Zevachim 91b — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

Shmuel said: According to Rabbi Tarfon

in our Mishna,

one who vows to bring oil, its handful is taken

the koen takes a handful from the oil and burns the handful upon the altar,

and its remnants,

the oil remaining after the taking of the handful,

are eaten by the koanim.

What is the reason? For it was taught:

it is stated: “

And when a person brings a meal-offering

”. And from the fact that it was not stated, “When a person brings a meal-offering,” Rabbi Tarfon expounded from the superfluous word “offering”:

It teaches

the verse

that one may vow

an offering of

oil

by itself.

And

since the oil of a vow was included in the passage of the meal-offering, it is

like a meal-offering. Just as with a meal-offering, its handful is taken

by the koen, and he burns the handful,

and its remnants are eaten; so too with oil, its handful is taken, and its remnants are eaten.

Rabbi Zeira said: We too have also learned

like Shmuel, that its handful is taken and its remnants are eaten.

For we learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil being divided in the Courtyard, you need not ask what it is. Rather,

certainly it is

the remainder of the wafers of

the meal-offerings of Israelites and the log of oil of the leper, because of

the fact that one may not vow to bring oil.

And we analyzed it:

By implication,

you learn this:

according to the one who says that one may vow to bring

oil, one must be uncertain concerning this oil that is divided in the Courtyard, perhaps it is oil of a vow. Thus, oil of a vow is

divided

among the koanim. That is to say, its handful is taken, and its remnants are eaten by the koanim. And this is proof for Shmuel.

And we reject this:

Abaye said to

Rabbi Zeira:

Come and hear the latter clause

of the Mishna, and from there it should be proved that it is not like Shmuel.

For we learned:

If you saw oil placed upon the fires, you need not ask what it is; rather,

it is certainly

the remainder of the wafers of the meal-offering of koanim and the meal-offering of the anointed koen, because one may not vow to bring oil.

And Abaye infers:

By implication,

you learn this:

according to the one who says that one may vow to bring oil,

one must be uncertain concerning this oil placed upon the fires, perhaps it is oil of a vow. And it is proved that oil of a vow

goes

entirely

to the fires,

and this is unlike Shmuel, who says that its handful is taken and its remnants are eaten by the koanim.

And the Gemara discusses:

For Abaye,

according to whose view oil of a vow goes entirely to the fires,

the first clause is difficult

of the Mishna [according to the version cited above in Rabbi Zeira’s words], from which it is proved from the first clause that if one vows to bring oil, its handful is taken, as Rabbi Zeira proved from the fact that one need not ask what it is, only because one may not vow to bring oil?

But

for Rabbi Zeira,

who holds that oil of a vow is divided among the koanim,

the latter clause is difficult

of the Mishna, concerning oil placed upon the fires, for even if one could vow to bring oil, one need not ask what it is, since oil of a vow is not placed upon the fires?

Granted, for Rabbi Zeira

it is possible to answer that

the first clause

of the Mishna, which implies that oil of a vow is divided among the koanim, is speaking

of the remnants,

which remained after the taking of the handful.

And the latter clause,

which implies that the oil is placed upon the fires, is speaking

of the handful.

But for Abaye,

who holds that oil of a vow goes entirely to the fires,

it is difficult

the first clause of the Mishna?

And we answer for Abaye: What was stated in the first clause of the Mishna, “because one may not vow to bring oil,” is indeed superfluous.

Rather,

the first clause was taught on account of the latter clause,

for with oil placed upon the fires there would indeed be uncertainty whether it is oil of a vow [if one could vow to bring oil], since all of it goes to the fires.

And we object:

Granted, the latter clause

can be said to have been taught

because of the first clause.

But was the first clause taught because of the latter clause?

And we answer:

Yes! They say in the West: The first clause was taught because of the latter clause.

And we object to Shmuel:

Come and hear

from that which was taught:

Wine, according to the words of Rabbi Akiva,

who says that one may vow to bring wine by itself, that wine is placed

into the bowls

at the top of the altar, where the wine is poured.

