Avodah Zarah 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Meir says:

the dyer

gives him

to the owner of the wool

the value of his wool,

white wool as it was initially, if he wishes. And he takes the dyed wool for himself, even though the wool is now worth more.

For Rabbi Meir maintains that any craftsman who alters an item against the owner's wishes has the status of a robber, and a robber acquires the stolen object through a "change effected by an act." Therefore, the wool becomes his, and he is obligated to pay only the value of the wool [but if the owner of the wool wishes, he may pay him the entire cost of the dyeing and take back his wool].

Rabbi Yehuda says:

He disagrees and maintains that the dyer may not retain the wool for himself and pay its value. For if you say so, the dyer profits. Rather, the dyer is penalized, and the owner of the wool takes for himself [if he wishes] the dyed wool, and pays him the lesser of the two payments, according to the owner's choice, namely:

if the improvement

that the dyer made to the wool is

greater than the expense,

the expenses that the dyer incurred for the dyeing—for the dyes, wood, and labor costs—

the owner of the wool gives

the dyer

him,

to the dyer, only

the expense,

and not the amount agreed upon between them. It follows that he gains the improvement—

but if the expense is greater than the improvement—

he gives him the improvement.

And with regard to this halakha, only Rav Huna ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

Rav Yosef turned his face away,

Rav Yosef looked angrily to the sides and said: For what purpose did Rav Huna say this?

Granted,

his statement that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa is understandable,

because

it was necessary;

it was necessary for him to say so, and there is novelty in it, because

it might enter your mind

to say that the halakha is not in accordance with him, since he disagrees with the Sages, and we hold that in a dispute between

an individual and the many, the halakha is in accordance with the many.

Therefore,

it teaches us

that

the halakha is in accordance with

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, even though he is

an individual.

But

what Rav Huna said,

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

is difficult:

why do I need this?

For

it is obvious;

we hold

that where there is a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling—

the halakha follows the anonymous ruling.

That is, wherever a dispute between tannaim is brought in one Mishna, and afterward the same law is taught in another Mishna in accordance with one of them, as an "anonymous" Mishna with no opposing view, the halakha is in accordance with that view. The reason is that once Rabbi, the editor of the Mishna, knew that there was a dispute and taught it in the Mishna, yet afterward taught an additional Mishna and "left it anonymous" in accordance with one of the views, by teaching it without a dispute he indicates that he rules in accordance with that view—

Therefore, Rav Yosef asks, this halakha was taught as a

dispute in

tractate

Bava Kamma, and

was taught again in an

anonymous Mishna in

tractate

Bava Metzia—

As it was taught

in tractate Bava Metzia [76b]:

Anyone who alters

the owner's instructions, such as the dyer who dyed with a different dye,

has the lower hand.

That is, he receives the lesser of the two payments.

And anyone who retracts, has the lower hand

[as explained there].

The halakha has already been ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda's view. Why, then, did Rav Huna need to say this, and what does it teach us?

And Rav Huna

responds: There is a need to rule that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda

because the Mishna has no fixed order.

That is, no proof may be brought from the order in which the Mishna was written,

for it can be said

that

the anonymous tanna taught the anonymous ruling first, and afterward the dispute.

During their study in the study hall, the later, "anonymous" Mishna was taught before the Mishna containing the dispute, even though it was written afterward.

And we object:

If so,

according to your statement that "the Mishna has no fixed order," and the writing of the Mishna does not follow an order, then in

every case of "a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling,"

where we hold that the halakha follows the anonymous ruling,

let us say

as well,

"the Mishna has no fixed order,"

and it is not known which of them was taught first. If so, the rule "a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling—the halakha follows the anonymous ruling" is difficult to locate.

And Rav Huna

will answer: There is a distinction between when the dispute and the anonymous ruling were taught in the same tractate, in which case we state the rule that "the halakha follows the anonymous ruling," and when the dispute and the anonymous ruling are in two tractates.

The reason is that the internal order within a tractate is arranged properly, one matter following another. If the halakha was left anonymous after the matter had already been disputed, it is clear that this is the ruling adopted as halakha.

But with two tractates, we do not know which tractate was arranged first and which was arranged later; regarding this we say, "the Mishna has no fixed order." Therefore, it is not known whether the ruling was first left anonymous in this tractate and afterward taught as a dispute in the second tractate, in which case "the halakha does not follow the anonymous ruling," or the reverse, in which case "the halakha follows the anonymous ruling"—

For

when

do we not say, "the Mishna has no fixed order,"

that is, when is there indeed an order?

