Bava Batra 12b (יב:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rava said: Know that

prophecy has not been taken from the Sages,

for

there is the case where

a great man stated a matter

a Sage formulated a halakha on his own initiative, and

that

same halakha

is stated

in the name of Rabbi Akiva bar Yosef, in accordance with his view. This shows that the Sage is a prophet, for he stated the same thing as Rabbi Akiva without knowing that Rabbi Akiva had stated this halakha. And one cannot say that he arrived at Rabbi Akiva’s view because he was his astrological counterpart, since Rabbi Akiva was certainly far wiser than he, and he was not his astrological counterpart.

thus, the sage is a prophet, for he stated in accordance with the words of Rabbi Akiva without knowing that Rabbi Akiva had stated this halakha—and one cannot say that he happened upon the words of Rabbi Akiva because he was of his fortune, for certainly Rabbi Akiva was much wiser than he, and he was not of his fortune.

Rav Ashi said: What difficulty is this?

It is still no proof that the Sage is a prophet, for

perhaps with regard to this matter he was his astrological counterpart.

It is possible that with regard to this particular matter that Sage was Rabbi Akiva’s astrological counterpart, although he was not his counterpart with regard to wisdom.

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Know

that the Sage is a prophet,

for

there is the case where

a great man stated a matter

a Sage innovated a halakha on his own initiative,

and a halakha transmitted from Sinai to Moses was stated in accordance with his view.

Since the matter was said to Moses at Sinai exactly as the Sage had innovated it, the Sage who innovated the halakha is a prophet.

And we challenge this:

Perhaps

it is possible that the Sage happened to state a halakha that had been transmitted to Moses at Sinai,

like a blind man descending through a skylight

A skylight is an opening through which one descends from the roof into the house. “A blind man through a skylight” is a metaphor for someone who reaches his destination by chance and without prior intention, like a blind man who happens to find his way and descend through the opening, but this is not an instance of prophetic knowledge of what was said to Moses at Sinai.

And we answer:

And

if

is he not providing a reason?

The Torah scholar provides a rationale for the halakha, and this reasoning came to his mind through prophecy, enabling him to arrive at the halakha transmitted to Moses at Sinai.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: From the day the Temple was destroyed

prophecy was taken from the prophets and given to fools and infants.

.

And we explain:

What is the instance involving fools?

It is like this:

as in the following incident:

Mar bar Rav Ashi was standing in the marketplace of Meḥoza

Mar bar Rav Ashi was standing in the marketplace in the city of Meḥoza.

He heard a certain fool saying: The head of the academy who will reign in Matalta is Taviumi, who signs

his letters with the title “Taviumi”

Taviumi has signed

he signed his letters with the title “Taviumi”.

He said

Mar bar Rav Ashi:

Who among the Sages signs as Taviumi?

Which of the Sages signs with the title “Taviumi”? Surely

I do.

Infer from this that the hour is standing for me

and from this I learn that my fortune is favorable at this time.

Immediately

he arose

Mar bar Rav Ashi, and

he came

to the city of Matalta.

By the time he came

before he reached the city,

the Sages had decided

the Sages had resolved

to appoint him

to seat

Rav Aḥa of Difti at the head

as head of the academy. And

once they heard that he had arrived

when the Sages heard that Mar bar Rav Ashi had arrived in the city,

they sent a pair of Sages to him

they dispatched two Torah scholars to him

to consult with him

to obtain his advice and permission to appoint Rav Aḥa.

He detained them

Mar bar Rav Ashi detained the pair of scholars with him.

Then they sent another pair of Sages

they again sent him another pair of Sages, and he also

detained them with him

detained them with him. And once again they sent him another pair,

until ten were gathered in his house

until ten Sages had assembled with him.

Once ten were gathered in his house

once ten people had arrived at his home,

he opened and taught and expounded

Mar bar Rav Ashi began teaching, expounded the Torah, and became head of the academy. The reason he waited until ten people came to him was

because one does not begin

to expound

the tractate

the tractate in which the head of the academy delivers his lecture

with fewer than ten!

Rav Aḥa

of Difti

applied

the statement to himself:

All who cause him harm

one whom others have harmed

are not soon benefited.

That is, since the favorable hour had been postponed, they would no longer appoint me head of the academy.

And all who benefit him are not soon harmed.

This incident proves that prophecy was given to fools, for just as the fool prophesied that Mar bar Rav Ashi would become head of the academy, so it was. The Gemara now brings another incident proving that prophecy was given to infants:

What is the instance involving an infant?

It is like this:

as in the following incident:

Rav Ḥisda’s daughter was sitting in her father’s lap

Rav Ḥisda’s daughter was sitting in the lap of her father.

