Bava Batra 141b — the Talmud in English

For it was taught: “Whoever informs me,”

whoever informs me

“what my wife has given birth to,”

what my wife has borne,

“if it is a male, he shall take a maneh,”

if he informs me of the birth of a male, he shall receive a maneh from me!

She gave birth to a male—

he takes a maneh,

as he stipulated. But for news of a female he receives nothing, since it is implied by his stipulation that he does not want a female.

And if he stipulated,

“if it is a female, he shall take a maneh,”

that if he informs him of a female he will receive a maneh,

she gave birth to a female, he takes a maneh,

as he stipulated. But for news of a male he receives nothing, since he did not stipulate concerning a male.

She gave birth to a male and a female,

if she gave birth to twins,

he has only a maneh

he receives only one maneh.

The Gemara asks:

But he did not say “a male and a female”!?

He did not mention twins in his stipulation, so why should he receive anything? Perhaps he does not want them.

The Gemara answers:

For he also said, “if it is a male and a female,”

also

he shall take a maneh.

It is speaking of a case in which he also stipulated concerning twins; it is only that the beraita abbreviated its words and did not mention this. And this is the novelty: for twins he receives only one maneh. It should not be said that he gives a maneh for each one separately, and therefore, for twins, he should receive two hundred zuz. Therefore, the beraita emphasizes: only one maneh.

The Gemara asks:

Rather, what is it to exclude!?

If he gives a maneh for each piece of news, why is it necessary to specify that he said: whoever informs me of the birth of my wife shall receive a maneh?

The Gemara answers:

To exclude a stillborn.

His intention is to exclude a stillborn, which is not viable; for such news he gives nothing.

That one

the husband,

who said to his wife,

who said to his pregnant wife:

“My property is for this one whom you are carrying,”

I hereby transfer my property to your fetus.

Rav Huna said: This is one who grants acquisition to a fetus,

this is a case of one who grants acquisition to a fetus,

and one who grants acquisition to a fetus does not acquire.

It is impossible to transfer ownership to a fetus, since it is considered something that has not yet come into the world, and therefore it does not acquire.

The Gemara asks against Rav Huna:

Rav Naḥman raised an objection to Rav Huna

from the earlier Mishna:

“One who says: If my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a maneh; she gave birth to a male, he takes a maneh.”

It is proven from the Mishna that even though he transfers ownership to a fetus, nevertheless the transfer is effective.

He said to him,

Rav Huna replied to him:

“Our Mishna—I do not know who taught it!”

The Mishna follows the view of a certain tanna, who indeed holds that it is possible to transfer ownership to a fetus, but we do not rule in accordance with him. And I do not know which tanna holds this way.

The Gemara asks: Why does he not know who it is!?

And let him say to him: It is Rabbi Meir, who says: A person

can transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world,

for a person can transfer to another the fruits of a date palm, even though the fruits have not yet come into the world. The Gemara assumes that just as it is possible to transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world, so too it is possible to transfer ownership to something that has not yet come into the world.

The Gemara rejects this: There is a distinction between them!

You may say that you heard Rabbi Meir

say only that a person transfers ownership

to something that is in the world,

that he transfers fruits that are not present in the world to someone who is present in the world.

But to transfer ownership

to something that has not yet come into the world, have you heard him say this!?

We have not heard this, and therefore Rav Huna does not know whose view our Mishna follows.

And the Gemara continues to search for who the tanna is, and asks:

And let him say,

let it be said that our Mishna is according to the view of

Rabbi Yosei, who says: A fetus acquires,

that a fetus can acquire money.

For we learned: A fetus disqualifies.

An Israelite woman who married a priest, and he died, leaving his wife pregnant: the slaves do not eat teruma as the slaves of a priest, even if there are other sons who are priests and are also owners, since the fetus too has a share in the slaves. And so long as he has not been born, he is considered a non-priest and not a priest, and therefore he disqualifies the slaves from eating teruma, by virtue of his share in the slaves.

