Avodah Zarah 53a (נג.) — the Talmud in English

And concerning this the Gemara cites:

Rabbi Hillel, son of

Rabbi Voles: It was necessary

for our Mishna to teach us that a Jew cannot revoke the idolatry of a gentile,

but

that the Mishna is dealing with a case in which

he has

a Jew

a share in it,

in the idolatry,

in partnership

with a gentile. And even in this there is no novelty in the fact that the Jew cannot revoke the gentile’s share, since he cannot even revoke his own share. Rather, the wording of the Mishna comes to imply that only the Jew cannot revoke the gentile’s share, but the gentile can revoke his own share,

and this teaches us

that only

the Jew cannot revoke

his share

of the gentile. But the gentile

can revoke the share

of himself

—his own share—

and he revokes it.

The novelty is that we do not say: Since he cannot revoke the share of the Jew who is his partner in the idolatry, he likewise cannot revoke his own share.

There are those

who

teach it

—who transmit the statement of Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Voles—

with regard to a baraita,

concerning the baraita in which we learned:

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: The idolatry of a Jew can never be revoked.

And we raised the issue:

What

is the meaning of

“never”?

Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Voles, said: It was necessary

to teach us that it cannot be revoked,

but

the case is one in which

a gentile has a share in the Jew’s idolatry

in the Jew’s idolatry

as a partner,

and the gentile revoked his share, so his share is revoked, but the Jew’s share is not revoked.

And this teaches us that a Jew worships according to his own intention,

that he worships it according to his own intention and not according to the gentile’s intention.

Practical halakha: There is no difference among the three formulations of Rabbi Hillel, son of Rabbi Voles. The gentile cannot revoke the Jew’s share; he can revoke only his own share.

Mishna:

How does a gentile revoke his idolatry?

He cuts off the tip of its ear

or

the tip of its nose

or

the tip of its finger.

And likewise, if he

crushed it,

striking it with a hammer until its form was crushed,

even though he did not remove any part of it, he has revoked it.

But if he

spat

and

spat in its face,

or

urinated in its face,

or

dragged it,

dragging it and throwing it into the mud, or

threw excrement at it—

it is not revoked,

since these acts do not constitute revocation; they merely express temporary anger, and when he calms down, he will worship it again.

If he sold it

the gentile, or

pawned it

for a debt,

Rabbi says: He revoked it; and the Sages say: He did not revoke it,

as will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: If he crushed it, even though he did not remove any part of it, he revoked it.

The Gemara discusses this:

When he did not remove any part of it,

and it remained whole,

by what means did he revoke it?

Rabbi Zeira said:

For example,

he crushed its face,

and damaged its form.

We learned in our Mishna:

If he spat in its face or urinated in its face,

dragged it, or threw excrement at it—it is not revoked.

The Gemara discusses this:

From where are these matters?

From where do we know that he will return to worship it after degrading it, and therefore it is not revoked?

Hezekiah said: The verse states (Isaiah 8): “And he will pass through it, oppressed and hungry [a difficult event will befall him and he will suffer hunger because his bread is lacking—Metzudat David];

and it shall be, when he is hungry, that he will become enraged—

and he will curse his king and his god

[he curses and degrades his idol]

and he will turn upward

[his heart turns toward heaven].”

And it is written afterward

and the following verse states:

“And he will look toward the earth, and behold distress and darkness, gloom, anguish, and thick darkness.”

It is clear

that even though he cursed his king and his god and turned upward,

when he calms down from his anger, then

he will look toward the earth,

be reconciled with it and return to worship it.

We learned in our Mishna:

If he sold it or pawned it—

Rabbi says: He revoked it; and the Sages say: He did not revoke it.

The Mishna does not state to whom the gentile owner sold it: whether to a smith [ordinarily, those who purchase metals are smiths ], a gentile or a Jew. The Gemara discusses this.

With a gentile smith, the inclination is to say that the sale is not an act of revocation, because the gentile who sells it assumes that the gentile purchaser will worship it rather than break it, refine it, or reshape it.

