Avodah Zarah 64a — the Talmud in English

For we learned in a Mishna:

“One may not hoe

—that is, dig—

with a gentile in a field containing forbidden mixtures, ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

but one may uproot them with him

in order to throw the mixed seeds away,

in order to reduce immorality.”

Even though the worker wants the mixture to remain in existence, so that it will not be uprooted on its own but rather he himself will uproot it in order to receive payment for it, it is nevertheless permitted in order to reduce immorality.

They thought

—the members of the academy thought to say—

that

the statement, “but one may uproot them with him,”

is according to whom? It is according to Rabbi Akiva.

That is, even according to Rabbi Akiva,

who says, “One who maintains a mixture is flogged,”

as will be stated below, it is nevertheless permitted to maintain it temporarily in order to uproot it and reduce immorality.

And where are the words of Rabbi Akiva taught?

A beraita teaches

in a tannaitic source:

“One who weeds, and one who covers

—after sowing, he covers them with earth—

, in a field containing forbidden mixtures,

even though he did not sow them, since through this action he wants to cause the mixed produce to grow,

is flogged.

Rabbi Akiva says: Even one who maintains

mixed produce is flogged.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s view

that he prohibited even maintaining a mixture without sowing it?

The verse says (Leviticus 19:19):

“Your field you shall not sow with mixed seed.”

“Your field you shall not sow with mixed seed.”

I have derived

the prohibition

only

against

“one who sows”;

from where do we derive a prohibition against

“one who maintains” it?

The verse therefore states: “Do not maintain mixtures.”

That is, the section concerning forbidden mixtures states: “You shall not mate your animal with a different species; you shall not sow your field with mixed seed.” We derive the word “your field” both from the phrase before it and from the phrase after it, as though the verse had said: “Mixtures—your field, do not …” This indicates that the verse comes to warn that mixtures must not be present in the field.

In any event, it follows that even according to Rabbi Akiva, who prohibits maintaining a mixture, this applies specifically when he actually wants it to remain in existence.

But

if he comes

to reduce immorality, it is permitted.

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

The statement

“One may not hoe with a gentile in a field containing forbidden mixtures, but one may uproot them with him”—

is according to whom? It is according to the Rabbis,

who maintain that there is no prohibition against maintaining a mixture. Therefore, it is permitted to uproot a mixture together with a gentile. Consequently, no proof can be brought from here that it is permitted to break containers of wine used for idolatrous purposes together with a gentile.

The Gemara asks:

If

this is according to the view of

the Rabbis, why specifically does it say “one may uproot them”? Even maintaining them is entirely permitted!

That is, why did the beraita teach us only that it is permitted to uproot a mixture? According to the Rabbis, it is permitted even to maintain it.

The Gemara answers:

What are we dealing with here? For example, he is doing it without payment

—he uprooted the mixture without payment—

.

and it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who says, “It is prohibited to give them a gift without payment.”

The innovation of the beraita is that nevertheless, reducing immorality is permitted even without payment.

The Gemara concludes:

F

rom the

w

ords of

Rabbi Yehuda, we can infer the position of Rabbi Akiva.

We can prove that even where maintaining it is prohibited, if he maintains it in order to uproot it and reduce immorality, it is permitted.

And this is the proof:

Is it not so

—is it not—

that Rabbi Yehuda said, “It is prohibited to give them a gift without payment,” but

nevertheless, if he works for them in order

to reduce immorality, is it entirely permissible?!

If so,

a

ccording to

Rabbi Akiva as well, although Rabbi Akiva says, “One who maintains a mixture is flogged,”

if he maintains it in order

to reduce immorality, it is entirely permissible.

The same applies to wine used for idolatrous purposes: it is permitted to work with a gentile to break containers of such wine, and it is permitted to benefit from the payment for this work.

A

nd we conclude:

There is nothing more to discuss.

There is no further uncertainty concerning this law.

They then sat again and raised a question

—they sat further and considered the matter—

concerning the money received for an idolatrous object

, found

in the possession of a gentile,

such as when he sold his idolatrous object:

what is the law?

Is it permitted to benefit from this money?

The two sides of the uncertainty are:

Does

—does an idolatrous object—

seize the money received for it when the money is in the possession of a gentile, or not?

Rav Naḥman said to them: It stands to reason that money received for an idolatrous object, when it is in the possession of a gentile, is permitted.

