Bava Batra 150a (קנ.) — the Talmud in English

And he said

concerning this:

Rav Dimi bar Yosef said that Rabbi Elazar

[explains the statement of the Sages]:

They made movable property a reservation with regard to a slave,

so that even if he reserved unspecified movable property in the document, his intention was to reserve the slave for himself. For although slaves were juxtaposed to land, in practice they are not attached to the land; rather, they are movable property. Therefore, they too are included in the reservation of movable property.

But they did not make movable property a reservation with regard to a woman’s marriage contract.

If one transferred all his property to his sons, but reserved for his wife any amount of land from which she could collect her marriage contract, and the wife remained silent, her intention regarding the transfer of the land to his sons is assessed from her silence: She waives her right to collect her marriage contract from all of her husband’s property, which is liened for her marriage contract, and is satisfied with the reservation of any amount of land from which she can collect her marriage contract. But if he transferred all his property to his sons and reserved for his wife only any amount of movable property from which she could collect her marriage contract, she does not waive her right to the lien on all her husband’s property for collection of the marriage contract.

This proves from Rabbi Elazar’s statement, in which he said, “They made movable property a reservation with regard to a slave,” that although the Mishna says, “He reserved any amount of land,” this is not דווקא; it is not specifically land, and one can say that the same applies when he reserved any amount of movable property. If so, we too should say with regard to our Mishna that land is not specifically required; rather, the same applies to movable property.

But the Gemara rejects Abaye’s proof and distinguishes:

There,

in the case of one who writes his property to his slave,

it is legally unnecessary for it to teach land,

as the tanna should not have taught “he reserved land” at all, since the same law applies if he reserved movable property; rather, he should have said only, “If he reserved any amount.”

And

the reason the tanna nevertheless taught “land”

is because he taught it in the first clause,

since land is mentioned in the first clause of the Mishna, where land is specifically required. Therefore, he mentioned land in the latter clause as well, although it is not specifically required.

And so it is taught in the first clause of the Mishna [there]:

Rabbi Akiva says: Any amount of land is obligated in pe'a and in the first fruits, and a prozbul may be written on its basis

[as a prozbul is written for a creditor only if the debtor owns land],

and movable property without intrinsic security may be acquired along with it,

by means of an acquisition incidental to the land,

movable property,

that is, movable property, such that if he transfers the land to him

with money, with a document, or through possession,

he acquires the movable property along with the land.

And because the first clause deals with land, where land is specifically required,

for this reason it teaches “land”

in the latter clause as well, with regard to a slave, although the law is also correct with regard to movable property.

But in other places where “land” is written, such as in our Mishna with regard to a person on his deathbed, perhaps land is specifically required.

The Gemara returns to discuss Rav Yosef’s second question:

And wherever it teaches “any amount,” does it have no fixed measure!?

Is it indeed the case that wherever the expression “any amount” is stated, it means literally any amount and no measure is required? Surely this is not so!

The Gemara proves this:

But we learned

in a Mishna in tractate Hullin, with regard to the obligation of the first shearing [135a]:

Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says:

If a person has

five sheep that are shorn,

and the wool shorn from them weighs

a maneh and a half, a maneh and a half,

that is, a maneh and a half from each sheep, they are

obligated in the first shearing,

as this is the measure of wool from which one must give the koen the first shearing.

And the Sages say: Five sheep,

even if they

are shorn of any amount,

one must give the first shearing from them.

And we said,

and we learned there concerning this Mishna:

And what is the measure of “any amount,”

that is, what is the measure of “any amount” according to the Sages?

Rav said: A maneh and a half.

A maneh and a half of wool from all the sheep together.

Provided that they are apportioned equally.

This is on condition that each sheep produces at least one-fifth of this measure; it is not sufficient for one sheep to produce more.

This proves that even where it says “any amount,” there is a measure.

The Gemara rejects this:

There, it is legally unnecessary for it to teach “any amount.”

There, the tanna should not have said “any amount,” and therefore it does not mean literally any amount.

And because the first tanna said,

since the first tanna obligates one who has

a large measure,

a large measure,

he too said a small measure,

the second tanna obligates one who has a small measure, and

calls it “any amount,”

because it is little relative to the first tanna’s measure.

But ordinarily, there is no proof that “any amount” has a specific measure.

The Gemara now discusses the laws of “reservation.”

It is obvious

that if a person transfers property to others, whether he is healthy or is a person on his deathbed, and says,

“My movable property to so-and-so!”

meaning that he transfers his movable property to so-and-so,

he acquires all his utensils of use,

that person acquires all the utensils that he uses,

apart from wheat and barley,

excluding wheat and barley. The same applies to animals, as they are not called movable property.

