Zevachim 39a (לט.) — the Talmud in English

And this is explicitly stated in this beraita:

“The blood

of a chatat

that is required

to be poured onto the

base

—that is, blood that is the remainder of the blood of a chatat—if some of it splashed onto a garment, it is

subject to laundering.

And an intention is effective with regard to it,

for if, while pouring the blood onto the base, one intended to eat the flesh of the offering outside its designated time, this intention renders the offering piggul.

And one who offers some of it outside is liable.

But

in contrast,

blood

that became disqualified,

which is poured into the channel

in the Temple courtyard, from which all the blood flows to the Kidron Valley—if this blood splashes onto a garment,

it is not

required to be

subject to laundering, and an intention

of piggul

is not effective with regard to it

to render the offering piggul,

and one who offers some of it outside is exempt.”

The Gemara proves:

“Whom do you hear saying

this law, that

one who offers some of it

—of the blood that is required to be poured onto the base—

outside is liable?” —

It is Rabbi Neḥemya.

And if so, he necessarily also

says

that this blood is

subject to laundering.”

And we object: But this beraita says that an intention is effective with regard to it to render the offering piggul. How is this possible?

But it was taught in a beraita: “The remainder of the blood and the burning of the sacrificial portions

among the procedures of the offering, since

they

do not prevent atonement; therefore an intention is not effective with regard to them”?

do not prevent atonement, and therefore an intention is not effective with regard to them?”

Rather, necessarily, you must say:

“When that beraita was taught

saying that an intention is effective, it was not stated with regard to the remainder of the blood, but

with regard to the three applications of the blood of a chatat

and not with regard to the remainder. If so, we have not learned at all from this beraita that the remainder of the blood is subject to laundering; and even according to Rabbi Neḥemya, we have found no such law!?

We object:

“If so,

if you wish to establish the beraita as referring to the blood of the three applications, why were they called “blood

that is required to reach the base”?

After all, this blood

goes to the horn

of the altar

and not to the base!?

The Gemara answers: Say instead

And we answer: Say instead:

“is destined for the base,”

meaning that the requirement of “reaching the base” applies to this blood, in that after the blood is applied to the horns of the altar, its remainder must be poured onto the base.

But the Gemara rejects this: Even if we establish the beraita as referring to the blood of the three applications, it is still difficult:

And

why is it that

an intention is effective with regard to them? You said,

you, Rav Pappa, earlier, that those three applications of the blood of a chatat

do not permit

the flesh and sacrificial portions,

and an intention does not render the offering piggul

when formed while they are being applied,

and they do not enter inside,

as they do not become disqualified by being brought inside; with regard to these three matters they are

like their end,

like the remainder of the blood!?

Therefore the Gemara retracts and says: The beraita was not speaking about the three applications of the blood of a chatat, which do not render the offering piggul,

but when that beraita was taught, it was with regard to

the remainder of

the inner blood.

Since the beraita follows the view that the pouring of the remainder of the inner blood is indispensable, these remainders are considered capable of rendering the offering piggul, of making one liable for offering them outside, and of requiring laundering.

We object: How can one say that the beraita is speaking about the remainder of the inner blood, and that specifically with regard to the inner blood one is liable for offering its remainder outside the courtyard,

but with regard to

offering the remainder of the

outer blood

outside the courtyard,

what is the law? He is exempt.

If so, the following objection applies: Rather than teaching

“it teaches”

in the beraita a distinction in three laws—laundering, piggul, and offering outside—between blood that is poured onto the base and

blood that is poured into the channel,

which is not subject to laundering, with regard to which an intention of piggul is ineffective, and for offering which outside one is exempt,

let it distinguish and teach it with regard to the same case,

with regard to the remainder of the blood that requires the base itself, and say:

“When do these matters apply,”

that one is liable for offering the remainder of the blood outside the courtyard?

With regard to the inner blood. But with regard to the outer blood, he is exempt

for offering its remainder outside!?

And we answer:

“This

beraita,

whose view is it?” —

It is Rabbi Neḥemya, who says

that even

the remainder of the blood

applied on the outer altar,

if one offers it outside, one is liable.