In one tractate,

within that same tractate. But

in two tractates,

as here, where the dispute is in tractate Bava Kamma and the anonymous ruling is in tractate Bava Metzia,

we say

"the Mishna has no fixed order."

Therefore, the rule "a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling—the halakha follows the anonymous ruling" does not apply here, and Rav Huna needed to rule that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

And Rav Yosef

will answer:

The entire order of Nezikin,

all the laws of damages, that is, monetary relations between one person and another —

is one tractate.

They were taught as one, properly arranged, one matter following another. Only afterward was it divided into three sections: "Bava Kamma," "Bava Metzia," and "Bava Batra."

Alternatively,

the Gemara explains another reason why Rav Yosef was angry that Rav Huna needed to rule in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, even if they are three tractates and the Mishna has no fixed order, so that the rule "a dispute and afterward an anonymous ruling—the halakha follows the anonymous ruling" does not apply here. Nevertheless, it was not necessary to teach us this

because it is taught together with

the

halakha,

a definitive ruling,

as it says there:

Anyone who alters—

has the lower hand, and anyone who retracts—

has the lower hand.

Just as the halakha was ruled with regard to "anyone who retracts," so too it was ruled with regard to "anyone who alters." This is what was difficult to Rav Yosef: Why did Rav Huna need to teach us this? It is an explicit Mishna.

And the Gemara brings another law in which the halakha was ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, based on the verse [Isaiah 58]: "If you restrain your foot because of the Shabbat, from pursuing your affairs and speaking words," which the Sages expounded to mean that on Shabbat it is forbidden to speak ordinary matters, matters of commerce, as explained in its place in tractate Shabbat.

The Sages disagree when one speaks only in hints, which are understood by both speakers to refer to commercial matters, whether this is permitted or forbidden.

The Sages taught: A person may not say to his fellow

on Shabbat,

"Shall you see,

now you see,

that you will stand with me in the evening

that you will come to me after Shabbat." His intention is to arrange with him that he come to work with him for payment.

According to the Sages, this is forbidden speech, since the two understood one another.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: A person may say to his fellow, "Shall you see that you will stand with me in the evening."

Since he does not speak explicitly but only by way of a hint, and on Shabbat only "speech" was forbidden, not "thought."

With regard to this halakha

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The halakha is in accordance with

him,

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

The Gemara brings another law in which the halakha was ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

The Sages taught: One who asks a Sage,

one who asks a halakhic question of a Sage,

and

the Sage

declares it impure,

rules for him, "Impure"—

may not ask another Sage

and

the

second

declare it pure,

rule for him, "Pure."

And

similarly, one who asks

a Sage, and he forbids it—

may not ask another Sage

and

permit it 4 .

If there were two

If there were two

together, and he asked both of them, and one Sage

declared it impure, and one declared it pure,

or

one prohibited it and one permitted it—

if one of them was

among the Sages

greater than his fellow in wisdom and in number —

follow him!

Whether for stringency or even for leniency.

And if not,

if neither of them was greater, but they were equal—

follow the more stringent one!

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says

If the question was

a matter of Torah,

a matter whose prohibition is by Torah law, and its present uncertainty is a Torah-level uncertainty—

follow the more stringent one!

But if the question was

a matter of the Scribes,

a matter whose prohibition is rabbinic, that is, a prohibition instituted by the Sages—

follow the more lenient one!

With regard to this halakha,

Rav Yosef said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa.

The Gemara brings another matter in which the halakha was ruled in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, concerning one who seeks to accept upon himself "the practices of ḥaverut."

A "ḥaver," in contrast to an am ha'aretz, is anyone who accepts upon himself not to give his terumot and tithes to an am ha'aretz, not to handle objects of ritual purity in the house of an am ha'aretz, and to separate tithes from what he sells and from what he buys, in addition to what he eats.

The beraita discusses robbers and amei ha'aretz who come to accept upon themselves the status of "ḥaverim."

The Sages taught: And all of them,

the robbers and amei ha'aretz,

who repented,

from their deeds and wish to become "ḥaverim"—

they are never accepted, the words of Rabbi Meir .

Rabbi Yehuda says: If they repented,

if they come to accept the practices of ḥaverut

secretly,

in private—

they are not accepted,

because their repentance is not complete and wholehearted. But if they repented

publicly—

they are accepted.

Some say,

there are those who transmitted Rabbi Yehuda's teaching in this version:

They practiced their ways

their practices until now

secretly—

they are accepted,

since they did not brazenly defy people to such an extent.