Bava Batra 141b (קמא:) — the Talmud in English

As it is taught in a beraita: “Whoever tells me,”

whoever tells me

“what my wife gave birth to,”

what my wife gave birth to,

“if it is a male, he shall take a maneh,”

if he tells me about the birth of a male, he will receive a maneh from me!

If she gave birth to a male—

he takes a maneh,

as he stipulated. But for news of a female birth, he receives nothing, since it is implied by his stipulation that he does not want a female.

And if he stipulated,

“If it is a female, he shall take a maneh,”

meaning that if he tells him about a female birth, he will receive a maneh,

If she gave birth to a female, he takes a maneh,

as he stipulated. But for news of a male birth, he receives nothing, since he did not stipulate concerning a male.

If she gave birth to a male and a female,

if she gave birth to twins,

he has only a maneh

he receives only one maneh.

The Gemara asks:

But he did not say “a male and a female”!

He did not mention twins in his stipulation, so why should he receive anything? Perhaps he does not want them.

The Gemara answers:

For he also said, “If it is a male and a female,”

also

he shall take a maneh.

The case is one in which he also stipulated concerning twins; it is merely that the beraita abbreviated its wording and did not mention this. And this is the novel point: for twins he receives only one maneh. It should not be said that he gives a maneh for each one separately, in which case, for twins he should receive two hundred zuz. Therefore, the beraita emphasizes: “only a maneh.”

The Gemara asks:

Rather, what is it meant to exclude!?

If he gives a maneh for every piece of news, why does he need to specify that whoever tells him about his wife’s giving birth will receive a maneh?

The Gemara answers:

To exclude a stillborn child.

His intention is to exclude a stillborn child, which is not viable; for such news he gives nothing.

A certain

husband

said to his wife,

who was pregnant:

“My property is for this one whom you are carrying,”

I hereby transfer my property to the fetus you are carrying.

Rav Huna said: This is one who transfers ownership to a fetus,

this is a case of transferring ownership to a fetus,

and one who transfers ownership to a fetus has not acquired.

It is impossible to transfer ownership to a fetus, since it is considered something that has not yet come into the world; therefore, it does not acquire.

The Gemara challenges Rav Huna:

Rav Naḥman raised an objection to Rav Huna

from the earlier Mishna:

“One who says, ‘If my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a maneh’; if she gives birth to a male, he takes a maneh.”

It is evident from the Mishna that although he transfers ownership to a fetus, the transfer is nevertheless effective.

He said to him,

Rav Huna replied:

“Our Mishna—I do not know who taught it!”

The Mishna follows the view of a particular tanna who indeed holds that it is possible to transfer ownership to a fetus, but we do not rule in accordance with him. And I do not know which tanna holds this view.

The Gemara asks: Why does he not know who it is?

Let him say to him: It is Rabbi Meir, who says that a person

can transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world,

as a person can transfer to another the produce of a date palm, even though the produce has not yet come into the world. The Gemara assumes that just as it is possible to transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world, so too it is possible to transfer ownership to something that has not yet come into the world.

The Gemara rejects this: There is a difference between them!

Perhaps you heard Rabbi Meir say

only that a person transfers ownership

to something that is in the world,

transferring produce that is not yet in the world to someone who is in the world.

But to transfer ownership

to something that has not yet come into the world—have you heard him say this!?

We have not heard this, and therefore Rav Huna does not know whose view our Mishna follows.

The Gemara continues to seek the identity of the tanna, and asks:

Let him say

that our Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Yosei, who says: A fetus acquires,

that a fetus can acquire property.

As we learned in the Mishna: A fetus disqualifies.

An Israelite woman who married a kohen, and he died, leaving his wife pregnant, causes the slaves not to eat teruma as the slaves of a kohen would, even if there are other sons who are kohanim and are also owners, since the fetus also has a share in the slaves. And as long as he has not been born, he is considered a non-kohen and not a kohen; therefore, he disqualifies the slaves from eating teruma by virtue of his share in them.

