Bava Batra 150a — the Talmud in English

And he said

concerning this

Rav Dimi bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Elazar [

he explains the statement of the Sages]:

They made movable property a reservation with regard to a slave,

so that even if he reserved unspecified movable property in the document, his intention was to reserve the slave for himself. For although slaves were equated with land, in practice they are not attached to the land, but are movable property, and therefore they too are included in the reservation of movable property.

But they did not make movable property a reservation with regard to a marriage contract.

If one conveyed all his property to his sons, and reserved for his wife any amount of land from which she could collect her marriage contract, and the woman remained silent, her intent is assessed from her silence regarding the conveyance of the land to his sons: she waives her right to collect her marriage contract from all of her husband’s property, which is liened for her marriage contract, and a reservation of any amount of land from which she can collect her marriage contract suffices for her. But if he conveyed all his property to his sons and reserved for the woman only any amount of movable property from which she could collect her marriage contract, she does not waive her right to the lien on all of her husband’s property for collection of the marriage contract.

It is proven from the words of Rabbi Elazar, who said, “They made movable property a reservation with regard to a slave,” that although the Mishna said, “He reserved any amount of land,” this is not specifically so, and it is possible to say that the same law applies when he reserved any amount of movable property. If so, we too shall say concerning our Mishna that land is not specifically required, but the same law applies to movable property.

But the Gemara rejects Abaye’s proof and distinguishes:

There,

in the case of one who writes his property to his slave,

it would be legally proper that he should not teach “land,”

for the tanna did not need to teach “he reserved land” at all, since the same law applies if he reserved movable property; rather, he should have said only, “If he reserved any amount.”

And

the reason that the tanna nevertheless taught “land” is

because he taught it in the first clause,

since land was mentioned in the first clause of the Mishna, and there land is specifically required; therefore he mentioned land even in the latter clause, although it is not specifically required.

And thus it is stated in the first clause of the Mishna [there]:

Rabbi Akiva says: Any amount of land is obligated in pe’a and in first fruits, and one may write a prozbul on its account [

for one writes a prozbul for a lender only if the borrower has land],

and to acquire with them

by an acquisition through association with the land]

property that does not have responsibility,

that is, movable property, for if he conveys the land to him

with money, with a document, or through possession,

he acquires the movable property along with the land.

And because the first clause deals with land, and there it is specifically required,

for this reason it teaches “land”

even in the latter clause, concerning a slave, although the law is also valid with movable property.

But in other places, where “land” is written, such as in our Mishna concerning a dangerously ill person, perhaps land is specifically required.

And the Gemara returns to discuss Rav Yosef’s second question:

And everywhere that it teaches “any amount,” does it have no measure!?

Is it so that everywhere it says “any amount,” the intention is literally any amount, and no measure is required? Yet this is not so!

The Gemara proves this:

But we learned:

we learned in a Mishna in tractate Hullin concerning the obligation of the first shearing [135a]:

Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas says:

if a person has

five ewes that are shorn,

from which there is a fleece of wool weighing

a maneh and a half, a maneh and a half,

a maneh and a half from each ewe, they are

obligated in the first shearing,

as this is the measure of wool from which one must give the first shearing to the kohen.

And the Sages say: Five ewes,

even if they are

shorn of any amount,

one is obligated to give the first shearing from them.

And we said,

and we learned there concerning this Mishna:

And how much is “any amount,”

what is the measure of “any amount” according to the Sages?

Rav said: A maneh and a half.

A maneh and a half of wool for all the ewes together.

Provided that they are apportioned in fifths.

On condition that each ewe produces at least one-fifth of this measure; it is not effective that another ewe produces more.

And it is proven from here that even where it says “any amount,” there is a measure.

The Gemara rejects this:

There, it would be legally proper that he should not teach “any amount.”

There the tanna did not need to say “any amount,” and therefore it does not mean literally any amount.

And because the first tanna said,

because the first tanna obligates one in

a large measure,

a large measure,

he too said a small measure,

the second tanna obligates one in a small measure, and

he calls it “any amount,”

therefore he uses “any amount,” since it is little relative to the first tanna.

But ordinarily, there is no proof that “any amount” has a measure in it.

The Gemara now discusses the laws of “reservation.”

It is obvious:

It is obvious that if a person conveys property to others, whether he is healthy or dangerously ill, and he said,

“My movable property to so-and-so!”

that he conveys his movable property to so-and-so,

he acquires all his utensils of use,

that so-and-so acquires all the utensils that he uses,

except for wheat and barley,

except for wheat and barley. And the same law applies to animals, which are not called movable property.

