Bava Batra 13a — the Talmud in English

The Gemara proceeds to discuss an additional case:

If their father left them a field, which

on one side

has along its northern boundary

nigra

a water-channel for irrigation,

and on one side

has along its eastern boundary

nahara,

a river.

Here there should be an illustration 3

In this case, it is impossible to divide the field into two parts, for if we divide the field across its width, it will emerge that the river is found only in the portion of one of them, whereas the portion of the other does not border the river at all. And for this reason as well, they cannot divide the field along its length, for if they divide it in this manner, even though their portions along the river will be equal, the entire nigra will fall into the portion of only one of them, and it will emerge that his portion is larger than that of his fellow. Therefore:

They divide it

they must divide the field

by karna zul

into eight portions diagonally , so that by this they will be able to divide it equally, as will be explained — here there should be an illustration 4

For when considering it in relation to the river, the closer the field is to the river, the greater its value. If so, the first in importance are the portions adjacent to the river [portions 1 and 2 in illustration 4], and in this each one takes one of the portions; it follows that in this part of the field their division is equal, for each one received a portion adjacent to the river.

Also, when they divide portions 3 and 8 [which are not adjacent to the river, but are closer to it than the other portions], their division is equal, for these two portions are on the same level, since both are equally close to the river. And likewise regarding the division of portions 4 and 7: these two portions are equal in the measure of their distance from the river, and therefore when each one takes one portion, this is an equal division. And the same applies concerning portions 5 and 6.

And likewise, when considering it in relation to the nigra, their division is equal. For both receive a portion adjacent to the nigra [portions 7 and 8], and they likewise divide equally the portion somewhat distant from the nigra [portions 6 and 1], and they likewise divide equally portions 2 and 5, which are equally distant from the nigra. And likewise concerning portions 4 and 3.

“Nor the reception hall, etc.”:

We learned above [11a] in the Mishna that a partner cannot compel his partner to dismantle the partnership and divide the property, unless even after the division the name of the property will remain upon it. For example: they do not divide a reception hall unless, even after the division, each one will retain in his possession a portion called a “reception hall”; but if after the division the portion in the possession of each one will not be called a “reception hall” [because of its smallness], one cannot compel his partner to divide the reception hall.

And the Gemara is uncertain concerning a situation in which those properties [listed in the Mishna] do not have the possibility of division, because

they are insufficient for this one and for that one,

the courtyard is too small for each one of them to retain a portion whose name would be as it was before the division,

what is the law?

Can the partner say to his fellow: I no longer wish to participate with you. And since I cannot divide this property into two, therefore, you purchase my portion from me, or I will purchase your portion from you?

Or perhaps he does not have the power to compel his partner to purchase or sell, and against his will he will remain a partner with him.

Rabbi Judah said:

In this case

there is a law

that applies to it

of “purchase or be purchased.”

