Bava Batra 12b — the Talmud in English

Rather, said Rava: Know this

that prophecy was not taken from the sages:

for

behold,

a great man stated a matter

a sage says a halakha on his own authority,

and

that halakha

is stated

exact location on the page

in the name of Rabbi Akiva bar Yosef, in accordance with him;

thus, the sage is a prophet, for he stated in accordance with the words of Rabbi Akiva without knowing that Rabbi Akiva had stated this halakha—and one cannot say that he happened upon the words of Rabbi Akiva because he was of his fortune, for certainly Rabbi Akiva was much wiser than he, and he was not of his fortune.

Rav Ashi said: And what is the difficulty?

this still is no proof that the sage is a prophet, for

perhaps for this matter he is of his fortune

perhaps with regard to this matter that sage is of the fortune of Rabbi Akiva, even though he is not of his fortune with regard to wisdom.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Know this

that the sage is a prophet:

for

behold,

a great man stated a matter

a sage innovates a halakha on his own authority,

and a halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai is stated in accordance with him

and it was said to Moses at Sinai as he said; thus, the sage who innovated the halakha is a prophet.

And we challenge this:

perhaps

is it not possible that by chance the sage stated a halakha that was said to Moses at Sinai,

like a blind man at a skylight

at a skylight one descends from the roof attic to the house, and “a blind man at a skylight” is a metaphor for one who reached his goal by chance and without prior intention, like a blind man who by chance succeeded in directing his way and descending through the skylight , but there are here no words of prophecy concerning what was said to Moses at Sinai.

And we answer:

and

for

does he not provide a reason?

does the Torah scholar not provide a reason for the halakha, and this reasoning came into his mind through prophecy, and he merited agreeing with the halakha given to Moses at Sinai

. Rabbi Yohanan said: From the day the Temple was destroyed

prophecy was taken from the prophets and given to fools and children

.

And we explain:

What is [the prophecy] for fools?

Like this

as in an incident that occurred:

for Mar bar Rav Ashi was standing in the marketplace of Meḥoza

Mar bar Rav Ashi stood in the marketplace in the city of Meḥoza,

he heard a certain fool saying: The head of the academy who will reign in Mata Meḥasya,

the head of the academy who is destined to reign today in the city of Mata Meḥasya,

Tavyomi signs

he signs his letters with the designation “Tavyomi”

.— He said

Mar bar Rav Ashi:

Who signs Tavyomi among the Sages?

which of the Sages signs with the designation “Tavyomi”? Surely

I.

Learn from this that my hour has arrived

and from here I learn that my fortune is standing me in good stead at this hour.—

Immediately

Mar bar Rav Ashi arose

Mar bar Rav Ashi and

came

he came to the city of Mata Meḥasya,

when he came

and before he reached the city,

the Sages resolved

the Sages decided

to establish him

to seat

Rav Aḥa of Difti at the head

at the head of the academy . And

once they heard that he had come

when the Sages heard that Mar bar Rav Ashi had arrived in the city,

they sent a pair of Sages to him

they sent him two Torah scholars

to take counsel with him

to receive from him advice and permission to appoint Rav Aḥa.

He detained them

Mar bar Rav Ashi detained the pair of Sages with him.

They again sent another pair of Sages

they returned and sent him another pair of Sages, and also them

he detained with him

he detained with him. And again they sent him another pair

until ten were filled in his house

until ten Sages had gathered with him.

Once ten were filled in his house

once ten men had arrived with him,

he opened, and taught, and expounded

Mar bar Rav Ashi began and expounded, and became head of the academy; and the reason he waited for ten men to come to him was

because one does not open

to expound

in the kallah

in the tractate in which the head of the academy expounds

with fewer than ten!

Rav Aḥa

of Difti

applied [the statement] to himself

as referring to himself:

All who do harm to him

one to whom they did evil

are not soon benefited;

that is, since the hour was postponed, they will no longer appoint me as head of the academy,

and all who benefit him are not soon harmed.

This incident proves that prophecy was given to fools, for just as the fool prophesied that Mar bar Rav Ashi would be head of the academy, so it was—and the Gemara adds another incident from which it is proved that prophecy was given to children—

What is [the prophecy] for a child?

Like this

as in an incident that occurred:

for the daughter of Rav Ḥisda was sitting in the lap of her father

the daughter of Rav Ḥisda was sitting in the lap of her father,

Rava and Rami bar Ḥama were sitting before him

and Rava and Rami bar Ḥama were sitting before Rav Ḥisda.

