Avodah Zarah 7a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Meir says:

the dyer

gives him

to the owner of the wool

the value of his wool,

white wool as it was at first, if he wishes. And he takes the dyed wool for himself, even though now the wool is worth more.

For Rabbi Meir holds that any craftsman who changes [the item] against the owner's instructions has the status of a robber, and a robber acquires the robbed object through a “change in the act.” Therefore, the wool becomes his, and he is obligated to pay only the value of the wool [but if the owner of the wool wishes, he can pay him the entire payment for the dyeing and take back his wool].

Rabbi Judah says:

He disagrees, and holds that the dyer cannot retain the wool for himself and pay its value. For if you say so, it follows that the dyer profits. Rather, the dyer is penalized, and the owner of the wool takes for himself [if he wishes] the dyed wool, and pays him the lesser of the two payments, according to the choice of the owner of the wool, namely—

if the enhancement

that the dyer brought about in the wool is

greater than the outlay,

the expenses that the dyer spent on the dyeing, on the dyes, wood, and labor wages—

the owner of the wool gives

the dyer

him,

to the dyer, only

the outlay,

and not the sum that they agreed upon. And it follows that he profits from the enhancement—

And if the outlay is greater than the enhancement—

he gives him the enhancement.

And with regard to this halakha, only Huna ruled in accordance with the words of Rabbi Judah.

Rav Yosef turned his face away,

Rav Yosef looked to the sides in anger and said: For what purpose did Rav Huna say this?

Granted,

understandable are his words when he said

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Joshua ben Korha,

because

it was necessary,

it was necessary for him to say so, and there is novelty in it, because

it might have entered your mind

to say that the halakha is not like him, for he disagrees with the Sages, and we hold that in a dispute between

an individual and the many, the halakha is according to the many.

Therefore,

he teaches us

that

the halakha is in accordance with

Rabbi Joshua ben Korha, despite the fact that he is

an individual.

But,

what Rav Huna said,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Judah,

is difficult: this—

why do I need it?

For

it is obvious!

For we hold

that when there is a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling—

the halakha is according to the anonymous ruling.

That is, wherever a dispute of tannaim is brought in one Mishna, and afterward that same law is taught in another Mishna according to the view of one of them, as an “anonymous” Mishna with no dissenter, the halakha is according to this view. The reason is that since Rabbi, the editor of the Mishna, knew that there was a dispute and taught it in the Mishna, and nevertheless afterward taught another Mishna and “left it anonymous” according to one of the views, by teaching it without a dispute it indicates that he rules in accordance with it—

And therefore Rav Yosef raises an objection: this halakha was taught in the form of

a dispute in

tractate

Bava Kamma, and

was taught again in an

“anonymous” Mishna, in

tractate

Bava Metzia—

For it was taught

in tractate Bava Metzia [76b]:

Anyone who changes

against the owner's instructions, such as the dyer who dyed with a different dye,

his hand is on the lower side.

That is, he receives the lesser of the two payments.

And anyone who retracts, his hand is on the lower side

[as explained there].

The halakha has already been ruled according to the words of Rabbi Judah; why, then, did Rav Huna need to say this, and what does he teach us?

And Rav Huna

answers: There is a need to rule that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Judah,

because there is no order to the Mishna.

That is, no proof may be brought from the order in which the Mishna was written,

for it may be said

that it is possible to say that

the anonymous teaching was taught first, and afterward the dispute.

When they studied in the beit-midrash, the later “anonymous” Mishna was taught before the Mishna containing the dispute, even though it was written after it.

And we object:

If so,

according to your words that “there is no order to the Mishna,” and the writing of the Mishna is not according to order, then, in

every “dispute and afterward anonymous”,

where we hold that the halakha is according to the anonymous ruling,

let us say,

let us say also,

“There is no order to the Mishna”,

and it is not known which of them was taught first. If so, it is difficult: where is the rule stated that “a dispute and afterward anonymous—the halakha is according to the anonymous ruling”?

And Rav Huna

will answer: There is a distinction between when the dispute and the anonymous ruling were taught in the same tractate, in which case the rule is stated that “the halakha is according to the anonymous ruling,” and when the dispute and the anonymous ruling are in two tractates.

The reason is that the internal order within the tractate is arranged, each matter in its proper form, and if the halakha was left anonymous after they had already disputed it, it is proven that this is how the halakha was ruled.

But in two tractates, we do not possess knowledge of which tractate was arranged first and which was later than it, and regarding this we say, “There is no order to the Mishna.” Therefore, it is not known whether first the matter was left anonymous in this tractate and afterward it was taught as a dispute in the second tractate, in which case “the halakha is not according to the anonymous ruling,” or the reverse, in which case “the halakha is according to the anonymous ruling”—

For

when

do we not say, “There is no order to the Mishna”,

that is, when is there indeed an order?—

In one tractate,

in that very same tractate. But

in two tractates,

such as here, where the dispute is in tractate “Bava Kamma” and the anonymous ruling is in tractate “Bava Metzia,”

we say “

there is no order to the Mishna.”

