Avodah Zarah 71b — the Talmud in English

And

from here Rav Ashi proved that a gentile does not acquire through pulling.

If it enters your mind that pulling acquires for a gentile,

then

from

the time

that a gentile pulls, he acquires,

whereas

libation wine does not become so until he touches it,

then why is it forbidden to derive benefit from the money of that wine? Rather, certainly pulling does not acquire; only money does. And therefore, as long as the gentile has not paid for the wine, he has not acquired it.

The Gemara rejects Rav Ashi’s proof: It can always be said that a gentile acquires through pulling. And indeed,

if he measures it and pours it into a Jew’s vessel

if the wine sellers had poured the wine into a Jew’s vessel

, here too,

they indeed would not have needed to take its money from the gentile first, since from the time of the pulling he had already acquired the wine, as stated above.

And

it is necessary—that is, Rav required the wine sellers to take the money for the wine first, because

to say that Rav required the wine sellers to take the money for the wine first because

he measures it and pours it into a gentile’s vessel

they poured the wine into a gentile’s vessel, which contained libation wine, and from the moment the wine entered the vessel and touched the gentile’s wine, all of it had already become libation wine, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from its money.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Ultimately,

even if they pour the wine into the gentile’s vessel,

when it reaches the airspace of the vessel, he acquires it

as soon as the wine enters the airspace of the vessel, the gentile acquires it through the acquisition of lifting, whereas

libation wine does not become so until it reaches the bottom of the vessel

the wine does not become libation wine until it reaches the bottom of the vessel; if so, can it still be proved from here that a gentile acquires only through money?

And if you say: Indeed, the gentile acquires the first drop of wine at the moment it enters the airspace of the vessel, but afterward, when a nitzok—that is, a stream of wine—is formed, connecting the libation wine found in the gentile’s vessel with the wine found in the Jew’s vessels, all the wine becomes forbidden on account of the nitzok.

If so,

infer from it

it should be proved from here that

“a nitzok”

is considered a

connection.

And below (72b), the amoraim dispute this law.

The Gemara answers:

No!

There is no difficulty as to why the gentile does not acquire the wine immediately when it reaches the airspace of the vessel.

Indeed,

if the gentile were holding the vessel in his hand

if the gentile were lifting the vessel in the air while the Jew poured into it

, here too,

he would acquire the wine through the acquisition of lifting the moment it reached the airspace of the vessel.

It is necessary

however, here it is speaking of

its being placed on the ground

the vessel is resting on the ground.

Therefore the gentile does not acquire the wine until he pulls the vessel, whereas the wine had already become libation wine the moment it reached the bottom of the vessel.

And it is still difficult:

Let his vessels acquire it for him!

Why does he not acquire the wine immediately when it reaches the airspace of the vessel?

And if you say

you can infer from it

it should be proved from here

that “the vessels of a purchaser

that are placed

in the seller’s domain, the purchaser does not acquire

what was placed within them,” and therefore the gentile does not acquire the wine entering the airspace of his vessels until he pulls the vessel.

If so, it is difficult: Why did the Gemara in tractate Bava Batra (85b), which was uncertain whether the purchaser acquired it or not, not resolve the uncertainty from Rav’s words?

The Gemara answers:

No!

It cannot be proved from here that “the vessels of a purchaser placed in the seller’s domain, the purchaser does not acquire what was placed within them,” but

I will always say to you: the purchaser acquired it.

And with what are we dealing here?

Here we are dealing with

a case in which there is an accumulation of wine at the mouth of the pitcher,

that is, the gentile’s vessel has rims in which a small amount of wine accumulates, and when he pours the wine into the gentile’s vessel, it becomes forbidden.

For each one becomes libation wine for him.

That is, each and every drop entering the vessel touches the wine found in the rims and becomes forbidden even before it enters the gentile’s vessel. Therefore it is now forbidden for the Jew to derive benefit from the money of that wine, since it became libation wine while in his domain, unless he took its money from him in advance.

And

now, this answer of the Gemara is based on the assumption that kosher wine mixed with a small amount of libation wine becomes entirely forbidden for benefit. Therefore, immediately when some of the Jew’s wine touched the wine found in the rims, all of it became forbidden, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from its money.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

According to whom?

According to whose view did Rav hold, according to the Gemara’s conclusion?

Apparently he held

not according to

the view of

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel,

who is cited in the Mishna below (74a): “Libation wine that fell into a pit—all of it is forbidden for benefit. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: It is all sold to a gentile, except for the value of the libation wine in it.”

For if

according to the view of

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel, he said: “It is all sold to gentiles, except for the value of the libation wine in it,”

that is, a mixture of libation wine does not prohibit all the wine from benefit, and it is permitted to derive benefit from the value of the kosher wine.

And it is apparently difficult: Is it not established for us, “Every place where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught [a ruling] in our Mishna, the halakha is like him” (see Bava Kamma 69a), whereas here Rav ruled the halakha not in accordance with the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

The Gemara answers:

Is the reason [being sought] anything other than for Rav?

