Avodah Zarah 23a (כג.) — the Talmud in English

The Gemara returns to resolve the contradiction raised above between our Mishna, which prohibits leaving an animal in seclusion with a gentile, and the beraita, which permits purchasing an animal from a gentile for a sacrifice:

Ravina said: It is not difficult

—this contradiction.

This

—the statement of our Mishna—was said

with regard to the outset

: One may not leave an animal in seclusion with a gentile, because of the concern that the gentile may engage in bestiality with it.

Whereas

this

—the statement of the beraita, that one may purchase an animal from them for a sacrifice—concerns

a case after the fact.

That is, once the animal was already in the gentile’s possession, there is no concern that perhaps it was used for bestiality.

The Gemara asks:

And from where do you say

—from where may it be said—

that there is a difference

in this matter

between the outset and after the fact,

that at the outset one is concerned, whereas after the fact the concern disappears?!

The Gemara explains:

As we learned,

we learned in our Mishna:

A woman may not be secluded with them,

with gentiles,

because they are suspected of forbidden sexual relations.

And we raise a contradiction,

as elsewhere [Mishna Ketubot 26b] it is stated:

A woman,

a Jewish woman,

who was imprisoned,

was taken captive,

by gentile idolaters,

her status is as follows: If she was imprisoned

because of

a monetary

debt

that she owed, and for that reason they imprisoned her,

she is permitted to her husband.

But if she was imprisoned

because of

having become liable under the laws of

capital offenses

[execution],

she is forbidden to her husband!

The Gemara asks: Why, if she was imprisoned because of a monetary debt, is she permitted to her husband? After all, we see from our Mishna that a woman may not be left in seclusion with gentiles because of the concern of a prohibition.

The Gemara derives from this:

Rather, is it not so? Learn from it

—we learn from this—

that there is a difference for us

that

there is a distinction between the outset and after the fact.

Our Mishna states the law that a woman may not be secluded with a gentile from the outset. Whereas the Mishna in Ketubot explains the law that if the woman was already imprisoned because of a monetary debt, she is permitted after the fact!

It is thus proven that there is a distinction between the outset and after the fact: Even if at the outset one is concerned, after the fact one does not take the concern into account and does not prohibit on its account.

The Gemara rejects this:

From where?

From where do we know that the reason for the difference between the conflicting laws in these mishnayot is that the matter is permitted after the fact?

Perhaps

it is possible that

I will tell you that, in fact, even after the fact it is also not

permitted.

And here,

the reason that a woman imprisoned over monetary matters is permitted

is

the reason

—the reason is

that

the gentile

is afraid because of the loss of his money.

He fears that if he has intercourse with her, her husband will not wish to redeem her and pay the debt she owes. Therefore he does not have intercourse with her, because he is concerned that he will lose his debt. But when this reason is absent, we are indeed concerned that perhaps the woman was violated while imprisoned, and she is forbidden to her husband!

The Gemara proves this:

Know

that the reason for the permission is only that the gentile fears losing his money,

as the latter clause teaches,

as it is stated at the end of this Mishna:

If the woman was imprisoned

because of a capital offense,

meaning that she was already liable to be executed and the gentile treats her as entirely abandoned, we are concerned that perhaps she willingly had intercourse with one of the gentiles who were with her—and

she is forbidden to her husband!

It is proven that when the gentile has no deterrent against having intercourse with her, he does so; consequently, she is forbidden even after the fact,

And that is all there is to it

—this proof is clear, and no objection can be raised against it!

The Gemara offers another answer to the contradiction between our Mishna, which prohibits leaving an animal in seclusion with a gentile, and the statement of the tosefta permitting the purchase of an animal from them for a sacrifice.

Rabbi Pedat said: It is not difficult

—the contradiction between the law of our Mishna and the law of the tosefta.

This

—one of them follows the opinion of

Rabbi Eliezer,

and

this

—the other follows the opinion of

the Rabbis

in the Mishna below.

As we learned with regard to the red heifer

[the red heifer]:

Rabbi Eliezer says:

A red heifer

may not be purchased

—one may not purchase it—

from gentile idolaters.

And the Rabbis permit

purchasing it from gentile idolaters.

The Gemara explains:

Is it not with regard to this

—this matter—

that they disagree?

Rabbi Eliezer holds:

Rabbi Eliezer holds: We are concerned about bestiality.

That is, that the gentile may have engaged in bestiality with the heifer. Therefore, one may not purchase a red heifer from him.

And the Rabbis,

who permit purchasing a heifer from a gentile,

hold—

we are not concerned about bestiality,

and there is no impediment to purchasing it from a gentile idolater.

The Gemara rejects this:

From where,

do we know that this is indeed their disagreement?

