Zevachim 115a — the Talmud in English

And we answer: And have we

not

found this so?!

But behold,

sacrifice

the Passover-sacrifice during the rest of the days of the year, which is not valid

if he offered it

for its sake,

because the entire year is not its time,

and it is valid

if he offered it

not for its sake 96 .

And we reject this:

A Passover-sacrifice during the rest of the days of the year,

if he slaughtered it not for its sake,

they are peace-offerings!

for this is its law: it becomes a peace-offering through the thought of not for its sake; and consequently, this Passover-sacrifice that was slaughtered for the sake of peace-offerings is not considered a Passover-sacrifice slaughtered “not for its sake,” but is considered peace-offerings slaughtered for their sake. And it is impossible to prove from this that it is possible to validate a sacrifice not for its sake even in a place where it is invalid for its sake.

Let us say that this supports

Rav Helkiah: for it was taught: It is stated, “To the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it,” and from this all that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting was excluded from liability for slaughtering outside.

Perhaps I would exclude

and exempt

even

if he offered

a burnt-offering

that is

premature with regard to its owners,

for the time has not yet arrived when its owners are obligated to bring it,

and the nazirite’s guilt-offering and the leper’s guilt-offering

which have a disqualification [and below it explains which disqualification], and I would say that he should not be liable for them if he slaughtered them outside?

The verse states

in the passage of slaughtering outside: “that slaughters an ox or a sheep or a goat outside the camp,” and we expound: Since it would have been sufficient to write, “that slaughters outside the camp,” and we would have known that it refers to an ox, a sheep, and a goat, necessarily the verse comes to teach through these superfluous words that he is liable for

“ox,” in every case!

“sheep,” in every case!

“goat,” in every case!

to include these disqualified ones for liability for slaughtering outside.

And the Gemara infers:

But as for a sin-offering, it left it out

in the beraita, and it was not included for liability.

What are we dealing with,

in what manner were the nazirite’s and the leper’s guilt-offerings included so as to make one liable for them outside?

If you say

that he slaughtered them outside

in their time,

when the time arrived that the owners were obligated to bring them,

why specifically a guilt-offering,

but behold

even a sin-offering as well

is he liable? For it is fit to be offered inside [and for a guilt-offering too, no verse is needed to include it].

Rather,

necessarily, it is speaking of a case in which he slaughtered them

not in their time.

And with what

are we dealing?

If you say

that he slaughtered them

for its sake, why is he liable for a guilt-offering?

For it is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, since its time has not yet arrived.

Rather, is it not

speaking of a case in which he slaughtered the guilt-offering

not for its sake,

and the verse revealed that he is liable if he slaughtered it outside, since it is now fit inside if he slaughters it with the thought of not for its sake. And this proves the view of Rav Helkiah.

And we reject this:

Actually,

it is speaking of a case in which he slaughtered it

in its time,

when the time had already arrived that their owners were obligated to bring them, and he slaughtered them with the thought

not for its sake,

and indeed according to us there is no novelty here, for a guilt-offering is not disqualified by “not for its sake.” But the beraita follows the view of

Rabbi Elazar, who says: We compare a guilt-offering to a sin-offering

to disqualify a guilt-offering not for its sake inside, like a sin-offering. And the verse had to include this guilt-offering for liability outside, because a guilt-offering not for its sake is disqualified [if he were to offer it inside], and one might have said that outside as well he should be exempt for it, because the designation of guilt-offering had been uprooted from it and it is not accepted inside. The verse therefore teaches that he is liable for it, because at the time that he slaughtered it outside, the designation of guilt-offering had not yet been uprooted from it, and it was fit inside to be offered for its sake,

and

indeed the beraita could have taught us this novelty with a sin-offering, that if he slaughtered it outside not for its sake he is liable, but

it taught the “secondary,”

the guilt-offering, which is secondary because it is learned from the sin-offering to be disqualified when not for its sake,

and the same law applies to the primary

that is, the sin-offering .

Come and hear

in support of Rav Helkiah: for it was taught:

Perhaps I would include

for liability for slaughtering outside even if he slaughtered

a burnt-offering premature in its own body,

for the sacrifice had not been seven days under its mother,

and a sin-offering

premature with regard to time

whether in its own body or with regard to its owners,

such as with a nazirite and a leper whose days had not been completed for bringing their sacrifices?

The verse states, “And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting

they did not bring it,” and it implies:

For everything that is not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, they are not liable for it.

And all these are not fit to be offered before their time.

And the Gemara infers:

But as for a guilt-offering,

premature with regard to time

it left out

in the beraita, and it was not included for exemption.

What are we dealing with,

in what manner is the beraita speaking?

If you say

that he slaughtered the sin-offering outside

for its sake, should he not also exempt the guilt-offering?

For it is not fit to be offered inside, since it is still premature with regard to time.

Rather, is it not

speaking of a case in which he slaughtered it

not for its sake,

and therefore only for a sin-offering is he exempt, but for a guilt-offering outside he is liable even before its time, because although it is not fit for its sake, nevertheless it is fit to be offered inside with the thought of not for its sake, like all the sacrifices that are valid not for their sake but do not count for the owners as fulfillment of their obligation. This is not so with a sin-offering, which is invalid not for its sake; therefore he is exempt for it outside, since it is not fit to offer it inside when it is premature with regard to time, whether for its sake or not for its sake.