Conversely, when he sells it to a Jewish smith, there is reason to say that the sale is an act of revocation, because the gentile knows that the Jew will melt and reshape it rather than worship it.

Although this is the more likely view, it is not an absolute principle, and there is no necessity to say so. It is possible that even when he sold it to a gentile, he revoked it; likewise, it is possible that even when he sold it to a Jew, he did not revoke it. As will be explained in the Gemara.

Ze’iri said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, and Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said in the name of Rav

disagreed in their interpretation of our Mishna.

One

of them

said: The dispute

between Rabbi and the Sages is

with regard to a gentile smith—

But with regard to a Jewish smith—

everyone agrees: He revoked it.

And one

of them

said: The dispute is with regard to a Jewish smith,

as will be explained.

It was asked of them:

What is the opinion of this second amora? Does he mean that

with regard to a Jewish smith

there is

the dispute—Rabbi says that he revoked it, and the Sages say that he did not revoke it—

but with regard to a gentile smith—

everyone agrees: He did not revoke it—

or perhaps

he means that

both in this case,

with a gentile smith,

and in this case,

with a Jewish smith, there is

a dispute.

The practical difference is: What does Rabbi hold when the gentile sells it to a gentile smith—does he hold that he did not revoke it, or that he did revoke it?

And we resolve it:

Come and hear

from Rabbi’s statement in a baraita.

For

we learned in a baraita:

Rabbi said: My words appear

reasonable,

my words

my view,

when he sold it for destruction

as will be explained,

and the words of my colleagues

the Sages who disagree with me—[appear reasonable]

when he sold it to be worshipped.

Before drawing the conclusion, we clarify:

What

is the meaning of

“for destruction,” and what

is the meaning of

“to be worshipped”?

If you say:

that it means:

“for destruction” means

literally for destruction,

that he sold it on the condition that it be destroyed,

and

“to be worshipped” means

literally to be worshipped, that he sold it on the condition that it be worshipped—

this is difficult. With regard to selling it to be worshipped,

what is the reason of the one who says

that Rabbi, who says

he revoked it?

He explicitly stipulated with the purchaser that he worship it; even if ultimately he does not worship it, in any event the seller did not revoke its status as idolatry.

And

the same difficulty applies to selling it for destruction:

what is the reason of the one who says

that the Sages, who say

he did not revoke it?

The seller certainly revoked it, knowing [or thinking] that the purchaser would destroy it.

Rather,

does

“for destruction”

mean

“for destruction”—

to one who is destined to destroy it, and who is that?

Who is he?

A Jewish smith.

Nevertheless, the Sages hold that he did not revoke it, because the seller says to himself: Since it is worth a great deal, the Jewish smith will not reshape it; he will sell it to another gentile, who will worship it. Rabbi disagrees and holds that the gentile knows that the Jew will reshape it with the skill of the finest smiths.

And the meaning

of “to be worshipped” is

“to one who is destined to worship it, and who is that?

Who is he?

A gentile smith.

Therefore the Sages hold that he did not revoke it, while Rabbi disagrees and holds that he revoked it.

Now, the meaning of Rabbi’s wording, “My words appear,” is that we indeed disagree about this halakha even when he sells it to a Jew, but Rabbi’s words are more convincing. Similarly, when he said, “And the words of my colleagues,” he meant that we also disagree when he sells it to a gentile, and in that halakha the words of my colleagues, the Sages, are more convincing—

And conclude from this: Both in this case

when he sells it to a Jewish smith

and in this case

with a gentile smith—

there is a dispute.

The question is resolved.

Now this presents a difficulty for the first amora, who said that with a Jewish smith everyone agrees that he revoked it, whereas the baraita implies that they also disagree with regard to a Jewish smith.

And we reject this:

No,

that is not the meaning of the baraita. Rather,

this is what it says:

This is the meaning:

Rabbi said: My words appear to my colleagues

and they too did not disagree with me

when he sold it for destruction, and who is that?

