Bava Batra 157b (קנז:) — the Talmud in English

Rather,

the Gemara rejects the proof:

This is in accordance with whom? It is in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

The Mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir,

who says: A person can transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world.

And the entire uncertainty applied to the Rabbis. But according to Rabbi Meir, just as it is possible to transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world, so too it is possible to create a lien on something that one has not yet acquired.

The Gemara attempts to resolve the uncertainty:

Come and hear

a proof from what we learned in a beraita:

Promissory notes dated earlier,

a loan document in which an earlier date was written, for example, the loan was made in Nisan and they wrote that it was made in the preceding Tishrei,

are invalid.

The document is invalid and one may not collect with it, since the creditor would unlawfully seize property from purchasers who bought land between Tishrei and Nisan.

But those dated later are valid.

Documents written after the loan, for example, the loan was made in Nisan and the document was written in Tishrei, or it was written on the day of the loan but given a Tishrei date, are valid, since there is no concern that the creditor will collect unlawfully.

And if it enters your mind

and we maintain that

with regard to property that I will acquire, if he acquired it and sold it,

or

with regard to property that I will acquire, if he acquired it and bequeathed it, it does not become subject to a lien,

then,

why are documents dated later valid!?

Let us be concerned that perhaps the borrower acquired property between Nisan and Tishrei, and it does not become subject to a lien since it was acquired after the loan, which was made in Nisan. If the borrower sells the property after Tishrei, the lender will seize it from the purchasers, because, since the acquisition occurred before the date written in the document, he will think that it is subject to a lien, whereas in fact it is not subject to a lien, if we say that property that I will acquire does not become subject to a lien.

And it is thereby demonstrated that property that I will acquire does become subject to a lien.

The Gemara rejects this, saying that this beraita as well is

in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world.

Come and hear

The Gemara attempts to resolve the uncertainty from what we learned in a beraita: debts that are not fixed may not be collected from purchasers, since the purchasers cannot assess the debt and ascertain whether the seller has property equal in value to the debt, so that it cannot be collected from them.

One example of a debt that is not fixed is the appreciation of land.

And the beraita explains:

With regard to the appreciation of land, how so?

In what case is it said that it is not collected from purchasers?

Consider the case of one who sold a field to another and he improved it,

that is, someone purchased a field and the purchaser improved it, and now it is worth more,

and a creditor came

of the seller

and repossessed it,

since the land was subject to his lien, and he repossessed the land together with its appreciation. And since the purchaser received a guarantee from the seller,

when he,

the purchaser, returns

and collects

from the seller,

he collects the principal from property subject to a lien,

like any creditor, to whom the seller’s property is subject to a lien,

and the appreciation from unencumbered property.

And the appreciation that he generated is collected only from unencumbered property, since it is not fixed, as it is not known how much it will appreciate.

And if it enters your mind

and we maintain

that property that I will acquire, if he acquired it and sold it, or if he acquired it and bequeathed it, does not become subject to a lien,

then,

why does the creditor collect the appreciation!?

Why does the creditor collect the appreciation from the purchaser, when it came into existence only after the loan?

It is thereby demonstrated that property that I will acquire does become subject to a lien.

The Gemara rejects this:

This is in accordance with whom,

this beraita?

It is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who says that a person can transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world.

And in conclusion, the uncertainty remains unresolved.

The Gemara adds:

If you should say,

if we adopt the possibility that

property that I will acquire, if he acquired it and sold it

or

property that I will acquire, if he acquired it and bequeathed it, does not become subject to a lien,

there is nothing to be uncertain about:

It does not become subject to a lien.

But,

if you should say that it does become subject to a lien,

if we adopt the possibility that it does become subject to a lien, we must now consider: What is the law if

he borrowed

from Reuven

and borrowed

from Shimon, and in both cases he wrote “property that I will acquire,” and ultimately

he then acquired

he acquired property,

what is the law?

To whom does the lien apply?

And the alternatives of the uncertainty are: Does

it become subject to a lien for the first,

does it become subject to a lien for the first lender, since he preceded the second,

or does it become subject to a lien for the latter,

or for the second lender, since by creating a lien for the second he retracted his commitment to the first, and he can retract it because the lien has not yet taken effect as long as he has not acquired property.

Rav Naḥman said: We were uncertain about this matter,

we were uncertain about this question,

and they sent us a response from there,

and they sent us a response from Eretz Yisrael that

the first acquired the right.

But

Rav Huna said: They divide it.

They divide it between them, since he did not intend to retract the lien granted to the first, but rather to create a lien for the second as well, and he can do so because the lien has not yet taken effect, and it becomes subject to a lien for both of them, in proportion to the amount of the loan, since when he acquired the property, the liens of both took effect equally.

And Rabba bar Avuha likewise taught: They divide it.

Ravina said: In Rav Ashi’s first recension,

when Rav Ashi taught his Talmud for the first time,

he told us

he ruled in this case that only

the first acquired the right.

Whereas

in Rav Ashi’s latter recension,

when he reviewed and taught his Talmud a second time, he

told us: They divide it!

And the Gemara’s conclusion is:

And the halakha is: They divide it.

An objection was raised,

the Gemara challenges the ruling that they divide it, from the aforementioned beraita:

With regard to the appreciation of land, how so?

In what case is the appreciation of land not collected from property subject to a lien?

Consider the case of one who sold a field to another, and the purchaser improved it,

the purchaser,

and a creditor came

of the seller,

and repossessed it

from the purchaser for his debt;

when he,

the purchaser,

collects

from his seller what was repossessed from him,

he collects the principal from property subject to a lien, and the appreciation from unencumbered property.

And if it is so,

if we maintain that when a person creates a lien on property that he will acquire for two creditors, they divide it between them, then

it should have said: half of the appreciation!?

The seller’s creditor should repossess only half of the appreciation, since the appreciation is subject both to a lien in favor of the purchaser, by virtue of the seller’s guarantee to him, and to a lien in favor of the seller’s creditor!?

The Gemara answers:

What does “he collects,” which the beraita likewise teaches, mean?

The intent of the beraita is to say that the creditor collects from the appreciation only

half of the appreciation.