He said to her

Rav Ḥisda said to his daughter:

Which of them do you want?

which of them do you want as a husband?

She said to him: Both of them

both of them. And Rava was concerned about her words, and therefore

Rava said: And I will be last

I will be the last among your husbands

, and so it was

and so it was: she was first married to Rami bar Ḥama and afterward married to Rava.

Rabbi Avdimi from Haifa said: Before a person eats and drinks, he has two hearts

that is, his mind is not complete,

after he eats and drinks, he has only one heart

and his mind is complete

As it is stated:

.

As it is stated: “ A hollow man acquires a heart”

that is, a person who is hollow, whose belly is not full, acquires a heart, he has something resembling two hearts,

and it is written, ‘hollow boards,’ and we translate: hollow boards.

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said: One accustomed to wine—even if his heart is sealed like that of a virgin, wine opens it, as it is stated: “

And wine makes virgins speak”

that is, a person whose heart is sealed like that of a virgin—the wine makes his heart hollow and open:

Brothers who come to divide their father’s inheritance: the firstborn takes a double portion from his brothers. One portion he receives like his brothers, and this is called below the “ordinary portion”; and an additional portion he receives according to Torah law, for the firstborn takes “a double portion,” and this is called below the “firstborn portion.”—

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said:

It is obvious

it is an obvious matter that when a firstborn takes two portions in his father’s field, then, whether the

portion

he receives by law of the

firstborn, or

whether the

ordinary portion

he receives like his brothers—the same two portions

we give him on one boundary

we must give him in one place, adjoining one another.—

This law is derived below [124a] from a verse . The reason for this law is that what the Torah innovated—that the firstborn takes two portions—is not two separate rights to receive two fields; rather, from the outset the Torah granted him one large field, and his one portion may not be divided between two places .

The Gemara is uncertain:

What is the law concerning a levir?

For concerning the levirate-marriage portion, the Sages expounded from the verse “he shall establish [his brother’s] name upon his dead brother” that when the father’s inheritance is divided, the levir [who married his deceased brother’s wife] takes a double portion of his father’s property: his own portion and likewise the portion of his deceased brother

. The Gemara is uncertain whether the levir is entitled to receive those same two portions in one place, adjoining one another, or perhaps the levir’s right is only to receive two portions, but he cannot compel his brothers to give him the two portions in one place.

Abaye said: It is the same!

Just as the firstborn’s right is to receive the two portions in one place, so too the levir’s right is to receive his portion and his brother’s portion in one place.

What is the reason?

The Merciful One called him a firstborn!

Because the levir is called “firstborn” in the Torah. For concerning the levirate marriage it is stated about the levir, “And it shall be that the firstborn,” and one must learn from this that his law is like that of a firstborn. And just as the Torah innovated that the firstborn takes his two portions in one place, so too is the law of the levir.

Rava said

the law of the levir is not like that of a firstborn! His reason is that concerning levirate marriage,

the verse says

the verse states concerning the levir: “

And it shall be that the firstborn,”

and from the expression “and it shall be” one must learn that

his being

is like a firstborn

the levir’s resemblance to a firstborn is only in the “being” [the reality] of the inheritance: in reality he inherits like a firstborn, taking two portions like a firstborn, but—

his division is not like that of a firstborn

with regard to the laws of division he does not resemble a firstborn. The firstborn compels his brothers to give him his two portions in one place, whereas the levir is not so, and his brothers can reject him and give him two separate portions.

The Gemara now proceeds to discuss the laws of dividing an inherited field.

There was a certain man who purchased land

an incident involving one who purchased land

on the boundary of his father-in-law’s house

on the boundary of his father’s field , and his father died.

When they divided

when the heirs came to divide their father’s field among themselves,

he said to them

the brother who had purchased land beside the father’s field

Divide for me on my boundary

I want to receive my portion in our father’s field adjoining the field belonging to me, so that I will thereby have a large field.