Perhaps

it is possible

that everyone,

both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer,

is not concerned about bestiality. And here, the reason for Rabbi Eliezer

to prohibit it is

as Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: If he placed upon it

—upon the heifer—

while it still had

a load of sacks,

a pile of empty sacks tied together,

he disqualified it!

Regarding the meaning of the word “load,” the Ya’avetz wrote that it derives from the Aramaic word meaning “its spoil,” which is the translation of “its booty.” In several places, the Sages used the word “spoil” to define a collection or grouping of objects.

This is because it is stated with regard to the red heifer [Numbers 19:2]: “Upon which no yoke has ever come.” Since this yoke came upon it, it is disqualified.

And

whereas

in the case of a heifer whose neck is broken,

it is not disqualified until

it pulls with it.

That is, until it walks and pulls the yoke, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 21:3]: “And which has not pulled with the yoke.” Once it has pulled with the yoke, it is disqualified.

The disagreement can now be explained:

One master,

Rabbi Eliezer,

holds that we are concerned

that perhaps a yoke was placed upon it, and therefore one may not purchase the heifer from them.

And the other master,

the Rabbis,

holds

[they hold]—

we are not concerned

that perhaps a yoke was placed upon it, and therefore one may purchase it from them. If so, there is no necessity to say that Rabbi Eliezer is concerned about bestiality. The reason he prohibits purchasing a red heifer from a gentile applies only to a red heifer, regarding which there is concern that a yoke was placed upon it. But with regard to other sacrifices, for which this law does not apply, Rabbi Eliezer concedes that one may indeed purchase them from gentiles.

The Gemara rejects this:

This cannot enter your mind—

it is inconceivable to say that we are concerned that he placed a yoke upon it.

For

on account of a slight convenience,

the minor convenience he gains by placing the “load” upon the animal, he

does not suffer a great loss.

He would not lose the large sum of money paid for a red heifer, since placing the load upon the animal would disqualify it.

If so, Rabbi Eliezer certainly does not prohibit purchasing a heifer from gentiles for this reason; certainly, the reason is that he is concerned about bestiality.

But this concern too is unacceptable, because

here as well we could say

that

on account of the slight pleasure

the gentile derives from engaging in bestiality with the animal,

he does not suffer a great loss!

The Gemara answers:

There,

with regard to the concern of bestiality,

his inclination overpowers him.

Therefore, although it is unreasonable that he would forgo a large sum of money for the sake of momentary pleasure, nevertheless, when his inclination toward forbidden sexual relations overpowers him, he does not calculate the resulting loss!

Therefore, because of the concern of bestiality, Rabbi Eliezer prohibits purchasing an animal from gentiles. The Rabbis, however, are not concerned about this.

Nevertheless, it cannot yet be established that this is the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis, since there is another possible explanation of their disagreement:

Perhaps

it is possible

that everyone,

both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer,

is not concerned about bestiality; and here, the reason for Rabbi Eliezer is as Shila taught,

as he taught,

Shila.

For Shila taught: What is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer

who prohibits bringing a red heifer purchased from gentiles?

It is stated [Numbers 19:2]:

“Speak to the children of Israel, and they shall take for you

a red heifer,” and this is expounded as follows:

The children of Israel shall take—

but gentiles shall not take

[the word “shall take” is interpreted as though it said “shall cause to be taken,” meaning “shall sell” ]. That is, the community must purchase the red heifer specifically from the children of Israel, and not from gentiles.

Because of this exposition, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that one may not purchase a heifer from a gentile.

The Gemara rejects this:

This cannot enter your mind!

It is impossible to explain Rabbi Eliezer’s statement in this manner.

For

after all,

the latter clause teaches,

it is written at the end of the beraita:

And likewise Rabbi Eliezer would disqualify

animals purchased from gentiles

for all sacrifices.

And not only with regard to a red heifer.

And if it enters your mind,

if the reason Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies a heifer originating with gentiles were indeed

as Shila taught

—for the reason expounded by Shila—this would be impossible, since

granted, with regard to the heifer, the Torah wrote “taking.”

Therefore, in the case of the heifer there is a special law prohibiting its purchase from gentiles.

Rather, all of them,

all the other sacrifices, which Rabbi Eliezer prohibits taking from gentiles [as explained at the end of the beraita], and

is the term “taking” written with regard to them,

with regard to those sacrifices?!

Rather, since Rabbi Eliezer prohibits the animals of gentiles for all sacrifices, it is evident that his reasoning is not as Shila stated.

If so, we must again understand the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer as to whether one may purchase a cow from gentiles.

The Gemara returns to its earlier explanation, that Rabbi Eliezer prohibits it due to concern that the animal may have been used for bestiality:

But perhaps,

it is possible that

they disputed only up to this point

the Rabbis did not disagree with Rabbi Eliezer regarding whether we are concerned about bestiality,