Avodah Zarah 63b (סג:) — the Talmud in English

And he is not concerned

neither because of the Sabbatical year

lest they purchase Sabbatical-year produce with it,

from one suspected of selling such produce],

nor because of tithes [

if they are ammei haaretz, lest they purchase something that has not been tithed]

, nor because of yayin nesekh [

if they are gentiles, lest they purchase yayin nesekh, with the result that he has paid his debt to them with yayin nesekh].

Since he did not feed them the prohibited produce directly, but merely gave them money.

But

conversely,

if he said to them, “Go out and eat, and I will pay; go out and drink, and I will pay,”

it is as though he purchased the prohibited item and gave it to them; therefore

he is concerned because of the Sabbatical year, because of tithes, and because of yayin nesekh.

Rav Sheshet infers:

It is evident

that although he does not pay at the time when he purchases the prohibited item, but only later, nevertheless

when he [

when ultimately]

pays, he pays the value of a prohibited item.

If so, this is difficult:

here too,

when they borrowed Sabbatical-year produce and paid in the eighth year,

when they pay, do they pay the value of a prohibited item?

And if so, why is the payment not considered an exchange for Sabbatical-year produce?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Ḥisda explained [

Rav Ḥisda explains the above tosefta]: this refers

to

a case in which he told his workers, “Go to

the shopkeeper

so-and-so,

who extends me credit,”

meaning that the employer regularly purchases from him on credit,

for

from the moment he gave the workers the food, the employer

becomes obligated to him

to repay the money.

Therefore, the money that he pays him afterward is considered the value of a prohibited item.

Since it is his practice to extend credit [

since he customarily sells to him on credit and knows with certainty that he will be paid later],

his mind relies on this, and immediately when he gave them the produce

he acquired a dinar on his account

wherever it may be.

But the poor people who were members of Rabbi Yannai’s household, who borrowed Sabbatical-year produce from the poor in order to repay them in the eighth year, were not so certain to make the payment. The poor did not rely on them sufficiently to acquire the payment wherever it might be. Therefore, the payment is not considered an exchange for a prohibited item.

The Gemara challenges: According to your words, only if he sent his workers to eat by a shopkeeper who regularly extends him credit is he concerned because of the Sabbatical year and so forth’,

but in the case of a shopkeeper who does not extend him credit, what

and is it

permitted

for him to send them to eat without concern?!

?!

If so, rather than teaching, “Go out and eat with this dinar; go out and drink with this dinar,”

that is, if so, why must the tanna introduce a new case in order to permit the employer to send his workers, and establish it as referring to one who said, “Go out and eat with this dinar,”

let him distinguish within that very case,

as the tanna could distinguish in the same case and say,

“When does this statement apply? To a shopkeeper who extends him credit, to whom he becomes obligated; but in the case of a shopkeeper who does not extend him credit, it is permitted.”

Furthermore,

there is a difficulty,

for does

a shopkeeper who does not extend him credit not [

not]

become obligated to him?!

But

Rava

said: If one says to another, “Give a maneh to so-and-so, and all my property will be acquired by you

in exchange for that maneh,”

and he gives it,

he acquires

all the property of the one who gave the instruction,

by the law of a guarantor.

That is, just as a guarantor becomes obligated to pay the lender even though the money did not come into his possession, so too here, the seller becomes obligated with all his property even though the money did not come into his possession. Accordingly, even if he said to his workers, “Go out and eat, and I will pay,” it is as though he said to the shopkeeper, “Give this produce to my workers, and I will become obligated to you for a maneh,” and the seller acquires the maneh immediately by the law of a guarantor. Our difficulty has therefore returned to its place: Why is the produce that Rabbi Yannai’s household paid to the poor in the eighth year not considered an exchange for Sabbatical-year produce?

Rather, Rava said,

indeed,

it makes no difference

whether he said this to a shopkeeper who

extends him credit, and it makes no difference

to a shopkeeper

who does not extend him credit, even though

immediately

he encumbers his property for him

to pay his debt, by the law of a guarantor, as stated above,

nevertheless

since he does not designate the lien [

since he did not designate money for this purpose], when he pays him afterward, the payment is not considered an exchange for Sabbatical-year produce, and

it is not prohibited.

Rather, here,

in the case of “one who says to his workers, ‘Go out and eat, and I will pay,’”

why is he concerned because of the Sabbatical year,

when

he did not designate the lien here [

for he did not designate money for the shopkeeper in his payment]?

Rav Pappa said: It is a case in which he advanced

the employer and paid

him [

the shopkeeper]

a dinar

before sending his workers to him.

It follows that they are now eating from the employer’s property, and the prohibition of the Sabbatical year applies to him.

Rav Kahana said: I stated this teaching before Rav Zevid of Nehardea

[I told Rav Zevid Rav Pappa’s answer]

, and he said to me: If so,

if it is as he said, that the case concerns an employer who paid the shopkeeper in advance and must now calculate the remaining credit balance that he has with the shopkeeper,

rather than teaching [

why do we teach]

“Go out and eat; go out and drink, and I will pay,”

he has already paid in advance, and therefore

it should have said, “Go out and eat; go out and drink, and I will calculate.” [

the tanna should have said this]?

He said to him

Rav Kahana: Indeed,

teach [

the version in the beraita should be]

“Go out, and I will calculate”

as you said.

There is another way to explain the above tosefta:

Rav Ashi said: It is a case in which he took

the employer took the prohibited produce directly from the shopkeeper

and gave

it to his workers

by hand.

Therefore, he is concerned because of the Sabbatical year and so forth, since he himself directly fed them a prohibited item, and not because of the value of Sabbatical-year produce.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If so, rather than teaching [

why do we teach]

“Go out and eat; go out and drink,”

it implies that he does not eat with them; but if the beraita is explained as you say,

it should have said, “Take and eat; take and drink.” [

the tanna should have said this] ?!

He said to him

Rav Ashi: Indeed,

teach [

the version in the beraita should be]

“Take and eat; take and drink”

as you said.

The Gemara returns to discussing the law concerning wages for yayin nesekh:

Rab Naḥman, and Ulla, and Avimi bar Papi sat,

and

and Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ami sat with them

,

and they sat and raised the following question [

and were uncertain]:

If one was hired to break

a

barrel of

wine

of yayin nesekh,

and destroy it from the world,

what

is the law? Is his wage prohibited? The sides of the question are:

Do we say that since

the worker

desires its continued existence

so that he can come and break it and collect his wage,

it is prohibited?

Or perhaps, everything

that a person does in order

to reduce refuse [

to reduce the presence of prohibited matter in the world]

, is well and good.

Rav Naḥman said: Let him break it, and blessing will come upon him.

That is, his wage is permitted.

Let us say [

seemingly, the beraita below]

supports

him: