Zevachim 56a (נו.) — the Talmud in English

Rather, over

a length of 187

cubits

by a width of 135

cubits, which is the area of the Courtyard [and below the Gemara explains what this serves to exclude].

A tanna taught before Rav Naḥman: The entire Courtyard was 187 cubits by a width of 135 cubits.

He said to him:

Rav Naḥman

said to me thus, my father:

Throughout this entire area,

priests enter there, and eat there offerings of the most sacred order, and slaughter there offerings of lesser sanctity, and one who enters there while impure is liable

because all of these matters have the status of the Courtyard.

And we analyzed this:

What does this serve to exclude

for which one is not liable on account of impurity?

If you say it serves to exclude

the thickness of the hollow spaces of

the windows

and

the doors

in the wall of the Courtyard,

and the thickness

of the wall at its upper edge, it is impossible to say this, as

we already learned: The windows and the thickness of the wall

have the status

of the interior!

Rather, it serves to exclude the chambers

in the Courtyard, for one who enters them while impure is not liable, since they were not sanctified with the sanctity of the Courtyard [as explained in Tractate Shevuot 14a].

And we raised an objection:

But if

those chambers are

built in unconsecrated space and open into sacred space,

how can it be possible to exclude them?

But didn’t we learn: Their interiors are sacred,

and one is liable on account of impurity for entering them?

And we answer:

By rabbinic decree

it is forbidden to enter there while impure, but with regard to liability for karet and a sacrifice, they are excluded!

And we challenge this:

But according to Torah law, are

the chambers not sanctified with the sanctity of the Courtyard?

But it was taught in a beraita: Chambers built in unconsecrated space and open into sacred space—

from where is it derived that priests enter there and eat there offerings of the most sacred order and the remainder of the meal-offering? The verse states: “In the courtyard of the Tent of Meeting they shall eat it,”

whereas earlier it is written, “in a sacred place,” and we derive from the repetition of the wording:

The Torah included many courtyards with regard to a single act of eating!

And infer from this that the sanctity of the chambers is by Torah law; for if their sanctity were only rabbinic, how could the Sages have permitted a non-sacred place for eating offerings? And we answer:

Rava said:

With regard to eating, it is different,

for the chambers were included through the phrase “many courtyards,”

but with regard to impurity, they are not

sanctified by Torah law!

And we analyzed this:

But it was taught in a beraita: Chambers built for unconsecrated use and open into sacred space—

priests enter there and eat there offerings of the most sacred order, but they do not slaughter there offerings of lesser sanctity, and one is liable on account of impurity.

And this is difficult, for the expression “one is liable” indicates that the liability is by Torah law.

And we answer:

Didn’t you say

in the beraita,

“They do not slaughter,”

which indicates that the chambers are not sacred?

Then teach likewise, “one is not liable”!

And we challenge this:

Granted, with regard to “they do not slaughter,”

it is not because of sanctity, but because

I require

slaughter

opposite the entrance, and there is none

of the slaughter in these chambers opposite the entrance.

But with regard to “one is not liable,” why?

What compels us to emend the beraita, since “they do not slaughter” is no proof? And we answer:

According to your reasoning,

that the reason is “opposite the entrance,” why does it state, “they do not slaughter”?

Are we not dealing with a case where he slaughters opposite the entrance?

This is when the entrance of the chambers was aligned with the entrances of the Chamber of Knives; and necessarily this is the case,

for if there is no

possibility that it would be opposite the entrance, it is obvious that they do not slaughter there, and

why was it necessary

to teach this to us?

Rather, even though he slaughters opposite the entrance, the beraita teaches

that

“they do not slaughter”

because it is not sacred;

if so,

teach likewise, “one is not liable

on account of impurity,” since they were not sanctified with the sanctity of the Courtyard except with regard to eating.

The matter that we said above is now satisfactorily explained: we have come to exclude the chambers.

And we analyzed this:

But with regard to eating, is it not necessary that it be opposite the entrance?

For above we initially thought that the reason they do not slaughter is that it is not “opposite the entrance,” implying that with regard to eating it is not necessary that it be “opposite the entrance” [another explanation: this is because the beraita states without qualification “they eat,” even in a place that is not opposite the entrance].

But it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:

Two small openings [pespașin]

were in the Chamber of Knives, eight cubits high, in order to render the Courtyard fit for eating offerings of the most sacred order and for slaughtering offerings of lesser sanctity.

This indicates that with regard to eating as well, it is necessary that it be “opposite the entrance,” and that is why they made the small openings!?

And we answer:

Ravina said: Erase

—remove

“eating” from here!

It should not be included in the text.

And we challenge this:

But it is written

with regard to the seven days of inauguration:

“Cook the meat at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and there you shall eat it,”

which indicates that with regard to eating as well, “the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” is required!?

And we answer:

Offerings of a temporary nature are different!

There was a special scriptural decree with regard to the inauguration. But for future generations, “the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” is not required for eating, because the Torah included many courtyards. [In Tosafot they explain that the inauguration is different, since even the priests were warned: “You shall not leave the entrance of the Tent of Meeting for seven days.”]

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said:

From where is it derived that the blood of an offering

becomes disqualified

for sprinkling

at sunset? [There is a question: What practical difference does this disqualification make? At night he cannot sprinkle in any event, since all the Temple services are performed during the day, and on the following day it becomes disqualified because of remaining overnight, like the sacrificial portions that become disqualified at dawn. The answer is: This is in a case where, after sunset, the blood was brought to the top of the altar and remained there throughout the night. Were it not disqualified immediately at sunset, it would not become disqualified at dawn according to the one who says that remaining overnight does not disqualify what is on top of the altar, and he could sprinkle it on the following day.]

As it is stated: “On the day that he offers his sacrifice, it shall be eaten,”

and we expound:

On the day when you slaughter, you offer

[you sprinkle the blood];

on the day when you do not slaughter

that is, when the day of slaughter has ended,

you do not offer!