ishmaelites.

And

because of this, the goats do not go on their own even from the owners' house to the shepherd's house. Rather,

they are handed directly from one person to another,

the owner hands them to the shepherd, and the same occurs when they return.

We learned in the Mishna regarding an irrigated field:

Rabbi Yishmael says: Three months

in the first year, three in the last year, and twelve months in between—for a total of eighteen months. Rabbi Akiva says: one month in the first year, one month in the last year, and twelve months in between.

The Gemara asks:

Let us say: “furrow” [

plowing]

is the point of difference between them—

is it to be said that the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva is the law of plowing in a field, whether it constitutes a hazaka:

For Rabbi Ishmael holds: a furrow is not a hazaka,

until he sows and eats fully ripened produce and therefore he requires three months, so that the produce will grow in his possession to its full extent.

And

if

Rabbi Akiva holds: a furrow is a hazaka,

then one month of furrowing is sufficient.