That is, one of them can say to his fellow: either “purchase you purchase my portion in the property from me, and you will be the owner of all of it, or “I will be purchased,” meaning that I will purchase your portion in the property . The foundation of the dispute between Rabbi Judah and Rav Nahman: In the Yad Ramah, subsection 164, he wrote that the foundation of the dispute over whether we say the law of “purchase or be purchased” or not is that they disagreed over what more closely resembles division. Since one of them requests division, and it is impossible to divide the field, we must bring about a situation as similar as possible to division. Rabbi Judah therefore maintains that this situation of “purchase or be purchased” resembles division, since each one takes a portion from which he benefits [land or money], and they withdraw from one another. But Rav Nahman maintains that when they remain partners, this more closely resembles division, because in this manner one does not withdraw entirely from the field, and they divide the uses of the field [or the rental income]. “Purchase or be purchased” where he wishes to purchase the field for more than its value: Tosafot [s.v. it] brought the view of Rabbi Isaac, who maintains that the partner can say to his fellow: purchase my portion in the courtyard from me at a high price [greater than its value], and if you do not wish this, I will purchase your portion from you at the same price that I set. His partner cannot say to him: I wish to purchase your portion, but only for a small amount according to its value; rather, if he does not wish to purchase it at the expensive price, he is obligated to transfer his portion. But the Rיב״א disagrees; see the reason in Tosafot. And the early authorities [the Rosh, section 50, and the responsa attributed to Nahmanides, section 43] inferred from Rashi’s words that his view is like the view of Rabbi Isaac in Tosafot. Their inference is from Rashi’s wording, for he wrote: “Set a price for me and purchase my portion, or I will set a price and give you your portion.” The Beit Yosef explained Rashi’s intent: he says to him, “Set a price for me,” meaning, set for me a price at which you wish to take my portion; and if I wish, I will take your portion from you for that price which you set, and if not, give me the sum of money that you set and I will give you my portion. Or I will set a price for your portion, meaning, I will set a price at which I wish to purchase your portion; then, if you wish, you will give me the same sum that I set and take my portion, and if not, I will take your portion from you for the same sum that I set. If so, it is explained in Rashi’s words that each one has the authority to set the sum of the purchase as he wishes, and this is not specifically at the true price of the property, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Isaac in Tosafot. See further in the Beit Yosef there, which explained Maimonides’ method in this matter, and how Maimonides interpreted the expression “purchase or be purchased.” And see above in the preceding note what we brought from the Derisha to explain the expression “purchase or be purchased” according to Rashi.

Rav Nahman said: There is no law of “purchase or be purchased”!

This law of “purchase or be purchased” does not exist!

Rava said to Rav Nahman: According to you, who say

according to your words, that you maintain that

there is no law of “purchase or be purchased”

and one cannot compel his fellow to purchase or sell, what will be [the law] in the following case:

Two brothers, one of whom is

a firstborn and

the other

an ordinary son ,

whose father left them

as an inheritance

a slave

or

an impure animal—what shall they do?

How shall they divide the inheritance between them? For it is impossible to divide the slave or the animal into several portions. And granted, according to Rabbi Judah, who maintains the law of “purchase or be purchased,” one brother can say to his brother: purchase my portion in the slave or in the animal from me, or I will purchase your portion. But according to Rav Nahman, who says that one cannot compel his fellow to carry out “purchase or be purchased,” how shall they divide the inheritance between them? [The note explains why the Gemara specified “a firstborn and an ordinary son,” for apparently the same difficulty exists with two ordinary brothers whose father left them a slave or an impure animal: how do they divide it? ]

He said to him

Rav Nahman to Rava.

“I say”

that the division will be in this manner:

the slave works

for the slave [or the animal

for this one

the ordinary brother

one day, and for that one, the firstborn, two days

in accordance with the law of a “firstborn,” who takes double; and it follows that although they did not divide the body of the slave or the animal, nevertheless they divided the labor of the slave or the animal.

But Rava, who raised the objection, “How do they make [the division]?” refused to say that the division would be in this manner, and his reason will be explained in the note .

It was objected

An objection from a Mishna against Rav Yehuda, who holds the law of gud o agud.

We learned in the Mishna:

One

who was the slave of two partners, and one of them emancipated him, and it turns out

that he is half a slave

[for one did not emancipate him, and he is still his slave]

and half a free man

[for one partner emancipated him].

The law of this slave is that he

works for his master

who did not emancipate him

one day, and for himself one day

for he is half a free man.

The words of Beit Hillel!

Beit Shammai say:

In what you said, that he works for his master one day, in this

you have remedied his master,

for the slave continues to work for him, but

the

slave

himself you have not remedied,

because this slave cannot marry! For the slave, although he is forbidden to marry a free woman, is permitted to marry a maidservant. And after his emancipation he is forbidden to marry a maidservant, but is permitted to marry a free woman. Whereas this one, who is half a slave and half a free man,

cannot marry a maidservant,

for he is half a free man, and a free man is forbidden to marry a maidservant, and likewise

cannot marry a free woman,

for he is half a slave, and a slave is forbidden to marry a free woman.

