Avodah Zarah 71b (עא:) — the Talmud in English

And

from here Rav Ashi proved that a gentile does not acquire through pulling.

If it enters your mind that pulling acquires for a gentile,

there is

from

the time

that the gentile pulled, he acquired it,

whereas

the wine would not become libation wine until he touched it,

then why is it forbidden to derive benefit from the money received for that wine? Rather, certainly, pulling does not effect acquisition; only money does. Therefore, as long as the gentile had not paid for the wine, he had not acquired it.

The Gemara rejects Rav Ashi’s proof: Actually, it can be said that a gentile acquires through pulling. And indeed,

if he was measuring it and pouring it into a Jew’s vessel

[if the wine sellers were pouring the wine into a Jew’s vessel]

, here too,

they would indeed not have needed to take the money from the gentile first, since from the moment of pulling he had already acquired the wine, as stated above.

And

it is necessary

to say that Rav required the wine sellers to take the money for the wine first because

he was measuring it and pouring it into a gentile’s vessel

[they poured the wine into a gentile’s vessel, which already contained libation wine], and from the moment the wine entered the vessel and touched the gentile’s wine, all of it had already become libation wine, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from its money.

The Gemara challenges:

Ultimately,

even if he poured the wine into the gentile’s vessel,

once it reached the airspace of the vessel, he acquired it

[as soon as the wine entered the vessel’s airspace, the gentile acquired it through the act of lifting], whereas

the wine would not become libation wine until it reached the bottom of the vessel

[the wine would not become libation wine until it reached the bottom of the vessel]. If so, can this still serve as proof that a gentile acquires only through money?

And if you say: Indeed, the gentile acquires the first drop of wine at the moment it enters the vessel’s airspace, but afterward, when a nitzok, that is, a stream of wine, is formed, connecting the libation wine in the gentile’s vessel with the wine in the Jew’s vessel, all the wine becomes prohibited because of the nitzok,

if so,

infer from here

that it can be proved from here that

a “nitzok”

is considered a

connection.

The amoraim dispute this law below (72b).

The Gemara answers:

No!

There is no difficulty concerning why the gentile does not acquire the wine as soon as it reaches the vessel’s airspace.

Indeed,

if the gentile were holding the vessel in his hand

[if the gentile were lifting the vessel in the air while the Jew poured the wine into it]

, here too,

he would acquire the wine through the act of lifting as soon as it reached the vessel’s airspace.

It is necessary

to say that here the case is

that it was resting on the ground

[the vessel was resting on the ground].

Therefore, the gentile does not acquire the wine until he pulls the vessel, whereas the wine had already become libation wine the moment it reached the bottom of the vessel.

The difficulty nevertheless remains:

Then let his vessel acquire it for him!

Why does he not acquire the wine as soon as it reaches the vessel’s airspace?

And if you say

infer from here

[it can be proved from here] that

“a purchaser’s vessel

that is resting

in the seller’s domain does not acquire for the purchaser what is placed inside it,”

and therefore the gentile does not acquire the wine that reaches the airspace of his vessel until he pulls the vessel,

then there is a difficulty: Why did the Gemara in tractate Bava Batra (85b), which was uncertain whether the purchaser acquired it or not, not resolve the uncertainty from Rav’s statement?

The Gemara answers:

No!

It cannot be proved from here that “a purchaser’s vessel resting in the seller’s domain does not acquire for the purchaser what is placed inside it,” and

actually, I can say to you that the purchaser acquires it.

And with what are we dealing here?

Here we are dealing with

a case where there is a residue of wine at the mouth of the small vessel,

that is, the gentile’s vessel has rims in which a small amount of wine collects, and when he pours the wine into the gentile’s vessel, it becomes prohibited.

For each drop as it enters becomes libation wine.

That is, every drop entering the vessel touches the wine in the rims and becomes prohibited before it enters the gentile’s vessel. Therefore, it is now forbidden for the Jew to derive benefit from the money for that wine, since it became libation wine while in his possession, unless he had received the money from the gentile in advance.

And

this answer of the Gemara is based on the assumption that kosher wine mixed with a small amount of libation wine becomes entirely forbidden for benefit. Therefore, as soon as some of the Jew’s wine touched the wine in the rims, all of it became prohibited, and it is forbidden to derive benefit from its money.

The Gemara asks:

According to whom?

According to whose view did Rav rule, according to the Gemara’s conclusion?

Apparently, he held

not according to

the view of

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who is cited in the Mishna below (74a): “Libation wine that fell into a pit—all of it is forbidden for benefit. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: He may sell all of it to a gentile, except for the value of the libation wine in it.”

For if

he held according to

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who said, ‘He may sell all of it to gentiles, except for the value of the libation wine in it,’

that is, a mixture containing libation wine does not render all the wine forbidden for benefit, and it is permitted to derive benefit from the value of the kosher wine.

Apparently, this is difficult: Is it not an established principle that “wherever Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is cited in our Mishna, the halakha is in accordance with his opinion” (see Bava Kamma 69a)? Yet here Rav ruled contrary to the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

The Gemara answers:

Is the matter relevant to anyone’s reasoning except Rav’s?