“And it does not enable [her] to eat,” the words of Rabbi Yosei.

A priestly fetus does not have the power to enable its Israelite mother to eat teruma, which she would eat teruma because of her priestly son, even after her husband has died. For a fetus cannot enable its mother to eat teruma, since while it is a fetus in its mother’s womb, it is considered a non-priest and not a priest.

And from the first ruling, that a fetus disqualifies, it is proven that it has a share in the slaves. And just as it acquires through inheritance, so too it is possible to transfer ownership to it.

The Gemara rejects this:

Inheritance that comes on its own is different,

indeed a fetus can acquire slaves, but this is specifically through inheritance, which passes without an act of acquisition. But to transfer ownership to a fetus is impossible. And the explanation is that there is a deficiency in settled intention when transferring ownership to a fetus that is not yet in the world; but in inheritance, where no transfer of ownership is required, even a fetus can acquire. Since the entire deficiency is on the side of the transferor and not on the side of the acquirer.

And the Gemara continues to discuss:

And let him say to him,

that Rav Huna should say that the Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka. It is he who says

that it is possible to transfer ownership to a fetus,

whether inheritance or whether a gift.

Not only in the language of inheritance, but also in the language of a gift.

For we learned: Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: If he said concerning one

of his sons,

“who is fit to inherit from me,”

that he should receive a larger share in the inheritance than what is due to him,

his words stand.

He acquires all that he added for him. And the Gemara assumed that anyone who is fit to inherit from him, even a fetus, acquires, for it too is fit to inherit from him.

And the Gemara rejects this:

You may say that you heard him,

all that we heard

from Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka

is only

when he transfers ownership to something that is in the world,

to someone who is fit to inherit from him but is presently in the world,

but

to transfer ownership

to something that is not in the world,

such as a fetus,

who said so!?

There is no proof of this from his words.

The Gemara asks:

And let us say: It is Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka,

that indeed we should establish it according to his view,

and he holds,

and perhaps he holds

like Rabbi Yosei,

that a fetus has the capacity to acquire. If so, it is reasonable that his ruling is also stated concerning a fetus, for it is included among those who are fit to inherit from him.

And again the Gemara rejects this:

Who says that he holds this way,

who will tell us this? For there is no proof at all that he holds like Rabbi Yosei.

And let him say to him,

that Rav Huna should establish the Mishna

with “Whoever informs me,”

for the father is not transferring the money to the fetus, but to the one who informs him of the birth of his sons, and the informer is in the world; therefore, it is possible to transfer ownership!?

The Gemara answers:

If so,

if it is speaking of the informer, then the continuation of the Mishna does not imply this:

For it teaches in the latter clause: “And if there is no heir there except him”

[the tumtum],

the tumtum, “he inherits everything,”

if the tumtum is the sole heir, then he inherits

everything.

If it is in “Whoever informs me”—

what business does an heir have!?

If the Mishna is speaking of his transferring ownership to the informer and not to his sons, then the informer has no status of an heir! Rather, it necessarily speaks of his transferring ownership to his sons.

And the Gemara continues to discuss:

And let him say to him,

that Rav Huna should answer that our Mishna is speaking

when she has given birth,

so that at the time of the statement they had already been born, and he says: If my wife gives birth to a male, give him a maneh. And he is not granting acquisition to a fetus, but to one who has been born!?

And the Gemara rejects this:

If so,

if you wish to say that he is transferring ownership to his sons who have already been born, then this is not the meaning of the wording of the Mishna

! For it teaches in the latter clause: “And if he said, ‘Whatever my wife will give birth to, he shall take,’ he shall take it,”

there was no need for it to say

“whatever she will give birth to,”

which implies the future, but

“whatever she has given birth to” should have been stated!

For only the wording “she has given birth” implies that they have already been born, and if so, it necessarily speaks of his granting acquisition to a fetus.

Until now we have understood that it is impossible for one who has not been born to acquire if he wishes to transfer ownership to him now.