Zevachim 72a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

They are necessary.

It is necessary to state both Mishnayot:

For if [it were stated] there, I would have said: these words

that the Sages decreed to prohibit a mixture of things forbidden for benefit, even in any amount,

for non-sacred

alone did they decree.

But

when things forbidden for benefit became mixed with consecrated animals, so that if we prohibit them there will be a loss

to the Most High, say: let us not cause all of them to be lost

the consecrated animals; rather, let us establish that with consecrated animals, things forbidden for benefit are indeed nullified in the majority, in accordance with their fundamental status according to Torah law, and it will be permitted to offer them, since the prohibition was nullified in the majority. Therefore, it teaches us here that they did not make things easier with consecrated animals.

And if [it were stated] here, I would have said: these words

that the entire mixture is prohibited, and even when things forbidden for benefit in any amount became mixed, because the case is one of

consecrated animals, for it is repulsive

to offer a sacrifice from an animal that had been prohibited, despite its having been nullified in the majority.

But non-sacred [animals], for it is not repulsive

to derive benefit from something that had been forbidden for benefit and was nullified in the majority,

say: things forbidden for benefit should be nullified in the majority.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach us that even with non-sacred [animals] they are not nullified.

The Gemara now discusses the explanation of the words of the Mishna: why is there here no law of nullification in the majority, and is the entire mixture prohibited?

And let the

prohibited animal

be nullified in the majority

of the permitted animals?

And if you would say,

perhaps you would say that the reason is that living creatures

are important

—they

are not nullified,

and their importance is that they are “a thing subject to counting,” and therefore they are not nullified in the majority—there would still be a difficulty:

For

this works well according to the one who says: “We learned, ‘anything whose way is to be counted.’”

That is, according to his view, what we learned—that “a thing subject to counting” is not nullified—means every thing that there are people who consider important enough to count separately, and do not include in a group. For example, animals: there are people who are particular to count their animals one by one, and when they sell them, they are unwilling to sell them as a “herd” of animals; rather, they count each animal separately, one by one. Therefore, an animal is properly called “a thing subject to counting,” which is not nullified in the majority, even though there are other people who do not count each animal separately. And according to him, it is understandable why an unfit animal is not nullified in a majority of fit animals.

But according to the one who says

only

“that whose way is to be counted” we learned,

that is, according to his view, what we learned—that a thing subject to counting is not nullified—means only a thing whose way it is that all people customarily count it separately because of its importance; only it is not nullified in the majority,

what is there to say!?

There are people who are not particular about counting the animals, to count each animal separately, but sell an entire herd according to estimation and not according to an exact count of the animals. If so, an animal is not considered an important thing that is not nullified in the majority!?

The Gemara now explains where they disagree concerning an important thing: whether it is specifically “that whose way is to be counted,” or also “anything whose way is to be counted.”

For we learned

[Orlah 3:6]

, “One who had bundles of fenugreek,”

a very important type of spice, and those bundles of fenugreek were prohibited with the prohibition

of mixed species in a vineyard,