Zevachim 60b (ס:) — the Talmud in English

Abaye said: This is derived from

lesser sanctity sacrifices

from the homiletical exposition of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught: Rabbi Yosei says: Three matters

on account of

of three Elders, and this is one of them: Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that a person may bring second tithe to Jerusalem and eat it

there without redemption

at the present time

when the Temple is not standing. For with regard to eating second tithe it is stated: “before the Lord your God,” and the question is required whether, when the Temple is destroyed, it is still considered “before the Lord your God.” And he holds that the sanctity of the Land has not lapsed and that the obligation to separate tithe remains by Torah law. And concerning this Rabbi Yishmael says:

And it is a matter of logical derivation

that it is impossible to eat second tithe without redemption when the Temple is not standing, as it is comparable to a firstborn:

A firstborn requires being brought to the designated place, and second tithe

also

requires being brought to the designated place,

and we derive the laws of second tithe from the laws of a firstborn:

Just as a firstborn may not be

eaten

except in the presence of the Temple, so too second tithe may not be

eaten

except in the presence of the Temple.

But it may be refuted: It is impossible to derive the law of second tithe from that of a firstborn, for

what is unique about a firstborn is that it requires the presentation of its blood and sacrificial portions on the altar;

that is why it may be eaten only in the presence of the Temple and when the altar is intact.

One may say:

First fruits prove

the point, for they do not involve the presentation of blood or sacrificial portions on the altar, and nevertheless they require the Temple, as it is stated: “And you shall place it before the altar.” So too, second tithe.

It may be refuted: It is impossible to derive the law of second tithe from first fruits, for

what is unique about first fruits is that they require being placed

beside the altar; and that is why they may be brought only in the presence of the Temple, unlike second tithe.

The verse states

that the eating of second tithe without redemption in Jerusalem applies only in the presence of the Temple, as it is stated:

“And you shall bring there your burnt offerings

and your sacrifices and your tithes

and so on.” It juxtaposes second tithe with a firstborn: Just as a firstborn may not be

eaten

except in the presence of the Temple, so too second

tithe

may not be

eaten

except in the presence of the Temple.

And we challenge this: Why does he need to derive from a verse that a firstborn is to be juxtaposed with second tithe?

Let the logical derivation return and let us derive it by the common feature

of a firstborn and first fruits: When we wished to derive the law from a firstborn, we refuted it by saying: What is unique about a firstborn is that it requires the presentation of blood and sacrificial portions. To this we would respond: First fruits prove the point. And when we refute this by saying: What is unique about first fruits is that they require being placed, we could say: A firstborn proves the point. Thus the logical derivation would return and teach the law concerning second tithe!?

And we answer: We do not derive it by the common feature

because it can be refuted: What is common to both of them

in the case of a firstborn and first fruits is

that they have an aspect involving the altar:

one involves the presentation of blood and the other involves being placed there. Therefore, we need to derive the law from a verse.

And we challenge this:

What does

Rabbi Yishmael

hold? If he holds that the first sanctity

of the Temple

sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future,

and the sanctity did not lapse when the Temple was destroyed, and sacrifices may be offered on the altar even when there is no Temple, then

even a firstborn should also

be offered and eaten when there is no Temple. Why, then, is it obvious to him that a firstborn may not be offered at the present time more than second tithe?

And if he holds

that the first sanctity of the Temple sanctified it for its time but

did not sanctify it for the future,

and that is why he raises the question whether “before the Lord” applies when the Temple is destroyed—for although the sanctity of the Temple no longer exists, it is possible that the sanctity of Jerusalem still remains—then

even concerning a firstborn there should also be a question

in a case where its blood was sprinkled and its sacrificial portions burned before the destruction, while its flesh remains: May its flesh be eaten in Jerusalem after the destruction?

Ravina said: Actually, he holds

that this tanna maintains that the first sanctity

did not sanctify

the Land for the future.

And here, with what are we dealing? With a firstborn whose blood was sprinkled

and whose sacrificial portions were burned

before the destruction of the Temple, and the Temple was destroyed while its flesh still remained.

And the reason that we do not raise this question concerning a firstborn in such a case, but it is obvious to the tanna that the firstborn may not be eaten, is that this tanna holds:

And its flesh was juxtaposed to its blood.

