Avodah Zarah 64a (סד.) — the Talmud in English

For we learned in the Mishna:

“One may not hoe

—that is, dig—

with an idolater in a mixed field,

but one may uproot with him

the seeds of mixed species, in order to cast them away,

in order to diminish licentiousness.”

And even though the laborer desires that the mixed species remain, so that they will not be uprooted on their own but rather he will uproot them and receive payment for them, nevertheless it is permitted in order to diminish licentiousness.

They assumed

—the members of the academy assumed—

that

the statement, “but one may uproot with him,”

is whose opinion? It is that of Rabbi Akiva.

That is, even according to Rabbi Akiva,

who said, “One who maintains mixed species is flogged,”

as stated below, it is nevertheless permitted to maintain them temporarily in order to uproot them and diminish licentiousness.

And where were the words of Rabbi Akiva taught?

As it was taught

in a beraita:

“One who weeds, or one who covers

—after sowing, he covers them with earth—

in a mixed field,

even though he did not sow them, once he desires the result of this action, to cause mixed-species produce to grow,

is flogged.

Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains

mixed-species produce is flogged.”

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Akiva,

who prohibited even maintaining mixed species without sowing them?

The verse states (Leviticus 19:19):

“Your field you shall not sow with mixed seed.”

“You shall not sow your field with mixed species.”

I have derived

a prohibition

only

against the

“one who sows”;

from where do I derive a prohibition against the

“one who maintains”?

The verse states: “Mixed species, no.”

That is, the passage concerning mixed species says, “You shall not breed your animal with mixed species; you shall not sow your field with mixed species.” We expound the word “your field” both with what precedes it and with what follows it, as though it were written: “Mixed species—your field, no,” meaning that the verse comes to warn that mixed species must not be present in the field.

In any event, it follows that even according to Rabbi Akiva, who prohibits maintaining mixed species, this applies specifically when he actually desires that they remain,

whereas

if he comes

to diminish licentiousness, it is permitted.

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

The statement

that “one may not hoe with an idolater in a mixed field, but one may uproot with him,”

is whose opinion? It is that of the Rabbis.

They maintain that there is no prohibition against maintaining mixed species. Therefore, it is permitted to uproot mixed species together with the gentile. Consequently, no proof can be brought from here that it is permitted to break jars of forbidden wine together with a gentile.

The Gemara asks:

If

this is in accordance with the opinion of

the Rabbis, why does the beraita specifically state “one may uproot”? Even maintaining them is also entirely permissible.

That is, why did the beraita teach us only that it is permitted to uproot mixed species? According to the Rabbis, it is even permitted to maintain them.

The Gemara answers:

What are we dealing with here? For example, he performs the work for free

—he uprooted the mixed species without payment—.

And it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said: “It is prohibited to give them a gratuitous gift.”

The beraita teaches that nevertheless, diminishing licentiousness is permitted even when done for free.

The Gemara concludes:

F

rom all

t

he words of

Rabbi Yehuda, we can infer the position of Rabbi Akiva.

We can prove that even where maintaining something is prohibited, if he maintains it in order to uproot it and diminish licentiousness, it is permitted.

And this is the proof:

Is it not so

—that is, is it not the case that—

Rabbi Yehuda said, “It is prohibited to give them a gratuitous gift,” but

nevertheless, if one serves them in order

to diminish licentiousness, it is entirely proper?!

If so,

a

ccording to

Rabbi Akiva as well, although Rabbi Akiva said, “One who maintains mixed species is flogged,”

if he maintains them in order

to diminish licentiousness, it is entirely proper.

The Ran in the chapter HaShole'aḥ (Gittin 20b of the pages of the Rif, s.v. kol hameshaḥrer) wrote that the prohibition against emancipating a slave applies only when he emancipates him for free. But if the master gains a mitzva through his emancipation, it is not gratuitous; rather, it is as though he receives its value, and it is permitted. Accordingly, Gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger (there) asked: How did the Gemara prove Rabbi Akiva's position from Rabbi Yehuda's words? Here, by uprooting licentiousness, one fulfills a mitzva; according to Rabbi Yehuda, he does not violate “You shall not show them favor” at all, since where he fulfills a mitzva it is not a gratuitous gift, but rather it is as though he receives its value, as the Ran wrote, and therefore it is permitted. But according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that maintaining mixed species is prohibited, from where do we derive permission to violate this prohibition in order to diminish licentiousness? Chatam Sofer. answers that a distinction must be made between the prohibition against emancipating a slave without payment and the prohibition “Do not show them favor.” The prohibition against emancipating a slave without payment, derived from “You shall work them forever,” means that the master may not emancipate the slave in a manner that causes him to lose the slave’s entire value. Therefore, if the master gains something through emancipating the slave—for example, by fulfilling a mitzva through his emancipation—it is permitted to emancipate him. But the prohibition “Do not show them favor,” which concerns giving a gentile a gift without payment, means that one may not allow a gentile to profit without an investment. Therefore, even though the Jew fulfills a mitzva, the gentile also profits here from a gift without payment, and this is prohibited. Accordingly, the Gemara properly proved Rabbi Akiva’s position from Rabbi Yehuda’s words: Just as it is permitted to violate “Do not show them favor” in order to reduce immorality, so too it is permitted to maintain a mixture in order to reduce immorality.