Thus we have learned in the beraita according to the view of Rabbi Helkiah, that one is liable for a guilt-offering premature with regard to time outside when he slaughtered it not for its sake.

And we reject this:

Actually,

the beraita deals with a case in which he slaughtered it

not for its sake,

but the intention is not to exempt specifically a sin-offering and not a guilt-offering; rather, the same law applies to a guilt-offering, because

whose is this? It is Rabbi Elazar’s, who compares a guilt-offering to a sin-offering,

for both are invalid not for their sake, and therefore in both cases he is exempt outside when they are premature with regard to time, since they are not fit inside even not for their sake. And

it taught the primary,

a sin-offering,

and all the more so the secondary,

a guilt-offering, which is learned from a sin-offering to disqualify it through the thought of “not for its sake.” And a guilt-offering is learned from a sin-offering to exempt one for it outside when it is premature with regard to time, for the reason for both is the same: they are not fit either for their sake or not for their sake .

Come and hear: For when Rav Dimi came, he said: The school of bar Levai taught: Perhaps I would exclude even a burnt-offering premature with regard to its owners, and the nazirite’s guilt-offering and the leper’s guilt-offering?

And Rav Dimi concluded:

And the teaching takes it

the beraita included these disqualified ones

for liability, and I do not know what the teaching is,

from which verse they were included.

Ravina said

to Rav Dimi: Why did you not know which verse it is? For they expounded:

“ox,” in every case; “sheep,” in every case; “goat,” in every case!

And the intention of the Gemara is to prove as above: This beraita was brought [in the initial assumption] to support Rabbi Helkiah and not Rav Huna.

And we wonder:

And what difficulty is there

from this beraita for Rav Huna?

Perhaps it is as you said

above: that according to the conclusion the proof for Rabbi Helkiah was rejected, since the intention of the beraita is to include a case in which he slaughtered it in its time. Consequently, there is no difficulty from here for Rav Huna.

And we explain that there is a difficulty from the beraita of bar Levai for Rav Huna:

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said:

Rav Dimi did not establish the beraita of bar Levai as the Gemara established it above, that it is speaking of a case in which he slaughtered it not in its time,

because there was a difficulty for him

for Rav Dimi from the beraita

that the school of bar Levai taught a

beraita

that Levi taught.

Levi taught: The nazirite’s guilt-offering and the leper’s guilt-offering, if he slaughtered them not for their sake, are valid, but they do not count for the owners for any obligation. If he slaughtered them

inside

premature with regard to time in the owners, or if they were two years old, and he slaughtered them, they are disqualified,

because the law of the nazirite’s and the leper’s guilt-offering is that a lamb that is one year old is to be offered.

And Rav Dimi raised a difficulty from a beraita that stated that one premature with regard to time is disqualified inside in the case of a guilt-offering, concerning what we learned in the beraita of bar Levai: that for one premature with regard to time whom he slaughtered outside, he is liable. Yet they are not fit inside.

It is not difficult. Here,

what Levi taught, that a guilt-offering premature with regard to time is disqualified, is when he slaughtered it

for its sake. Here,

what bar Levai said, that for a guilt-offering premature with regard to time one is liable outside, is when he slaughtered it

not for its sake

since it is fit inside with the thought of not for its sake, and according to the view of Rabbi Helkiah.

And since Rav Dimi raised a difficulty against the beraita of bar Levai and did not resolve it with the Gemara’s rejection above, that this beraita speaks of a case in which he slaughtered it in its time, it necessarily follows that Rav Dimi held that this beraita deals with one premature with regard to time and not with one in its time. If so, it can be reconciled only as referring to not for its sake, and the proof for Rabbi Helkiah is restored, as the Gemara proved above in the initial assumption. Therefore he raised a difficulty from here against Rav Huna, his disputant.

Rav Ashi raised

a seemingly contradictory difficulty, from

the Mishna

in which we learned that one who offers outside the guilt-offering of a man with a flux or a woman with a flux, which is premature with regard to time, is exempt,

against the beraita

which we learned above, “Perhaps I would exclude,” which included liability outside for the nazirite’s and leper’s guilt-offering [and necessarily the intention is when he slaughtered it not in its time, as we inferred above in the initial assumption].

And he answered: Here,

in the Mishna we learned that he is exempt,

for its sake,

since it is not fit inside before its time,

and here,

in the beraita,

not for its sake,

and it is fit inside, and therefore he is liable for it outside, according to the view of Rabbi Helkiah .

And we raise the matter:

Shall we say that this is a refutation of Rav Huna

from the beraita of bar Levai, from which we proved above that it is not according to Rav Huna?

And we answer:

Rav Huna could say to you:

What we find in this beraita, that for a guilt-offering premature with regard to time one is liable outside, is not because the guilt-offering is fit to be offered inside with the thought of not for its sake, for there is no item that is not valid for its sake and valid not for its sake. Rather,

what are we dealing with here? For example, he designated two guilt-offerings for responsibility,

so that if one of them were lost, he would attain atonement through the other; and in such a case, if he slaughtered one of them outside before its time for the sake of a burnt-offering, he is liable for it, because

one of them is a burnt-offering,

for in the end it will be offered as a burnt-offering, for this is the law of these guilt-offerings: one is offered as a guilt-offering, and the other grazes until a defect befalls it, and it is redeemed, and from its money they offer the summer-offerings of the altar, which are a burnt-offering. Therefore, even if he offered the guilt-offering itself inside before its time for the sake of a burnt-offering, it is valid to be a burnt-offering.