And he derives that at a time when you are fit to sprinkle the blood, you may eat the flesh, as it is stated: “And you shall sprinkle their blood, and you shall burn their fat, and their flesh shall be yours”:

Just as its blood is [offered] on the altar, so its flesh is [eaten only when there is] an altar;

for its flesh may likewise be eaten only when there is an altar.

And

the eating of

second tithe is derived from the

eating of

a firstborn,

for second tithe, too, may be eaten only when the altar exists and is intact.

And we challenge this:

Is it so that a matter learned through a juxtaposition can return and teach through a juxtaposition?

How can we derive the eating of second tithe from the eating of a firstborn through a juxtaposition, when the eating of the firstborn itself was derived through a juxtaposition from the sprinkling of its blood?

And we answer:

Grain tithe is non-sacred produce,

and this principle—that a matter learned through a juxtaposition cannot return and teach through a juxtaposition—applies only to sacrificial matters, and not to non-sacred matters.

And we challenge this:

This works according to the one who says that we follow the subject that was learned

and, since the subject learned is non-sacred, we can properly derive it through a juxtaposition.

But according to the one who says that we follow the source from which it was learned,

and when the source is a sacrificial matter, if it was itself learned through a juxtaposition, it cannot return and teach even a non-sacred matter,

what is there to say?

How can we derive second tithe from a firstborn?

And we answer: This authority holds that

blood and flesh are one matter,

and the principle that every matter learned through a juxtaposition cannot return and teach through a juxtaposition does not apply here, since the derivation of blood from flesh is not in the category of a juxtaposition; they are one matter.

When Ravin went up, he stated this teaching

of Abaye—that lesser sanctity sacrifices may not be eaten when the altar is defective—and that it is derived from Rabbi Yosei’s homiletical exposition,

before Rabbi Yirmeya.

Rabbi Yirmeya

said:

Babylonians,

those who dwell in Babylonia,

fools! Because

of

you sit in a dark land,

Babylonia is deep and dark,

you state teachings that are obscure.

When they do not know the reason for a matter, they invent a reason from their own minds that is not [the true reason].

It has not been heard by them,

the people of Babylonia,

that it is taught:

And from this beraita they could have learned that with regard to all lesser sanctity sacrifices, we do not invalidate them when the altar is defective. For it is taught:

At the time of the dismantling of the camps,

when the altars are dismantled during the journeys in the wilderness,

sacrifices become disqualified

because the altar has been removed,

and zavim

who are forbidden to enter the Levite camp

and lepers,

who are forbidden to enter the Israelite camp,

are sent outside the enclosure 45.

A zav is sent outside the Levite camp of those who carry the Ark, for the sanctity of the camps did not lapse during the journeys, and a leper is sent outside the tribal banners, which constitute the Israelite camp. And from the fact that a zav is sent outside the Levite camp, it is evident that the sanctity of the camps did not lapse during the journeys. Necessarily, the sacrifices are not disqualified because they have become disqualified as products that have gone outside their designated area, for they are still within the enclosures and the law of the enclosures remains in its sanctity; rather, it is because the altar has been removed.

And it is taught in another [beraita]: In two places sacrifices are eaten,

both when the Tabernacle is encamped and when the Tabernacle is traveling, the sacrifices are eaten in their designated place. And the words of this beraita contradict that which is taught in the preceding beraita, that sacrifices become disqualified.

Is it not

possible to reconcile the contradictory laws in the two beraitot as follows:

This

beraita, which teaches that sacrifices become disqualified, is referring

to most holy sacrifices; this

beraita, which teaches that sacrifices are eaten, is referring

to lesser sanctity sacrifices?

And this demonstrates that the halakha is not as Abaye said, that lesser sanctity sacrifices also become disqualified. And although Abaye proved that lesser sanctity sacrifices are disqualified from the fact that the beraita teaches that Rabbi Yishmael says that eating a firstborn, which is a lesser sanctity sacrifice, is disqualified when the altar is defective, Rabbi Yirmeya holds that specifically a firstborn, with regard to which the verse explicitly revealed that its eating is disqualified when the altar is defective, is subject to this law; we do not derive from a firstborn that the same applies to the other lesser sanctity sacrifices.

Ravina said: Both this and that

—both the beraita that teaches that sacrifices become disqualified and the beraita that teaches that sacrifices are eaten—are discussing

lesser sanctity sacrifices,

in accordance with Abaye, that all lesser sanctity sacrifices become disqualified when the altar is defective or has been removed.

And there is no difficulty

in the contradiction between the beraitot.