Lest you say:

Let him remain idle

and not marry a woman,

but was the world created for anything other than procreation, as it is stated, “He did not create it for emptiness,”

the Holy One, blessed be He, did not create the world for emptiness—that there should be no people in it—but

“He formed it to be inhabited,”

so that human beings should inhabit it. If so, we may not leave him so that he does not marry a woman, for he must fulfill the command of “He formed it to be inhabited.”

Rather,

for the sake of the repair of the world

so that one who is half a slave and half a free man will be able to marry a woman,

we compel his master

to emancipate him ,

and make him a free man,

and through this he can marry a free woman.

But the slave must pay his master in exchange for his emancipation,

and

therefore

they write a document

the slave writes for his master a document of obligation

for half his value

for half the value of the slave [for only half of him belonged to his master], and after he is emancipated he must discharge his document and pay.

And Beit Hillel returned to rule in accordance with the words of Beit Shammai!

And we raise an objection: are not the slave and his master partners, since half of the slave belongs to the master and his other half belongs to himself? If so, even without this reason of the repair of the world, the slave can compel his master to emancipate him. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one partner can say to his partner, “gud o agud,” here too the slave can say to the master: I wish to dissolve the partnership and purchase the portion that you have in me. And why did Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel need the reason of “the repair of the world”?

And we answer:

Here it is different:

this partnership of the slave and his master differs from other types of partnership. For in every ordinary division of a partnership, the partner can say to his fellow, “gud”—you purchase my portion—or “agud”—I will purchase your portion from you. But here, even though

there is agud,

for the slave can say to his master: sell me the portion that you have in me, nevertheless

there is no gud:

it is not possible for him to offer the master to purchase the portion of the “free man” in him. For since he has been emancipated, he can no longer sell himself as a slave.

And although he can sell himself as a Hebrew slave, this is not considered gud. For a Hebrew slave can be sold only for six years. It follows that he says to the master, “Gud”—purchase my portion for labor for six years—or “agud”—sell me the portion that you have in me for lifelong labor—and it follows that the gud and the agud are not equal.

Come and hear!

A proof for Rav Naḥman, who holds that there is no law of gud o agud.

Two brothers, one poor and one wealthy, whose father left them

as an inheritance, a

bathhouse

or

an olive press

[in which olives are crushed for oil].

When the brothers come to divide the inheritance, if

he made them

their father [the bathhouse or the olive press]

for rental,

in order to rent them to others—in this case, the brothers too continue to rent out the bathhouse and the olive press, and

the rental proceeds are in the middle

and they divide the rental proceeds equally.

And the Gemara asks:

But say

how do you derive from this that Iyov was in the days of Ahasuerus? Is it not possible to say that Iyov was

in the days of David, for

indeed

it is written

concerning David [I Kings, chapter 1, verse 3]:

“And they sought a beautiful young woman

throughout every border of Israel”?

And the Gemara answers: The verse in Iyov, “And women as beautiful as the daughters of Iyov were not found in all the land,” cannot be compared with the verse stated concerning David, “And they sought a beautiful young woman throughout every border of Israel,” because

there,

concerning David, it is stated:

“throughout every border of Israel,”

whereas

here,

concerning Iyov, it is stated:

“in all the land.”

Rabbi Natan says: Iyov was in the days of the kingdom of Sheba

in the period of King Solomon,

as it is stated

in Iyov, chapter 1, verse 15:

“And Sheba fell upon them and took them.”

When the sufferings began to come upon Iyov, the angel informed Iyov that his flocks and servants had been taken captive by the queen of Sheba; and it is proven that Iyov was in the days of the queen of Sheba.

