Zevachim 44a (מד.) — the Talmud in English

This is what he said:

“If the stringent cases had not been stated”,

namely, corpse impurity,

I would have said:

with regard to the lenient cases, namely, the impurity of a creeping creature, for which one violates a prohibition, and

with regard to the stringent cases,

corpse impurity,

punishable by death.

This cannot be so, because if corpse impurity had not been written,

it would have been derived from the impurity of a creeping creature, and

if so,

it is sufficient for that which is derived from the law to be like the case from which it is derived.

And just as the impurity of a creeping creature involves a prohibition, so too corpse impurity would involve no more than a prohibition!

And we answer:

Ze’iri said: The lenient cases

mentioned in the beraita are

the impurity of a creeping creature;

the stringent cases are corpse impurity!

And this is what

the tanna of the beraita

said:

If there

had been stated only the impurity of a creeping creature

alone,

and the tithe had been stated,

for one who eats it while impure due to contact with a creeping creature violates a prohibition,

and teruma

for one who eats it is liable to death,

and corpse impurity had not been stated, I would have said: The lenient cases

—one rendered impure through contact with a creeping creature—

with regard to the lenient cases,

eating tithe, he violates

a prohibition. And the stringent cases,

eating teruma,

are punishable by death.

And I would have continued and said:

And from the lenient cases to the stringent cases,

namely, one impure through contact with a creeping creature who ate teruma,

it is punishable by death. The stringent cases also to the lenient cases,

namely, one impure through contact with a corpse who ate tithe,

are punishable by death,

because just as one who eats a stringent food while experiencing a lesser impurity is liable to death, so too the same law should apply to one who eats a lenient food while experiencing a more stringent impurity.

Therefore the stringent cases were stated,

corpse impurity, to teach you that one impure through contact with a corpse who eats tithe is not liable to death; rather, he violates a prohibition.

We learned in the Mishna:

Anyone that has something that renders it permissible, whether for a person or for the altar, is liable for it on account of piggul.

The Sages taught:

We learned in the Torat Kohanim: From where do we derive the inclusion, under the law of piggul, of every sacrifice that has something that renders it permissible, whether for a person or for the altar? Perhaps

or does it bring

to piggul

only

a sacrifice that is

like a peace-offering?

Since here a generalization, a specification, and a generalization are stated [as will be explained below], we might say:

Just as peace-offerings are distinctive, in that they

are

eaten for two days and one night,

and the law of piggul was written with regard to them,

so too everything eaten for two days and one night

is included in this law. If so, with regard to a sacrifice

eaten for one day and one night, from where

do we know that it too is included in the law of piggul?

The verse states,

in the passage concerning piggul: “And if it shall be eaten at all

of the flesh

of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings” (Leviticus 7), and afterward it says: “The soul that eats of it shall bear its iniquity.” The word “flesh” is an inclusion, teaching that

every

thing

whose remainder is eaten

is subject to the law of piggul.

But we have still learned only these cases. What about

a burnt-offering, whose remainder is not eaten—how

do we know that it too is included in the law of piggul?

The verse states: “Of the

flesh

of the sacrifice

of his peace-offerings.” The word “sacrifice” comes to include even a burnt-offering.

And

from where do we derive the inclusion

of

birds

and meal-offerings?

And once we include them, we continue with the inclusions

until I include

even

the log of oil of a leper,

which would become piggul through a piggul thought during the blood rites of the leper’s guilt-offering?

The verse states, with regard to impurity: “And they shall separate themselves from the sacred things of the Children of Israel, and they shall not profane My holy Name

which they dedicate to Me”

(Leviticus 22). All sacred items are included in this.

All sacred offerings are included in this.

We have now learned this through a double gzera shava:

1.

And

the disqualification of

notar

in all sacred items

is derived through the gzera shava of

“profanation, profanation” from impurity.

“For he has profaned the sacred thing of the Lord” is stated with regard to notar, and the verse cited above states with regard to impurity: “And they shall separate themselves from the sacred things of the Children of Israel, and they shall not profane My holy Name.” Just as all sacred items are included with regard to impurity, so too the disqualification of notar is stated with regard to all of them.

