Avodah Zarah 62b — the Talmud in English

As we learned,

similar to what we learned in tractate Maaser Sheni (chapter 3, Mishna 1):

“A person may not say to his fellow ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

‘Bring up these fruits

of maaser sheni

to Jerusalem, to divide them.’

That is, on condition that he take a portion of them as his wage. For it is forbidden to repay one’s debt with fruits of maaser sheni.

But he may say to him

that is, it is permitted to say to him:

“Bring them up to eat them and drink them in Jerusalem.”

For he is like one inviting him to eat together with him,

and

in this manner, when

they give one another a gratuitous gift,

there is no prohibition.”

And here too, the tanna taught us that he may give the workers fruits of the Sabbatical year as a gratuitous gift.

And Rava said: Actually,

the beraita is dealing with a case in which they performed prohibited labor with fruits of the Sabbatical year, and the tanna came to teach us

that

their wages

are sanctified with the sanctity of the Sabbatical year.

And as for what is difficult for you,

if so, why were the wages of a

worker

who performed labor with fruits of the Sabbatical year not prohibited?

There is a distinction:

a worker whose wage is not large

[his wage is small]

the Sages did not penalize him.

But

animal drivers whose wages are large

[their wages are considerable]

the Sages penalized them.

And this is the penalty that the Sages imposed upon animal drivers.

And our Mishna,

that is, why, in the case of yayin nesech, did they penalize even a worker whose wage is not large?

Rather, because of

the stringency of yayin nesech; it is different.

And they penalized even a worker:

It is explained in the Mishna that wages for labor with yayin nesech are forbidden for benefit.

The Gemara raises a question:

“What is the status of one whose wage was paid for ‘ordinary wine of gentiles’”

?

Is his wage permitted for benefit or not?

And the sides of the question are:

Do we say that since the prohibition

of “ordinary wine of gentiles”

is as severe as yayin nesech,

and both are forbidden for benefit,

his wage is likewise forbidden?

Or perhaps, since its impurity is less severe,

as it does not impart impurity like a corpse, but only the impurity of liquids,

its wage is likewise less severe.

The Gemara resolves the question:

Come and hear,

[come and hear what we learned in a beraita concerning this matter]:

There was a certain man who rented out his boat

[he rented out his boat]

for

labor involving

ordinary wine of gentiles,

and

they gave him wheat as his wage;

[they gave him wheat as his wage]

, he came before Rav Hisda, who said to him: “Go, burn them and bury them”

[go, burn them and bury them].

And it is proven that even wages for labor involving “ordinary wine of gentiles” are forbidden for benefit like yayin nesech.

The Gemara asks: why did Rav Hisda require him to burn the wheat,

rather, let him say to him: “Scatter them”

[let him say to him to scatter them as they are]?

The Gemara answers: Rav Hisda was concerned lest

they come through them to a stumbling block.

Perhaps after he scatters them, other people will gather them and benefit from them.

And

it is still difficult: why did they require him also to bury them?

Let him burn them and scatter them

[let him burn them and scatter their ashes]?

The Gemara answers: Rav Hisda was concerned

lest they fertilize with them.

Perhaps they would use the ashes as fertilizer, and it would emerge that they benefited from those wheat kernels.

And

it is still difficult: why did they require him also to burn them?

Let him bury them as they are

[let him bury them as they are]?

And if you say: even now there is concern lest they take them out of the earth and use them,

did we not learn

[and did we not learn (Sanhedrin 45b)] concerning one who is going out to be executed:

“Whether a stone with which he was stoned, whether a tree on which he was hanged, whether a sword with which he was killed, whether a cloth with which he was strangled, all

are forbidden for benefit, and

are buried with him,”

and we are not concerned lest they take them out and use them,

so why here is burial insufficient?

The Gemara answers:

There,

in the case of one going out to be executed,

since they bury

him and the objects used to execute him

in the court, it is evident that they are those executed by the court,

and therefore we are not concerned lest they take them out and use them.

But

here, it is not evident,

and there is concern lest other people find them, and

say

[and say]:

“Some person stole and brought a grave here.”

The household of Rabbi Yannai borrowed fruits of the Sabbatical year from poor people,

the members of Rabbi Yannai’s family borrowed fruits of the Sabbatical year from the poor before the time of removal,

and repaid them

money

in the eighth year.

It emerged that the poor were eating in the eighth year, after the time of removal, substitutes for fruits of the Sabbatical year.

They came and said to Rabbi Yohanan,

and asked him whether it was permitted to do so.

He said to them: “They acted properly”

[they acted properly]. Since at the time when they paid them for the fruits of the Sabbatical year, the fruits were no longer extant, the payment is not considered a substitute for fruits of the Sabbatical year, and the sanctity of the Sabbatical year does not apply to it.

And correspondingly, payment to a prostitute is permitted.

That is, also in the case of “payment to a prostitute,” which is prohibited from being offered upon the altar, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 23:19), “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God,” if he had intercourse with the prostitute and afterward gave her the payment, it is permitted. Since he did not give it to her at the time of intercourse, it is merely a gift, and the prohibition of “payment to a prostitute” does not apply to it.”

And from where did we learn this law?

For it was taught

in a beraita:

“He gave her

the payment

but did not have intercourse with her,

or

he had intercourse with her but did not give it to her, her payment is permitted.”

The Gemara asks: if

“he gave her but did not have intercourse with her,” it is obvious

that the payment is permitted, since

because

in the end

he did not have intercourse with her, it is merely a gift that he gave her?

And what was novel in the beraita?

Furthermore,

if

“he had intercourse with her but did not give it to her,” did he not give her anything at all? And since he did not give her

anything

, what does ‘her payment is permitted’ mean?”

Rather,

certainly,

this is what it is saying

[this is the intention of the beraita]:

“He gave her and afterward had intercourse with her,

or he had intercourse with her and afterward gave her, her payment is permitted.”

And from here is the source for Rabbi Yohanan’s ruling: if he gave her the payment after having intercourse with her, her payment is permitted.

The Gemara asks: if

he gave her

the payment,

and afterward had intercourse with her,

why is her payment permitted,