Rava and Rami bar Ḥama were sitting before him

and were sitting before Rav Ḥisda.

He said to her

Rav Ḥisda said to his daughter:

Which of them do you want?

Which of them do you want as a husband?

She said to him: Both of them

Both of them. Rava was concerned by her words, and therefore

Rava said: And I will be the latter

I will be the last of your husbands.

And so it was

and so it was: she first married Rami bar Ḥama and afterward married Rava.

Rabbi Avdimi of Haifa said: Before a person eats and drinks, he has two hearts

that is, his mind is not settled.

After he eats and drinks, he has only one heart

and his mind is settled.

As it is stated:

.

“A hollow man becomes wise-hearted”

that is, a person who is hollow, whose abdomen is not full, becomes wise-hearted; he has something resembling two hearts.

And it is written: “Hollow boards,” and we translate it: “Hollow planks.”

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: One who is accustomed to wine—even if his heart is sealed like that of a virgin, wine opens his mind, as it is stated:

“And wine makes virgins speak”

that is, a person whose heart is sealed like that of a virgin—wine makes his heart hollow and open:

When brothers come to divide their father’s inheritance, the firstborn takes a double portion from his brothers. He receives one portion, like his brothers, which is called below the “ordinary portion,” and he receives an additional portion, as prescribed by the Torah, since the firstborn takes “a double portion”; this is called below the “firstborn’s portion.”

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

It is obvious

that it is obvious that when a firstborn takes two portions in his father’s field, both the

portion

that he receives by law

of the firstborn, and

the

ordinary portion

that he receives like his brothers, those two portions

are given to him adjacent to one another

we must give them to him in one place, next to each other.

This law is derived below [124a] from a verse. The rationale for this law is that when the Torah innovated that the firstborn takes two portions, this does not mean that he has two separate rights to receive two fields. Rather, from the outset the Torah granted him one large field, and his one portion may not be divided between two locations.

The Gemara is uncertain:

What is the law with regard to a yavam?

For the Sages derived from the verse “He shall arise in the name of his dead brother” in the passage concerning levirate marriage that when the father’s estate is divided, the yavam—the brother who married the wife of his deceased brother—takes a double portion of his father’s property: his own portion as well as the portion of his deceased brother.

The Gemara is uncertain whether the yavam is entitled to receive those two portions in one place, adjacent to one another, or whether the yavam’s right is only to receive two portions, but he cannot compel his brothers to give him both portions in one place.

Abaye said: It is the same!

Just as the firstborn has the right to receive both portions in one place, so too the yavam has the right to receive his portion and his deceased brother’s portion in one place.

What is the reason?

The Torah calls him a firstborn!

Because the yavam is called a “firstborn” in the Torah. In the passage concerning levirate marriage, the yavam is described with the words “And it shall be that the firstborn,” and it may be learned from this that his law is like that of a firstborn. Just as the Torah innovated that the firstborn takes his two portions in one place, so too is the law with regard to the yavam.

Rava said

that the yavam’s law is not like that of a firstborn. The reason is that in the passage concerning levirate marriage,

the verse says

the verse states regarding the yavam:

“And it shall be that the firstborn,”

and from the wording “and it shall be” it may be learned that

his existence

is like that of a firstborn.

The yavam resembles a firstborn only with regard to the “existence” [the reality] of the inheritance: in practice, he inherits like a firstborn and takes two portions like a firstborn. However,

his division is not like that of a firstborn.

With regard to the laws of division, he does not resemble a firstborn: the firstborn can compel his brothers to give him both portions in one place, whereas this is not so with the yavam, and his brothers may reject his request and give him two separate portions.

The Gemara now proceeds to discuss the laws governing the division of an inherited field.

There was a certain man who purchased land

a certain man bought a tract of land

on the boundary of his father-in-law’s property

along the border of his father’s field, and his father died.

When they divided

when the heirs came to divide their father’s field among themselves,

he said to them

the brother who had bought land beside his father’s field said:

“Divide my portion along my boundary”

I want to receive my portion of our father’s field adjacent to the field that belongs to me, so that I will have one large field.

