Zevachim 94b (צד:) — the Talmud in English

Rava said: If there is a difficulty for me, this is the difficulty:

Pillows and cushions are soft,

as they are made only from soft leather so that it will be comfortable to lie upon them,

and we learned

with regard to Shabbat:

If there was

a [filth

on]]

a leather

pillow, one may pour water over it until it is removed.

But soft leather is fit for laundering, and its law should therefore be like that of a garment, upon which it is prohibited to pour water on Shabbat because of laundering?

Rather, Rava said: Any laundering that does not involve rubbing,

that is, rubbing one side against the other, as a launderer does when he rubs the garment with both hands,

is not called laundering.

Therefore, one may pour water over it until the filth is removed, even when it is soft leather, since he does not rub the pillow or cushion; it is not considered laundering.

And with regard to that which Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said: Many times I would stand before Rav, and I would rinse his shoes in water.

This proves that

rinsing, yes,

it is permitted to rinse them.

But laundering,

by means of rubbing,

no.

For such laundering applies even to leather.

What kind of leather was this shoe made of?

If it was soft,

made of soft leather,

then according to everyone,

both according to the Rabbis and according to the others, laundering applies to it, and therefore rubbing is prohibited.

If it was hard,

made of hard leather,

then according to the others,

who maintain that laundering applies even to hard leather, and therefore rubbing is prohibited.

And we challenge this:

If so, a garment as well

should be permitted to have water poured over it, since laundering exists only when there is rubbing. Why, then, did we learn that if there was filth on a garment, one wipes it with a cloth, but it is prohibited to pour water over it?

And we answer:

With regard to a garment, its soaking

in water

is its laundering.

But with regard to leather, soaking it is not its laundering until one rubs it.

And Rava follows his own reasoning. For Rava said: If one threw a cloth into water

on Shabbat, he

is liable

because of laundering, even if he did not rub it.

If one threw flaxseed into water, he is liable

because of kneading, as we explained:

We raised a difficulty:

Granted, with regard to a cloth, its soaking is its laundering,

and therefore he is liable,

but with regard to flaxseed, for what reason

is he liable?

And if you say that it is because it sprouts,

that it grows in water, and this constitutes sowing,

if so, wheat and barley as well

grow in water, and one should be liable for sowing. Why, then, did Rava mention specifically flaxseed?

And we answer:

These,

flaxseeds,

have slime,

a slime, or moisture, emerges from them, and the seeds adhere to one another through their slime.

And we challenge this:

If so, raw hides,

that is, hides that have not been processed, if one places them in water,

also

release slime. Why, then, should one who places them in water on Shabbat not be liable?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of throwing flaxseed into water,

he performs kneading,

for when the seeds adhere through the slime that emerges from them, this is a derivative of kneading. But with raw hides, their adhering does not involve the labor of kneading.

Rava taught: It is permitted to launder a shoe on Shabbat,

which implies that this is permitted even by means of rubbing.

And we challenge this:

Rav Pappa said to Rava: But did Rav Hiyya bar Ashi not say: Many times I would stand before Rav, and I would rinse his shoes in water,

and we learned from this incident that only

rinsing, yes,

is permitted. But

laundering

by means of rubbing is

not permitted!?

And we conclude:

He then reinstated an interpreter over Rava,

at that moment he returned and instructed the interpreter: “Stand and make it known to the public that I retract what I taught,”

and he taught: The things that I said were an error on my part! Rather, this is what they said

concerning the law of washing shoes:

Rinsing is permitted,

but

laundering

by means of rubbing

is prohibited.

We learned in the Mishna:

The laundering must be performed in a sacred place, and so on.

We raised a difficulty:

From where are these matters derived?

For the Sages taught:

It is stated:

“It shall be laundered in a sacred place”—

we learn that the laundering must be performed in a sacred place.

And if the garment leaves the curtains, one must bring it into the courtyard to launder it.

The breaking of an earthenware vessel

in a sacred place—

from where is this derived?

The verse states: “And the earthenware vessel in which it was cooked shall be broken,”

and this verse is stated after the command concerning laundering in a sacred place, to juxtapose the breaking of an earthenware vessel to laundering and teach that both acts must be performed in a sacred place.

With regard to scouring and rinsing a copper vessel, from where is this derived?

The verse states: “And if it was cooked in a copper vessel, it shall be scoured and rinsed in water.”

This too is juxtaposed to laundering with regard to its preparation in a sacred place.

We learned in the Mishna:

And we challenge this:

Is there nothing else

more stringent about a sin-offering than about other sacred offerings, apart from the law of laundering?

But there is

another stringency, such as

that its blood enters inside,

as there are sin-offerings whose blood enters inside, and this does not apply to other sacred offerings.

And we answer:

We are speaking of external sin-offerings,

whose blood does not enter inside.

And we challenge this:

External ones also

have a stringency that does not apply to other sacred offerings:

if their blood enters inside, they become disqualified,

as it is written: “And any sin-offering whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to make atonement in the Sanctuary shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire.”

