Avodah Zarah 23a — the Talmud in English

The Gemara returns to resolve the contradiction raised earlier between our Mishna, which prohibits leaving an animal alone with a gentile, and the beraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna—which permits purchasing an animal from a gentile for a sacrifice:

Ravina said: There is no contradiction

between these two rulings.

This

the statement of our Mishna,

was stated as an initial ruling:

One may not leave an animal alone with a gentile, because of the concern that the gentile might engage in bestiality with it.

But

this

the statement of the beraita, that one may purchase an animal from them for a sacrifice,

concerns a situation after the fact.

That is, once the animal was already in the gentile’s possession, there is no concern that it might have been used for bestiality.

The Gemara asks:

And from where do you say

that one may say

that there is a difference

in this matter

between an initial ruling and a ruling after the fact—

that initially there is concern, whereas after the fact the concern disappears?

The Gemara explains:

As we learned in a Mishna:

Our Mishna states:

A woman may not be secluded with them,

with gentiles,

because they are suspected with regard to forbidden sexual relations.

But they raise an objection from a source,

for elsewhere, in the Mishna of Ketubot 26b, it is stated:

A woman

who is Jewish

who was imprisoned

that is, taken captive

by idol worshippers,

the law is as follows: If she was imprisoned

because of

a monetary

debt

that she owed, and they imprisoned her because of it,

she is permitted to her husband.

But if she was imprisoned

because of

a matter in which she was liable under the laws of

capital cases

that is, execution,

she is forbidden to her husband!

And this is difficult: Why, when she was imprisoned because of a monetary debt, is she permitted to her husband? We see from our Mishna that a woman may not be secluded with gentiles because of concern about a prohibition.

The Gemara derives from this:

Rather, can it not be inferred

from this,

that for us there is a distinction

that there is a difference

between an initial ruling and a ruling after the fact?

Our Mishna states that a woman may not initially be secluded with a gentile. But the Mishna in Ketubot teaches that if she was already imprisoned because of a monetary debt, she is permitted after the fact!

It is therefore proven that there is a distinction between an initial ruling and a ruling after the fact. Even if initially there is concern, after the fact we do not take that concern into account and do not prohibit on its basis.

The Gemara rejects this:

From where

do we know that the difference between the apparently contradictory laws in these Mishnayot is because the woman is permitted after the fact?

Perhaps

it is possible that

I could always tell you that even after the fact she is not permitted.

She is not permitted.

And here,

the reason that a woman captured because of monetary matters is permitted

is

the reason

that

the

gentile

is afraid because of the loss of his money.

He fears that if he has relations with her, her husband will not wish to redeem her and pay the money she owes. Therefore, he does not have relations with her, because he is concerned that he will lose the debt owed to him. But when this reason is absent, there is indeed concern that the woman had relations while imprisoned, and she is forbidden to her husband!

The Gemara proves this:

Know

that the reason for the permission is only that the gentile fears losing his money,

as the latter clause teaches,

the following is stated at the end of that Mishna:

If the woman was imprisoned

because of a capital matter,

meaning that she had already become liable for execution, and the gentile treats her as entirely at his disposal, we are concerned that she willingly had relations with one of the gentiles who were with her—and

she is forbidden to her husband!

It is proven that when the gentile has no deterrent against having relations with her, he does so. Consequently, she is forbidden even after the fact,

And there is nothing more to say

this proof is clear, and no objection can be raised against it!

The Gemara offers another resolution to the contradiction between our Mishna, which prohibits leaving an animal alone with a gentile, and the ruling of the Tosefta that one may purchase an animal from them for a sacrifice.

Rabbi Pedat said: There is no contradiction

between the law of our Mishna and the law of the Tosefta.

This

one of them follows the view of

Rabbi Eliezer,

while

this

other one follows the view of

the Rabbis

in the Mishna below.

As we learned concerning the cow used for the purification rite

the red heifer,

Rabbi Eliezer says:

A red heifer

may not be purchased

one may not buy it

from idol worshippers.

But the Sages permit

purchasing it from idol worshippers.

The Gemara explains:

Is it not that, in this matter,

in this issue,

they disagree?

Rabbi Eliezer holds:

We are concerned that the animal may have been used for bestiality.

That is, that the gentile may have had relations with the cow. Therefore, one may not purchase a red heifer from him.

And the Rabbis,

who permit purchasing a cow from a gentile,

hold—

we are not concerned that it may have been used for bestiality,

and there is no impediment to purchasing it from an idol worshipper.

The Gemara rejects this:

From where

do we know that this is indeed the subject of their disagreement?

