Bava Batra 136b (קלו:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The purchaser did not acquire [the property],

even after the father’s death , as will be explained below.

And Reish Lakish said: The purchaser acquired [the property]

after the father’s death.

The Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the purchaser did not acquire [the property]

because he maintained that the

usufructuary right

the father possessed was

considered like ownership of the substance itself,

and, consequently, before the father died, the son could sell only the property that would come into his possession at that time. Since in fact the property never came into his possession, as he died during his father’s lifetime, the purchaser did not acquire it, and the father’s other heirs inherited these properties.

However, if the son did not sell the property and died during his father’s lifetime, the son’s heirs inherit their father’s right in the land, and not the father’s heirs.

But when the son sold it, he removed himself from the property from the time of the sale, and the purchaser likewise did not acquire it until the time of the father’s death, at which point he could acquire the property by virtue of the son. Therefore, if the son died before his father, the purchaser acquired nothing.

And Reish Lakish said: The purchaser acquired [the property].

For he maintained that the

ownership

of the

usufruct

that the father possessed in the property

was not considered like ownership of the substance itself,

and therefore the son could sell the substance of the property immediately, and the purchaser acquired it at once.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But they already disputed this issue once

[Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disputed this matter elsewhere; why, then, did they dispute it again here]?

And where did they dispute it?

For it was stated:

with regard to first fruits,

if one sells his field for its produce, Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

the purchaser

brings

first fruits from its produce

and recites

over them, “The land that You have given me,” since usufructuary ownership is considered like ownership of the substance itself, and it is as though the substance of the land is owned by him.

And Reish Lakish said:

the purchaser

brings

first fruits,

but does not recite

over them, “The land that You have given me,” since the usufructuary ownership he possesses is not considered like ownership of the substance itself.

Nevertheless, he is obligated to bring first fruits, because it is written, “that you shall bring from your land,” and these fruits are considered to be “from your land,” since the owner of the land assigned to him the land’s nourishment for the sake of producing his fruits.

In any event, here too they disputed whether usufructuary ownership is considered like ownership of the substance itself or not.

Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who

said, “He brings and recites,” maintained that usufructuary ownership is considered like ownership of the substance itself. And Reish Lakish

who

said, “He brings but does not recite,”

maintained that

usufructuary ownership is not considered like ownership of the substance itself.

The difficulty is: What, then, did they newly teach us through their dispute in this passage?

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yoḥanan could say to you: Even though, generally,

I likewise maintain that

usufructuary ownership is considered like ownership of the substance itself, here it was necessary

to teach us specifically that

one might have thought: A father, with regard to his son, waives his rights,

[that is, a father who gives his property to his son after his death waives his right to give him complete ownership of the substance, even though he reserves for himself the right to consume the produce], and therefore his usufructuary ownership is not considered like ownership of the substance itself. For this reason,

it teaches us

that here too usufructuary ownership is considered like ownership of the substance itself.

And

there is likewise a special novel point in Reish Lakish’s statement:

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Even though generally usufructuary ownership is not considered like ownership of the substance itself, here it was necessary

to teach us specifically that

one might have thought: Whenever one reserves something for himself, even where his son is concerned, he gives preference to himself,

[that is, whenever he reserves the produce for himself, even in the case of his son, his intention is to reserve it completely], and in this case usufructuary ownership is considered like ownership of the substance itself.

It teaches us

that here too usufructuary ownership is not considered like ownership of the substance itself.

Rabbi Yoḥanan challenged Reish Lakish:

Did we not learn in a beraita: One who says to his fellow,

“My property is given to you, and so-and-so shall inherit it after you,

these properties,

and so-and-so shall inherit it after him.”

If the first dies, the second acquires [the property]; if the second dies, the third acquires [it].

However, if

the second dies during the lifetime of the first,

when the first dies

the property shall return

to

the heirs of the first.

Since the third was granted the property only by virtue of the second, and since the second did not acquire it, the third likewise did not acquire it. This concludes the beraita.

And if it is so

as you say, that usufructuary ownership is not considered like ownership of the substance itself, why should the property return to the heirs of the first? The first possessed only usufructuary ownership until his death, and since there is no one after him who can acquire either the substance or the usufruct,

it should be necessary for it to go to the heirs of the donor

[the property should return to the donor’s heirs]?

He said to him,

Reish Lakish to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Rav Hoshaya already interpreted

[explained this matter]

in Babylonia:

When he said, “My property is given to you, and

after you

so-and-so shall inherit it,”

it is different.

The meaning of the wording is that he gives him the substance and the produce completely, and only whatever remains after his death will be received by so-and-so. Indeed, the first recipient may sell even the substance, as will be explained below.

Therefore, if that so-and-so is not alive and cannot inherit, the property returns to the heirs of the first recipient.

And similarly, Rabbah

[raised this difficulty]

bar Rav Huna before Rav, and Rav said

to him:

“After you” is different.

As above.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement:

But

it

was taught

in another beraita that in a case where he said, “My property is given to you, and so-and-so shall inherit it after you,” and the second died during the lifetime of the first,

it shall return

the property

to the heirs of

the

donor,

and not to the heirs of the first recipient.

This proves that although one may say, “The phrase ‘after you’ is different,” nevertheless the property returns to the donor’s heirs, since the first recipient’s usufructuary ownership is not considered like ownership of the substance itself—and certainly ordinary usufructuary ownership is not considered like ownership of the substance itself—contrary to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s view?