Oil, according to the words of Rabbi Tarfon,

who says that one may vow to bring oil, is placed

upon the fires.

Is it not

that the wine and the oil are equal in their law, and

just as wine

is placed

entirely into the bowls, so too oil

is placed

entirely upon the fires?

And this is difficult for Shmuel, who said that only the handful of the oil is burned upon the fires?

And we answer:

Is it necessarily so?

Must we establish them equally? Rather,

this one is according to its manner, and that one is according to its manner!

Wine is indeed placed entirely into the bowls, but of the oil only the handful goes to the fires.

And the Gemara says that this law stated by Shmuel, that one who vows to bring oil has its handful taken and its remnants eaten, is

a matter of a dispute between tannaim,

a dispute between tannaim.

For it was taught: One who vows to bring

oil may not bring less than a log,

like the measure of oil placed in an ordinary meal-offering.

Rabbi says:

he may not bring less than

three logs,

like the measure of wine of libations.

And the Gemara discusses:

With regard to what do

the Sages and Rabbi disagree?

And we answer:

The Sages stated before Rav Pappa:

Do we say,

“Derive from it and from it,”

or

“Derive from it and establish it in its place”—that is what they disagree about.

For the Sages and Rabbi disagreed concerning the manner of deriving one matter from another, as follows.

When a matter is learned from another matter, through a gezera shava or through a juxtaposition, it is possible to say, “Derive from it and from it”: the matter learned from the other will have the laws of the matter learned from it in accordance with all the laws of the matter teaching it. And it is possible to say, “Derive from it”: only the essence of the law is learned from the teacher; but “establish it in its place”: with regard to the details of the law, we must establish them according to the matter being learned, and not according to the matter teaching it.

For the Sages hold: “Derive from it and from it,”

that is,

derive

oil

from it,

from a meal-offering:

Just as one may vow to bring a meal-offering, so too one may vow to bring oil

by itself [for the essence of the law that one may vow to bring oil is learned from a meal-offering, as above]

and from it,

and one must learn from the meal-offering also all its details:

Just as a meal-offering

requires that the measure of oil in it be

a log, so too oil

brought by itself has as its measure

a log.

And since the Sages hold that oil is learned from a meal-offering in every matter, therefore one must also learn:

Just as with a meal-offering, its handful is taken and its remnants are eaten; so too with oil, its handful is taken and its remnants are eaten.

Thus, the view of the Sages is like Shmuel.

And Rabbi holds: “Derive from it and establish it in its place.”

That is,

derive

oil

from it

from a meal-offering:

Just as one may vow to bring a meal-offering, so too one may vow to bring oil.

But now, after we have learned the essence of the law, that oil too comes as an offering by itself,

and establish it in its place,

we establish the details of its laws according to its own place, and learn the remaining laws from its own substance; namely, it should be

like libations,

like wine brought by itself:

Just as libations

have as their measure

three logs

[as this is learned from Scripture],

so too oil

has as its measure

three logs.

And likewise, the manner of giving it is also learned from libations:

Just as with libations,

all the wine is placed

into the bowls

[this too is learned from Scripture],

so too oil, all of it goes to the fires.

Thus, Rabbi does not hold like Shmuel, and it is proved that Shmuel’s law is disputed by tannaim.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye:

Rabbi and the Sages did not disagree concerning “derive from it.”

For

if from a meal-offering

it

was brought by Rabbi

as the source of the essence of the law that one may vow to bring oil, he would not have disagreed with the Sages concerning the measure of the oil, because

everyone

holds

“Derive from it and from it.”

Rather,

Rabbi

derived it from “the native.”

It is stated in the passage of libations, “Every native shall do thus,” and this verse is superfluous; Rabbi holds that it comes to include a vow of oil by itself. And since it is learned from libations, even if we say “derive from it and from it,” he may not bring less than three logs, for this is the smallest measure of wine of libations brought with an offering, namely, the libations of a lamb.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: Can you say this,

that Rabbi learns from “the native” that one may bring oil by itself?

But it was taught:

it is written,

“a meal-offering,” teaching that one may vow to bring oil. And how much? Three logs!