Rabba said:

In a case

such as this,

where that brother benefits by receiving this particular portion of the field, while his brothers suffer no loss, since it makes no difference to them whether they receive this field or another,

we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom

we compel his brothers to give him the portion of the field adjoining his own, since he benefits from this and they lose nothing; this is the principle that “we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom.” First, this entire law of compelling someone on account of the measure of Sodom applies only when a person claims, in his father’s field, the portion adjoining his own field. Since, before the division, his field was already adjacent to that portion of his father’s field, “we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom” and give him that field. But if two brothers come and request to be partners in the fields they inherited from their father, and therefore ask to receive two adjoining fields [so that together they will have one large field in which they will be partners], in this case the other brothers are not obligated to give them two adjoining fields, and this is not considered the measure of Sodom. [The reason for this will be explained below.] Accordingly, the Tosafot answered that the firstborn’s claim to receive his portion in one place is no stronger than the claim of two brothers who wish to become partners. Were it not for the Torah’s innovation that the firstborn receives his two portions in one place, we would not give them to him in one place. The principle of “we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom” would not apply, because when two brothers wish to become partners, this is not considered the measure of Sodom, as stated above; and the firstborn is comparable to two brothers. Therefore, we require the Torah’s innovation in this matter. As for the reason that two brothers who wish to become partners are not entitled to two adjoining fields, even though the other brothers lose nothing by giving them those fields, while the brothers who wish to become partners benefit by receiving two adjoining fields, so that ostensibly this should be considered the measure of Sodom: They explained this on the basis of what the Rashba wrote, that the law of compelling someone on account of the measure of Sodom applies only when, before the division, the brother’s field was adjacent to the father’s field. If, however, only after the division will a situation arise in which one of the brothers is a neighbor of the field, there is no obligation to give him the field adjoining his future field. The great Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky, of blessed memory, explained the matter as follows [in the lectures of Rabbi Shmuel, here]. What is taught in this sugya—that by virtue of “we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom,” we must give the neighbor the portion adjoining his field—is because this principle creates a situation in which that particular portion of the field does not enter the division among the brothers at all. Rather, by virtue of “we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom,” that portion passes directly to the neighbor. This applies specifically when he was already the neighbor before the brothers divided the estate, for then it is possible to say that, by virtue of this principle, the portion was removed from the brothers and passed to him. But when two brothers wish to become partners after the division, then, as long as they have not divided the estate, there is no neighbor among them. Consequently, this field enters the division among all the brothers, and once the brothers have a share in this field, they are no longer obligated to relinquish their right to it. Therefore, with regard to the firstborn, since his two claims resemble the claim of two brothers requesting to receive their portions in one place [because we regard the “firstborn’s portion” and the “ordinary portion” as two separate claims], the Torah’s innovation is necessary to establish that nevertheless the firstborn receives his portion in one place. The Tosafot offered a second answer: Since the Torah calls the firstborn’s additional portion a “gift”—for the verse says “to give him a double portion”—the recipient of the gift cannot compel the giver to give the gift in one place. They explained the Tosafot’s words on the basis of the Netivot HaMishpat [section 278, subsection 9], who wrote that the law that the firstborn receives “a double portion” is a law addressed to the brothers: the obligation rests upon them to give him a double portion. Accordingly, the Tosafot’s words are clear. Since the firstborn’s portion is called a gift and the brothers are the givers of the gift, the firstborn cannot compel them to give him the gift in a single portion. Therefore, we need the ruling that instructs us to give him both portions in one place. The Tosafot also wrote in the name of the Ritzba that, strictly speaking, the principle of “we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom” is not relevant here at all. That principle was stated only in a case where one person lives in another’s courtyard [in a situation where the owner would not have rented his courtyard to anyone else], and the question is whether the occupant must pay or not. In such a case, we compel the owner on account of the measure of Sodom and the occupant is not required to pay, since the owner would not have rented the courtyard to anyone else in any event. But if the question does not concern payment, rather the occupant wants to enter and live in the courtyard while the owner does not allow him to enter, this is not considered the measure of Sodom, and the owner of the courtyard is permitted to prevent him from entering. Our case resembles the situation in which one does not allow another to enter his domain [since the value of his portion and the value of the other brothers’ portions in the field are equal, and they prevent him from taking that particular portion of the field]. Therefore, strictly speaking, the law of “we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom” is not applicable here. When the Gemara in our sugya said, “we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom,” this was only a rabbinic enactment. Accordingly, there is no difficulty as to why the Torah had to innovate that the firstborn receives both portions in one place, since on the level of Torah law the principle of compelling someone on account of the measure of Sodom is not applicable here, as explained above. The Ritzba’s words contain a major innovation: The reason for the law taught in Bava Kamma 20a—that one who lives in another’s courtyard without the owner’s knowledge, where the owner does not intend to rent out the courtyard, is exempt from paying the occupant’s rent—is that “we compel them on account of the measure of Sodom.” The Penei Yehoshua wrote this there as well, and the Tosafot here clearly support his view.

