Bava Batra 165b (קסה:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Ashi said to him:

But there is still a difficulty!

The Mishna

If so, according to your view, that you disagree with Abaye and maintain that the Mishna did not teach this law, what does the Mishna come to teach us? Did the tanna really need to teach us that a document bearing only one witness is invalid?

It comes to teach us this:

the legal status of

two witnesses on a mekushar document is like that of one witness on a pashut document.

Just as there,

with regard to one witness on a pashut document,

it is a Torah-level disqualification

as it is stated: “One witness shall not stand against a man.”

So too here,

with regard to a mekushar document bearing only two witnesses,

it is a Torah-level disqualification

; the Sages imposed upon it a disqualification as though it were a Torah-level disqualification. Thus, if it is a bill of divorce, the woman is not divorced by it. And if it is a promissory note, the creditor cannot collect with it from liened property. And Ameimar continued:

Know

that this is indeed the law: that one witness in writing and one witness orally join together, from

what the colleagues sent from there

to Rabbi Yirmeya:

Rabbi Yirmeya’s colleagues sent him a question from there:

What is the ruling concerning one witness in writing and one witness orally? Do they join together,

so that it is as though both of them signed the document?

There are two disputes in the beraita above [32a]:

A. The first tanna and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korkha disagree.

The first tanna maintains that two witnesses never join to form a single testimony unless both of them saw the same act simultaneously. But if one witness testifies that he saw on a certain day that Reuven lent Shimon one hundred zuz, and the second witness testifies that on another day Reuven lent Shimon one hundred zuz, their testimonies are not joined to obligate Shimon to pay Reuven one hundred zuz, despite the fact that both witnesses testify that in fact Shimon owes Reuven one hundred zuz.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korkha, by contrast, maintains that their testimonies are joined, despite the fact that each one testifies about a different act, since according to both of them Shimon owes Reuven one hundred zuz.

B. There is another dispute in that same beraita, between the first tanna and Rabbi Natan:

The first tanna maintains that the two witnesses must testify together in court.

Rabbi Natan maintains that the court may accept the testimony of one witness today and the testimony of the second on the following day.

The colleagues explain their question to Rabbi Yirmeya:

According to the opinion of the first tanna of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korkha, you need not ask.

Since

even two witnesses in writing,

two witnesses who signed a document stating that so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred zuz, but each testifies [in that document] about a different act, or

two orally,

two witnesses testifying orally, each about a different act,

do not join

to form a single testimony until both testify about the same act, all the more so one witness in writing and one witness orally do not join.

Rather, if you ask the question, it is according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

Is it specifically

Rather, when you do have a question, it is according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korkha. Is it specifically

two in writing and two orally that join,

despite the fact that each of the witnesses in the document or testifying orally testifies about a different act? But

one in writing and

one

orally, we do not join them?

Or perhaps there is no difference.

And one witness in writing and one witness orally also join?

They sent to them

Rabbi Yirmeya:

I am not worthy

[fit]

of your having sent me

your question.

Rather, this is what your student’s opinion tends toward: They join!

Thus, one witness in writing and one witness orally join.

Rav Ashi said

to Ameimar: There is no difficulty here for Abaye, who maintains that one witness in writing and one witness orally do not join. For

we teach it

as follows:

we maintain that the discussion between Rabbi Yirmeya and his colleagues concerned something entirely different:

The colleagues sent to Rabbi Yirmeya: Two witnesses who testified

in such a manner that

one

testified

in this court, and one

testified

in this court—what is the ruling concerning the court

coming

to the court

of the other,

and joining

together to adjudicate on the basis of the testimony heard separately by each court?

The colleagues explain the question:

According to the opinion of the first tanna of Rabbi Natan, you need not ask.

Since

even in one court,

even if the two testified in the same court, each at a different time,

they do not join.

All the more so, if each testified in a different court, they do not join.

Rather, when you do have a question, it is according to Rabbi Natan.

Is it only

in one court that they join,

the two witnesses, even when they testify at different times? But

in two courts,

since they testified in two courts,

they do not join?

Or perhaps there is no difference,

and they join even when they testified in two courts?

And Rabbi Yirmeya sent to them: I am not worthy of your having sent this to me; rather, this is what your student’s opinion tends toward: They join!

Mar bar Ḥiyya said: This is what they sent to him

to Rabbi Yirmeya:

Two who testified in this court and then testified again

about the same testimony

in this court—what is the ruling concerning one

judge

from each court

joining

together to adjudicate on the basis of that testimony?

According to Rabbi Natan, you need not ask.

For

now, witnesses

who testified separately

we join;

if so,

is it necessary to ask about judges?

It is certainly the case that they can join, despite the fact that each court accepted the testimony separately.

Rather, if you ask the question, it is according to the first tanna, who disagrees with Rabbi Natan.

Rather, when you do have a question, it is according to the opinion of the first tanna of Rabbi Natan. Is it specifically

witnesses whom we do not join, but judges we do join?

