Bava Batra 136b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yohanan said: The purchaser did not acquire it,

even after the father’s death . As will be explained below.

And Reish Lakish said: The purchaser acquired it

after the father’s death.

The Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yohanan said: The purchaser did not acquire it,

since he held that

usufructuary acquisition

which the father has

is considered like acquisition of the substance itself,

and therefore, before he died, the son could sell only for the time when it would come into his possession. And since in fact the properties did not come into his possession, for he died during his father’s lifetime, the purchaser did not acquire them, and the father’s other heirs inherited these properties.

But if the son did not sell the properties and died during his father’s lifetime, the son’s heirs inherit their father’s right that he had in the land, and not the father’s heirs .

But when he sold, he removed himself from the properties from the time of the sale, and the purchaser likewise did not acquire them until the time of death, at which time he could acquire the properties by virtue of him. Therefore, if the son died before his father, the purchaser acquired nothing .

And Reish Lakish said: The purchaser acquired it.

For he held that

the acquisition of

the

produce

which the father has in the properties

is not considered like acquisition of the substance itself,

and therefore the son can sell the substance of the properties already from now, and the purchaser acquired them immediately.

And the Gemara objects:

But they already disagreed about it once [הרי נחלקו רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש בענין זה במקום אחר, ומדוע חזרו וחלקו גם כאן]for Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed about this matter elsewhere, so why did they disagree again here?

[Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed about this matter elsewhere; why, then, did they disagree about it again here]?

And where did they disagree?

For it was stated,

with regard to first fruits,

one who sells his field for its produce, Rabbi Yohanan said:

the purchaser

brings

first fruits from his produce,

and recites

over them, “the land that You gave me,” since usufructuary acquisition is considered like acquisition of the substance itself, and it is as though the substance of the land is acquired by him.

And Reish Lakish said:

the purchaser

brings

first fruits,

but does not recite

over them, “the land that You gave me,” since the usufructuary acquisition that he has is not like acquisition of the substance itself.

But nevertheless he is obligated to bring first fruits, since it is written, “that you shall bring from your land,” and these fruits are considered “from your land,” since the owner of the land subordinated to him the land’s nourishment for his produce .

In any event, here too they disagreed whether usufructuary acquisition is like acquisition of the substance itself or not.

Rabbi Yohanan,

who

said, “he brings and recites,” held that usufructuary acquisition is considered like acquisition of the substance itself. And Reish Lakish

who

said, “he brings but does not recite,”

held that

usufructuary acquisition is not considered like acquisition of the substance itself.

And it is difficult: What did they innovate for us in their disagreement in this passage?

And the Gemara answers:

Rabbi Yohanan could say to you: Even though generally

I also hold that

usufructuary acquisition is considered like acquisition of the substance itself, here it was necessary

to teach us specifically that

it might enter your mind to say that a father, with regard to his son, waives it, [אב הנותן נכסיו לבנו לאחר מותו, מוחל לו להקנות את הגוף לגמרי, אף על פי ששייר לעצמו את אכילת הפירות]a father who gives his properties to his son after his death waives it for him, to acquire the substance completely, even though he reserves for himself the eating of the produce, and the usufructuary acquisition that he has is not like acquisition of the substance itself; therefore

it teaches us

it teaches us

that here too usufructuary acquisition is considered like acquisition of the substance itself.

And

there is likewise a particular innovation in the words of Reish Lakish:

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Even though generally usufructuary acquisition is not considered like acquisition of the substance itself, here it was necessary

to teach us specifically that

it might enter your mind to say: Whenever he reserves something for himself, even in the presence of his son, himself is preferable to him, [כל מקום שמשייר פירות לעצמו, אפילו במקום בנו, כונתו לשיור גמור]whenever he reserves produce for himself, even in the presence of his son, his intention is a complete reservation,

and in this case usufructuary acquisition is considered like acquisition of the substance itself.

It teaches us

that here too usufructuary acquisition is not like acquisition of the substance itself.

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish:

Have we not learned in a beraita: One who says to his fellow,

“My properties are yours, and after you so-and-so shall inherit

these properties,

and after him so-and-so shall inherit.”

If the first dies, the second acquires; if the second dies, the third acquires.

But if

the second dies during the lifetime of the first,

when the first dies,

the

the

properties return to the heirs of the first.

Since he granted the third only by virtue of the second, and since the second did not acquire, the third also did not acquire. Thus far the beraita.

And if it is so

as you say, that usufructuary acquisition is not like acquisition of the substance itself, why should the properties return to the heirs of the first? The first has only usufructuary acquisition until his death, and since after him there is no one who will acquire the substance or the produce,

it should be to the heirs of the giver [על הנכסים לחזור ליורשי הנותן]that the properties return to the heirs of the giver ?

[that is, the property should return to the donor’s heirs]?

He said to him,

Reish Lakish to Rabbi Yohanan:

Rav Hoshaya in Babylonia already explained [פירש ענין זה]explained this matter

[this matter]

it:

when he said, “My properties are yours, and

after you

so-and-so shall inherit

,” it is different.

Since the meaning of the language is that he gives him the substance and the produce completely, and only whatever remains after his death will so-and-so receive. Indeed, the first can sell even the substance, as explained below .

Therefore, if that so-and-so is not alive and cannot inherit, the properties return to the heirs of the first.

And likewise, [הקשה]raised the objection

[raised this difficulty]

Rabba bar Rav Huna before Rav, and Rav said

to him:

“After you” is different.

As above.

And the Gemara objects to Rabbi Yohanan’s words:

But

indeed

it was taught

in another beraita, in the case where he said, “My properties are yours, and after you so-and-so shall inherit,” and the second died during the lifetime of the first,

the properties return

the properties

to the heirs of

the

giver,

and not to the heirs of the first.

And it is demonstrated that even though one can say, “After you is different,” nevertheless they return to the heirs of the giver, since the first’s usufructuary acquisition is not like acquisition of the substance itself; and certainly ordinary usufructuary acquisition is not like acquisition of the substance itself, contrary to Rabbi Yohanan’s words .