Rav Yosef challenged this:

this is not a case of the “measure of Sodom,” because

the brothers say to him

the brothers say to him: We specifically want that field adjoining your field, because this field

is more valuable to us

it is more advantageous for us,

like the properties of Bar Maryon

like the fields of Bar Maryon [the name of a man who owned excellent real estate]. And this is referring to a case in which the fields their father bequeathed to them are nourished by rainwater, and the brothers claim that it is possible that this field adjoining their brother’s field will be blessed with more rainwater than the others.

Therefore, they do not wish to give him this field, and since they lose by giving him this field [for it is possible that the other fields will be blessed with less rain than this one]], therefore, this opposition of theirs is not considered the “measure of Sodom.”

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosef!

The brothers may not be compelled to give that brother the portion adjoining his field.

The Gemara proceeds to discuss another case in the laws of dividing an inherited field.

Reuven and Shimon whose father left them as an inheritance

two plots of land

two tracts of land

by two canals

and beside each of the fields there was a reservoir from which the field could be irrigated. One of these fields was adjacent to a field that had already belonged to Reuven , and Reuven requests to receive his inheritance portion in that field adjoining his own.

Rabba said:

In a case

such as this

where Reuven benefits from receiving the field adjoining his own, while Shimon suffers no loss by giving him that field, since for Shimon there is no difference between this field and the other, as the two fields are equal because both have a reservoir for irrigation, in such a case

there is coercion under the measure of Sodom

if Shimon objects to giving Reuven the field adjoining his own, this is the “measure of Sodom,” and Shimon is compelled to give Reuven that field.

Although earlier Rabbi Yosef said that one may claim, “This field is worth more to me,” that applies specifically to a field nourished by rainwater, since one can claim that perhaps this field adjoining your field will receive more rain than the other. But here we are dealing with a field nourished by irrigation, and since the two fields are equal, as both have a reservoir, Shimon may no longer prevent Reuven from taking the field adjoining his own.

Rav Yosef challenged this:

This is not the “measure of Sodom,” since Shimon can claim to Reuven: I do not wish to give you the entire field adjoining your field, because

at times

sometimes

this one

that reservoir adjoining the second field

will dry up

will dry up,

whereas this one

the reservoir adjoining the field you are requesting

will not dry up

will not dry up. Therefore, I do not wish to give you the field you request; rather, I want us to divide the two fields so that each of us will take half of each field , and in this manner, even if one reservoir dries up, each of us will still possess half of the other field.

Since this is so, this is no longer the measure of Sodom, for if the entire field is given to Reuven, Shimon will suffer a loss if the reservoir in his portion dries up. Therefore, Shimon may demand that they divide each field.

And the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosef!

The Gemara now discusses another case!

Reuven and Shimon whose father left them

two

plots of land

two tracts of land

along one canal

located on the bank of a single river, and one of these fields was adjacent to a field that had already belonged to Reuven, and Reuven requests to receive his inheritance portion in that field adjoining his own.

An illustration should appear here 1

Rav Yosef said:

In a case

such as this

where Reuven benefits from receiving the field adjoining his own, while Shimon suffers no loss by giving him that field,

“there is coercion under the measure of Sodom,”

and Shimon is compelled to give Reuven the field adjoining his own. -

This case differs from the preceding cases, since in this case no situation can arise in which one field is superior to the other. For here too, we are dealing with a field that grows through irrigation, and both fields are adjacent to the same river, which serves as their source of irrigation. Therefore, in this case Rabbi Yosef agrees that Shimon’s opposition to giving Reuven the field adjoining his own is the “measure of Sodom,” since from Shimon’s perspective there is no difference between the two fields, and “there is coercion under the measure of Sodom.”

Abaye challenged him

to Rav Yosef: Even in this case, this is not the “measure of Sodom,” because

he can say

Shimon can claim to Reuven: I want you specifically to take the field that is not adjacent to your courtyard, for by doing so I will benefit, because

you will need to increase the number of tenant farmers

you will have to employ more tenant farmers [field workers]. For if you take the field that is not adjacent to your own field, you will have two fields, and in each of them you will have to station tenant farmers. Since my field will be between those two fields, the tenant farmers in your fields will guard my field as well . Since he has a reason why he does not wish to give Reuven the field adjoining his own, this is no longer the “measure of Sodom.”

And the halakha

the halakha is

in accordance with Rabbi Yosef

that in this case “there is coercion under the measure of Sodom,” because

increasing

the tenant farmers

this claim Shimon makes—that he will benefit by being surrounded by tenant farmers—

is not a matter

is not a valid claim, since the field itself is not worth more to him. Rather, if they divide the fields in this manner, he will have the incidental benefit of the tenant farmers’ guarding his field. Because of this benefit, Shimon may not divert him to another field; rather, he is compelled to give Reuven the field adjoining his own.