And since

according to him there is no distinction between the outer and inner blood with regard to the law of offering outside,

he cannot teach three exemptions

with regard to the outer blood, distinguishing them

alongside the three liabilities

together with the three liabilities stated with regard to the inner blood. Although a distinction must be made between the outer and inner blood with regard to laundering and piggul, they are not distinct with regard to offering outside.

Ravina said

to resolve what was difficult earlier concerning Rav Pappa’s inference from the Mishna: What the Mishna says—“If it splashed from the horn, it is not subject to laundering”—means that it splashed

from the actual horn.

Rav Pappa inferred from this that if it splashed from what is destined for the horn, such as the blood of the three applications, it is subject to laundering. However, what it says there—“If it splashed

from the base,

it is not subject to laundering”—means that it splashed

from what is destined for the base.

The Mishna teaches us that once the blood-service has been completed, the remainder is not subject to laundering. It did not need to teach that if it splashed from the actual base it is not subject to laundering, since it already said that if it splashed from the horn it is not subject to laundering, and this applies all the more so to the base.

Rav Taḥlifa bar Geza said to Ravina:

According to you, that what the Mishna says “from the base” means from what is destined for the base,

say that both of them refer to what is destined

—and that what it says “from the horn” also means from what is destined for the horn, namely, the blood of the three applications. Thus the Mishna teaches that even this blood is not subject to laundering!?

And we answer:

“What is this?”

How can you establish the Mishna as referring to what is destined for the horn and say that it is not subject to laundering? If so, the following difficulty arises: Why did the Mishna need to state this law also with regard to blood destined for the base?

Now,

according to you, even blood

destined for the horn you said is not

subject to laundering; with regard to blood that is only

destined for the base, is it necessary

for the tanna to say that it is not subject to laundering!?

Rather,

it is necessarily as we said:

“From the horn”

means blood

from the actual horn.

From this Rav Pappa inferred that blood destined for the horn, while the applications of the blood have not yet been completed, is subject to laundering. However,

“from the base”

means

from what is destined for the base,

namely, the remainder, which is not subject to laundering; and it goes without saying that blood splashed from the actual base is not subject to laundering.

We learned in the Mishna:

“With regard to all offerings whose blood is applied on the inner altar,

if one omitted one of all the applications, it is as though he had not achieved atonement.”

The Sages taught:

In the passage concerning the bull brought for an unwitting matter of the community [Leviticus 4], all the applications of its blood are first stated. Subsequently, Scripture says:

“And he shall do

for the bull [the chatat brought for an unwitting matter of the community]

as he did

for the bull of the chatat [as the anointed High Priest does for his own chatat, when he brings it for a sin that he committed while issuing a ruling on his own].” Since all the sprinklings of the bull brought for an unwitting matter have already been specified, one must determine what this verse—“And he shall do for the bull as he did for the bull of the chatat”—comes to teach.

[Although the Torah did not explain what should be done with the diaphragm and the two kidneys of the bull brought for an unwitting matter, and this must be learned from the bull of the anointed priest mentioned earlier, it is impossible to say that this verse concerns the burning of the sacrificial portions, because it says in it, “And the priest shall effect atonement for them,” whereas the sacrificial portions do not prevent atonement; only the sprinkling of the blood does.]

Rather, the verse comes

to repeat

its statement

with regard to its sprinkling, and teaches

that if

in applying the blood of the bull brought for an unwitting matter

he omitted one of all the applications, he has accomplished nothing.

For the verse cannot be interpreted as instructing him to perform for this bull as he performed for another bull, since Scripture did not omit any particular matter that we would need to learn from the bull of the anointed priest. Rather, “as he did” must necessarily be interpreted as: as I have specified to you all of its procedures. Scripture repeated them in order to make them indispensable.

“I have learned

that omitting one of all the applications is consequential

only

with regard to

the sevenfold application

of sprinklings opposite the curtain,

for

these

are indispensable wherever

a sevenfold application is required. But

the fourfold application

to the horns—

from where

do we know that each one is indispensable for this offering, given that with regard to an outer chatat we learned that not all of them are indispensable!?

“The verse states”

later in the verse:

“So shall he do

with it.” It again repeats the law of its procedure; and if this is not needed for the sevenfold application, apply it to the fourfold application.

The Gemara now expounds the entire verse:

“For the bull”—this is the bull of Yom Kippur.

And the Torah came to equate it with the bull brought for an unwitting matter.