Bava Batra 165b — the Talmud in English

Rav Ashi said to him:

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Mishna

If so, according to you, who disagree with Abaye and maintain that the Mishna did not teach this law, what does the Mishna come to teach us? Did the tanna need to teach us that only one witness is invalid? Amiemar said to him:

This teaches us this:

its law

is like that of one witness in an unrolled document.

Just as there

with regard to one witness in an unrolled document,

it is a disqualification by Torah law

it is, as it is written: “One witness shall not stand against a man.”

So too here,

with regard to a rolled document that has only two witnesses,

it is a disqualification by Torah law

it is, for the Sages imposed upon it a disqualification as though it were a disqualification by Torah law. For if it is a bill of divorce, the woman is not divorced by it. And if it is a promissory note, the creditor cannot collect with it from liened properties. And Amiemar continues:

Know

that this is the law, that one witness in writing and one witness orally combine, from this:

for they sent from there

the companions to Rabbi Yirmeya,

the companions of Rabbi Yirmeya sent him a question from there:

One witness in writing and one witness orally—what is the law: do they combine,

so that it is as though both had signed the document?

There are two disputes in the baraita above [32a]:

A. The First Tanna and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa disagree.

The First Tanna maintains that two witnesses never combine into one testimony unless both saw the same act at the same time. But if one witness testifies that he saw on a certain day that Reuven lent Shimon one hundred zuz, and the second witness testifies that on another day Reuven lent Shimon one hundred zuz, their testimonies are not combined to obligate Shimon to pay one hundred zuz to Reuven, despite the fact that both witnesses testify that in fact Shimon owes Reuven one hundred zuz.

Whereas Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa maintains that their testimonies are combined, despite the fact that each one testifies concerning a different act, since according to the words of both of them, Shimon owes Reuven one hundred zuz.

B. There is another dispute in that same baraita, between the First Tanna and Rabbi Natan:

The First Tanna maintains that the two witnesses must testify together in the court.

And Rabbi Natan maintains that the court may receive the testimony of one of the witnesses today, and the testimony of the second on the following day.

And the companions explain their question to Rabbi Yirmeya:

According to the First Tanna of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, you need not ask.

Since

even two in writing,

two witnesses who signed the document that so-and-so owes so-and-so one hundred zuz, but each testifies [in that same document] concerning a different act, or

and two orally,

two witnesses testify orally, each one concerning a different act,

do not combine

to become one testimony until both testify concerning the same act. And all the more so, one witness in writing and one witness orally do not combine.

Rather, when you do need to ask, it is according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

Is it specifically

Is it specifically that

two in writing and two orally do combine,

despite the fact that each of the witnesses in the document or orally testifies concerning a different act. But

one witness in writing and

one witness

orally, we do not combine?

Or perhaps it is no different.

And one witness in writing and one witness orally also combine?

He sent to them

Rabbi Yirmeya:

I am not worthy [

worthy ]

that you sent to me

your question.

Rather, this is what the opinion of your student inclines to: that they combine!

It follows that one witness in writing and one witness orally combine.

Rav Ashi said to him

to Amiemar: There is no difficulty from here against Abaye, who maintains that one witness in writing and one witness orally do not combine. For

we teach it this way

to him,

we maintain that the discussion between Rabbi Yirmeya and his companions was concerning an entirely different matter:

For the companions sent to Rabbi Yirmeya: Two who testified,

in a situation in which

one

testified

in this court, and one

testified

in this court, what is the law: should this court come

to

that court

and

combine

together to judge on the basis of the testimony that each of the courts heard separately?

And the companions explain the question:

According to the First Tanna of Rabbi Natan, you need not ask.

Since

even in one court,

even if the two testified in the same court, each at a different time,

they do not combine.

And all the more so, if each testified in a different court, they do not combine.

Rather, when you do need to ask, it is according to Rabbi Natan.

Is it only

in one court that they combine

the two witnesses, even when they testify at different times. But

in two courts,

since they testified in two courts,

they do not combine?

Or perhaps it is no different,

and even in two courts they combine?

And Rabbi Yirmeya sent to them: I am not worthy that you sent to me, but this is what the opinion of your student inclines to: that they combine!

Mar bar Ḥiyya said: This is what they sent to him

to Rabbi Yirmeya:

Two who testified in this court, and then testified again

the same testimony

in that court, what is the law: should

one judge

from each court,

combine

together to judge on the basis of that same testimony?

According to Rabbi Natan, you need not ask.

For

now, witnesses

who testified separately

we combine,

if so,

judges—is it necessary to say so!?

Certainly they can combine, despite the fact that each court received the testimony separately.

Rather, when you do need to ask, it is according to the First Tanna of Rabbi Natan.

Is it specifically that

witnesses are whom we do not combine, but judges we do combine?

Or perhaps, it is no different.