The same applies to forbidden wine: It is permitted to work together with the gentile to break jars of forbidden wine, and the payment for the work is permitted for benefit.

A

we conclude:

There is no further matter.

There is no longer any uncertainty concerning this law.

They then sat again and raised the following question

—they continued sitting and deliberating:

What is the status of the proceeds of idolatry

found

in the possession of an idolater,

for example, when he sold his idolatry?

What

is the ruling? Is it permitted to benefit from them?

And the alternatives of the uncertainty are:

Does

idolatry

seize its monetary value when it is in the possession of an idolater, or not?

Rav Naḥman said to them: It stands to reason that the proceeds of idolatry in the possession of an idolater are permitted.

And the proof is

from those who came before Rabba bar Avuha,

idolaters who came before Rabba bar Avuha to convert:

He said to them: Go, sell everything that you own, and then convert

—go, sell all the idols in your possession, and then come to convert—.

.

What is the reason?

Certainly,

because he holds that the proceeds of idolatry in the possession of an

idolater are permitted.

Therefore, if they sell their idols before converting, they can benefit from the proceeds after their conversion.

The Gemara asks:

Perhaps there is a difference there, since once they intend to convert, they have certainly nullified it,

and since a gentile can nullify idolatry, its proceeds are permitted, and no proof can be brought from there that the proceeds of idolatry in the possession of an idolater are permitted for benefit. Rather, his proof is

from here:

We learned in a beraita:

“If a Jew was owed a hundred dinars by an idolater, and the gentile sold

the

idolatry

that belonged to him

and brought him

the proceeds, or he sold

forbidden wine

that belonged to him

and brought him

the proceeds to repay his debt,

it is permitted

for the Jew to benefit from them.

But if he said to him, “Wait for me until I sell idolatry and bring you the proceeds, or until I sell forbidden wine and bring you the proceeds, it is prohibited.”

This proves that it is permitted to benefit from the proceeds of idolatry that are found in the possession of an idolater.

Now, although we have resolved the uncertainty from the words of the beraita, the words of the beraita still require explanation:

What is different in the first clause,

which permits benefiting from the proceeds of idolatry,

and what is different in the latter clause,

which prohibits it?

Rav Sheshet said,

in the

conclusion,

it is forbidden to derive benefit

because this is tantamount to wanting it to continue to exist.

For the Jew wants the idolatry to continue to exist until the gentile sells it. But in the first clause, where the gentile preceded him and sold it without the Jew’s knowledge, it is permitted to derive benefit from the proceeds, as stated above.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And

if

wanting it to continue to exist in such a manner, is he [

does he ]

forbidden?!

But didn’t we learn in tractate Kiddushin (17b):

“A convert and a gentile who inherited

their gentile father,

his

idolatry,

and there were money and idols among his property.

The convert may say to him,

to his gentile brother,

‘You take the idolatry, and I will take the money,

or

‘You take the wine of libation, and I will take the produce.’

And although the convert wants the idols to continue to exist, so that he can take his portion in exchange for them,

but

if they came into the convert’s possession, it is forbidden

to derive benefit from them, and it is forbidden for the convert to return them to his gentile brother in order to take money or produce in exchange for them.”

In any event, it is proven that a Jew may take money in exchange for idolatry in the possession of a gentile, even though he wants it to continue to exist.

The Gemara answers:

Rava bar Ulla said:

The Mishna is dealing with idolatry whose value is apportioned according to its fragments.

That is, the Mishna, which permitted the convert to take property in exchange for his brother’s idolatry, is dealing with idolatry made of gold or silver, which retains value even if it is broken. Therefore, since the convert does not care if it breaks and does not want it to continue to exist, he may take money in exchange for it.

The difficulty nevertheless remains:

Granted [

you have answered our objection ] regarding

idolatry,

but

what can be said concerning wine of libation?

Surely he wants it to continue to exist so that it will not spill, and nevertheless he may take produce in exchange for it?

The Gemara answers: The Mishna is dealing

with ḥeres hadriyani.

That is, pottery in which wine of libation has been absorbed, and when it is soaked in water, it again releases the wine absorbed in it.

In such a case, the convert does not want it to continue to exist. For even if it breaks, it is possible to extract the wine from it again.

The difficulty nevertheless remains for us:

But

even if we accept your explanation—that the case concerns idolatry whose value is apportioned according to its fragments, and ḥeres hadriyani—the convert still

wants it to continue to exist, so that it will not be stolen or lost,

so why is he permitted to take produce or money in exchange for them?

Rather, Rav Pappa said: Are you saying that this is referring to the inheritance of a convert?!

That is, no objection can be raised from the inheritance of a convert,

for

the Sages were lenient with regard to the inheritance of a convert,

and permitted it even when he wants it to continue to exist.

This was a decree lest he revert to his former corruption.

But in general, if he wants it to continue to exist, it is forbidden.