Bava Batra 137a (קלז.) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara resolves:

It is a dispute between tanna’im.

That is, the tanna’im, too, disagreed about this matter.

As it was taught

in a beraita: If one says,

“My property is given to you, and after you, to so-and-so,” and the first recipient went down

to the property,

and sold

it,

and consumed [

squandered the money ],

the second recipient may remove

the land

from the purchasers. These are the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The second recipient has only what the first recipient left over.

In a straightforward reading, they disagree as to whether the first recipient’s usufructuary ownership is considered equivalent to ownership of the substance of the property, or whether it is not considered equivalent to ownership of the substance of the property.

And the Gemara raises a contradiction:

But it was taught:

For we learned the opposite: If one says,

“My property is given to you, and after you, to so-and-so,” the first recipient goes down to the property, sells it, and consumes the proceeds. These are the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The first recipient has only the right to consume the usufruct.

This is difficult

for

the

words of

Rabbi

in the first beraita,

in

contrast to the

words of Rabbi

in the second beraita;

, and

the

words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

in contrast to the

words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

And the Gemara resolves:

The contradiction between one statement of Rabbi and another statement of Rabbi is not difficult: This one concerns the substance of the property, whereas that one concerns the usufruct.

That is, the first beraita deals with a case in which he sold the substance of the property, and in this regard Rabbi maintains that he cannot sell it, because “usufructuary ownership is not considered equivalent to ownership of the substance of the property”; therefore, the second recipient removes it from the purchasers.

By contrast, the second beraita deals with a case in which he sold the usufruct, and in such a case even Rabbi concedes that his sale is valid.

And likewise,

the contradiction between one statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and another statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is not difficult: This one concerns an initial action, whereas that one concerns a post facto situation.

That is, this is the interpretation of the second beraita:

According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, although he is able to sell the substance of the property, nevertheless, initially he should not sell it, in order to fulfill the words of the donor, who wishes to give it to the second recipient after him.

Therefore, the second beraita deals with a case in which he sold without specification, and did not clarify what he was selling. In such a case, according to Rabbi, he sold only the usufruct, since he cannot sell the substance of the property, whereas he can sell the usufruct even initially.

According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, however, when he sold without specification, he sold the substance of the property; therefore, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that he should not sell it initially.

The first beraita, by contrast, speaks of a post facto situation, in which he sold the substance of the property. In this case, according to Rabbi, his sale is void, whereas according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, his sale is valid.

Abaye said: Who is a cunning wicked person [

that is, who is a wicked person whose words are fulfilled ]?

One who gives advice

to the first recipient of the gift

to sell the property,

thereby causing a loss to the second recipient who comes after him,

in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes

that

, if the first recipient gave them

the property

as a deathbed gift ,

he has done nothing.

And the second recipient inherits it despite his gift.

What is the reason?

Abaye said:

Since

a deathbed gift does not acquire

anything

except after death, and

at that time

the “after you” recipient has already preceded him .

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

But did Abaye say this?

But it was stated,

a statement was transmitted in his name:

When does a deathbed gift take effect? Abaye said: Upon the completion of death. And Rava said: After the completion of death.

Yet here he maintains that a deathbed gift takes effect only after death?

And the Gemara resolves:

Abaye later retracted that statement. [

Rava retracted that statement and maintained that it takes effect only after death. ]

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

From where do you know that he retracted that statement? Perhaps he retracted this statement,

and maintained that a deathbed gift takes effect upon the completion of death?

And the Gemara resolves:

It should not enter your mind [

do not entertain the possibility of saying this ],

for

we

learned:

If one says to his wife,

“This is your bill of divorce if I die,”

or

“This is your bill of divorce

if I die

from this illness,”

or

“This is your bill of divorce after death,” he has done nothing.

Since he did not complete the divorce except after death, and there is no bill of divorce after death.

It is thus demonstrated that when he gives a bill of divorce and makes its effectiveness contingent upon his death, the bill of divorce takes effect only after death, and not at the time of death.

Likewise, when he gives a deathbed gift, it takes effect only after death, and not at the time of death.

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, even if there were among them

among the property that had been given to him

slaves, and he emancipated them

the first recipient

.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Is this obvious?

What difference is there between emancipating the slaves and selling them to another person?

And the Gemara resolves:

It might have been said that the donor could say to him

the first recipient

, “I did not give you the property in order for you to commit a prohibition,”

that is, I did not give you my property so that you would commit Torah prohibitions with it. For one who emancipates his slave violates a prohibition derived from a positive commandment, as it is written: “You shall work them forever.”

It teaches us,

that even so, his sale is valid.

Rav Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, even if he made them shrouds for the dead.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

Is this obvious?

And the Gemara resolves:

It might have been said

that the donor would say to the first recipient,

“To make them objects forbidden to derive benefit from

[

for shrouds of the dead are forbidden for benefit ] I did not give them to you.”

Since a person wishes others to benefit from his property, rather than for it to be lost.

It teaches us

that he may even make them into shrouds.

Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda expounded:

If one says:

“This etrog is given to you as a gift, and after you, to so-and-so,” and the first recipient takes it and fulfills the mitzva with it, we arrive at the dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

According to Rabbi, he has not fulfilled the mitzva with it, since he does not own it with ownership of the substance of the property. And with regard to the Four Species it is written: “And you shall take for yourselves”—from your own property; but this etrog is not his.

According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, he has fulfilled the mitzva with it, since it is entirely his property, and it is considered “for yourselves.”

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak strongly challenged him: Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagreed there only because one master holds that “usufructuary ownership is considered equivalent to ownership of the substance of the property,” while the other master holds that “usufructuary ownership is not considered equivalent to ownership of the substance of the property.” But here,