Avodah Zarah 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

Except according to

the opinion of

the one who says that a tereifa can give birth—

what can be said?

According to his view, it is impossible to exclude a tereifa from the phrase “to preserve seed,” since it does in fact “preserve seed” and can give birth. If so, the tereifa is excluded by the verse “from every living creature,” and the question returns: From where is it derived that an animal lacking a limb is forbidden to the descendants of Noah?

And we answer:

The verse says: “To preserve you alive.”

And we derive:

“You”—

those similar to you.

Just as Noah was not a tereifa [as will be explained below], so too he was not to bring a tereifa animal into the Ark.

From here we derive the exclusion of a tereifa. Whereas “from every living creature” is expounded to exclude an animal lacking a limb.

And we challenge this:

Perhaps

it is possible to say

that Noah himself

personally

was a tereifa?

And we answer:

“Wholehearted” is written concerning him.

The Torah testified concerning him that he was “a righteous man, wholehearted”; evidently, he was not a tereifa.

And we challenge this: From where do we know that “wholehearted” refers to being physically whole?

Perhaps,

it is possible to say that Noah

was “wholehearted” in his ways,

humble and meek? And we answer:

“Righteous” is also written concerning him.

From this we learn that he was righteous in his ways, while from “wholehearted” we learn that he was physically whole—and not a tereifa.

And we challenge this: We still have not learned that he was physically whole, because

perhaps

it is possible to say that Noah was

“wholehearted

in his ways, and “righteous”

in his deeds,”

and did not perform acts of violence like the people of his generation?

On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara retracts and says that this is indeed not learned from the statement “wholehearted”; rather, it is learned from the statement “you.” As for the difficulty, “Perhaps Noah himself was a tereifa,” one can say:

It does not enter one’s mind—

it is not reasonable to entertain the thought—

that Noah himself was a tereifa.

For if it would enter your mind that Noah was a tereifa,

would it be possible to say that this is what

the Merciful One said to him: Only living creatures

that are

like you,

similar to you in being tereifot,

bring in, bring only them into the Ark; but living creatures

that are

whole, do not bring in, do not bring them in?!

you shall not bring them in?!

From here there is proof that he did not bring a tereifa into the Ark.

But the Gemara now considers:

And now,

after we have concluded

that it is derived for him

that he did not bring in a tereifa

from

the statement

“you”—

there is a difficulty:

Why do I need “to preserve seed”?

Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, tell him this, when the tereifa had already been excluded by “you”?

And we answer: Even if he would not bring in tereifot, it would still be possible for him to bring in animals that were incapable of giving birth. Since the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted all living creatures to endure, He told him “to preserve seed,” meaning that he should bring in animals capable of giving birth.

Had it said only “you”,

if He had commanded him only “you,”

we might have thought

that he should bring in whole animals

merely for companionship,

to stand with him and the other living creatures in the Ark for twelve months. Therefore, he would not bring in tereifot that could not survive twelve months, and the “companionship” would be nullified;

but

he could bring in

even an old animal and even a castrated animal

that were incapable of giving birth.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote

“to preserve

seed,”

to teach him that he should bring in only animals capable of giving birth.

The Gemara now discusses the three days mentioned in the Mishna: Do they include the day of the festival, meaning that the two days before the festival together with the day of the festival constitute three days? Or do they not include it, but rather it is forbidden to engage in business with them during the three days before the festival.

A dilemma was raised before them,

the members of the academy were uncertain:

Three days,

the days during which business is prohibited—do

they and their festivals,

together constitute three days?

Or perhaps,

it is possible to say:

They,

the three days, are

without their festivals,

and the day of the festival is not included among the three days?

Come and hear,

the Gemara resolves the question from the following Mishna, where we learned:

Rabbi Yishmael says: Three

days

before them and three days after them—

it is forbidden

to engage in business with them [the reason will be explained there].

The Gemara proves:

If it enters your mind,

if you would entertain the possibility that

they and their festivals are included, how is it possible to say that

Rabbi Yishmael

counts

the day of their festival

twice—both

at the beginning, “before” their festivals,

and also

counts it at the end?!

For example, if the festival day is Tuesday, and it is said that “they and their festivals” are prohibited, then according to Rabbi Yishmael, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday are prohibited. It follows that Tuesday is counted twice: both with the days before it and with the days after it—

and it is not reasonable to say this.

The statement of Rabbi Yishmael can be applied to the statement of the Sages as well, since they disagree only over whether business is prohibited after the festival, but they do not disagree over whether the three days include the festival or are counted without it.

And we reject this: Indeed, the festival day is included among the three days before it, while after it business is prohibited for only two days. Why, then, did Rabbi Yishmael say “three after them”?

Since,

because

he taught “three before them,”

therefore

he also taught “three after them,”

in order to keep the wording parallel, although in fact there are only two days after them.

Come and hear,

the Gemara resolves the question from a statement of Shmuel:

For Rav Taḥlifa bar Avdimi said in the name of Shmuel: Sunday

—another version:

the Christian day—

the day of the Christians, who follow the mistaken path of “that man,” who instructed them to make Sunday a festival day every week,

according to Rabbi Yishmael,

who holds that three days before and three days after are prohibited,

always,

throughout the entire year,

it is forbidden

to engage in business with them.

For Thursday, Friday, and Shabbat are the three days before the festival day, while Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday are the three days after it.

And if it enters your mind that they and their festivals are included,

why did Shmuel say “it is always prohibited”?

There

is

indeed

the days of

the fourth and fifth,

Wednesday and Thursday,

which are permitted,

and business is permitted. The statement of Rabbi Yishmael can be applied to the statement of the Sages as well.