And the Sages say: Iyov was in the days of the Chaldeans

in the time of Nebuchadnezzar,

as it is stated

in Iyov, chapter 1, verse 17:

“The Chaldeans appointed three heads

and they raided the camels”—and from the fact that a Chaldean force came upon Iyov, the Sages learned that Iyov was in the days of Nebuchadnezzar.

And there are those who say

Iyov was in the days of Jacob, and he married Dinah, the daughter of Jacob.

For

it is written here

in Iyov [chapter 2, verses 9–10]: “And his wife said to him: Do you still hold fast to your integrity? Bless G-d and die. And he said to her:

You speak as one of the foolish women,”

and it is written there

in Genesis [chapter 34, verse 7]: “...

for he had committed a disgraceful act in Israel by lying with the daughter of Jacob.” And we derive a gezera shava from the expression “disgraceful act” stated concerning Dinah, to teach you that Iyov said to Dinah, “You speak as one of the foolish women”; it follows that he was in the days of Jacob.

Now the Gemara returns to explain the dispute of the tannaim whether Iyov was from Israel or from the nations of the world.

And all these tannaim

all the tannaim who disagreed above concerning the time in which Iyov lived, all of them

hold

that Iyov was an Israelite,

as will be explained below,

except,

apart from

“there are those who say,”

who said that Iyov was in the days of Dinah.

If it should enter your mind

that all those tannaim above hold that Job was

from the nations of the world,

this is not possible, for according to all those tannaim Job was after the death of Moses. And

after Moses had died, did the Divine Presence rest

did it rest

upon the nations of the world?!

But

not

did the Master say: Moses requested that the Divine Presence not rest upon the nations of the world, and it was granted to him. As it is stated:

in Exodus [33:16], that Moses our teacher requested of the Holy One, blessed be He,

“And I and Your people shall be distinguished,”

that the Divine Presence should not rest upon the nations of the world, and through this the people of Israel would be distinguished from the other nations. And afterward the Holy One, blessed be He, said to him [there, verse 17], “I will also do this thing that you have spoken.” It follows that Job, who was a prophet and upon whom the Divine Presence rested, must have been from Israel.

But according to the opinion of those who say that Job was in the days of Dinah, there is no proof that Job was from Israel, for this period was before the period of Moses, and at that time the Divine Presence also rested upon the nations of the world

Rabbi Yohanan said: The generation of Job was steeped in licentiousness. As it is stated: [

Job 27:12] “

Behold, all of you have seen it, and why do you make yourselves utterly vain?”

And it is written

in the Song of Songs: “

Return, return, O Shulammite; return, return, that we may look upon you.”

And the expression “that we may look upon you” is an expression of licentiousness, concerning gazing at women [and the verse’s intention is by way of parable, saying that this is what the idolaters say to Israel: Return to our Torah and engage in licentiousness with us ].

And the Gemara learns by means of a gzera shava, from the expression “that we may look” stated in Proverbs, to the expression “you have seen” stated in Job, that the intention of “you have seen” is licentiousness. And this is what Job said to his companions: All of you have “seen,” meaning, all of you are steeped in licentiousness .

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Say

perhaps what Job said to his companions, “all of you have seen,” does not refer to the matter of licentiousness, but rather, you have seen

through prophecy,

for we find in prophecy the expression “vision,”

as it is written: “

The vision of Isaiah son of Amoz”!

And the Gemara answers:

If so,

if the intention is that you have seen through prophecy, “

why do you make yourselves utterly vain,”

why do I need it ?

Why did Job continue and say to them concerning the prophetic vision, “you make yourselves utterly vain”?

And Rabbi Yohanan said: What is the meaning of that which is written

in the Scroll of Ruth: “

And it was in the days of the judging of the judges”?

What is the repetition, “the judging of the judges”?

Rather, the intention is a

generation that judges its judges.

For the judges themselves were corrupt, and when they judged, the person being judged had an opening to say to the judge: Are you yourself not clean? How, then, will you judge me?