Zevachim 81b (פא:) — the Talmud in English

And if so,

what

does the verse come to teach by repeating

twice:

“blood”—“blood”?

Since

I

would have

been able

to say:

I have no

bloods that became intermingled that may be sacrificed

except these

sacrifices, such as

a burnt offering that became intermingled with its substitute, for even

if the burnt offering and its substitute became intermingled

while still alive, both may be sacrificed, since their laws are identical; therefore, we would not be concerned with their bloods becoming intermingled.

From where is it derived that a thanks offering and peace offerings

that became intermingled with one another may also be sacrificed, despite the fact that their laws are not identical, as a thanks offering is eaten for one day and the following night, whereas peace offerings are eaten for two days and the following night?

I include a thanks offering and peace offerings, which are brought as vows and freewill offerings, like

the burnt offering.

From where is it derived that

the blood of

a guilt offering

that became intermingled with the blood of a burnt offering, which may be sacrificed, may also be sacrificed, even though if a guilt offering and a burnt offering became intermingled while still alive, they could not be sacrificed?

I include a guilt offering, which requires four applications, like

the burnt offering.

A firstborn offering, a tithe offering, and a Paschal offering

whose blood became intermingled with the blood of a burnt offering—

from where

is it derived that they may be sacrificed?

The verse comes to teach: “blood”—“blood.”

And Rava analyzes this as follows:

Is that not

the teaching derived from the superfluous mention of “blood”—“blood,” which comes to teach us that even if the bloods of

the final application of a burnt offering and a firstborn offering became intermingled, this proves that the place of the burnt offering

is

the place of the remainder?!

And we reject this:

No,

do not prove it from here; rather, it is speaking of the bloods of

the initial application of a burnt offering and a firstborn offering. And what does it teach us? That applications of sacrificial blood do not nullify one another!

And we challenge this: The principle that applications of sacrificial blood do not nullify one another

is derived from: “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat”?!

And we answer:

It is the subject of a dispute between tanna’im: One derives it from here, and another derives it from there.

And now we find three derivations of three tanna’im for the principle that applications of sacrificial blood do not nullify one another.

The first, from

“They are holy.” The second, from

“And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat.” And the third, from “Blood”—“blood.”

And we inquire: Why did each of the tanna’im not derive the principle from the derivations of the other two tanna’im?

And these tanna’im do not derive it from “And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat,”

because

they hold that one does not mix

the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat in order to apply them

to the corners

of the inner altar. Rather, the blood of the bull is applied separately and the blood of the goat separately, and consequently we have no derivation that the blood of the goat retains its status even when it is intermingled.

And these tanna’im

do not derive it from “blood”—“blood,”

because the superfluous wording of

“blood”—“blood” does not appear to them

to be superfluous, as it was necessary to write it; that is simply the wording of the verse.

Rather, this difficulty remains:

With regard to “They are holy,”

what is the reason

that these tanna’im

do not derive

it from there?

And we answer:

They hold that the verse

“

They are holy”

comes to teach a different lesson:

They may be sacrificed, but their substitutes may not be sacrificed.

And the other tanna derives it from “Whether an ox or a sheep—

it is the Lord’s.”

And he interprets it as follows:

It may be sacrificed, but its substitute may not be sacrificed.

Come and hear:

We learned in our Mishna: With regard to blood that is applied below that became intermingled with blood that is applied above, the mixture must be poured into the drainage channel; and if the priest

applied

the blood

above without consulting,

all agree that he must return and apply it above. Both applications count for him.

And we analyze this:

Is that not referring to the blood of a sin offering becoming intermingled with the blood of a burnt offering, and once he applies it above, the bloods of the sin offering become

the remainder? And it teaches:

“All agree that he must return and apply it below.” This proves that the place of the burnt offering is the place of the remainder.

When Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came, he said: In the West, they say—

Here we are dealing with a case where

the blood of the initial application of

an external sin offering became intermingled with the internal remainder,

of an internal sin offering, since after he applies some of it above, both of them are remainder [see Rashi carefully].

Abaye said to him:

If you establish the case as one in which remainder became intermingled with remainder,

let the master say that it is a case where

the remainder of an external sin offering became intermingled

with the remainder

of an external sin offering.

And we answer:

Perhaps this comes to teach us by establishing the case as one in which it became intermingled with the remainder of an internal sin offering, that

even according to the one who says that pouring the

remainder

of the blood

of an internal offering

is indispensable, this applies specifically when none of it was applied to the base of the external altar. But if some of it was applied and only

even according to the one who says

the amount

of blood in the remainder was reduced,

it is not indispensable.