2.

And

once we have learned that the law of

notar applies to all sacred items, the law of

piggul

in all sacred items is derived through the gzera shava of

“iniquity, iniquity” from notar,

for with regard to notar it says, “He shall bear his iniquity,” and with regard to piggul it says, “She shall bear her iniquity.”

And since in the end everything is included

with regard to the law of piggul, as explained,

why is “peace-offerings” stated now

[to interpret it through a generalization, specification, and generalization that includes only what resembles the specification], when even something that does not resemble peace-offerings is included in this law?

To teach you: Just as peace-offerings are distinctive in that they have something that renders them permissible, whether for a person or for the altar,

and one is liable for them on account of piggul,

so too everything

that

has something that renders it permissible, whether for a person or for the altar, one is liable for it on account of piggul.

Therefore, we learned the law of piggul for a burnt-offering and for the sacrificial portions of other sacred items from the sacrificial portions of peace-offerings, since they have something that renders them permissible only for the altar. And we learned the flesh of all sacred items that are eaten from the flesh of peace-offerings, which has something that renders it permissible only for a person, and one is liable for it on account of piggul. But other things that have nothing that renders them permissible are not subject to piggul!

We learned in the Mishna:

For a burnt-offering, its blood renders its flesh permissible for the altar and its hide permissible for the priests; for a bird burnt-offering, its blood renders its flesh permissible for the altar; for a bird sin-offering, its blood renders its flesh permissible for the priests; for bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, their blood renders their sacrificial portions permissible for the altar.

And we likewise learned in the Torat Kohanim, and there the beraita continues:

And I exclude

from the law of piggul

the handful, the frankincense, the incense, the meal-offering of priests, the meal-offering of the anointed priest, the libation meal-offering, and the blood,

for none of these is rendered permissible through another item.

Rabbi Shimon says: Just as peace-offerings are distinctive in that they have

the rite of sprinkling their blood

on

the

outer altar, and one is liable for them

on account of piggul,

so too all

the sacrifices

whose blood is sprinkled

on

the outer altar are subject to liability for them on account of piggul. Bulls that are burned and goats that are burned are excluded, since

their blood is not placed

on the outer altar, as with peace-offerings,

but on the inner altar; therefore,

one is not liable for them on account of piggul!

The Master said

above: Does it perhaps bring about piggul only for something that is

like peace-offerings?

The Gemara explains:

What is it

that is a sacrifice resembling peace-offerings?

A firstborn offering,

whose law is

that it is eaten for two days and one night

like peace-offerings.

And we challenge this:

By what

means is the firstborn offering included under the law of piggul?

If

it is derived

by means of what is found in one case

from peace-offerings,

there is room to refute

the comparison: A firstborn offering is not similar to peace-offerings, because

what is distinctive about peace-offerings is that they require the laying of hands

on the sacrifice,

libations

that accompany it,

and the waving of the breast and thigh

by the owners and the priest. Therefore, the law of piggul is stated with regard to them, unlike a firstborn offering, which does not require any of these laws!?

Rather,

we should have derived the firstborn offering

from

what is stated concerning peace-offerings: “

And if it shall be eaten

of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings.” We expounded this verse as a generalization, specification, and generalization: “eaten” is a generalization, “of the flesh of his peace-offerings” is a specification, and “it shall be eaten” returns and generalizes. Just as the specification refers to something eaten for two days and one night, so too everything eaten for this period is included in the law of piggul. The firstborn offering is therefore included in the law of piggul.

And we challenge this:

These two generalizations are adjacent to one another,

and the specification was not written between them but afterward. How, then, can a generalization, specification, and generalization be expounded in this manner!?

And we answer:

Rava said:

The explanation is

as they say in the West,

in Eretz Yisrael:

Whenever you find two generalizations adjacent to one another,

with the specification written afterward, as in the verse before us,

place the specification between them, and expound them as a generalization, specification,

and generalization. In this case as well, we should insert the words “the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace-offerings,” which constitute the specification, between “eaten” and “it shall be eaten,” and expound the verse as a generalization, specification, and generalization. This would teach the law of piggul only for a firstborn offering; therefore, it was necessary to include the other sacred items through other derivations, as explained.