And we must infer:

And whom have you heard say

that he may not bring less than

three logs? It is Rabbi. And he derives it

that one may vow to bring oil

from

the verse

“offering

of a meal-offering,” and not as you said, that he derives this from the verse “the native.” Necessarily, Rabbi and the Sages disagree concerning “derive from it”!

Rav Pappa said to him: If it was taught—

it was taught! Shmuel said: One who vows to bring wine

by itself

brings

wine

and pours it

upon the altar,

upon the fires.

What is the reason?

The verse says: “And wine you shall bring for the libation, half a hin, a fire-offering, a pleasing fragrance to the Lord.”

The verse said “a fire-offering” with regard to wine, to say that there is wine that rises upon the fire. And which is it? This is wine brought by itself! [For wine brought with the offering is learned from the verse that it is poured into the bowls at the top of the altar] .

And we object:

But he extinguishes

the fire upon the altar by pouring the wine upon it, and he is thereby found to transgress the prohibition of “You shall not extinguish,” which forbids extinguishing the altar’s fire!?

And we answer:

Extinguishing

the altar’s fire

partially is not called extinguishing,

for “a perpetual fire shall burn upon the altar” still continues to be fulfilled.

And we object:

Is that so? But Rav Nahman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: One who removes a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable.

It follows that one is liable even for partial extinguishing?

And we answer: This is what we are dealing with here:

there is not

on the altar

anything but this

single coal, and in such a manner he is found to have extinguished all the fire upon the altar .

If you wish, say instead:

in truth, even partial extinguishing is forbidden, and there is no difficulty concerning how he pours the wine upon the fire, for

extinguishing for the sake of a mitzva is different!

And we object:

Come and hear

from that

which Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov taught: Since

it is so

that the Torah granted permission to remove

the ashes from the altar,

could he extinguish

the coals

and remove them? You say,

it is impossible to do so, for it is stated,

“He shall not extinguish.”

It follows that it is forbidden to extinguish even for the purpose of removing the ashes, although it is a mitzva.

If so, even when he pours the wine upon the fires and extinguishes the fire, even if the extinguishing is for the sake of a mitzva, it should be forbidden!? And we answer:

That case is different,

for it is not a need of a mitzva, since

he can sit and wait,

waiting to remove the ashes until the coals are extinguished.

We object further:

Come and hear

a proof from that which was taught:

One who vows to bring

wine, according to the words of Rabbi Akiva,

who says that one may vow to bring wine, gives it

to the bowls.

One who vows to bring

oil, according to the words of Rabbi Tarfon,

who says that one may vow to bring oil, gives it

to the fires.

It is thus explained that wine brought by itself is poured into the bowls, and this is unlike Shmuel?

And it was further taught: Libation wine—

to the bowls.

Or is it not

to the bowls,

but rather to the fires?

You say,

it is impossible to pour it upon the fires, for it is forbidden by the prohibition of

“He shall not extinguish.”

And this is difficult for Shmuel?

And we answer:

It is not difficult: This

which was stated in the beraita, that it is forbidden to pour the wine upon the fire, is according to the words of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that an “unintended act” is forbidden. According to him, necessarily, wine brought by itself is poured into the bowls and not upon the fires [and the verse of Shmuel, “a fire-offering, a pleasing fragrance to the Lord,” means that it shall be a satisfaction to the Lord like the fires].

This,

that which Shmuel said, that he pours it upon the fire, is according to the words of

Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that an “unintended act” is permitted. Therefore, it is permitted to pour it upon the fire, since he does not intend to extinguish it. And it is not an inevitable consequence, since it is possible to pour in fine drops [which do not extinguish the fire] .

And we object:

Does this mean that Shmuel holds like Rabbi Shimon,

that an act not intended is permitted?

But Shmuel said: One extinguishes a glowing metal coal

in the public domain

in the public domain, so that the public will not be harmed by it.

Since extinguishing a metal coal is prohibited not by Torah law but rabbinically, the Sages did not decree in a place where the public might be harmed.