But if he says that he transfers

“all my movable property to so-and-so,”

using the word “all,” which expresses inclusion, he transfers to him

even wheat and barley, and even the upper millstone.

He transfers even wheat and barley, and also the upper part of the millstone, although it is not considered as much one of the household utensils,

apart

from

the lower millstone,

which he does not transfer to him, because it is not included in his expression “all my movable property”: Since it is not moved, it is not called “movable property.”

But if he says

“everything that can be moved,”

his intention is every object that can be moved from place to place.

Even the lower millstone, he acquires.

He acquires even the lower stone of the millstone, although it is not ordinarily moved and is not called “movable property”; nevertheless, it is ultimately an object that can be moved.

They raised a dilemma:

The members of the academy were uncertain:

A slave

is he considered like land or like movable property?

Is the legal status of slaves like that of land or like that of movable property? With regard to Torah law, slaves certainly have the status of land, as in the laws of oaths, since one does not take an oath concerning slaves, and a slave also has the forms of acquisition applicable to land. The uncertainty is with regard to ordinary human language: Are slaves included in the expression “movable property” or not?

Rav Aha, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear

a proof from what we learned above [68b]:

One who sells a “city,”

his intention is all matters considered land, and therefore

he sells houses, cisterns and caves, bathhouses, an olive press, and irrigated fields. But not movable property.

Objects that can be moved are not included in the sale of “the city.” But

when he says, “It and everything within it,”

since he added in his words that he is selling even what is within the city,

even if there were animals or slaves in it, they are all sold,

although they are not connected to the city.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Avya, proves:

Granted, if you say

that slaves

are considered movable property, that is why

it is properly the case that they

are not sold

with the city

in the first clause

of the Mishna, because since he sold only the city, the slaves are not included in the sale, as they are movable property.

But if you say

that slaves

are considered land, why are they not sold!?

Why are the slaves not included in the sale?

This proves that slaves are like movable property.

But the Gemara rejects this:

And what can you say? They are considered movable property!?

Even if we say that they are like movable property, it is difficult:

What is the meaning of “even”

that is written in the latter clause with regard to slaves? It implies that they are not similar to the other movable objects, which he includes by saying that he is selling everything “within the city”!

Rather, what can you say to resolve this,

what can you answer and say?

There is a difference between movable property that moves and movable property that does not move,

there is a distinction between movable property that is mobile on its own, such as animals and slaves, and movable property that is not mobile on its own, such as utensils. Therefore, one can also say that

even if you say that slaves are considered land,

even if we maintain that slaves are like land,

there is a difference between land that moves and land that does not move.

There is a distinction between “mobile land,” such as slaves, and land that is not mobile, such as cisterns and caves. Therefore, a slave is not included in the sale of the city, since he is unlike the city, which is fixed.

Come and hear

a proof from what we learned above [149b]:

One who writes all his property to his slave—the slave goes free. But if he reserved any amount of land, the slave does not go free,

since perhaps by doing so he reserved the slave as well.

Rabbi Shimon says: He is always a free man until the owner says, “All my property is given to so-and-so, my slave, except for one ten-thousandth of it,”

as this wording indicates that he may have intended to exclude the slave from the gift.

And Rav Dimi bar Yosef said that Rabbi Elazar

[Rav Dimi explains the statement of the Sages]:

They made movable property a reservation with regard to a slave,

so that even if he reserved movable property for himself, the slave does not go free, as perhaps he intended to reserve the slave for himself as well. But

they did not make movable property a reservation with regard to a woman’s marriage contract,

if one gives land to his sons, but does not give them everything and reserves land for his wife, and the wife hears of this and remains silent, she thereby waives her right to collect her marriage contract from the other land. But if he reserves only movable property for her, she does not intend to waive her claim.

And Rava said to Rav Naḥman: What is the reason?

What is the reason for distinguishing, with regard to a reservation, between slaves and a woman’s marriage contract? Because

a slave is movable property,

a slave is considered movable property,

and movable property with regard to movable property constitutes a reservation,

and therefore, if the master reserved movable property for himself in the deed of gift, it is possible that he intended to reserve the slave for himself as well. But

a woman’s marriage contract is land,

the primary collection of the marriage contract is from land, on which the woman relies,

and

therefore, a reservation of

movable property with regard to land does not constitute a reservation.

Even if she received movable property, she does not waive her claim to the marriage contract.

Rava’s statement can establish that slaves are like movable property.