And here, the remainder was reduced because some of it was first applied above on the altar, although that is not the place where it is to be applied.

Rava Tosfa’a said to Ravina:

Why was Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef compelled to establish the case as one in which the blood of an external sin offering became intermingled with the remainder of an internal sin offering, so that we could not prove that the place of the burnt offering is the place of the remainder? After all,

we established that case in which the blood of a sin offering and a burnt offering became intermingled

as a case where

the

intermingled bloods were

mostly blood that is applied above, and he applies above the amount required for the blood applied below and more,

and thereby fulfills the obligation of the sin offering. But he does not fulfill the obligation of the burnt offering, since he has already applied above the amount required for the blood applied below and more. And when he applies the blood below, he does so only to fulfill the obligation of pouring the remainder of the sin offering; this blood is poured on the ledge of the base, not on the lower wall of the altar. Consequently, there is no proof that the place of the burnt offering is the place of the remainder?!

Ravina said to him,

Rava Tosfa’a:

This applies—that we established the case as one in which most of the blood was blood applied above and he applied above the amount required for the blood applied below and more—only

according to what they initially said,

that their dispute concerned a mixture in which the bloods are blended. Therefore, we seek forced explanations so that this will not conflict with what Rav Ashi said, that Rabbi Eliezer holds

that there is no reliable distinction within a blended mixture.

But

the conclusion

of the matter is that they did not dispute a blended mixture; rather, they dispute

a case where

cups became intermingled:

a cup of a burnt offering became intermingled with a cup of a sin offering. Rabbi Eliezer says with regard to both of them that the blood is to be applied above and below. It follows that both bloods are valid. Therefore, if we establish the case of one who applied the blood without consulting as also referring to a sin offering and a burnt offering, according to everyone he should apply some of both below; and if he applies them in that same place, on the lower wall of the altar, it would be proven that the place of the burnt offering is the place of the remainder. Therefore, he established the case of one who applied above without consulting as one in which the blood of an external sin offering became intermingled with the remainder of an internal sin offering.

of the matter is that they did not dispute a blended mixture, but rather

Mishna:

Blood

that is applied inside,

in the Sanctuary,

that became intermingled with blood applied outside,

on the external altar, may not be applied either inside or outside, because one may not change the place designated for applying the blood of one offering in the mixture in order to apply the blood of the other offering in its designated place. Here, if he applies some of the mixture outside, he will thereby also be applying the blood designated for inside outside; and if he applies it inside, he will thereby also be applying the blood designated for outside inside. Therefore,

the mixture must be poured into the drainage channel. [The tanna does not agree with Rabbi Eliezer, who said that one “regards” one of the bloods as though it were water and the other as blood.]

in the Sanctuary

And if he violated the prohibition against changing the place and

applied

some of the mixture’s blood

outside

first,

and then applied

some of the mixture’s blood

inside, it is valid. The prohibited act he performed has been performed, but the violation itself does not disqualify the blood.

and then applied

And if he violated the prohibition and applied some of the mixture’s blood

inside

first,

and then applied

some of the mixture

outside—

Rabbi Akiva disqualifies

the application of the blood on the external altar,

and the Sages deem it valid.

As Rabbi Akiva says: Any blood that entered the Sanctuary to effect atonement is disqualified,

and it cannot be applied outside.

And the Sages say: Only the blood of

an external

sin offering

alone

is disqualified when it is brought inside in order to effect atonement, but other bloods are not.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even

the blood of

a guilt offering that was brought inside is disqualified, because a guilt offering is equated with a sin offering,

as it is stated: “Like a sin offering—

so is a guilt offering.”

Gemara:

And we inquire:

And should Rabbi Eliezer also have disputed

the tanna of our Mishna in this case, since he holds the principle of “regarding,”

here,

and deemed the application of the blood valid ab initio, by “regarding” the second blood [which was applied in the wrong place] as though it were water?

And we answer:

What should he do?

Should he apply it outside

first

and then apply it inside?

That cannot be done, because

just as it is a mitzva to give precedence

to the application of the blood of a sin offering, which is

above [

applied above the scarlet line],

over

the application of the blood of a burnt offering, which is

below [

below the scarlet line],

so too it is a mitzva to give precedence

to the application

inside,

that is, the application of the blood of an internal sin offering,

over

the application

outside.

For applying blood in the Sanctuary is more important than applying blood outside.