The proof is as follows:

From those people who came before Rabbah bar Avuha,

—gentiles who came before Rabbah bar Avuha to convert—

he said to them: “Go, sell everything that you own, and then convert,”

—go and sell all the idols in your possession, and then come to convert—

.

What is the reason?

Certainly,

because he holds that money received for an idolatrous object in the possession of a

gentile is permitted.

Therefore, if they sell their idols before converting, they will be able to benefit from the money after their conversion.

The Gemara asks:

Perhaps the situation there is different, since once they intended to convert, they certainly nullified the idolatrous objects,

and since a gentile can nullify an idolatrous object, the money received for it is permitted. Therefore, no proof can be brought from there that money received for an idolatrous object in the possession of a gentile is permitted for benefit. Rather, his proof is

from here:

We learned in a beraita:

“If a Jew was owed one hundred dinars by a gentile, and the gentile sold

his

idolatrous object

of his own

and brought him

the money received for it, or he sold

wine used for idolatrous purposes

of his own

and brought him

the money received for it to repay the debt,

it is permitted

for the Jew to benefit from it.

But if he said to him, “Wait for me until I sell an idolatrous object and bring you the money, or until I sell wine used for idolatrous purposes and bring you the money, it is prohibited.” ()

This proves that it is permitted to benefit from money received for an idolatrous object that is found in the possession of a gentile.

Now, although we have resolved the uncertainty from the words of the beraita, the words of the beraita still require explanation:

What is the difference in the first clause,

which permits benefiting from money received for an idolatrous object,

and what is the difference in the latter clause,

which prohibits it?

Rav Sheshet said:

in the

latter clause,

it is forbidden to derive benefit,

because this is considered as though he desires its continued existence.

For the Jew desires the continued existence of the idolatry until the gentile sells it. But in the first clause, where the gentile preceded and sold it without the Jew’s knowledge, it is permitted to derive benefit from its value, as above.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And if

if

one desires its continued existence in such a case, does he

[does he]

become forbidden?!

But did we not learn

in Kiddushin (17b'):

“A convert and a gentile who inherited

the

property of their gentile father,

and there were money and idols among his assets.

The convert may say to him,

to his gentile brother,

‘You take the idolatry, and I will take the money,

or

‘You take wine of libation, and I will take produce.’

And even though the convert desires the continued existence of the idols, so that he will be able to take his share in exchange for them.

But,

if, once they came into the convert’s possession, it is forbidden

to derive benefit from them, and it is forbidden for the convert to return them to his gentile brother in order to take money or produce in exchange for them”.

In any event, it is demonstrated that it is permitted for a Jew to take money in exchange for idolatry that is in the gentile’s possession, even though he desires its continued existence.

The Gemara answers:

Rava bar Ulla said:

The Mishna concerns idolatry whose value is apportioned according to its fragments.

That is, the Mishna, which permitted the convert to take in exchange for his brother’s idolatry, concerns idolatry made of gold or silver, which has value even if it breaks. Therefore, since the convert does not care if it breaks, and he does not desire its continued existence, it is permitted for him to take money in exchange for it.

And it is still difficult:

This is fine

you have answered our question concerning

idolatry,

but

what is there to say concerning wine of libation?

For surely he desires its continued existence, so that it should not spill, and nevertheless it is permitted for him to take produce in exchange for it?

The Gemara answers: The Mishna concerns

Hadrianic pottery.

That is, pottery in which wine of libation has been absorbed, and when it is soaked in water, it again expels the wine absorbed in it.

And in such a case, the convert does not desire its continued existence, for even if it breaks, it is possible to extract the wine from it again.

And it is still difficult for us:

But surely

even if we say as you say, that the matter concerns idolatry whose value is apportioned according to its fragments, and Hadrianic pottery, the convert still

desires its continued existence, so that they should not steal it and so that they should not lose it,

and why is it permitted for him to take produce or money in exchange for them?

Rather, Rav Pappa said: Are you speaking of the convert’s inheritance?!

That is, one cannot raise a difficulty from the convert’s inheritance,

for

the convert’s inheritance is different, for the Sages were lenient in its regard,

and they permitted it even if he desires its continued existence.

This was a decree lest he return to his former corruption.

But in general, if he desires its continued existence, it is forbidden.