That is, we are seeking the rationale behind Rav’s statement, and

he

indeed

said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

only in a case where

a barrel

of libation wine became mixed

with barrel

s

of

kosher wine, in which case it is permitted to derive benefit from the value of the kosher wine,

but not

when

wine

of libation

with wine

of kosher wine became mixed. In such a case, all the wine is forbidden for benefit.

Accordingly, it is understandable why Rav ruled that the wine sellers should take the money first. Since the wine in their vessels became prohibited as soon as it touched the wine in the rims of the gentile’s vessel, whereas the gentile did not acquire the wine until it reached the vessel’s airspace, from the moment the wine became prohibited the seller was forbidden to derive benefit from its money, unless he had taken the money from the gentile in advance.

The Gemara returns to discuss the dispute between Ameimar and Rav Ashi over whether a gentile acquires and transfers ownership through pulling.

The Gemara challenges the view of Ameimar:

It was raised as an objection:

We learned in a beraita:

One who purchases scrap metal

[metal fragments]

from gentiles, and finds an object of idol worship among it—if he pulled it before he gave money, he may return it;

he is not obligated to destroy it at his own expense.

However,

if he pulled it after he gave the money,

he may not return it to the gentile and receive his money back. Rather,

he shall lead

it

to the Salt Sea.

This concludes the beraita.

The Gemara infers: It is clear that as long as he has not given money, he may return the object of idol worship and receive its value from the gentile.

If it enters your mind

that Ameimar’s statement is correct, that

pulling acquires for a gentile, why may he return it?

He had already acquired it from the moment he pulled it and is obligated to destroy it.

The Gemara answers:

Abaye said:

Here, he may return the object of idol worship

because it appears to be a mistaken transaction.

That is, it appears that at the time he pulled it, he did not intend to acquire the object of idol worship.

The Gemara challenges Abaye’s answer:

Rava said: Is the first clause a mistaken transaction, but the latter clause not a mistaken transaction?!

That is, according to your statement, why in the latter clause, where he gave the money and then pulled it, may he not return it? It is also a mistaken transaction.

Rather, Rava said:

Both in the

first clause

and in the

latter clause

it is a

mistaken transaction! And

as a matter of strict law, he could return the object of idol worship in either case and take its value, but nevertheless there is a distinction between the first and latter clauses.

In the

first clause,

since

he did not give money, it does not appear

[to appear]

as an object of idol worship in a Jew’s possession.

Therefore, he may return it to the gentile and take his money back.

But in the

latter clause,

since

he gave money, it appears as an object of idol worship in a Jew’s possession.

Therefore, the Sages instituted that he may not return it to the gentile; rather, he must lead it to the Salt Sea.

The Gemara challenges the view of Rav Ashi:

Mar Keshisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: Come

[and]

hear

what we learned in the Mishna:

“One who sells his wine to a gentile,

if he

set

a price

before he measured

the wine into the gentile’s vessels,

its money is permitted.”

Mar Keshisha infers:

And if you say

that Rav Ashi’s statement is correct, that

pulling does not acquire for a gentile, why is its money permitted?

The gentile did not acquire the wine until he paid, and by then the wine had already become forbidden for benefit through his contact with it.

The Gemara answers:

With what are we dealing here? With a case where he gave him a dinar in advance.

That is, the gentile paid for the wine in advance.

But the difficulty remains:

If so, say the latter clause: “If he measured it before he set a price, its money is forbidden.” And if he gave him a dinar in advance, why is its money forbidden?

The gentile had already acquired the money before the wine became prohibited.

He said to him,

Rav Ashi

, and according to you, who say that pulling acquires for a gentile, why in the first clause is its money permitted, whereas in the latter clause its money is forbidden?

In both cases the gentile pulled the wine and acquired it, and only afterward touched it and rendered it prohibited.

Rather, what can you say?

In the first clause, since he

set

the price in advance,

he relied on the transaction,

and therefore, as soon as he pulled it, he acquired the wine. But in the latter clause, since he

did not set

the price in advance, despite the fact that he pulled it,

he did not rely on the transaction

to acquire the wine. Therefore, when he subsequently touched it and made it libation wine, it was still in the Jew’s possession, and it is forbidden for him to derive benefit from its money.

If so,

I too,

can explain the Mishna in this manner and say that

even though

the Mishna is dealing with a case

where he gave him a dinar in advance,

nevertheless, only if he

set

the price in advance

, he relied on the transaction

to transfer ownership of the dinar to the Jew in advance. But if

he did not set the price, he did not rely on the transaction,

and he did not acquire the dinar until after the wine became prohibited.

Another difficulty according to Rav Ashi:

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Come and hear, as Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A descendant of Noah is executed for [stealing] less than the value of a peruta.

That is, even if he steals something worth less than a peruta, he is executed.

And

conversely,

it cannot be reclaimed.

That is, he is not obligated to return what he stole to the Jew, since it is not worth a peruta, and the Jew has waived it.

Ravina infers:

And if you say

that your statement is correct, that

pulling does not acquire for a gentile, why is he executed?

He did not acquire the stolen object, and wherever it is, it still belongs to the Jew.

Rav Ashi said to him: Indeed, the gentile did not acquire the stolen object through the laws of acquisition by theft; nevertheless, he is executed for the very act of stealing,

because he caused distress to a Jew.