And we reject this: Indeed,

according to Rabbi Yishmael, I have no dilemma.

According to Rabbi Yishmael there was no uncertainty:

for

certainly,

they are without their festivals,

and therefore business is prohibited throughout the entire week—

but my dilemma is

according to whom the uncertainty was raised:

according to the Sages—

What

What is their view?

What do they hold: “They and their festivals,” or “They without their festivals”?

Come and hear.

The Gemara resolves the question from the following Mishna [8a]:

As we learned:

And these are

the

festival days of the idolaters,

which the gentiles observed at the time and in the place where the Mishna was taught:

Kalenda, Saturnalia, and Kratesis.

These are names of festivals.

And Rabbi Hanin bar Rava said: Kalenda

takes place

eight days after the tekufa,

the winter tekufa, for all eight days.

Saturnalia

takes place

eight days before the tekufa.

And

although Saturnalia precedes Kalenda, in every case the Mishna states the later one first;

and your mnemonic is

the wording of the verse [Psalms 139]:

“You have enclosed me behind and before,”

for this verse, too, mentions the later element before the earlier one.

The Gemara proves:

And if it enters your mind,

if you would entertain the possibility that

“they and their festivals” are included—

there is a difficulty:

there would be ten!

Together with the eight festival days, there would be ten days?!

Granted, if we say “they without their festivals,” it is understandable, for the tanna does not include the festival day in the count of the days and is not discussing the festival day at all. But if we say “they and their festivals,” and when the festival lasts one day it joins the two days before it, making three altogether, then in the case of Kalenda, which lasts eight days, two days would be included with it, just as they are included with a one-day festival, making ten days altogether.

And we reject this: It is impossible to resolve the question from here, because

the tanna counts all of Kalenda,

all the days of this festival, which lasts eight days,

as one day,

he counts it as a single day.

That is, the tanna does not extend the period for each festival by counting the length of the festival together with the days before it. Rather, he said “three days” with regard to the festival day, meaning the two days before the festival; and each festival day is prohibited according to the length of its festival.

Rav Ashi said: Come and hear:

The dilemma can be resolved from the wording of the Mishna:

“Before the festivals of the idolaters, three days.”

And if it enters your mind,

if you would entertain the possibility that

“they and their festivals” are included,

let the tanna teach

in the Mishna:

“The festivals of the idolaters—

three days

it is forbidden to engage in business with them.” Then his words would mean that when the time of their festivals arrives, the prohibited period is three days. But since the tanna taught in the Mishna “before their festivals,” this indicates that the “three days” are before the festival and do not include it.

And if you would say,

if you wish to reject the proof and say that whenever the tanna said “before their festivals,” it was in order to teach us that the prohibition applies only before the festival,

to exclude after their festivals—

that is not so, for if the tanna wished to say that specifically “before” is prohibited, but not “after,”

let him teach

the Mishna as follows:

“The festival of the idolaters: the three days before it

are prohibited.” Then his words would mean that “their festival” is the primary subject of the Mishna, and that two additional days are joined to it.

Since the tanna of the Mishna did not speak at all about the day of their festival, and placed the primary emphasis on the days before it, this indicates that the “three days” are the days prohibited without the festival day, about which the Mishna informs us.

The tanna of the Mishna did not speak at all of the festival day; it follows that the festival day itself is obviously prohibited.

Conclude from this:

The dilemma has been resolved: The three days are counted without the festival day.

Once the duration of the prohibition has been clarified, the Gemara clarifies the reason for the prohibition against engaging in business with them.

Is it because of “enrichment”—when the gentile makes a profitable transaction and gains financially, he goes and offers thanks to his idol, with the result that the Jew has violated what is written in the Torah [Exodus 23]: “And the name of other gods you shall not mention; it shall not be heard upon your mouth.” And we derive: “It shall not be heard”—it is forbidden to cause a gentile to vow to idols, and likewise to offer thanks to them.

Or is the reason for the prohibition that one causes the gentile to stumble in a prohibition, since he may offer the animal as a sacrifice to idols, whereas the descendants of Noah were commanded not to worship idols; consequently, the Jew violates the prohibition stated in the Torah [Leviticus 19]: “Before the blind, do not place a stumbling block.”

The Gemara will explain the practical difference between these two reasons.

A dilemma was raised before them:

Is the prohibition against engaging in business

because of enrichment, or perhaps

it is possible to say that the reason for the prohibition is

“Before the blind, do not place a stumbling block”?

And the Gemara asks:

What is the practical difference

which reason was stated?

And it explains: The practical difference is in a case where

he has

the gentile has

an animal

other

for himself,

for purposes of idolatrous worship.

If you say,

if you say that the reason for the prohibition is

because of providing him with benefit,

it is still prohibited to engage in business with him, because

you are thereby providing him with benefit,

as he nevertheless now has greater financial leeway.

But if

you say,

if you say that the reason for the prohibition is

because of [

before

the blind—you shall not place a stumbling block,]

there is no placing of a stumbling block here, because

he himself has it,

and even without the animal that he purchases from a Jew, he can offer his own animal to idols.

The Gemara discusses this reasoning: If the one who might stumble has the possibility of transgressing the prohibition without the one who causes him to stumble, does the one who causes him to stumble nevertheless not transgress the prohibition of “before the blind

And we challenge this:

But if he has it,

does it follow that when the one who might stumble has the possibility of transgressing the prohibition without the one who causes him to stumble,

he does not transgress because of [

before

the blind—you shall not place a stumbling block?!]

But it was taught

we learned a beraita from which it is apparent that even if the one who might stumble has the possibility of transgressing a prohibition on his own, nevertheless, the one who causes him to stumble transgresses “before the blind”.