And we answer: The tanna of our Mishna holds

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, who says: All blood

of all offerings

that enters the Sanctuary to effect atonement is disqualified.

And we challenge this: But there is another stringency,

that they effect atonement for those liable to karet,

which does not apply to other sacred offerings.

And we answer: This is referring to

the sin-offering for hearing the voice,

as it is written: “If he hears the voice of an oath, and is a witness,” or

to an oath of utterance,

for intentional violation of these does not entail karet [Leviticus 5:1–4].

And we challenge this: But there is another stringency,

that it requires

its blood

to be given in four presentations,

separately [distributed], whereas other sacred offerings require two presentations that are four, and in their case there is only a division [distribution] of two presentations?

And we answer: The tanna of our Mishna holds

in accordance with Rabbi Ishmael, who says: All blood

of other sacred offerings as well

requires four presentations,

divided into four presentations; they are merely given on two corners, one presentation on each side of the corner, making a total of four separate presentations.

And we challenge this: According to Rabbi Ishmael, there is still a stringency of sin-offerings, in that they require four presentations

on four corners,

whereas other sacred offerings require the four separate presentations on only two corners?

And we reject this:

But according to your reasoning, there is the corner,

for a sin-offering requires its blood to be given on the corner of the altar, whereas other blood is given below the red line. Similarly,

there is the finger,

for a sin-offering requires its blood to be given with the priest’s finger, whereas other blood is thrown from the vessel onto the altar. Likewise,

there is the edge,

for a sin-offering requires its blood to be given on the edge of the altar’s corner, unlike other blood.

Rather,

the tanna of our Mishna

selected one of two

or

three stringencies,

and “This is a stringency” does not necessarily mean “this and nothing else”; rather, there are additional stringencies that the tanna did not mention.

Mishna:

In the previous Mishna we learned that the place for preparing a garment upon which the blood of a sin-offering splashed, and earthenware and copper vessels in which sacred offerings were cooked, is in the courtyard.

Our Mishna discusses a garment that left the courtyard before it was laundered, an earthenware vessel that left the courtyard before it was broken, and a copper vessel that left the courtyard before it was scoured and rinsed.

a.

A garment

upon which the blood of a sin-offering splashed,

that left beyond the curtains,

outside the wall of the courtyard,

is brought back,

it is brought into the courtyard,

and it is laundered in a sacred place,

as required by the Torah.

If

the garment

became impure

outside the curtains, after it had left, and it is prohibited to bring impurity into the courtyard,

one tears it

through most of it, so that it is no longer fit for its original use, thereby removing from it the status of a garment and enabling it to become pure from its impurity. But one leaves a minority of it connected, without tearing it, so that it still retains the designation of a garment for purposes of the mitzva of laundering,

and it is brought

into the courtyard,

and it is laundered in a sacred place,

in accordance with the law of a pure garment upon which the blood of a sin-offering splashed.

b.

An earthenware vessel

in which a sin-offering was cooked,

that left beyond the curtains

before it was broken—

it is brought

into the courtyard

and broken in a sacred place.

And if it

became impure beyond the curtains,

having become impure after it left, so that it cannot be brought in while impure into the courtyard,

it is perforated

in order to purify it from its impurity,

and it is brought

into the courtyard

and broken in a sacred place,

in accordance with the law of a pure earthenware vessel in which a sin-offering was cooked.

c.

A copper vessel

in which sacred offerings were cooked,

that left beyond the curtains

before it was scoured and rinsed—

it is brought

into the courtyard

and scoured and rinsed in a sacred place

as required by the Torah.

And if it

became impure beyond the curtains,

after it left, so that the vessel became impure and cannot be brought in while impure,

it is damaged,

a large hole is made in it, since a metal vessel is not purified from impurity through a small hole but only through a large one,

and it is brought

into the courtyard,

and scoured and rinsed in a sacred place,

in accordance with the law of a pure copper vessel in which a sin-offering was cooked.

Gemara:

Ravina raised an objection:

The Mishna states that a garment that became impure beyond the curtains

is torn

and thereby loses its status as a garment so that it can become pure. But this is difficult, for

“garment,” the Merciful One said,

as it is written: “The garment upon which the blood is spattered shall be laundered.” This indicates that it must have the status of a garment at the time it is laundered,

but it is not a garment

after it has been torn.

And we answer:

He leaves in it enough for a cloth.

He does not complete the tear entirely so as to divide the garment into two pieces; rather, he leaves in it an amount sufficient for the width of a cloth. Therefore, the garment becomes pure from its impurity, since most of it has been torn. And since he leaves in it an amount sufficient for a cloth, and it remains fit to be joined, it still retains the status of

a garment for purposes of the law of laundering. And we challenge this:

Is that so?

Does this procedure indeed render it pure?

But Rav Huna said: They taught

that an impure garment that one began to tear becomes pure once most of it has been torn

only when one did not leave in it enough to serve as a head covering. But if one left in it

in that small portion that was not torn

enough to serve as a head covering, it is considered connected;

it is considered a connection, and it is still subject to impurity?