Bava Batra 36a (לו.) — the Talmud in English

He said to me personally: A gentile told me that he purchased it from you [

as the gentile said to me: He purchased the field from you] "—

he is deemed credible,

since he could have said, “I purchased it from you,” and because he could have made that claim, he is deemed credible even with regard to the claim he is making now.

And we raise an objection to this:

Is there any case where, if a gentile had said it, he would not be deemed credible, but if a Jew said it in the name of a gentile

he is deemed credible [

Is it possible that if the gentile had said in our presence that he purchased the field from the Jew he would not be deemed credible, whereas when the Jew says this in his name, he is deemed credible]?!

That is to say, you cannot establish the Jew’s ownership of the land. For although, had he claimed, “I purchased it from you,” he would indeed have been deemed credible, since he had possessed it for three years, nevertheless it is not possible to deem him credible by virtue of a migo with regard to his claim that the gentile told him that he had purchased it from you. For even if the matter were as he claims, that the gentile indeed told him so, this is no reason to establish his ownership of the land, since the gentile would not be deemed credible with regard to his claim. It is impossible that because the Jew made this statement in the gentile’s name, the gentile’s claim should be presumed true!

Rather, Rava said:

a. Rishballag's (Rashbam's) wording is: Therefore what to him to lie —and he indeed said— ;

If a Jew said,

after he himself had possessed it for three years, “

Before me, a gentile purchased it from you, and he sold it to me,”

he is deemed credible [

if the Jew who possessed it said, “The gentile purchased the land from you in my presence, and sold it to me,” he is deemed credible]!

And the reason is:

Since, had he wished, he could have said to him,

the Jew in possession of the land could have said to the Jew challenging his ownership: “

I

myself

purchased it from you,”

and he would have been deemed credible by virtue of his presumptive ownership, since he had possessed it for three years; therefore, he is also deemed credible with regard to the claim he makes now: I know that the gentile purchased it from you, and he sold it to me.”

And

he further

Rav Yehuda said:

One who is holding a sickle and a rope for climbing palm trees

in his hand, and says, “

I am going to cut

the palm tree belonging to so-and-so, for I purchased it from him,”

he is deemed credible! What is the reason?

Because

a person is not so brazen as to cut a palm tree that does not belong to him—[

one who takes in his hand tools for harvesting dates and says, “I am going to harvest the dates of so-and-so’s palm tree, having purchased this right from the owner of the tree, who is not present,” the court does not restrain him, because it is reasonable to assume that a person is not so brazen as to harvest the dates of another’s palm tree].

And

further

Rav Yehuda said:

There are people who construct fences around a field adjacent to a forest, extending them somewhat into their fields, and sow seed beyond the fences so that the wild animals of the field will have food and will not come and damage the field. These fences are called “the fence for wild animals” [a partition for wild animals]—

and

one who establishes a presumption of ownership from the fence for wild animals outward,

one who sowed for three years in the field beyond those partitions,

it does not constitute—

the sowing and consumption of this produce—

a presumption of ownership

to claim that he purchased that area! And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because

he says

the landowner says: “

Whatever he sows, the wild animals will also eat [

for the wild animals eat whatever this person sows],” and this is not a presumption of ownership established in the manner in which people ordinarily establish ownership; therefore, I did not take care to protest.

And Rav Yehuda said: If he consumed

the produce of the field when it was prohibited on account of

orla

the challenger can claim: I do not care that this person eats the produce, since it is prohibited—

Or if he consumed the produce of the field during the

Sabbatical year,

when all the produce of the field is ownerless, and the landowner does not care to protest against him—

and

likewise if he consumed produce that was prohibited on account of

mixed species [

mixed species in a vineyard]—

in all these circumstances:

it is not a presumption of ownership.

It was likewise taught in a beraita: If he consumed produce of orla, the Sabbatical year, or mixed species—

it is not a presumption of ownership.

Rav Yosef said:

If he consumed

the crop of the field when it was

shachat,

meaning that he did not wait until the crop grew and became fit for human consumption, but cut it at the beginning of its growth, while it was still shachat, and fed it to his animal—

it is not a presumption of ownership,

since he did not consume the produce of the field as do other people who own grain fields; therefore, the owner did not take care to protest, since it was evident that he was not the owner of the field.

Rava said,

who lived in Mehoza:

But

nevertheless,

if it stands in the valley of Mehoza [

if the field is located in the valley of Mehoza],

it is a presumption of ownership;

for they are wealthy and have many animals, and it is their practice to feed the fields to their animals while the crop is still shachat.

Rav Naḥman said:

a. One who establishes possession of land that is

tafteiḥa [

an open field full of cracks that produces no fruit],

it is not a presumption of ownership,

since because of its poor quality the owner was not particular enough to protest.

b. The possessor established possession in the manner of

“a kor goes in and a kor comes out” [

he sowed a kor and produced only a kor of grain],

it is not a presumption of ownership;

since the possessor gained nothing from his sowing, the owner of the field does not take care to protest against him.

c.