Who is he?

A Jewish smith—

for even my colleagues did not disagree with me

by saying that it was not revoked—

but when he sold it to be worshipped,

to a gentile,

but

when he sold it

for destruction, they agree with me.

We now explain “My words appear”: It means from the outset—that is, they never disagreed with me—not as the questioner explained it, namely, “My words appear” means that after our dispute my words are more convincing.

Rabbi’s statement comes to clarify in which matter they disagreed, not, as the questioner thought, to say whose words are more convincing.

The wording of the baraita is precise in this way: At the beginning it says “appear,” whereas at the end it says “and the words of my colleagues,” without saying “appear.” This implies that at the beginning he says, “My words appear to my colleagues,” meaning that they never disagreed with him; and at the end, “and the words of my colleagues,” meaning: In what did we in fact disagree? In the case of selling it to be worshipped.

In summary: There are two views.

The first amora holds: The dispute is with regard to a gentile smith, whereas with regard to a Jewish smith everyone agrees that he revoked it.

The second amora holds: There is a dispute in both cases.

The Gemara raises an objection

by citing a baraita to challenge the first amora, who holds that when the purchaser is a Jew everyone agrees that he revoked it. And so we learned:

A Jew

who purchases scrap metal

metal fragments

from gentiles and finds idolatry among it,

an idol—

If, before he gave

the Jew

money

to the gentile seller,

he pulled it

—he performed an act of meshikha, a kinyan that applies even between a Jew and a gentile—

he must return it

to the seller; and if he wishes, the gentile may revoke it, after which the Jew may purchase it from him again with a new kinyan.

The Jew’s “pulling” it from him constitutes a mistaken acquisition, and the acquisition is void, since he did not know that there was idolatry among the items. Therefore, it does not have the status of a Jew’s idolatry, which cannot be revoked.

But

if after he had given

[after he had given]

the money, he pulled it—

he must take

the benefit, meaning the value of the idolatry,

to the Dead Sea,

and the money is forbidden to benefit from. He cannot return it to the gentile and then take back the money he paid for it.

Although the act of pulling constituted a “mistaken acquisition,” nevertheless, since he had already paid for it and now returns it and takes back his money, it appears as though he is selling it to the gentile.

Apparently, this gentile, who sold his scrap metal to the Jew, knew that idolatry was present and did not revoke it before the sale—

This implies that the baraita holds that when he sells it to a Jew, it is not revoked.

Granted, if you say: The dispute is with regard to a Jewish smith,

and the Sages hold that it is not revoked,

this

baraita,

whose

teaching is it?

It is the view of the Sages—

But if you say that the dispute is with regard to a gentile smith, whereas with regard to a Jewish smith everyone agrees that he revoked it, this

baraita,

whose

teaching is it? After all, the Sages, like Rabbi, hold that it is revoked—

Why, then, must he take the benefit to the Dead Sea, and [for what purpose would he return it if he had not yet given the money]?

The Gemara answers:

This case is different

the case is different

there, for he purchased it with the intention that it was scrap metal—

he bought it

the gentile sold it together with scrap metal, thinking that it was scrap metal—

he did not buy it with the intention that it was idolatry

he did not know that idolatry was present, and therefore he did not revoke it.

But when he sells idolatry alone to a Jewish smith, the first amora holds that everyone agrees that he voluntarily revokes it.

We learned in our Mishna that Rabbi holds that if the gentile sells the idolatry either to a Jew or to a gentile [or, according to the Sages and the first amora’s view, if he sells it to a Jew], it is revoked.

The following baraita teaches us that this law applies specifically when he sold it, but when he did not actually sell it, it is not revoked.

The Sages taught: If he borrowed

the gentile

against it

meaning that he pawned it with the intention of repaying the loan and taking it back from the lender ,

or a collapse fell upon it

and he does not take the trouble to clear it away,

or bandits stole it

and he does not pursue it,

or its owners abandoned it and went away to a distant land

to a faraway country—