Perhaps

it is possible

that everyone,

both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer,

is not concerned about bestiality. And here, the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling

the reason that Rabbi Eliezer prohibits it

is in accordance with what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: If one placed upon them

upon the cow

while it still had

a load of sacks,

a pile of empty sacks tied together—

he disqualified it!

This is because it is stated concerning the red heifer (Numbers 19:2), “Upon which no yoke has been placed.” Once this yoke was placed upon it, it became disqualified.

But

if it was

a heifer whose neck was broken,

it is not disqualified unless

until it pulls it.

That is, until it walks and pulls the yoke. As it is stated (Deuteronomy 21:3), “that has not pulled with the yoke.” Once it pulls the yoke, it is disqualified.

The disagreement between them can now be understood:

One master,

Rabbi Eliezer,

holds that we are concerned

that a yoke may have been placed upon it, and therefore one may not purchase the cow from them.

And

the other master,

the Rabbis,

hold

that we are not concerned

that a yoke may have been placed upon it, and therefore one may purchase it from them. If so, there is no necessity to say that Rabbi Eliezer is concerned about bestiality. The reason he prohibits purchasing a red heifer from a gentile applies only to a red heifer, because there is concern that a yoke was placed upon it. But regarding other sacrifices, for which this law was not stated, Rabbi Eliezer agrees that one may purchase them from gentiles.

The Gemara rejects this:

This cannot enter your mind;

it is unreasonable to say that the concern is that a yoke was placed upon it.

For

because of a slight convenience,

the small convenience gained by placing the “load” upon the animal,

he would not suffer a great loss.

He would not lose the considerable sum paid for a red heifer, since placing the load upon the animal disqualifies it.

If so, Rabbi Eliezer certainly does not prohibit purchasing a cow from gentiles for this reason; the reason must certainly be that he is concerned about bestiality.

But this concern too cannot be accepted, because

here as well, one could say

that

because of the slight pleasure

that the gentile gains from having relations with the animal,

he would not suffer a great loss!

The Gemara answers:

There,

with regard to the concern about bestiality,

his inclination overwhelms him.

Therefore, although it is not reasonable that he would forfeit a large sum for a momentary pleasure, when his inclination toward forbidden sexual relations overwhelms him, he does not consider the resulting loss!

Therefore, because of the concern about bestiality, Rabbi Eliezer prohibits purchasing an animal from gentiles. But the Sages are not concerned about this.

Nevertheless, it still cannot be demonstrated that this is the subject of the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages, since there is another possible explanation of their disagreement:

Perhaps

it is possible

that everyone,

both according to the Sages and according to Rabbi Eliezer,

is not concerned about bestiality. And here, the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling is as Shila taught,

as

Shila taught.

For Shila taught: What is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer

who prohibits bringing a red heifer purchased from gentiles?

It is stated (Numbers 19:2):

“Speak to the Children of Israel, and they shall take for you

a red heifer,” and this is expounded as follows:

The Children of Israel shall take

it—but

idol worshippers shall not take it [that is, the word “take” is understood as though it said “cause to be taken,” meaning that they shall sell it]. In other words, the public must purchase the red heifer specifically from the Children of Israel, and not from idol worshippers.

Because of this exposition, Rabbi Eliezer holds that one may not purchase a cow from a gentile.

The Gemara rejects this:

This cannot enter your mind!

It is not possible to explain Rabbi Eliezer’s words in this way.

For

after all,

the latter clause teaches,

the end of the beraita states:

And similarly, Rabbi Eliezer would disqualify

animals purchased from gentiles

for all sacrifices.

And not only with regard to a red heifer.

And if it should enter your mind

that the reason Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies a cow that comes from gentiles is

as Shila taught,

for the reason taught by Shila, then this cannot be so, since

granted, with regard to a cow, the verse mentions taking.

Thus, a special law exists concerning a cow, prohibiting its purchase from gentiles.

Rather, all of them,

the other sacrifices, which Rabbi Eliezer forbids taking from non-Jews [as explained at the end of the beraita], and is

“taking” written concerning them

in those sacrifices?!

Rather, from the fact that Rabbi Eliezer forbids the animals of non-Jews for all the sacrifices, it is proved that his reason is not as Shila said.

And if so, it is again necessary to understand the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer as to whether it is possible to purchase a cow from non-Jews.

And the Gemara returns to the previous explanation, that Rabbi Eliezer forbids it because of the concern of bestiality:

And perhaps,

it is possible that

only up to this point did they not dispute

the Rabbis did not dispute with Rabbi Eliezer regarding the question of whether one is concerned about bestiality,ેણ