Rabbah said,

in a case

such as this,

where that brother benefits by receiving that portion in the field, whereas his brothers suffer no loss from it, for as far as they are concerned there is no difference between this field and another,

we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom

we compel his brothers to give him the portion in the field adjoining his, for he benefits from this and they lack nothing, and this is “we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom”

. First: This entire law of compelling on account of the attribute of Sodom applies only where he claims in his father’s field the portion adjoining his own field. Since, before the division, his field was already adjoining that portion of his father’s field, in this case we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom and give him that field. But if two brothers come and ask to be partners in the fields they inherited from their father, and therefore ask to receive two adjoining fields [so that together they will have a large field in which they will be partners], in this case the other brothers are not obligated to give them two adjoining fields, and this is not the attribute of Sodom. [The reason for this will be explained below.] Accordingly, Tosafot answered that the firstborn’s entire claim to receive his portion in one place has only the force of two brothers who wish to become partners. Therefore, were it not for the Torah’s innovation that the firstborn takes his two portions in one place, we would not give them to him in one place; there is no “we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom,” for with two brothers who wish to become partners this is not the attribute of Sodom, as above, and the firstborn is like two brothers. For this reason we require the Torah’s innovation here. And concerning the reason that two brothers who wish to become partners are not entitled to be given two adjoining fields, although the other brothers suffer no loss from this, whereas the brothers who wish to become partners benefit by receiving two adjoining fields—and if so, apparently this is the “attribute of Sodom”—they explained this on the basis of what the Rashba wrote: This law that we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom applies only where, before the division, the brother’s field was adjoining the father’s field. But if only after the division will a situation arise in which one of the brothers will be a “bar-metzra,” he is not entitled to be given a field adjoining his future field. The explanation of this matter was given by the gaon Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky, of blessed memory [in the Shiurei HaGrash, here]: What is explained in the sugya—that by the rule of “we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom” we must give the “bar-metzra” the portion adjoining his field—is because this rule creates a situation in which that portion of the field does not fall at all into the division among the brothers; rather, by virtue of “we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom,” this portion falls directly to the share of the “bar-metzra.” This is specifically where he was a “bar-metzra” before the brothers’ division, for then it is possible to say that by virtue of compelling on account of the attribute of Sodom, this portion is removed from the brothers and falls to his share. But when two brothers wish to become partners after the division, as long as they have not divided there is no “bar-metzra”; therefore this field falls to division among all the brothers. Once the brothers have a share in this field, they are no longer obligated to relinquish their right to this field. Therefore, concerning the firstborn, since his two claims resemble the claim of two brothers who demand to receive their portions in one place [because we regard the “firstborn portion” and the “ordinary portion” as two separate claims], for this reason we require the Torah’s innovation that nevertheless the firstborn receives his portion in one place. Tosafot gave a second answer: Since the Torah calls the firstborn’s additional portion a “gift,” for the verse says “to give him a double portion,” the giver of the gift cannot be compelled to give the gift in one place. They explained the words of Tosafot according to the words of the Netivot HaMishpat [section 278, subsection 9], that this law—that the firstborn receives “a double portion”—is a law stated with regard to the brothers, and the obligation is imposed upon them to give him “a double portion.” Accordingly, the words of Tosafot are explained: Since the firstborn portion is called a gift, and the brothers are the givers of the gift, the firstborn cannot compel them to give him the gift as one portion; therefore we require a ruling that teaches us to give him the two portions in one place. Tosafot further wrote in the name of the Ritzba that, fundamentally, “we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom” is not applicable here at all, because this law was stated only in a case where one lives in his fellow’s courtyard [in a place where his fellow would not rent out his courtyard to another person], and the question is whether he must pay or not. In such a case, we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom, and he is not obligated to pay him, for in any event he would not have rented his courtyard to others. But if the question is not about payment, but the resident wishes to enter to live in the courtyard and the owner of the courtyard does not allow him to enter, this is not the attribute of Sodom, and the owner of the courtyard is entitled to prevent him from entering the courtyard. Our case resembles a place where he does not allow him to enter his domain [for his portion and the portions of the other brothers in the field are equal, and they prevent him from taking that particular portion of the field]. Therefore, fundamentally, the law of “we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom” is not applicable here. What they said in our sugya, “we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom,” is only by rabbinic enactment. Accordingly, it is not difficult why the Torah needed to innovate that the firstborn takes his two portions in one place, because by Torah law “we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom” is not applicable here, as stated above. And in the aforementioned words of the Ritzba there is a great innovation: The reason for the law that we learned in Bava Kamma 20a—that one who lives in his fellow’s courtyard without his knowledge, in a place where his fellow does not intend to rent out the courtyard, is exempt from paying the resident—is that it is on account of “we compel on account of the attribute of Sodom.” So too wrote the Penei Yehoshua there, and from Tosafot here it is evident that they agree with his words. Rav Yosef challenges this:

this is not the “practice of Sodom,” because

the brothers say to him

the brothers say to him: Our desire is specifically for that field adjacent to your field, because this field

we value more highly

it is more valuable to us,

like the estates of the house of Bar Maryon

like the fields of Bar Maryon [the name of a man who had excellent land]. And this concerns a case in which the fields that their father bequeathed to them are nourished by rainwater, and the brothers claim that perhaps this field adjacent to their brother’s field will be blessed with rainwater more than its fellows.

