Bava Batra 150b (קנ:) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara rejects this:

He said to him: We are teaching this because it is not a document of complete severance.

We are explaining the Mishna differently: indeed, slaves are like land. However, here the deficiency is that a slave must be emancipated by means of a document that does not leave him bound to his master, so that the severance will be complete. Since this document states that the movable property remains the master’s, the master’s rights are recorded in the document, and therefore it is not a document of complete severance.

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said:

There are

five

types of recipients of a gift with regard to whom a particular halakha was stated, and it applies only

until they write all their property.

For there is a difference whether one gives all his property or only part of it.

And these are they: a shekhiv mera, his slave, his wife, and his sons,

and

a mevarket.

And the Gemara explains these cases:

The first:

a shekhiv mera,

as we learned in the Mishna: If a shekhiv mera wrote all his property to others, and retained

for himself

any amount of land,

even if he ultimately recovered from his illness,

his gift stands

and he cannot retract it. But if he

did not retain any amount of land,

and ultimately recovered from his illness,

his gift does not stand,

because it can be inferred from the fact that he gave all his property that he intended to give it only on the assumption that he would die.

The second case:

his slave

as we learned in the Mishna: One who writes all his property to his slave—the slave goes free. But if he retained any amount of land, the slave does not go free,

as was explained above, because there is a deficiency in the severance.

The third case:

his wife

as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One who writes all his property to his wife,

one who transferred all his property to his wife,

has made her only an administrator,

He did not intend to remove his property from his sons, who inherit from him; rather, he wished to honor her by making her administrator over the property. This applies specifically when he gives her all the property. But if he transfers only part of it to her, it is a complete acquisition.

The fourth case:

his sons

as we learned in the Mishna: One who writes all his property to his sons, and writes any amount of land for his wife, has caused her to forfeit her marriage contract.

By agreeing to accept land, she waived her right to collect her marriage contract from his property. But if he did not give his sons everything, rather retaining land for himself, then since she relies on the land that remained with him in order to collect her marriage contract, it is likewise the case that she relies on all the land, and she does not waive the lien that she has on it for collection of her marriage contract.

The fifth case:

a mevarket

As the Master said: A mevarket—

must write all her property.

A widow who wishes to marry and owns property, but does not wish to bring her property into her husband’s possession and instead wishes to conceal it from him so that he will have no rights to it, may transfer it before her marriage to another person. If she is widowed or divorced, the recipient will be required to return the property to her. This applies when she transferred all her property to him, in which case it is self-evident that the entire transfer was solely in order to conceal the property from her husband. But if she transferred only part of the property, the recipient acquired it completely and does not return it to her later.

These are the five cases in which there is a difference between transferring part of the property and transferring all of it.

And Rava adds in the name of Rav Naḥman, saying:

And in all of them,

in all the cases that we discussed above,

movable property is considered retained property.

Even if one leaves movable property behind, this is considered a partial gift,

except for the marriage contract,

apart from the fourth case,

as the Sages instituted with regard to land,

the Sages instituted that a woman collects her marriage contract from land, but

with regard to movable property, the Sages did not institute this.

A marriage contract cannot be collected from movable property. Therefore, even if her husband retained movable property, she does not waive the lien of her marriage contract on the land.

But

Ameimar said,

adding that there is a case in which even retaining movable property causes her to waive her rights to the land:

movable property that is written in the marriage contract,

if he designated movable property for her and wrote this in the marriage contract,

and

also

it is present as it is,

that is, it is before us, then the Sages instituted that she may collect it as she collects from land; therefore, it is considered retained property.

And the Gemara continues to explain what is included in ordinary human expressions.

When one transferred his property to another and used the expression “my property,” what did he intend to transfer to him?

If he said: “My property to so-and-so,”

one who said to so-and-so that he was transferring his property to him—

A slave is called “property.”

A slave is included in the expression “my property,” as we learned in the Mishna:

as we learned: One who writes all his property to his slave—the slave goes free.

And it is proven that the slave is included in the transfer of all his property.

Land is called “property.”

His land is likewise included in the expression “my property,” as we learned in the Mishna:

as we learned: Property that provides guarantee,

on which people rely, since it is land,

is acquired with money, by means of a document, or through possession.

These are the forms of acquisition specific to land. And it is proven that the Mishna uses the expression “property” with regard to land.

A cloak is called “property.”

Clothing is included in the expression “my property,” as we learned in the Mishna, as we learned:

And property that does not provide guarantee

—property—

is acquired only through pulling.

This is a continuation of the discussion of land, and the expression “property” applies here as well, as though it were written: “And property that does not provide guarantee.”

And it is proven that movable property is included in the expression “my property.”

Money is called “property.”

Silver coins are included in the expression “my property,”

as we learned: And

property

that does not provide guarantee,

that is, movable property,

is acquired along with

by virtue of

property that provides guarantee,

which is land. If he transfers the land to him

with money, by means of a document, or through possession,

he acquires, by virtue of the land, the movable property as well.

As in this case,

as we found:

Rav Pappa had twelve thousand zuz

deposited with a custodian, twelve thousand zuz,

in Bei Ḥozai,

the name of a place. He wished to have a messenger bring him the money from the custodian, and therefore had to transfer ownership of the deposited money to him, so that they would agree to give him the money.

He transferred it to him

—he transferred ownership of the deposit

to Rav Shmuel bar Aḥa,

who was the messenger,

by virtue of the threshold of his house,

by virtue of the land at the entrance to his house.

When he came,

when he returned,

he went out to meet him as far as Tavakh.

Rav Pappa went out to meet him as far as a place called Tavakh.

And it is proven that in the language of the Mishna, with regard to acquisition by virtue of other property, which states “property that does not provide guarantee,” money is included as well.

A document is called “property.”

Documents are also included in the expression “my property,” as we find:

as Rabba bar Yitzḥak said: There are two types of documents,

there are two different legal statuses of documents:

The first is when one

said

to witnesses:

“Acquire this field for so-and-so, and write the document for him,”

that is, perform an act of acquisition of the field on his behalf and sign a document attesting to the acquisition, so that he will have in his possession a document proving that the field is his.

If it happened that the witnesses had already acquired the field for him but had not yet written the document,

the giver may retract

the one giving the field

with regard to the document, but may not retract with regard to the field.

He cannot retract from the gift itself; he can only prevent the writing of the document, because the document may be written only with the consent of the obligor, and as long as it has not been written, the giver may retract his consent to its writing. But he cannot retract from his fellow’s acquisition of the field, since the acquisition has already taken place.

And the second is if he said that they should acquire the field for him

on the condition that they write the document for him;

thereby he made the acquisition dependent on the writing of the document, and therefore

he may retract both with regard to the document,

from his willingness to have the document written,

and with regard to the field,

he may also retract the transfer of the field, since it is dependent on the writing of the document.

And Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav Huna said: There are three types of documents: Two—

these that we stated,

the two mentioned above,

the other

the additional document is

if the seller preceded the buyer and wrote the document,

he prepared a bill of sale so that it would be ready in his possession when he wished to sell his field,

as in that which we learned: