Zevachim 94b — the Talmud in English

Rava said: If there is a difficulty for me, this is the difficulty for me: ![](pamud.bmp "

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Pillows and cushions are soft,

for they are made only from soft leather, so that it will be comfortable to lie upon them,

and we learned

with regard to Shabbat:

If there was

filth [feces]

on

a leather

pillow, one may place water upon it until it is removed.

But soft hides are fit for laundering, and their law should be like that of a garment, upon which it is forbidden to place water on Shabbat because of laundering?

Rather, Rava said: Any laundering that does not have rubbing,

where he rubs one side against its other side, as a launderer rubs a garment with both hands,

is not called laundering.

Therefore, one may place water upon it until it is removed, even in the case of soft leather, since he does not rub the pillow or cushion; it is not called laundering.

And concerning that which Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said: Many times I would be before Rav, and I would rinse his shoes in water.

And it is proven from here that

rinsing, yes,

it is permitted to rinse it.

But laundering,

by means of rubbing,

no.

For such laundering applies even to hides.

Of what kind of hide was this shoe made?

If it was soft,

from soft leather,

then according to everyone,

both according to the Rabbis and according to the Others, laundering applies to it, and therefore rubbing is forbidden.

If it was hard,

from hard leather,

then according to the Others,

who hold that laundering applies even to hard leather, and for that reason rubbing is forbidden.

And we challenge this:

If so, a garment also

should be permitted to have water placed upon it, since laundering exists only with rubbing. Why, then, did we learn that if there was filth on a garment, one wipes it with a rag, but it is forbidden to place water upon it?

And we answer:

In the case of a garment, its soaking

in water

is its laundering.

But in the case of leather, its soaking is not its laundering until he rubs it.

And Rava follows his own reasoning. For Rava said: If one threw a kerchief into water

on Shabbat,

he is liable

because of laundering, even if he did not rub it.

If one threw flaxseed into water, he is liable

because of kneading. As we explained:

We raised the issue:

Granted, in the case of a kerchief, its soaking is its laundering,

and therefore he is liable,

but flaxseed, for what reason

is he liable?

And if you would say that it is because it sprouts,

it grows in water, and this constitutes sowing,

if so, wheat and barley also

grow in water, and he should be liable because of sowing. Why did Rava specifically mention flaxseed?

And we answer:

These,

flaxseeds,

have slime,

slime [moisture] emerges from them, and the seeds adhere to one another through their slime.

And we challenge this:

If so, raw hides,

hides that have not been tanned, if one places them in water,

also

have slime emerge from them. Why, then, should one who places them in water on Shabbat not be liable?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of throwing flaxseed into water,

he performs kneading,

for when it adheres through the slime that emerges from it, this is a derivative of kneading. But with raw hides, there is no aspect of the labor of kneading in their adhering.

Rava expounded: It is permitted to launder a shoe on Shabbat,

and this implies even by means of rubbing.

And we raise a difficulty:

Rav Pappa said to Rava: But did not Rabbi Hiyya bar Ashi say: Many times I would be before Rav, and I would rinse his shoes in water,

and we learned from this incident that only

rinsing, yes,

is permitted. But

laundering

by means of rubbing,

no!?

And we conclude:

Afterward, Rava appointed an interpreter over him,

at that time he returned and said to the translator: Arise and make it heard to the public that I retract what I expounded,

and expounded: The words that I said are an error on my part! However, this is what they said

concerning the law of washing shoes:

Rinsing is permitted,

but

laundering

by means of rubbing

is forbidden.

We learned in the Mishna:

The laundering in a sacred place, and so forth.

We raised the issue:

From where are these matters?

For the Sages taught:

It is stated:

“It shall be laundered in a sacred place”—

we learn laundering in a sacred place.

And if the garment went outside the curtains, one must bring it into the courtyard to launder it.

The breaking of an earthenware vessel

in a sacred place,

from where?

The verse states: “And the earthenware vessel in which it was cooked shall be broken,”

and this verse is stated after laundering in a sacred place, to equate the breaking of an earthenware vessel with laundering and to teach that both acts are performed in a sacred place.

Scouring and rinsing in a copper vessel, from where? The verse states: “And if it was cooked in a copper vessel, it shall be scoured and rinsed in water.”

And this too is equated with laundering with regard to making it fit in a sacred place.

We learned in the Mishna:

This is the stringency of a sin-offering, and so forth.

And we challenge this:

And is there nothing else

any other stringency in a sin-offering beyond other sacred offerings, apart from the law of laundering?

But there is

another stringency, such as

that its blood enters inside,

for there are sin-offerings whose blood enters inside, and this does not apply to other sacred offerings.

And we answer:

We are speaking of external sin-offerings,

whose blood does not enter inside.

And we challenge this:

External ones also

have a stringency that does not apply to other sacred offerings:

if their blood enters inside, they become disqualified,

as it is written: “And any sin-offering whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to effect atonement in the sacred place shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire.”

And we answer: The tanney of our Mishna holds

like Rabbi Akiva, who says: All blood

of all offerings

that entered the Sanctuary to effect atonement is disqualified.

And we challenge this: But there is another stringency,

for they effect atonement for those liable for excision,

which is not the case with other sacred offerings.

And we answer:

In the case of the sin-offering for hearing the voice,

as it is written, “He heard the voice of the oath, and he is a witness,” or

and the sin-offering for an oath of utterance,

for there is no excision for their intentional violation [Leviticus 5:1–4].

And we challenge this: But there is another stringency,

for it requires

its blood

four separate placements,

whereas other sacred offerings require two placements that are four, and they have only a division [separation] of two placements?

And we answer: The tanney of our Mishna holds

like Rabbi Ishmael, who says: All blood

of other sacred offerings as well

requires four placements,

a separation of four placements, except that they are given on two corners, one placement on each side of the corner, and together they are four separate placements.

And we challenge this: According to Rabbi Ishmael, there is a stringency in a sin-offering, for it requires four placements

on four corners,

whereas other sacred offerings require a separation of four placements on only two corners?

And we reject this:

And according to your reasoning, there is the corner,

for a sin-offering requires its blood to be placed on the corner of the altar, whereas other blood is given below the red line. And likewise

there is the finger,

for it requires its blood to be placed with his finger, whereas other blood is cast from the vessel onto the altar. And likewise,

there is the edge,

for a sin-offering requires its blood to be placed on the edge of the corner of the altar, unlike other blood?

Rather,

the tanney of our Mishna

selected one out of two

or

three stringencies,

and “this is the stringency” does not specifically mean “this and nothing else,” but rather there are additional stringencies that the tanney did not mention.

Mishna:

In the previous Mishna we learned that the place for making fit the garment upon which the blood of a sin-offering splashed, and the earthenware and copper vessels in which sacred offerings were cooked, is the courtyard.

Our Mishna discusses a garment that went outside the courtyard before it was laundered, an earthenware vessel that went outside the courtyard before it was broken, and a copper vessel that went outside the courtyard before it was scoured and rinsed.

a.

A garment

upon which the blood of a sin-offering splashed

that went outside the curtains,

outside the wall of the courtyard,

is brought in;

it is brought into the courtyard

and laundered in a sacred place,

as the Torah commands.

If

the garment became impure

outside the curtains,

after it went out, and it is forbidden to bring impurity into the courtyard,

he tears it

through most of it, so that it will no longer be fit for its original use, thereby removing from it the law of a garment in order to purify it from its impurity. But he leaves a minority of it attached without tearing, so that it will still have the name of a garment for the mitzva of laundering,

and brings it in

to the courtyard,

and launders it in a sacred place,

according to the law of a pure garment upon which the blood of a sin-offering splashed.

b.

An earthenware vessel

in which a sin-offering was cooked

that went outside the curtains

before it was broken—

is brought in

to the courtyard,

and is broken in a sacred place.

And if it

became impure outside the curtains,

having become impure after it went out, and it is impossible to bring it in while it is impure to the courtyard,

he perforates it

in order to purify it from its impurity,

and brings it in

to the courtyard,

and breaks it in a sacred place,

according to the law of a pure earthenware vessel in which a sin-offering was cooked.

c.

A copper vessel

in which sacred offerings were cooked

that went outside the curtains

before its scouring and rinsing—

is brought in

to the courtyard,

and is scoured and rinsed in a sacred place

as the Torah commands.

And if it

became impure outside the curtains,

after it went out the vessel became impure, and it is impossible to bring it in while it is impure,

he diminishes it,

making a large hole in it, since a metal vessel is not purified from its impurity through a small hole but through a large hole,

and brings it in

to the courtyard,

and scours and rinses it in a sacred place,

according to the law of a pure copper vessel in which a sin-offering was cooked.

Gemara:

Ravina raised an objection:

It is stated in the Mishna that a garment that became impure outside the curtains

he tears it

and nullifies its status as a garment in order to purify it. But this is difficult, for

“garment,” the Merciful One said,

as it is written: “The garment upon which it is sprinkled shall be laundered.” It follows that it must have the status of a garment at the time it is laundered,

but it is not a garment

after the tearing.

And we answer:

That he leaves in it enough for a cloak.

For he does not complete the tear entirely, to divide the garment into two parts, but leaves in it a measure equal to the width of a kerchief. Therefore the garment is pure from its impurity, since most of it was torn. And since he left in it the measure of a kerchief and it is fit to be joined, it still has the status of a garment.

And we raise an objection:

Is that so!

And does this avail to render it pure in this manner?

But Rav Huna said: They taught this only

that an impure garment which one began tearing, once most of it has been torn, is pure,

only when he did not leave in it the size of a handkerchief. But if he left in it

in that minority that was not torn

the size of a handkerchief, it is considered a connection,

it is considered a connection, and it is still in its state of impurity?