Therefore, the rule “a dispute and afterward anonymous—the halakha is according to the anonymous ruling” does not apply here, and Rav Huna needed to rule that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Judah.

And Rav Yosef

will answer:

All of Nezikin,

all the laws of damages, that is, monetary relations between one person and another —

is one tractate.

And they were taught as one, each matter in its proper form. Rather, afterward it was divided into three sections, “Bava Kamma,” “Bava Metzia,” and “Bava Batra.”

Alternatively,

the Gemara explains another reason why Rav Yosef was angry that Rav Huna needed to rule in accordance with Rabbi Judah, even if they are three tractates, and there is no order to the Mishna, and here there is no rule that “a dispute and afterward anonymous—the halakha is according to the anonymous ruling.” For nevertheless, he did not need to teach us this

because it was taught together with

together with

a halakha

a definitive ruling,

a decided halakha, for it says there:

Anyone who changes—

his hand is on the lower side, and anyone who retracts—

his hand is on the lower side.

Just as the halakha was ruled in the case of “anyone who retracts,” so it was ruled in the case of “anyone who changes.” And this is what was difficult to Rav Yosef: why did Rav Huna need to teach us this? It is an explicit Mishna.

And the Gemara brings another law in which the halakha was ruled in accordance with Rabbi Joshua ben Korha, from the verse [Isaiah 58]: “If you turn back your foot because of the Shabbat, from pursuing your affairs and speaking words,” which the Sages expounded to mean that on Shabbat it is forbidden to speak ordinary matters, commercial matters, as explained in its place in tractate Shabbat.

And the Sages disputed when he speaks only in hinted words, which are understood by the two speakers to be commercial speech, whether it is permitted or forbidden.

The Sages taught: A person may not say to his fellow

on Shabbat, “

Does it appear

that now it appears

that you will stand with me in the evening

that you will come to me at the conclusion of Shabbat?” And his intention is that he is arranging with him to come work with him for payment.

And according to the Sages, this is forbidden speech, since the two of them understood one another.

Rabbi Joshua ben Korha says: A person may say to his fellow, “Does it appear that you will stand with me in the evening?”

Since he does not say it explicitly, but only by hint, and on Shabbat only “speech,” and not “thought,” was forbidden.

And concerning this halakha

Rabba bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: The halakha is in accordance with

him,

Rabbi Joshua ben Korha.

The Gemara brings another law in which the halakha was ruled in accordance with Rabbi Joshua ben Korha.

The Sages taught: One who asks a Sage,

one who asked a halakhic question of a Sage,

and

the Sage

declared impure,

ruled for him and ruled “impure”—

he should not ask a Sage

another,

and

the second

declare pure,

rule for him “pure.”

And

likewise, one who asks

a Sage, and he forbade—

he should not ask a Sage

another

and permit 4 .

If there were two

If there were two

together, and he asked both of them, one Sage

declares impure, and one declares pure,

or

one forbids and one permits—

if one of them was

among the Sages

greater than his fellow in wisdom and in number —

follow him!

Whether for stringency or even for leniency.

And if not,

if neither of them was greater, but both were equal—

follow the stricter one!

Rabbi Joshua ben Korha says

If the question was

in a matter of Torah,

in a matter whose prohibition is by Torah law, and its uncertainty is now a Torah uncertainty—

follow the stricter one!

But if the question was

in a matter of the Scribes,

in a matter whose prohibition is from the words of the Scribes, that is, a rabbinic prohibition—

follow the more lenient one!

And concerning this halakha

Rav Yosef said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Joshua ben Korha.

The Gemara brings another law in which the halakha was ruled in accordance with Rabbi Joshua ben Korha, concerning one who comes to accept upon himself “the practices of a haver.”

“Haver,” in contrast to an ignoramus, is called anyone who accepts upon himself not to give his terumot and tithes to an ignoramus, and not to handle ritually pure things in the home of an ignoramus, and to separate tithes both from what he sells and from what he buys, in addition to what he eats.

The beraita discusses robbers and ignoramuses who come to accept upon themselves to be “haverim.”

The Sages taught: And all of them,

the robbers and the ignoramuses,

who repented,

from their deeds and wish to become “haverim”—

they are not accepted ever, the words of Rabbi Meir .

Rabbi Judah says: If they repented,

if they come to accept the practices of haverut

in secret,

privately—

they are not accepted,

because their repentance is not complete and wholehearted. But if they repented

publicly—

they are accepted.

Some say,

there is one who transmitted Rabbi Judah's teaching in this version:

They performed their practices

their deeds until now

in secret—

they are accepted,

for they did not brazenly show their faces so greatly.