But if he said that he conveys

“all my movable property to so-and-so,”

since he used the word “all,” which is an expression of inclusion, he conveys to him

even wheat and barley, and even the upper millstone.

Even wheat and barley, and also the upper part of the millstone, although it is not considered so much among the household utensils, he conveys it to him,

except

except

for the lower millstone,

which he does not convey to him, because it is not included in his expression “all my movable property,” since it is not moved and is therefore not called “movable property.”

But if he said

“everything that can be moved,”

his intention is every object that can be moved from place to place. And

even the lower millstone, he acquires.

Even the lower stone of the millstone, although it is not ordinarily moved and is not called “movable property,” nevertheless it is ultimately an object capable of being moved.

They raised a dilemma:

The members of the academy were uncertain:

A slave

is he considered like land or like movable property?

Are slaves governed as land or as movable property? With regard to Torah laws, certainly slaves are governed as land, such as with regard to an oath, for one does not take an oath concerning slaves, and likewise a slave has acquisitions of land. The uncertainty is with regard to ordinary human language: are slaves included in the expression “movable property” or not?

Rav Aha, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear

a proof from what we learned [above, 68a]:

One who sells the “city,”

his intention is all the things considered land, and therefore

he sold houses, pits and caves, bathhouses, an olive press, and irrigated fields. But not movable property.

Objects that can be moved are not included in the sale of “the city.” But

when he said, “It and everything inside it,”

since he added in his words that he was selling even what was inside the city,

even if there were animals or slaves in it, they are all sold,

although they are not attached to the city.

Rav Aha, son of Rav Avya, proves:

Granted, if you say

that slaves

are considered like movable property, for this reason

properly

they are not sold

with the city

in the first clause

of the Mishna, because since he sold only the city, the slaves are not included in the sale, since they are movable property.

But if you say

that slaves

are considered like land, why are they not sold!?

Why are the slaves not included in the sale?

And it is proven from here that slaves are like movable property.

But the Gemara rejects this:

But what can you say: They are considered like movable property!?

For even if we say that they are like movable property, it is difficult:

What is the meaning of “even”

that is written in the latter clause concerning slaves? For it implies that they are not similar to the other movable objects, and he includes them by saying that he is also selling what is “inside the city”!

But what do you have to say:

but what can you answer and say?

There is a difference between movable property that moves and movable property that does not move,

there is a difference between movable property that is mobile on its own, such as animals and slaves, and movable property that is not mobile on its own, such as utensils. And therefore it is also possible to say:

Even if you say that slaves are considered like land,

even if we hold that slaves are like land,

there is a difference between land that moves and land that does not move.

There is a difference between “mobile land,” such as slaves, and land that is not mobile, such as pits and caves; therefore the slave is not included in the sale of the city, since he is not similar to the city, which is fixed.

Come and hear

a proof from what we learned above [149b]:

One who writes all his property to his slave, the slave goes free. But if he reserved any amount of land, the slave does not go free,

since perhaps by doing so he reserved the slave as well.

Rabbi Shimon says: He is always a free man until he says, “All my property is given to so-and-so my slave, except for one ten-thousandth of it,”

for with this wording it is possible that he intended to exclude the slave from the gift.

And Rav Dimi bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Elazar [

Rav Dimi explains the statement of the Sages]:

They made movable property a reservation with regard to a slave,

so that even if he reserved movable property for himself, the slave does not go free, lest he intended to reserve the slave for himself as well. But

they did not make movable property a reservation with regard to a marriage contract,

one who gives land to his sons, and does not give them everything but reserves land for his wife, and the woman hears of this and remains silent, thereby waiving her collection of the marriage contract from the other land. But if he reserves only movable property for her, she does not intend to waive it.

And Rava said to Rav Naḥman: What is the reason?

What is the reason for distinguishing with regard to a reservation between slaves and a marriage contract? For

a slave is movable property,

a slave is considered movable property,

and movable property with regard to movable property is a reservation,

and therefore if the master reserved movable property for himself in the gift document, it is possible that he intended to reserve the slave for himself. But

a woman’s marriage contract is land,

the principal collection of the marriage contract is from land, on which the woman relies,

and

therefore a reservation of

movable property with regard to land is not a reservation.

And even if she received movable property, she does not relinquish the marriage contract.

And from Rava’s words it is possible to resolve that slaves are like movable property.