That even judges from two courts cannot combine together in order to judge according to the testimony that they heard separately?

He sent to them: I am not worthy that you sent to me, but this is what the opinion of your student inclines to: that they combine!

Ravina said: This is what they sent to him: Three

judges

who sat to validate the document,

for this requires a court of three, and after the court received the witnesses who testified that this was indeed their signature,

one of them died

of the judges. Do

they need

the judges

to write

in their confirmation: “

We were seated as three [

the three of us sat together ]

and one is absent,”

that they must add that one of us is no longer here, so that it should not appear false when they initially write “We were seated as three” [which is the ordinary wording in every validation] and at the end only two have signed.

Or not,

that there is no need to be concerned about this, and they may write as usual?

He sent to them: I am not worthy that you sent to me, but this is what the opinion of your student inclines to: they need to write “

We were seated as three and one is absent”!

And because of this,

because of Rabbi Yirmeya’s answers, which he answered them properly [each according to his version

they brought Rabbi Yirmeya up to the beit-midrash.

They returned him to the beit-midrash, after they had expelled him from there because he had asked improperly, concerning a pigeon found far from the dovecote, with one of its feet within fifty cubits of the dovecote and its other foot outside the fifty cubits of the dovecote—to whom does it belong [above, 23b].

Mishna:

A promissory note in which it was written

that so-and-so borrowed from so-and-so “

one hundred zuz [

one hundred zuz ],

which are twenty sela” [

which are twenty sela]. Yet one hundred zuz are twenty-five sela [each sela is worth four zuz (dinars)]. Nevertheless,

he has

the creditor

only twenty

sela, because the holder of the document always has the lower hand, since he is the one who brings it out against his fellow and must bring proof for his words. And here we are uncertain whether the intention was to inferior and worn zuz worth only twenty sela.

And if it was written in the document, “

one hundred zuz, which are thirty sela” [

which are thirty sela], and thirty sela are one hundred twenty zuz,

he has

the creditor

only a maneh

only one hundred zuz. For it may be explained that the intention was to thirty light sela whose value corresponds to twenty-five ordinary sela.

And if it was written in the document, “

silver zuz, which are,” and

it was erased

the amount that was written after “which are,”

there is

for the creditor

no less than two,

two zuz, for the minimum of “zuz” is two.

And if it was written, “

silver sela, which are,” and

it was erased

the amount of the sela,

there is

for the creditor

no less than two,

two sela.

And if it was written, “

daric” [

the name of a gold coin ]

which are,” and

it was erased

the amount,

there is

for the creditor

no less than two,

two darics.

A document in which it was

written at the top,

at the beginning of the document, “

a maneh,” and

at the bottom

at the end of the document, when the matter was repeated, it was written “

two hundred.”

Or if

at the top

it was written

two hundred,

and

at the bottom, a maneh.

Everything follows the bottom!

If so, why do they write the upper amount,

since they repeat the amount at the end of the document and rely only upon it, why do they write it at the beginning at all?

In order

that if one letter is erased from the lower one, it may be learned from the upper one.

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

a document in which it was written that so-and-so borrowed from so-and-so "

silver",

and it is not known which silver coin is intended,

there is not

for the lender

less than a dinar

of

silver.

If it was written in it "

silver dinars.

And silver dinars.

That is, or it was written "silver dinars

there is not

for the lender

less than two dinars

of

silver,

for the minimum of "dinars" is two.

And if it was written "

silver in dinars",

there is not

for the lender

less than two gold dinars, silver.

That is, he owes him silver worth two gold dinars.

The Master said: "

silver,"

there is not less than a silver dinar.

And the Gemara asks:

But say a silver ingot,

perhaps the "silver" stated in the document does not mean a silver coin, but rather a piece of silver?

And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Elazar said:

for example,

that "coin" was written in it.

It was explicitly written in the document "silver coin," but it was not written which coin.

And the Gemara asks:

But say small coins,

perhaps the intention is to a silver pruta, which is less than a silver dinar?

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Pappa said: In a place where silver small coins are not in circulation.

In that place there were no small coins of silver, only of copper, and the smallest silver coin there was a dinar; therefore, he owes him a silver dinar.

The Sages taught:

a document in which it was written "

gold" [

gold ],

there is not

for the lender

less than a gold dinar.

If it was written "

gold dinars",

and gold dinars.

That is, or it was written "gold dinars

there is not

for the lender

less than two gold dinars.

And if it was written "

gold in dinars",

there is not

for the lender

less than two silver dinars, gold.

He owes him gold worth two silver dinars.

The Master said: "

gold" —

there is not less than a gold dinar.

And the Gemara asks:

But say an ingot!?

Perhaps the intention is to a piece of gold?

And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Elazar said: that "coin" was written,

for it was explicitly written "gold coin ".