Avodah Zarah 62b (סב:) — the Talmud in English

As we learned in the Mishna,

similar to what we learned in tractate Ma'aser Sheni (chapter 3, Mishna 1):

“A person may not say to another,

‘Take these fruits

of ma'aser sheni

up to Jerusalem, to divide them.’

That is, in order to take a portion of them as your wage. For it is prohibited to repay one’s debt with fruits of ma'aser sheni.

But he may say to him

that is, it is permitted to say to him:

“Take them up to eat them and drink them in Jerusalem.”

For he is inviting him to eat with him together,

and

in this manner,

when each gives the other a gratuitous gift,

there is no prohibition”.

Here too, the tanna teaches us that he may give the workers fruits of the Sabbatical Year as a gratuitous gift.

And Rava said: Actually,

the beraita is discussing a case in which they performed prohibited labor with fruits of the Sabbatical Year, and the tanna came to teach us

that

their wage

is sacred with the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.

And as for what is difficult for you,

if so, why is the wage of a

worker

who performed labor with fruits of the Sabbatical Year not prohibited?

The distinction is as follows:

A worker whose wage is not substantial

a small wage

, the Sages did not impose a penalty upon him.

But

donkey drivers whose wages are substantial

whose wages are considerable

, the Sages imposed a penalty upon them.

And this is the penalty that the Sages imposed upon donkey drivers.

And as for our Mishna,

that is, why, in the case of yayin nesech, did they penalize even a worker whose wage is not substantial?

Rather, it is

because the stringency of yayin nesech is different.

And they therefore penalized even a worker.

The Mishna states that wages for labor involving yayin nesech are prohibited for benefit.

The Gemara raises a dilemma:

They raised a dilemma before them: What is the status of one’s wage for “ordinary wine”?

What is

the ruling? Is his wage permitted for benefit or not?

The two sides of the dilemma are:

Do we say that since the prohibition

of “ordinary wine”

is as severe as that of yayin nesech,

and both are prohibited for benefit,

his wage is also prohibited?

Or perhaps, since its impurity is less severe,

as it does not convey impurity like a corpse, but only the impurity of liquids,

its wage is also less severe.

The Gemara resolves the dilemma:

Come and hear

what we learned in a beraita concerning this matter:

There was a certain man who rented his boat

to transport it

for

work involving

ordinary wine,

and

they gave him wheat as his wage.

They gave him wheat as his wage

, he came before Rav Ḥisda, who said to him: ‘Go, burn it and bury it.’

Go, burn it and bury it.

It is thus proven that even wages for labor involving “ordinary wine” are prohibited for benefit, like yayin nesech.

The Gemara asks: Why did Rav Ḥisda require him to burn the wheat?

Why did he not say to him: ‘Scatter it,’

that is, scatter it as it is?

The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda was concerned lest

they come to a mishap through it.

Perhaps after he scattered it, other people would gather it and benefit from it.

And

it is still difficult: Why did he also require him to bury it?

Let him burn it and scatter it

that is, burn it and scatter its ashes.

The Gemara answers: Rav Ḥisda was concerned

lest they fertilize with it.

Perhaps they would use the ashes as fertilizer, and it would turn out that they benefited from that wheat.

And

it is still difficult: Why did he also require him to burn it?

Let him bury it as it is

that is, bury it in its original form.

And if you say that we must still be concerned lest they remove them from the ground and use them,

did we not learn

that is, did we not learn the following (Sanhedrin 45b) concerning one who is executed:

“Whether the stone with which he was stoned, the tree on which he was hanged, the sword with which he was killed, or the cloth with which he was strangled—all

are prohibited for benefit, and

are buried with him,”

and they are not concerned lest people remove them and use them,

so why is burial alone insufficient here?

The Gemara answers:

There,

in the case of one who is executed,

they bury

him and the objects used to execute him

at the court, and it is evident that they are those executed by the court,

and therefore there is no concern lest people remove them and use them.

But

here, it is not evident,

and there is concern lest other people find them and

say

that is, say:

“Someone stole them and brought them here to bury them.”

The household of Rabbi Yannai borrowed fruits of the Sabbatical Year from poor people,

the members of Rabbi Yannai’s family borrowed fruits of the Sabbatical Year from the poor before the time of removal,

and repaid them

with money

in the eighth year.

It follows that the poor were eating in the eighth year, after the time of removal, the substitutes for fruits of the Sabbatical Year.

They came and said to Rabbi Yoḥanan,

and asked him whether it was permitted to do so.

He said to them: ‘They acted properly’

they acted correctly. Since at the time they paid them for the fruits of the Sabbatical Year, the fruits were no longer extant, the payment is not considered a substitute for the fruits of the Sabbatical Year, and the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year does not take hold upon it.

And correspondingly, the gift given to a prostitute is permitted.

That is, even in the case of the gift given to a prostitute, which is prohibited for offering on the altar, as it is stated: “You shall not bring the fee of a prostitute or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19), if he had intercourse with the prostitute and only afterward gave her the gift, it is permitted. Since he did not give it to her at the time of intercourse, it is merely an ordinary gift, and the prohibition of a gift given to a prostitute does not take effect upon it”.

And from where do we learn this law?

As it is taught

in a beraita:

“If he gave her

the gift

and did not have intercourse with her,

or

if he had intercourse with her and did not give her the gift, her gift is permitted.”

The Gemara asks: If

“he gave her the gift and did not have intercourse with her,” it is obvious

that the gift is permitted, since

he ultimately

did not have intercourse with her,

so it is merely an ordinary gift that he gave her?

What did the beraita teach us?

Furthermore,

if

“he had intercourse with her and did not give her the gift,” he did not give her

anything

, what does ‘her gift is permitted’ mean?”

Rather,

certainly,

this is what it is saying

that is, this is the intention of the beraita:

“If he gave it to her and afterward had intercourse with her,

or if he had intercourse with her and afterward gave it to her, her gift is permitted.”

And this is the source for the ruling of Rabbi Yoḥanan that if he gave her the gift after having intercourse with her, her gift is permitted.

The Gemara asks: If

he gave her

the gift

and afterward had intercourse with her,

why is her gift permitted?