Zevachim 90a (צ.) — the Talmud in English

And one is not liable for them for karet,

not

for piggul, notar, or ritual impurity,

because in all these cases, and likewise with regard to misuse of consecrated property, liability applies only after the blood has been sprinkled, whereas these sacrificial portions, which left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling, were not benefited by the sprinkling performed afterward, and it is as though they were outside before the sprinkling.

Rabbi Akiva says: One is liable for misuse of consecrated property through them, and one is liable for them

for

piggul, notar, and ritual impurity. Is it not referring to a case where he brought them back inside,

meaning that he brought those sacrificial portions back into the courtyard, so that at the time of the sprinkling they were already inside? And in such a case

they disagree,

Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva.

And they disagree about this: One master,

Rabbi Eliezer,

holds that they become invalid

the sacrificial portions

through having left

the courtyard; therefore, the sprinkling was of no benefit to them, and there is no liability for misuse of consecrated property or for piggul with regard to them.

And the other master,

Rabbi Akiva,

holds that they do not become invalid through having left,

and the sprinkling benefited them; therefore, one is liable for them for misuse of consecrated property and so forth.

It follows that the ruling stated by Ravina bar Sheila—that the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left before the sprinkling of the blood become invalid through having left—is subject to a dispute between tannaim.

And we reject this:

Rav Pappa said: If he brought them back inside, everyone agrees

that they do not become invalid through having left, and this is not in accordance with Ravina.

And the later authorities explained the words of Tosafot that their view is that the entire dispute over whether the sprinkling benefits something that has left is not a dispute resulting from the disqualification of having left that took effect when the sacrificial portions exited; for if that were so, there would be no difference whether they were brought back inside or not. Rather, their dispute concerns an item that is invalid and is located outside: does the sprinkling benefit it? Therefore, when the sacrificial portions are inside, everyone agrees that the sprinkling takes effect upon them; although they are invalid, the sprinkling applies to them. But when they are outside, where there is no connection between the sprinkling and the sacrificial portions, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree. And the Hazon Ish wrote that Rav Pappa also did not intend to say that he disagrees with Ravina. Certainly, the law is that the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity become invalid through having left, in accordance with Ravina. Rather, Rav Pappa came to say that the beraita does not establish Ravina’s ruling with certainty; but Rav Pappa did not disagree with the law that the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity become invalid through having left. And here, when they are located

the sacrificial portions at the time of the sprinkling

outside

outside

they disagree. And they disagree about this—

one master,

Rabbi Eliezer,

holds that the sprinkling does not benefit

what was, at the time of the sprinkling,

outside

the courtyard, since it became invalid when it left.

And the other,

Rabbi Akiva,

holds that the sprinkling benefits

even

something that has left!

And we raise an objection:

But it was Rav Pappa who said [

in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, who also disagreed in tractate Menahot with regard to the two loaves that left between the slaughter of the two rams of Shavuot and the sprinkling]:

When they are outside, everyone agrees that they do not disagree.

Rather,

they disagree when he brought them inside.

The Gemara now reasons that there is no distinction between the two loaves and the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity. This is difficult, since here Rav Pappa said the opposite: that they disagree when the items are outside?

And we answer: When Rav Pappa said that everyone agrees that, when the items are outside, the sprinkling does not benefit them,

this statement applies to the two loaves, for they are not the substance of the offering,

since they are not part of the substance of the offering; therefore, the sprinkling of the offering’s blood does not benefit them when they are outside.

But with regard to the sacrificial portions, which are the substance of the offering, they disagree when they are outside.

For it may be said that even when they are outside, the sprinkling benefits them, since they are part of the substance of the offering.

We learned in the Mishna:

Bird-offerings precede

meal-offerings.

And the Gemara discusses this:

On the contrary, meal-offerings should precede, since there are

meal-offerings that are brought

by the community

such as the omer meal-offering and the two loaves,

as well as by an individual,

whereas the community never offers bird-offerings!?

And we answer:

Even so, the types involving blood

which is the advantage of bird-offerings

are superior!

We learned in the Mishna:

A sinner’s meal-offering

precedes a voluntary meal-offering.

And the Gemara discusses this:

On the contrary, a voluntary meal-offering should precede, since it requires oil and frankincense?

Unlike a sinner’s meal-offering, which does not contain oil and frankincense.

And we answer:

Even so, that which is brought on account of a sin

as is the case with a sinner’s meal-offering

is superior, since it effects atonement!

They raised a dilemma: A woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering

which the woman brings to the Temple while the water is being tested, and which is not brought to effect atonement for a sin,

and a voluntary meal-offering—which of them precedes?

Does

the voluntary meal-offering precede, since it requires oil and frankincense; or perhaps the woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering precedes, since it comes to clarify the iniquity

of the woman suspected of adultery, if she committed adultery while married?

And we resolve this:

Come and hear:

we learned in the Mishna:

A sinner’s meal-offering precedes a voluntary meal-offering.

And the Gemara infers:

It is specifically a sinner’s meal-offering that precedes a voluntary meal-offering

because it effects atonement;

but a woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering,

which does not effect atonement,

does not

precede a voluntary meal-offering.

And we reject this:

Does it state

in the Mishna that a sinner’s meal-offering precedes

“because it effects atonement”?

But it states

“because it is brought on account of a sin,”

not specifically to effect atonement; this also includes a woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering, which, although it does not effect atonement,

also is brought on account of a sin,

namely, to clarify the iniquity [that is, the sin of adultery with a married woman].

We further resolve this:

Come and hear:

as it is taught in a beraita:

This one precedes that one because this one comes from wheat and that one comes from barley.

Is it not

that the beraita is speaking of a

voluntary meal-offering

which comes from wheat and precedes

a woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering

which comes from barley?

And we reject this: The beraita

does not

speak of a voluntary meal-offering, but of a

sinner’s meal-offering

which also comes from wheat and precedes

the woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this rejection: If it is speaking of a sinner’s meal-offering, why do I need the reason that it comes from wheat?

Let it be inferred

that it precedes the woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering because

after all,

the sinner’s meal-offering

effects atonement, whereas

the woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering

does not effect atonement?

And we answer:

Rather, what

would you say—that the beraita speaks of a

voluntary meal-offering

? It would still be difficult:

let it be inferred

that a voluntary meal-offering precedes a woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering

because this one requires oil and frankincense, whereas that one does not require oil and frankincense.

Why, then, do I need the reason that it comes from wheat?

Rather,

you are compelled to explain that

the tanna states one of two reasons.

Accordingly, even if we establish that the beraita is referring to a sinner’s meal-offering, it may be said that the beraita states one of two reasons. Therefore, the beraita did not state as the reason for precedence that it effects atonement, and we cannot resolve from this beraita the dilemma concerning a voluntary meal-offering and a woman suspected of adultery’s meal-offering—which of them precedes.

We learned in the Mishna:

A bird sin-offering precedes

a bird burnt-offering.

And the Gemara discusses this:

From where are these matters ?

And we answer:

As the Sages taught:

With regard to a poor sinner who brings two turtledoves or two young pigeons, one as a sin-offering and one as a burnt-offering, it is stated:

“And he shall offer that which is for the sin-offering first”—

what does this teach us?

For what purpose was this verse written?

If it is to teach that the sin-offering is offered first, it has already been stated

in that same passage:

“And he shall make the second one a burnt-offering,”

and we know by implication that the sin-offering comes first?