And therefore they do not desire to give him this field, and since they suffer a loss by giving him this field [for perhaps the other fields will be blessed less than this field]], therefore their opposition is not considered the “practice of Sodom.”

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosef!

For the brothers may not be compelled to give that brother the portion adjacent to his field.

The Gemara continues to discuss another case in the laws of dividing an inherited field.

Reuven and Shimon whose father left them as an inheritance

two tracts of land

two parcels of land

on two river channels

and adjacent to each of the fields was a body of water from which the field could be irrigated. And one of those fields was adjacent to a field that had already belonged to Reuven , and Reuven requests to receive his portion of the inheritance in that field adjacent to his field.

Rabba said:

in a case

such as this

where Reuven benefits from receiving that field adjacent to his field, whereas Shimon suffers no loss if he gives him that field, since for Shimon there is no difference between this field and its fellow, as both fields are equal, because both have a body of water for irrigation, in this case

we compel on account of the practice of Sodom

if Shimon objects to giving Reuven the field adjacent to his field, this is the “practice of Sodom,” and we compel Shimon to give Reuven that field. [

Although earlier Rabbi Yosef said that he can claim, “This field is worth more to me,” that applies specifically to a field that grows from rainwater, where he can claim that perhaps this field adjacent to your field will be blessed more than its fellow. But here we are dealing with a field nourished through irrigation, and since the two fields are equal, as both have a body of water, Shimon can no longer prevent Reuven from taking that field adjacent to his field].

Rav Yosef challenges this:

this is not the “practice of Sodom,” for Shimon can claim to Reuven: I do not wish to give you the entire field adjacent to your field, because

at times

sometimes

this one

that body of water adjacent to the second field

dries up

will dry up,

whereas this one

while the body of water adjacent to the field that you are demanding

does not dry up

will not dry up. And therefore I do not want to give you this field that you request; rather, I want us to divide the two fields, so that each one of us will take half a field , and in this manner, even if one body of water dries up, each one of us will still have a portion of the other field.

And since this is so, this is no longer the practice of Sodom, for if the entire field is given to Reuven, Shimon will suffer a loss if the body of water in his portion dries up, and for that reason Shimon may demand to divide each and every field.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosef!

And now the Gemara discusses another case!

Reuven and Shimon whose father left them

two [

tracts of land]

two parcels of land

on one river channel

situated on the bank of one river, and one of those fields was adjacent to a field that had already belonged to Reuven , and Reuven requests to receive his portion of the inheritance in that field adjacent to his field.

An illustration should be here 1

Rav Yosef said:

in a case

such as this

where Reuven benefits from receiving the field adjacent to his field, whereas Shimon suffers no loss if he gives him that field,

“we compel on account of the practice of Sodom,”

and we compel Shimon to give Reuven the field adjacent to his field. -

This case differs from the cases preceding it, since in this case no situation can arise in which one field will be superior to the other. For here too we are dealing with a field that grows through irrigation, and both fields are adjacent to the same river, which serves as their source of irrigation. Therefore, in this case Rabbi Yosef concedes that Shimon’s opposition to giving Reuven the field adjacent to his field is the “practice of Sodom,” for as far as he is concerned there is no difference between the two fields, and “we compel on account of the practice of Sodom.”

Abaye challenges

Rav Yosef: even in this case this is not the “practice of Sodom,” because

he can say

Shimon can claim to Reuven: I want you specifically to take the field that is not adjacent to your courtyard, through which I will profit, because

you would need to increase the number of tenant farmers

you would have to increase the number of tenant farmers [field workers]. For if you take the field that is not adjacent to your field, it follows that you will have two fields, in each of which you will have to place tenant farmers. And since my field will be between those two fields, it follows that the tenant farmers in your fields will guard my field , and since he has a reason on account of which he does not want to give Reuven the field adjacent to his field, this is no longer the “practice of Sodom.”

And the halakha

the halakha is

in accordance with Rabbi Yosef

that in this case “we compel on account of the practice of Sodom,” since

increasing [

the tenant farmers]

this claim that Shimon makes, that he will profit by being surrounded by tenant farmers,

is not a matter

is not a claim, for the field itself is not worth more to him; rather, if they divide it in this manner, he will have a secondary profit from the guarding by the tenant farmers. And on account of this profit Shimon cannot divert him to another field; rather, we compel him to give Reuven the field adjacent to his field.