Avodah Zarah 73b (עג:) — the Talmud in English

Hezekiah said: If the quantity increased while it was prohibited, it is prohibited; if the quantity increased while it was permitted, it is permitted.

That is, if the quantity of wine increased before the water nullified the prohibited substance—for example, if initially there was a pit containing permitted wine, and afterward water fell into it, and only afterward the prohibited wine fell into it, or if the water fell in last—then the water does not have the power to nullify the wine, since the wine encounters its own kind and combines with it to prohibit it, and the water no longer has the power to nullify it.

But if the quantity of wine increased while it was permitted—for example, if the water fell into the pit first, and afterward libation wine fell into the water, was nullified by it, and became permitted, and only afterward the permitted wine fell into it—we do not say that the permitted wine combines with the prohibited wine; rather, everything is permitted.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even if the quantity increased while it was prohibited,

since the water fell in first, we do not say, “Its kind encountered its own kind and it reawakened,” but everything is

permitted.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: Shall we say that Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree in accordance with the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis? [

Apparently, the dispute between Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan depends on the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis cited below.]

As we learned in the Mishna: “Leaven

[the leavening agent]

of non-sacred produce and of teruma that fell

together

into the dough,

and

neither

was

sufficient to leaven it, but they combined

together

and leavened it, Rabbi Eliezer says: I follow the last one.”

That is, if the teruma leaven fell in last and, as a result of its falling, the dough became leavened, everything is prohibited.

And the Rabbis say: Whether the prohibited substance fell in first

or last, it is not prohibited unless it alone is sufficient to leaven it

on its own.”

Rav Yirmeya reasoned that Hezekiah’s rationale accords with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says, “I follow the last one.” Therefore, if libation wine fell in last, everything is prohibited, whereas if permitted wine fell in last, everything is permitted. And Rabbi Yohanan held in accordance with the Rabbis; therefore, since the libation wine by itself is insufficient to prohibit the mixture, everything is permitted.

The Gemara objects:

Can you understand it that way?!

Is that truly the basis of the dispute?

But

indeed

Abaye said: They taught

[Rabbi Eliezer permitted it]

only

in a case

where he removed the prohibited substance beforehand,

and the prohibition was completed only through the combination,

but

if he

did not remove the prohibited substance beforehand, it is prohibited.

And if we say in accordance with Rav Yirmeya’s statement,

with whom does Hezekiah agree?

That is, Hezekiah’s statement accords neither with Rabbi Eliezer nor with the Rabbis.

For in our case, it is not applicable to say that he “removed it beforehand.” If so, even if the quantity increased while permitted, it should be prohibited according to Rabbi Eliezer. And if he holds like the Rabbis, even if the quantity increased while prohibited, it should be permitted?

Rather,

it is certainly the case that the dispute between Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan does not depend on the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis, but

here, they disagree about the principle of “we envision.”

That is, they disagree over whether we say, “We regard its own kind as though it were absent, and its other kind increases upon it and nullifies it.”

According to Hezekiah, he does not accept the principle of “we envision,”

and therefore, if libation wine fell into the water and wine, its kind encounters its own kind and reawakens, and it is not nullified. And

according to Rabbi Yohanan, he accepts “

we envision”; and since the libation wine fell into both its own kind and another kind, we regard its own kind as though it were absent, and its other kind increases upon it and nullifies it.

The Gemara asks:

And does Rabbi Yohanan accept

[the view] that we say

“we envision”?! But Rabbi Asi asked Rabbi Yohanan: [What is the law concerning] two cups,

of wine,

one containing non-sacred produce and one containing teruma, which he diluted

[he mixed water into them, three parts water to one part wine] ,

and in the case where the water in both of them is sufficient to nullify the teruma wine,

and he mixed them with one another—what is the law?

Do we say, “We regard its own kind as though it were absent, and its other kind increases upon it and nullifies it,” so that the water nullifies the teruma wine? Or perhaps, since permitted wine is also present here, and it is not nullified by its own kind, everything is prohibited?

And

Rabbi Yohanan

did not resolve it

[he did not answer him].

And this proves that Rabbi Yohanan does not accept the reasoning of “we envision”?

The Gemara answers:

Initially he did not resolve it,

but

ultimately he resolved it,

as we say: “We regard its own kind as though it were absent, and its other kind increases upon it and nullifies it.”

It was also stated

[and this was explicitly taught in the name of Rabbi Yohanan]:

Rav Ami said that Rabbi Yohanan said—and some say that Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yohanan said: [In the case of] two cups, one containing non-sacred produce and one containing teruma, which he diluted and mixed with one another, we regard the permitted substance as though it were absent, and the remaining water increases upon it and nullifies it.

We learned in the Mishna:

“This is the general principle: When [the prohibited substance] is of the same kind, even any amount prohibits; when it is not of the same kind, it prohibits by imparting flavor.”

The Gemara had difficulty: What does the Mishna add by stating, “This is the general principle”? After all, it explicitly taught in the first clause that “of the same kind” prohibits with any amount, and “of a different kind” prohibits by imparting flavor.

Two possibilities for resolving this difficulty are presented below.

1.

Rav and Shmuel both say: All prohibited substances of the Torah

that became mixed

with their own kind

prohibit even

with any amount.

But if they became mixed

with a different kind,

they prohibit only

by imparting flavor.

And according to this,

what does “This is the general principle” come to include?

What law did we learn from “This is the general principle”?

It comes to include

[to teach]

all prohibited substances of the Torah

that became mixed with their own kind and prohibit even with any amount.

2.

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish both say: All prohibited substances of the Torah

that became mixed

whether with their own kind or with a different kind

prohibit only

by imparting flavor, except for tevel and libation wine.

When they become mixed

with their own kind,

they prohibit even

with any amount; and when they are mixed with a different kind, they prohibit by imparting flavor.

And

according to this,

“This is the general principle” comes to include tevel.

Now, in the beraita, on the one hand

it was taught in accordance with Rav and Shmuel,

and on the other hand

it was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish.

It was taught in accordance with Rav and Shmuel: “All prohibited substances of the Torah, when mixed with their own kind, [prohibit] with any amount; when mixed with a different kind, [prohibit] by imparting flavor.”

It was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish: “All prohibited substances of the Torah, whether mixed with their own kind or with a different kind, [prohibit] by imparting flavor, except for tevel and libation wine: when mixed with their own kind, [they prohibit] with any amount; when mixed with a different kind, [they prohibit] by imparting flavor.”

It follows that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish depends on a dispute between tanna’im.

The Gemara asks:

Granted, libation wine

prohibits with any amount

because of the stringency of idolatry. But tevel—what is the reason

that it prohibits with any amount?

The Gemara answers:

As is its manner of permitting it, so is its manner of prohibiting it.

That is, just as one grain exempts the entire pile from teruma, so too, if one grain of tevel fell into the entire pile, it prohibits the entire pile.

For Shmuel said:

If he separated

one grain

from a heap of wheat,

it exempts the pile.

And we likewise learned: When did they say that tevel prohibits with any amount?

Only if it became mixed

with its own kind;

but if it became mixed

with a different kind,

it prohibits only

by imparting flavor.

Since when it became mixed with a different kind, it is not applicable to say, “As is its manner of permitting it, so is its manner of prohibiting it”; therefore, it prohibits only by imparting flavor.