We learned in a beraita:

Until I include the log of oil of a leper.

The Gemara explains:

This

beraita, which includes the log of oil of a leper under the law of piggul,

is according to Rabbi Meir!

As it was taught: With regard to the log of oil of a leper

that came together with the guilt-offering, and one formulated a piggul thought during the rites of the guilt-offering,

one is liable for it on account of piggul,

even though, if the leper wishes, he may bring the log anytime within the next ten days. Nevertheless, since he brought it together with the guilt-offering, the blood of the guilt-offering renders it permissible to be placed on the thumbs and toes of the leper and to eat its remainder; therefore, it becomes piggul through it,

this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

And we challenge this:

Come and hear the latter clause

of this beraita:

And I exclude

from liability for piggul

the libation meal-offering and the blood.

And this necessarily

comes to the Rabbis,

who are the ones who maintain that one is not liable for a libation meal-offering on account of piggul, while Rabbi Meir disagrees with them on this matter.

As it was taught: One is liable for the animal libations on account of piggul

if he formulated the piggul thought during the rites of the animal,

because the blood of the sacrifice renders them permissible

for the libations

to be offered; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

They said to him: But a person may bring his sacrifices today, and the libations

he may bring

from then until ten days later.

It necessarily follows that the sacrifice does not render the libations permissible; if so, why should they become piggul through it?

He said to them,

Rabbi Meir:

I too said

that the libations become piggul

only with regard to

libations that

come with the sacrifice

on that same day; but if he brought them afterward, the sacrifice does not render them piggul. It follows now that the first clause, which explains that the log of oil becomes piggul through the guilt-offering, is according to Rabbi Meir, whereas the latter clause, which states that the libations do not become piggul through the sacrifice even when they came with it, is according to the Rabbis!?

And we answer:

Rav Yosef said:

In truth, this beraita follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that since the libations may be brought later, even when one brings them together with the sacrifice, the sacrifice does not render them piggul. The same applies to the log of oil: The sacrifice does not render it piggul. And when the beraita states that the log of oil of a leper is subject to the law of piggul, it does not mean that it can become piggul through the sacrifice. Rather,

whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi’s, who says: With regard to the log of oil of a leper, its placements

from which seven sprinklings are made inside the Sanctuary

render its remainder permissible

for eating.

And

once we have heard that Rabbi maintains that

its placements render it permissible,

we may say for this reason that

its placements render it piggul

if he performed them with the thought of eating the remainder of the oil outside its prescribed time, whose eating period is only one day and one night. The beraita too is discussing a case in which he formulated a piggul thought during the sprinklings of the oil.

And where do we hear that Rabbi said that the placements of the log render it permissible for eating?

As it was taught: With regard to the log of oil of a leper, one commits misuse with it,

since it has not yet been permitted to the priests,

until he sprinkles

the

blood

of the guilt-offering, at which point the log becomes permitted to the priests. And anything that has a time when it becomes permitted to the priests is not subject to the law of misuse.

Once the blood has been sprinkled, one may not derive benefit

from the log of oil, by rabbinic decree, until he performs its placements,

but one does not commit misuse,

because it has already become permitted to the priests.

Rabbi says: Even if the blood has been sprinkled,

Even if the blood has been sprinkled,

one commits misuse

with the log of oil

until he performs its placements,

namely, its seven sprinklings. Once he has performed these placements, one no longer commits misuse with it, even if he has not yet placed some of it on the leper’s thumbs and toes, since that placement is not required for the sake of the Most High.

And Rabbi and the Rabbis agree

that

, that

even though he has already performed the seven placements from it, which are placements for the sake of the Most High, nevertheless

the log of oil is forbidden

for

eating

by rabbinic decree

until he performs

from it

the seven placements

of sprinkling

and the placement on the thumbs and toes

of the leper.

The Rabbis said this

to Rabbi Yosef’s answer

before Rabbi Yirmeya.

Rabbi Yirmeya said,

rhetorically:

Would a great man such as Rav Yosef say such a thing?

Since its placements render it permissible, its placements render it piggul!?