Zevachim 17a (יז.) — the Talmud in English

Rather:

necessarily, we cannot use a kal va-chomer to alter the plain meaning of an unspecified verse, since

this objection can be raised, and that objection can be raised;

therefore,

each one remains unresolved in its place:

we establish it in its place, in accordance with the plain meaning of the verse.

Therefore, when the state of acute mourning was permitted for the High Priest without qualification, it was permitted both in the case of an individual offering and in the case of a communal offering. And likewise, when the state of acute mourning was prohibited for an ordinary kohen, the prohibition applies without qualification, both in the case of an individual offering and in the case of a communal offering.

Similarly, when impurity was permitted with regard to a communal offering without qualification, it was permitted even for an ordinary kohen; and when it was prohibited with regard to an individual offering without qualification, it was prohibited both for a High Priest and for an ordinary kohen.

We learned in the Mishna: Any offerings whose blood was received by

one who had immersed that day—

he invalidated them!

From where

do we know that one who had immersed that day invalidates the Temple service?

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Simai says: There is an indication

regarding one who had immersed that day, that if he performed the service, he desecrated his service.

From where? The verse states:

“They shall be holy”—

“and they shall not desecrate

the name of their God, for they offer the fire-offerings of the Lord, the food of their God.”

If it does not refer to an impure person

who desecrates sacred offerings through his service,

as is derived from

“They shall separate themselves

from the sacred things of the Children of Israel [so that the priests shall not perform the service of the offerings while they are impure] and they shall not desecrate the name of My holiness,”

apply it to one who had immersed that day,

who also desecrates the service.

And we ask: And from where do we know that the extra phrase “and they shall not desecrate” comes to teach us about one who had immersed that day, who desecrates the service?

Say instead: Apply it to one who makes a bald patch or shaves the edge of his beard,

which are written in the preceding verse. The meaning of the verse would then be that priests who make a bald patch or shave the edge of their beard transgress both the positive and negative commandments of “They shall be holy—and they shall not desecrate”?

And we answer: It is impossible to establish the verse “They shall be holy, and they shall not desecrate” as referring to one who makes a bald patch or shaves the beard . For

as for one who had immersed that day, if he performed

the service of the sacred offerings, his liability

to death— from where do we know it? For it is derived

from the verse “They shall be holy, and they shall not desecrate,” through a gzera shava of

desecration—

desecration from teruma:

just as one who desecrates teruma is liable to death , so too, one who desecrates sacred offerings through his service is liable to death.

And since the verse “They shall not desecrate” does not specify which disqualified persons it refers to, we can derive only that a disqualification

that invalidates teruma,

such as one who had immersed that day,

desecrates the service; but one

who

does not invalidate teruma,

such as one who makes a bald patch or shaves the beard,

does not

become one who

desecrates the service by virtue of this derivation. It follows that this verse refers only to one who had immersed that day, who desecrates the service, and not to one who makes a bald patch or shaves the beard, who do not desecrate teruma; consequently, this verse cannot teach that they desecrate sacred offerings!

Rabba said:

Why do I need the Merciful One to have written

three separate verses concerning the invalidation of the service performed by

an impure person, one who had immersed that day, and one lacking atonement?

If it had stated only that an impure person desecrates the service, could we not have derived from him by analogy that one who had immersed that day and one lacking atonement also desecrate the service, since anyone who is disqualified from performing the service due to impurity desecrates the service?

And we answer:

They are necessary ,

to write one concerning one who had immersed that day and one concerning one lacking atonement as well.

Had the Merciful One written only “an impure person,”

we would not have derived from him the case of one who had immersed that day or one lacking atonement, because he is more stringent than they are,

as

the impure person

renders

food impure through contact, whereas one who had immersed that day and one lacking atonement do not render it impure [one who had immersed that day merely invalidates teruma but does not render it impure]!

And had the desecration of the service been written only

with regard to one who had immersed that day—

one lacking atonement could not be derived from him, as

one who had immersed that day is more stringent than he is, in that he

invalidates teruma,

whereas one lacking atonement does not invalidate teruma.

And had the desecration of the service been written only

with regard to one lacking atonement—

one who had immersed that day could not be derived from him, as

one lacking atonement is more stringent than he is, in that he still

lacks an act

—the bringing of his offerings—before he becomes pure, whereas one who had immersed that day becomes pure without an act, when the sun sets.

The Gemara still asks: Granted,

one cannot be derived from one

of the others because of the objections stated above; but why can

one be derived from the other two?

It should suffice to write the cases of an impure person and one who had immersed that day, or of an impure person and one lacking atonement, and derive the third by the common denominator of the other two.

The Gemara clarifies the question:

Which one could the Merciful One have omitted

and had it derived from the two laws in which desecration is stated?

If the intention is

to omit one lacking atonement and derive him from these,

from an impure person and one who had immersed that day, there is a basis for rejecting this:

What is common to these

is that they are more stringent than he is,

as

they

invalidate teruma,

whereas one lacking atonement does not invalidate teruma.

Rather, let the Merciful One omit one who had immersed that day and derive him from these,

from an impure person and one lacking atonement.

What objection can you raise?

What is common to these is that they lack an act

for their purification, and therefore they are more stringent than one who had immersed that day, who does not require an act for his purification.

Ultimately, their impurity is weakened,

for once one lacking atonement has immersed and the sun has set, he lacks only the bringing of his offerings; he no longer renders anything impure and is not liable to karet for eating sacred offerings.

Although he still lacks the act of bringing his offerings, nevertheless, since his impurity has weakened after he immersed and the sun set, it is possible to derive the law of one who had immersed that day from him: Just as one lacking atonement desecrates the service even though he does not render anything impure and is not liable to karet for eating sacred offerings, so too, one who had immersed that day does so. The objection, “What is common to the impure person and one lacking atonement is that they lack an act and are more stringent than one who had immersed that day,” therefore falls away, since one can derive the law of one who had immersed that day from one lacking atonement, as he has a leniency in another respect: he does not lack an act for purification, but only for atonement; and a person impure through contact with a corpse does not lack an act for atonement. Thus, one who had immersed that day can be derived from both of them .