Or perhaps there is no difference.

Even judges from two courts cannot join together to adjudicate on the basis of the testimony they heard separately?

They sent to them: I am not worthy of your having sent this to me; rather, this is what your student’s opinion tends toward: They join!

Ravina said: This is what they sent to him: Three

judges

who sat to validate the document,

which requires a court of three, and after the court accepted the witnesses who testified that these were indeed their signatures,

one of them died

of the judges. Do

the judges need

the judges

to write

in their certification: “

We sat as a court of three

[the three of us sat together]

and one is absent,”

meaning that they must add that one of their number is no longer present, so that it should not appear to be a falsehood for them to write at the beginning, “We sat as a court of three” [which is the standard wording in every validation], while only two sign at the end?

Or not,

and there is no need for such concern, and they may write as usual?

They sent to them: I am not worthy of your having sent this to me; rather, this is what your student’s opinion tends toward: They must write “

We sat as a court of three, and one is absent”!

And because of this,

because of Rabbi Yirmeya’s answers, which he gave them appropriately [each according to his version],

they brought Rabbi Yirmeya back into the beit-midrash.

They returned him to the beit-midrash after expelling him from there because he had asked an improper question, concerning a lost pigeon found far from the dovecote, with one of its legs within fifty cubits of the dovecote and its other leg outside fifty cubits of the dovecote; to whom does it belong? [above, 23b].

Mishna:

A promissory note in which it was written

that so-and-so borrowed from so-and-so

“one hundred zuz,

[one hundred zuz],

which are twenty sela,”

[which are twenty sela], although one hundred zuz are twenty-five sela [each sela is worth four zuz, or dinars], nevertheless

he has no

creditor

more than twenty

sela, because the holder of the document is always at a disadvantage, since he is the one seeking to collect from the other and must provide proof for his claim. Here, we are uncertain whether the reference is to one hundred inferior, worn zuz worth only twenty sela.

And if it was written in the document:

“One hundred zuz, which are thirty sela”

[which are thirty sela], although thirty sela are one hundred and twenty zuz,

he has no

creditor

more than a maneh,

only one hundred zuz. This is because it can be interpreted as referring to thirty light sela whose value is equivalent to twenty-five standard sela.

And if it was written in the document:

“Silver zuz, which are” and

the amount was erased

that was written after “which are,”

he has

creditor

no fewer than two,

two zuz, since the minimum plural of “zuz” is two.

And if it was written:

“Silver sela, which are” and

the amount

of the sela

was erased,

he has

no fewer than two,

two sela.

And if it was written:

“Darconot

[the name of a gold coin]

which are,” and

the amount

was erased,

he has

creditor

no fewer than two,

two darconot.

A document that was

written at the top,

at the beginning of the document,

“a maneh,” and

at the bottom,

at the end of the document, when the matter is repeated, it was written

“two hundred.”

Or if

at the top

it was written

“two hundred,”

and

at the bottom, “a maneh.”

Everything follows the bottom!

If so, why do they write the upper amount,

since the amount is repeated at the end of the document and only that amount is relied upon, why write it at the beginning at all?

In order

that if one letter of the lower amount is erased, it can be inferred from the upper amount.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

With regard to a document in which it was written that so-and-so borrowed from so-and-so

“silver,”

and it is unknown which silver currency is intended,

the lender has

no

less than one silver dinar

of

silver.

If it was written

“silver dinars,”

“and silver dinars.”

That is, if it was written “silver dinars,”

the lender has

no

less than two dinars

of

silver,

as the minimum number indicated by “dinars” is two.

And if it was written

“silver in dinars,”

the lender has

no

less than the value of two gold dinars in silver.

That is, he owes him silver worth two gold dinars.

The Master said:

“Silver,”

the minimum is one silver dinar.

And the Gemara asks:

But perhaps it means an ingot,

perhaps the “silver” mentioned in the document does not refer to a silver coin but to a piece of silver?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Elazar said:

For example,

it was written in it: “coin.”

The document explicitly stated “silver coin,” but did not specify which coin.

And the Gemara asks:

But perhaps it means small coins,

perhaps it refers to a silver peruta, which is worth less than a silver dinar?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Pappa said: In a place where silver perutot are not used.

In that place there were no silver perutot, only copper ones, and the smallest silver coin there was a dinar; therefore, he owes him one silver dinar.

The Sages taught:

With regard to a document in which it was written

“gold”

[gold],

the lender has

no

less than one gold dinar.

If it was written

“gold dinars,”

“and gold dinars.”

That is, if it was written “gold dinars,”

the lender has

no

less than two gold dinars.

And if it was written

“gold in dinars,”

the lender has

no

less than the value of two silver dinars in gold.

He owes him gold worth two silver dinars.

The Master said:

“Gold”—

the minimum is one gold dinar.

And the Gemara asks:

But perhaps it means an ingot!?

Perhaps it refers to a piece of gold?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Elazar said: It was written “coin,”

as it explicitly stated “gold coin.”