“And he does not enable her to eat,” the statement of Rabbi Yosei.

A fetus who is the son of a kohen does not have the power to enable his Israelite mother to eat teruma, which she would eat on account of her kohen son even after her husband has died. A fetus cannot enable his mother to eat teruma, since while he is a fetus in his mother’s womb, he is considered a non-kohen and not a kohen.

From the first ruling, that a fetus disqualifies, it is evident that he has a share in the slaves. And just as he can acquire through inheritance, so too it should be possible to transfer ownership to him.

The Gemara rejects this:

Inheritance that comes on its own is different,

Although a fetus can acquire slaves, this applies specifically to inheritance, which passes without an act of acquisition. But it is impossible to transfer ownership to a fetus. The explanation is that there is a deficiency in forming firm intent to transfer ownership to a fetus who is not yet in the world; with inheritance, however, where no transfer of ownership is necessary, even a fetus can acquire. Since the entire deficiency is on the part of the transferor and not on the part of the acquirer.

The Gemara continues its discussion:

Let him say

that Rav Huna should say that the Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka. For he says

that it is possible to transfer ownership to a fetus,

whether through inheritance or through a gift.

Not only when expressed in the language of inheritance, but also when expressed in the language of a gift.

As we learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: If one said concerning one

of his sons

who is fit to inherit from him

that he should receive a larger portion of the inheritance than the portion due to him,

his words stand.

He acquires everything that the father added to his share. The Gemara assumes that anyone who is fit to inherit from him, even a fetus, acquires, since a fetus too is fit to inherit from him.

The Gemara rejects this:

Perhaps you heard him say this

only

with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka

only

when he transfers ownership to something that is in the world,

to one who is fit to inherit from him but is presently in the world,

but

to transfer ownership

to something that is not in the world,

such as a fetus,

who said so!?

There is no proof of this from his statement.

The Gemara asks:

Let us say that it is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka,

and indeed establish the Mishna in accordance with his view,

and he holds

perhaps he holds

like Rabbi Yosei,

that a fetus has the ability to acquire. If so, it is reasonable that his ruling applies to a fetus as well, since a fetus falls within the category of one who is fit to inherit from him.

The Gemara again rejects this:

Who can say that he holds this view,

who can tell us this? There is no proof at all that he holds like Rabbi Yosei.

Let him say

that Rav Huna should establish the Mishna

as referring to “whoever tells me,”

since the father is not transferring the money to the fetus, but to the one who tells him about the birth of his sons, and the one who tells him is in the world; therefore, the transfer is possible!?

The Gemara answers:

If so,

if the case concerns the one who delivers the message, this is not implied by the continuation of the Mishna:

For it teaches in the latter clause: “And if there is no heir other than him”

the tumtum,

“he inherits everything,”

if the tumtum is the sole heir, he inherits

everything.

If it is referring to “whoever tells me”—

what role does inheritance have for the one who delivers the message!?

If the Mishna is referring to one who transfers ownership to the messenger and not to his sons, the messenger has no status of an heir! Rather, it must be referring to one who transfers ownership to his sons.

The Gemara continues its discussion:

Let him say

that Rav Huna should explain that our Mishna is speaking

of a case in which she had already given birth,

so that at the time of the statement they had already been born, and he says: If my wife gives birth to a male, give him a maneh. He is not transferring ownership to a fetus, but to one who has been born!?

The Gemara rejects this:

If so,

if you wish to say that he transfers ownership to sons who have already been born, this is not the meaning of the language of the Mishna

! For it teaches in the latter clause: “And if he said, ‘Everything that my wife will give birth to, he shall take it, he shall take it,’”

it should not have said

“everything that she will give birth to,”

which implies the future, but rather

“everything that she has given birth to” would have been required!

For only the expression “she has given birth” implies that they have already been born. Therefore, it must be that he is transferring ownership to a fetus.

Until now, we have understood that it is impossible for one who has not yet been born to acquire if one wishes to transfer ownership to him now.