But those of the house of the Exilarch [

the people of the Exilarch, who cast fear upon the townspeople and are wealthy]:

they do not establish possession through others, [

their possession of our fields is not a presumption of ownership], since the owner of the field is afraid to protest against them.

And

even

we do not establish possession through them,

the possession we establish in their houses and fields is of no avail to us. Since they are wealthy and have many houses and fields, they allow strangers to live in their houses and work their lands, so that the strangers will improve them and they will find them in good condition when they wish to reclaim their property. They likewise do not take care to protest against one who establishes possession of their property, since they trust in their power to take back what is theirs whenever they wish.

We learned in the Mishna:

And slaves ...

their presumptive ownership is established after three years, from day to day:

And we raise an objection: Is it so that

slaves have a presumption of ownership!?

But didn’t Reish Lakish say:

Flocks [

flocks of sheep], and likewise anything that is mobile and moves from place to place,

do not have a presumption of ownership;

but a slave is mobile and walks on his own, so why should he be different?!

He said—

Rava

explained:

Flocks

do not have a presumption of ownership immediately,

meaning: Reish Lakish said only that flocks are not like other movable property, for one who possesses such property and claims, “They are purchased by me,” is deemed credible immediately, even before possessing them for three years, because “whatever is in a person’s possession is presumed to be his.” Since flocks move on their own from place to place, one can say that they arrived in this person’s possession on their own, and not because he brought them into his house after purchasing them.

But

even slaves and flocks

do have a presumption of ownership

after three years.

This has been explained according to Rashbam; ;

Rava said:

;

Although slaves are included among flocks and do not acquire a presumption of ownership immediately, nevertheless,

if the

slave was

a small child lying in a cradle, he has a presumption of ownership immediately,

since he could not have entered on his own, and his status is like that of other movable property.

And we raise an objection to Rava:

It is obvious

that this is the law, so why did Rava need to teach us this ruling?!

And we answer:

It is necessary

for Rava’s statement only with regard to a small child

who has a mother [

who has a mother], because

it might enter your mind to say,

were it not for Rava’s statement:

Let us be concerned that perhaps his mother

brought him in there, [

perhaps his mother, who is comparable to a member of a flock, brought her son there with her],

he teaches us: A mother does not forget her son, [

a mother does not forget her son], and if his mother brought him there, she would have taken him out.

There was an incident involving

certain goats that ate peeled barley [

an incident involving goats that ate peeled barley spread out in a field to dry]

in Nehardea. The owner of the barley came, seized them, and was claiming a great deal, [

the owner of the barley came, took hold of the animals, and claimed that they had eaten a great deal of barley in his field].

Shmuel’s father said: He may

he

claim

that they ate barley

up to the value of the goats, because of the migo:

since, had he wished, he could have said, “

They are purchased

by

the goats

in my possession,”

and then he would have been entitled to their value; therefore, even when he claims that they ate his barley in his field, he is deemed credible with regard to barley worth the value of the goats, since he could have extracted this amount by claiming, “They are purchased by me.”

And we raise an objection:

And

how can you say that he could have claimed, “They are purchased by me”—

didn’t Reish Lakish say: Flocks do not have a presumption of ownership

immediately, like other movable property, but only after three years, like land?!

And we answer:

Goats are different, since they are entrusted to a shepherd,

the law of goats differs from that of other flocks, since they are more distinctive than rams and sheep, and a person cannot take possession of them on the way. Therefore, they do acquire a presumption of ownership, since they do not move on their own; rather, the shepherd watches over them.

We nevertheless raise an objection:

But there is the morning [

morning], for in the morning they go on their own from the owners’ house to the shepherd’s house,

and

likewise in the

evening [

evening], they return on their own from the shepherd’s house to the owners’ house. If so, goats too should have the status of flocks, since perhaps they came to this person’s house in the morning or evening while moving on their own! And we answer: This incident took place in Nehardea, and

in Nehardea, Arab raiders are common [

thieving Ishmaelites are common],

and

therefore they do not go on their own even from the owners’ house to the shepherd’s house; rather,

they are transferred from hand to hand, [

they are transferred from the owners’ hands to the shepherd’s hands, and likewise when they return].

We learned in the Mishna concerning a field watered by rainfall:

Rabbi Yishmael says: Three months

in the first year, three in the last, and twelve months in the middle, totaling eighteen months; Rabbi Akiva says: One month in the first year and one month in the last, and twelve months in the middle:

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say, nir [

plowing]

is the issue between them—

whether the basis of the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva is the halakha concerning plowing a field, namely, whether it establishes a presumption of ownership:

As Rabbi Yishmael holds: nir does not establish a presumption of ownership,

until he sows and consumes fully ripened produce. Therefore, he requires three months, so that the produce will grow in his possession to its full extent.

And

if

Rabbi Akiva holds: nir does establish a presumption of ownership,

then one month of plowing suffices.