Avodah Zarah 73b — the Talmud in English

Hezekiah said: If it increased while under prohibition, it is forbidden; if it increased while permitted, it is permitted.

That is to say, if the measure of the wine increased before the water nullified the prohibition—for example, there was initially in the pit wine that was permitted, and afterward water fell into it, and only at the end the forbidden wine fell in, or if the water fell in at the end—then the water does not have the power to nullify the wine, since the wine finds its kind and joins with it to prohibit it, and again the water does not have the power to nullify it.

But if the measure of the wine increased while permitted—for example, the water fell into the pit first, and afterward the libation wine fell into it, was nullified in it, and became permitted, and only afterward the permitted wine fell into it—then we do not say that the permitted wine joins with the forbidden wine; rather, everything is permitted.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even if it increased while under prohibition,

since the water fell first, we do not say, “The kind found its kind and awoke,” but everything

is permitted.

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: Shall we say that Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis? [

Apparently, the dispute between Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan depends upon the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis brought below.]

For we learned in a Mishna: “Leaven [

a leavening agent]

of non-sacred produce and of teruma, which fell

together

into the dough,

and

it did not

have

enough to leaven, nor did this have enough to leaven, and they joined

together

and leavened it, Rabbi Eliezer says: I follow the last one.”

That is to say, if the teruma leaven fell last, and as a result of its falling the dough became leavened, everything is forbidden.

And the Sages say: Whether the prohibition fell first

or at the end, it is not forbidden until it alone has enough to leaven

by itself.”

Rav Yirmeya thought that Hezekiah’s reason follows the view of Rabbi Eliezer, who says, “I follow the last one”; therefore, if libation wine fell in at the end, everything is forbidden, and if kosher wine fell in, everything is permitted. And Rabbi Yohanan held like the Sages; therefore, since the libation wine by itself does not have enough to prohibit, everything is permitted.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But can you understand this?!

Is this the basis of the dispute?

And

indeed

Abaye said: They taught [

Rabbi Eliezer permitted only]

only

in a case

where he preceded and removed the prohibition,

and the prohibition was completed only through joining,

but

if he

did not precede and remove the prohibition, it is forbidden.

And if we say as Rav Yirmeya said,

Hezekiah, who said this—according to whom?

That is to say, Hezekiah’s words follow neither the view of Rabbi Eliezer nor the view of the Sages.

For in our case it is not applicable to say, “He preceded and removed it,” and if so, even if it increased while permitted, according to Rabbi Eliezer it is forbidden. And if he holds like the Rabbis, even if it increased while under prohibition, it is permitted?

Rather,

certainly, the dispute between Hezekiah and Rabbi Yohanan does not depend upon the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages, but

here, they disagree concerning “we see.”

That is to say, they disagree whether we say, “We regard its kind as though it were not present, and the unlike kind increases upon it and nullifies it.”

According to Hezekiah, he does not hold of “we see,”

and therefore, if libation wine fell into the water and the wine, its kind found its kind and awoke, and it is not nullified. And

according to Rabbi Yohanan, he does hold of “

we see,” and since libation wine fell into its kind and an unlike kind, we regard its kind as though it were not present, and the unlike kind increases upon it and nullifies it.

The Gemara asks:

And does Rabbi Yohanan hold of

[does Rav Yohanan hold that we say]

“we see”?! But Rabbi Asi asked Rabbi Yohanan: Two cups,

of wine,

one of non-sacred produce and one of teruma, and he diluted them [

mixed water into them, one part wine with three parts water ],

and in the case where the water in both of them has enough to nullify the teruma wine,

and he mixed them with one another, what is the law?

Do we say, “We regard its kind as though it were not present, and the unlike kind increases upon it and nullifies it,” and consequently the water will nullify the teruma wine; or perhaps, since there is here also permitted wine, which is not nullified by its kind, everything is forbidden?

And

Rabbi Yohanan

did not resolve it [

did not answer him].

And it is proven that Rav Yohanan does not hold the reasoning of “we see”?

The Gemara answers:

At first he did not resolve it,

and

at the end he resolved it,

for we say, “We regard its kind as though it were not present, and the unlike kind increases upon it and nullifies it.”

It was also stated: [

And likewise we explicitly learned it in the name of Rav Yohanan]:

Rav Ami said in the name of Rav Yohanan—and some say Rav Asi said in the name of Rav Yohanan: Two cups, one of non-sacred produce and one of teruma, and he diluted them and mixed them with one another: we regard the permitted substance as though it were not present, and the remaining water increases upon it and nullifies it.

We learned in the Mishna: “

This is the general rule: a kind with its kind, in any amount; not with its kind, by imparting taste”:

The Gemara had difficulty: What does the Mishna come to add when it said, “This is the general rule...” For we learned explicitly in the first clause that “a kind with its kind” is in any amount, and “a kind with an unlike kind” is by imparting taste?

Below are two possibilities for answering this difficulty.

1.

Rav and Shmuel both said: All prohibitions of the Torah

that became mixed

with their kind

prohibit even

in any amount.

But if they became mixed

with an unlike kind,

they prohibit only

by imparting taste.

And according to this,

“This is the general rule”—what does it come to add?

What law did we learn from “This is the general rule”?

It comes to add [

to teach concerning]

all prohibitions of the Torah

that became mixed with their kind, which prohibit even in any amount.

2.

Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish both said: All prohibitions of the Torah

that became mixed

whether with their kind or with an unlike kind

prohibit only

by imparting taste, except for tevel and libation wine.

When they became mixed

with their kind,

they prohibit even

in any amount; and when not with their kind, by imparting taste.

And

according to this,

“This is the general rule”—it comes to add tevel.

Now, in a beraita, on the one hand

it was taught in accordance with Rav and Shmuel,

and on the other hand,

it was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish.

It was taught in accordance with Rav and Shmuel: “All prohibitions of the Torah, with their kind, in any amount; not with their kind, by imparting taste.”

It was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish: “All prohibitions of the Torah, whether with their kind or not with their kind, by imparting taste, except for tevel and libation wine: with their kind, in any amount; not with their kind, by imparting taste.”

It follows that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel and Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish depends upon a dispute among the tannaim.

The Gemara raised a difficulty:

Granted, libation wine

prohibits in any amount

because of the stringency of idolatry. But tevel—what is the reason

that it prohibits in any amount?

The Gemara answers:

As is its permission, so is its prohibition.

That is to say, just as one grain exempts the entire grain heap from teruma, so too, if one grain of tevel fell in, it prohibits the entire grain heap.

For Shmuel said:

If he separated

one grain

from a heap of grain,

it exempts the grain heap.

And we also learned likewise: When did they say that tevel prohibits in any amount?

Only if it became mixed

with its kind,

but if it became mixed

with an unlike kind,

it prohibits only

by imparting taste.

Since, when it became mixed with an unlike kind, it is not applicable to say, “As is its permission, so is its prohibition,” it prohibits only to the extent of imparting taste.