That is, we are seeking a rationale in Rav’s words, and

he

indeed

said: Rav said that the halakha is like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

only in a case where

a barrel

of libation wine

[was mixed] with barrel

s

s of kosher wine, and then it is permitted to derive benefit from the value of the kosher wine,

but

not

when

wine

of libation

[was mixed] with wine

that is kosher. And in such a case, all the wine is forbidden for benefit.

And if so, it is understood why Rav ruled that the wine sellers should take its money first. Since the wine in their vessels became forbidden immediately when it touched the wine found in the rims of the gentile’s vessel, whereas the gentile did not acquire the wine until it reached the airspace of the vessel. Therefore, from the moment the wine became forbidden, it was forbidden for the seller to derive benefit from its money, unless he took the money from the gentile in advance.

The Gemara returns to discuss the dispute between Amemar and Rav Ashi, whether a gentile acquires and transfers through the acquisition of pulling.

The Gemara raises an objection according to Amemar’s view:

It was objected:

We learned in a beraita:

One who purchases scrap metal

metal fragments

from gentiles and finds idolatry among it: If, before he gave money, he pulled it, he returns

the idolatry, and he is not required to destroy it at his own expense.

But

if, after he gave money, he pulled it,

he cannot return it to the gentile and receive his money back; rather,

he shall lead

it

to the Salt Sea.

This is the conclusion of the beraita.

The Gemara infers: It is stated that as long as he has not given money, he can return the idolatry and receive its value from the gentile. And

if it enters your mind

according to Amemar’s words, that

pulling acquires for a gentile, why should he return it?

He already acquired it from the time he pulled it, and he is obligated to destroy it from the world.

The Gemara answers:

Abaye said:

Here, he can return the idolatry

because it appears to be a mistaken transaction.

That is, it appears that at the time he pulled it, he did not intend to acquire the idolatry.

The Gemara raises an objection to Abaye’s answer:

Rava said: The first clause is a mistaken transaction, but the latter clause is not a mistaken transaction?!

That is, according to your words, why, in the latter clause, where he gave the money and afterward pulled it, can he not return it, since it is a mistaken transaction?

Rather, Rava said:

Both in the

first clause

and in the

latter clause

it is

a mistaken transaction! And

according to the strict law, he could return the idolatry in every case and take its value, but nevertheless there is a distinction between the first clause and the latter clause.

In the

first clause,

since

he did not give money, it does not appear

to appear

as idolatry in the possession of a Jew.

Therefore it is permitted for him to return it to the gentile and take its value back.

But in the

latter clause,

since

he gave money, it appears as idolatry in the possession of a Jew.

Therefore the Sages enacted that he should not return it to the gentile, but should lead it to the Salt Sea.

The Gemara raises an objection according to Rav Ashi’s view:

Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Hisda, said to Rav Ashi: Come

[come] and

hear

what we learned in the Mishna:

“One who sells his wine to a gentile,

if he

fixed

the price

before he measured

the wine into his vessel,

, its money is permitted.”

Mar Kashisha infers:

And if you say

according to Rav Ashi’s words, that

pulling does not acquire for a gentile, why is its money permitted?

For the gentile did not acquire the wine until he paid, and by then the wine had already become forbidden for benefit because of his touching it.

The Gemara answers:

With what are we dealing here? With a case where he advanced him a dinar.

That is, the gentile paid for the wine in advance.

And it is still difficult for us:

If so, say the latter clause: “He measured it before he fixed the price, its money is forbidden”; and if he advanced him a dinar, why is its money forbidden?

For he had already acquired the money before the wine became forbidden.

He said to him,

Rav Ashi

, “And according to you, who say that pulling acquires for a gentile, why is the money in the first clause permitted, and the money in the latter clause forbidden?”

For in both cases the gentile pulled it and acquired the wine, and only afterward touched it and rendered it forbidden.

Rather, what must you say?

In the first clause, since he

fixed

the price in advance,

his mind relied on it,

and therefore he acquired the wine immediately when he pulled it. But in the latter clause, since he

did not fix

the price in advance, even though he pulled it,

his mind did not rely on it

to acquire the wine. Therefore, when he touched it afterward and rendered it libation wine, it was still in the Jew’s possession, and it is forbidden for him to derive benefit from its money.

If so,

for me too,

I can likewise explain the words of the Mishna and say:

even though

the Mishna is dealing with a case

where he advanced him a dinar,

nevertheless, only if he

fixed

the price in advance

, his mind relied on it

to transfer the dinar to the Jew in advance. But if he

did not fix the price, his mind did not rely on it,

and he did not acquire the dinar until after the wine became forbidden.

Another difficulty according to Rav Ashi’s view:

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear, for Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: A descendant of Noah is executed for [stealing] less than the value of a peruta.

That is, even if he stole less than the value of a peruta, he is executed.

And

on the other hand,

it cannot be reclaimed.

That is, he is not required to return his theft to the Jew, since it is not worth a peruta; he has waived it.

Ravina infers:

And if you say

according to your words, that

pulling does not acquire for a gentile, why is he executed?

For he did not acquire the stolen object, and wherever it is found, it still belongs to the Jew.

Rav Ashi said to him: Indeed, the gentile did not acquire the stolen object through the acquisitions of theft, but nevertheless he is executed for the very act of theft,

because he caused distress to a Jew.