Zevachim 87b — the Talmud in English

For we learned in the Mishna above concerning those invalid things whose law is that, if they ascended, they shall not descend, and it said there that the flesh of a sacrifice invalidated because

invalid persons received and sprinkled its blood,

if it ascended, it shall not descend,

is it not

that the matter speaks of a case

in which invalid persons received and invalid persons sprinkled,

and only in this manner is the law of the flesh that it may not be brought up ab initio. Now, why is the receiving by invalid persons alone not sufficient to invalidate the flesh and prevent its being brought up, and for what purpose did the Mishna state that the sprinkling, too, was performed invalidly? Rather, it necessarily comes to teach us that specifically in this manner the flesh may not be brought up; but if valid persons sprinkled, it is possible to bring the limbs up ab initio, because the sprinkling was performed validly. And although the receiving was performed invalidly, nevertheless the invalid blood was sanctified by a ministering vessel and may be offered ab initio, and consequently the flesh, too, is offered. And from here there is proof that ministering vessels sanctify invalid things.

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

the matter here is not that both the receiving and the sprinkling were invalid, but the Mishna spoke of two cases, one

in which invalid persons received

the blood,

alternatively,

another case

in which invalid persons sprinkled,

and in each of these, the law of the limbs is that they may not ascend ab initio. And the Mishna innovated by this that although there was invalid sprinkling here, nevertheless, if they ascended, they shall not descend.

And consequently the proof is rejected, for according to this interpretation it follows that even if the invalid blood was in a ministering vessel, it was not sanctified for offering ab initio.

Now the Gemara is uncertain concerning this law of invalid limbs that ascended to the top of the altar and shall not descend: whether

the airspace of the altar is considered like the altar,

and for that reason, even if he did not place them on the altar itself but suspended them in its airspace, their law is that they shall not descend,

or

the airspace of the altar

is not

considered like the altar, and they shall descend!?

Come and hear:

we learned in our Mishna,

just as the altar sanctifies, so

the

ramp sanctifies.

And if you say, the airspace of the altar is not considered like the altar,

then the same law is that

the airspace of the ramp, too, is not considered like the ramp.

And now, when the koen comes to offer the invalid things that ascended onto the ramp,

how can he bring it up from the ramp to the altar,

for as soon as he lifts them into the air,

it becomes one that descended,

for the airspace of the ramp is not considered like the ramp, and if so, he may no longer offer them, for we learned that invalid things that descended may not ascend again. And how will the law of the Mishna be fulfilled, that the ramp sanctifies invalid things!?

Rather, necessarily, the airspace of the altar is considered like the altar; therefore, even while the limbs are in the hands of the koen, they are considered as though placed upon the ramp, and they have not descended from it.

The Gemara rejects this: what they said in the Mishna, that the invalid things that ascended onto the ramp are to be offered, refers to a case

in which he drags it,

where the koen drags them along the ramp to the altar and does not lift them.

And we ask:

but there is airspace between the ramp and the altar,

and when he drags them from the ramp to the altar, he transfers them over that airspace. And if the airspace of the altar is not considered like the altar, it follows that when he transfers them from the ramp to the altar, they descend from the altar and may no longer be brought up. And since we find that nevertheless the invalid things are brought up from the ramp to the altar, necessarily the airspace of the altar is considered like the altar.

The Gemara rejects this:

When most of it is toward the ramp, it is like the ramp.

When he drags it from the ramp to the altar, at first most of it still remains on the ramp; therefore it is considered as though entirely placed on the ramp, because even that part situated opposite the airspace follows its majority that is on the ramp. And likewise

When most of it is toward the altar, it is like the altar.

For after he dragged it and transferred most of it to the altar, even that part which is still placed opposite the airspace follows its majority, which is already on the altar.

And if so, it is still possible to transfer the limbs from the ramp to the altar in a manner in which they will not be considered as having descended, even if the airspace of the altar is not considered like the altar.

And we ask: since we have established that the reason the limbs are not considered as having descended is that we follow the majority of the limb, then

resolve from this that which Rami bar Hama asked,

who was uncertain whether

there is joining for things ascending

to the altar, and it is considered entirely one part, and even that part which has not yet ascended to the altar is considered as having ascended, because we follow its majority, and its majority ascended.

or not,

because they are considered separate parts and it is impossible to join them so that we may follow the majority with regard to them. And since we have said that the invalid things may be brought up from the ramp to the altar, resolve from here that there is joining; for otherwise, each small portion of the limb that he transfers opposite the airspace separating the ramp from the altar would be like something that descended and became invalid to be brought up again. Rather, certainly the entire piece is considered one part, and therefore we follow its majority.

And we answer:

this is not difficult,

for in truth

you may resolve

this uncertainty from here.

Rava bar Rav Hanan challenged: And if you say that the airspace of the altar is considered like the altar,

then

the bird burnt offering

whose pinching is performed at the top of the altar,

which he invalidated through a thought

of piggul, intending to offer it outside its time,

how can you find it?

For one will never find that it is invalidated through a thought of piggul concerning its offering. Since its pinching is performed in the airspace of the altar,

the altar has grasped it,

and the law that it shall not descend applies to it. If so, that offering which he thinks to perform with it is a valid offering, for even if in practice he left it overnight on top of the altar and it thereby became invalid, nevertheless its law would be that it should be offered the next day ab initio, by virtue of the law concerning the offering of invalid things that ascended and shall not descend. It follows, then, that he thought only to perform a valid offering, and such a thought does not cause piggul.

And if we find that a thought of piggul is possible in a bird burnt offering, necessarily that offering which he thinks to perform the next day is an invalid offering; that is because, at the time of its pinching, it is not yet considered as placed upon the altar, since the airspace of the altar is not considered like the altar. And when he thinks to leave it as it is in his hand and delay its offering until the next day, his thought is to perform an invalid offering, and therefore it becomes piggul.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi challenged him

and answered in the form of a question:

why not

can a thought of piggul be possible in a bird burnt offering? For even if the airspace of the altar is considered like the altar, nevertheless

you find it

as piggul in a case

such as where he said,

the koen,

I am pinching it on the condition of bringing it down

from the altar

tomorrow

before the offering

and bringing it up

again

and offering it,

and this thought is a thought of an invalid offering, for if he indeed brought it down from the altar in practice after it became invalid through being left overnight, its law would be that it may not ascend again, for invalid things that descended may not ascend.

And we ask:

this works well according to Rava, who said that being left overnight takes effect at the top of the altar

and invalidates those that remained overnight at its top, whose law is that if they descend they may not ascend; therefore, the thought of offering them the next day after bringing them down from the altar is a thought of piggul, and the matter can be established in this manner.

But according to Rabba, who said that being left overnight does not take effect at the top of the altar,

and that which remains overnight at the top of the altar is valid, then

his thought does not exist,

for even if he were to fulfill his thought in practice, he would not thereby invalidate the offering, and all the more so since he did nothing but think this. If so, the question returns: if the airspace of the altar is considered like the altar, how can a thought of piggul be possible in a bird burnt offering?

And we answer:

according to Rabba, too, you find it

as a thought of piggul in a case

such as where he said,

the koen,

I am pinching it on the condition of bringing it down

from the altar

before dawn and bringing it up after dawn.

And since this offering is certainly invalid, for since at dawn it was not on the altar but on the floor, the invalidity of being left overnight takes effect upon it, it follows that he thought to perform an invalid offering with it.

And it is thus resolved that even if the airspace of the altar is considered like the altar, nevertheless a thought of piggul is possible in a bird burnt offering.