Zevachim 114a — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

Granted, concerning an animal that copulated and one with which an act of bestiality was performed,

it is understandable that the exclusion from “before the Sanctuary of the Lord” was necessary, because

you can find it

in a case in which they were initially fit for sacrifice, such as

that he consecrated them initially, and afterward they copulated with them,

and they became disqualified. Therefore, they should not be excluded from “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” for it would have been possible to interpret the verse as follows: “and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it”—at that time, when it was still fit to be brought—and now he sacrificed it outside: he is liable.

But,

it is still difficult:

an animal set aside for idolatry and an animal worshipped,

for they too were excluded in the Mishna from “before the Sanctuary of the Lord,” and it is impossible to establish these disqualified animals in a manner in which he consecrated them first and afterward they became set aside for idolatry or worshipped, for the prohibition of an animal set aside for idolatry or worshipped does not take effect upon them after he consecrated them and they are no longer his, since

a person cannot prohibit an object that is not his! Therefore, it must necessarily be speaking of a case in which they were set aside for idolatry or worshipped before consecration. If so, they were never fit for sacrifice, and it is possible to exclude them from “to the entrance”; why, then, was the exclusion from the verse “before the Sanctuary of the Lord” necessary?

Rather, necessarily, the case is one in which they were designated or worshipped before their consecration. If so, they were never fit for sacrifice, and they could be excluded by “to the entrance”; why, then, was the exclusion from the verse “before the Tabernacle of the Lord” necessary?

And we answer: also in the case of an animal set aside for idolatry and an animal worshipped, the exclusion was stated regarding a case in which he consecrated them and afterward made them set aside for idolatry or worshipped, and initially they were fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. And we find a case in which the status of being set aside for idolatry or worshipped takes effect upon them even after he consecrated them:

in the case of lesser sanctity, and according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who said that lesser sanctity belongs to the owners.

Therefore, the owners can prohibit them as set aside for idolatry or worshipped even after they consecrated them.

For it was taught:

It is said concerning the guilt-offering for misappropriation [which is brought by one who denies owing his fellow money and swears falsely to him, and afterward admits],

“and he commits a betrayal against the Lord

and denies his fellow.” And we expound from the words “against the Lord and denies his fellow,” to make one liable for a guilt-offering concerning things that involve both the Lord and his fellow:

to include lesser sanctity,

for he is liable for a guilt-offering for misappropriation if he denied them, because

they are his property, the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

The same applies: they are considered his property with regard to his ability to prohibit them as set aside for idolatry or worshipped. Therefore, they must be excluded from “before the Lord” in a case in which they became prohibited after he consecrated them.

And the Gemara details all the disqualifications for sacrifice that the Mishna exempted from sacrifice outside because of the exclusion “before the Sanctuary of the Lord”: how is it possible for there to be a case involving them in which they were fit for sacrifice and afterward became disqualified?

An animal that copulated and one with which an act of bestiality was performed—

a matter of sexual transgression

is the cause of their disqualification, and it takes effect even upon consecrated offerings, already, even though they are not his.

An animal set aside for idolatry and an animal worshipped,

although their disqualification is because of

idolatry

and does not take effect upon an object that is not his, nevertheless,

in the case of lesser sanctity

the disqualification takes effect, as above.

The payment to a prostitute and the exchange-price,

does not take effect upon offerings that were already consecrated, and it is impossible that their consecration preceded their disqualification. Likewise,

mixed species

and

an animal delivered by caesarean section

also cannot have their consecration precede their disqualification, for from the beginning of their birth they are disqualified for sacrifice. The exclusion is necessary for them only

in the case of offspring of consecrated animals,

whose mother was consecrated for an offering. Therefore, they were fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting and to be sacrificed while they were still in their mother’s womb, together with their mother. It follows that their consecration preceded their disqualification, which prevents them from being sacrificed together with their mother only once they are born. Therefore, it is impossible to exclude them from the verse “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it,” and the Mishna needed to exclude them from the verse “before the Sanctuary of the Lord.”

And one should not wonder: how can the disqualification of the payment to a prostitute and the exchange-price of a dog take effect upon offspring of consecrated animals? Is it not the case that such a disqualification cannot take effect upon consecrated animals, since consecrated animals are not his? For

the tanna holds

in our Mishna that

offspring of consecrated animals

are sanctified only

at their coming into being,

at their birth,

they are sanctified,

for it is only at their birth that the sanctity of an offering takes effect upon them, and not while they are still in their mother’s womb. And the case is one in which he made them the payment to a prostitute or the exchange-price while they were still fetuses; at that point the disqualification takes effect, since they were not yet sanctified. And although, while they were fetuses, they had not yet been sanctified, they are considered fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting together with their mother, and therefore a verse is needed to exclude them.

The Sages and Rabbi Shimon dispute in our Mishna concerning one who slaughters outside an offering that is presently disqualified but will be valid later: according to the Sages, he is entirely exempt, while according to Rabbi Shimon, he violates a negative commandment and is exempt from karet.

Their dispute was taught with regard to three cases: a.

animals with temporary blemishes; b. turtledoves that have not yet reached their time; c.

b. turtledoves that have not yet reached the proper age; c.

that one and its offspring.

And the Gemara explains:

And they are necessary

to teach us their dispute in all three cases:

if it taught

only concerning

animals with temporary blemishes,

I might have said that the Sages exempt him only in their case,

because they are repulsive

while their blemish remains, and they are not fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.

But turtledoves, which are not repulsive, I might have said that they agree with him

the Sages

with Rabbi Shimon

that one violates a negative commandment on their account, since they will be fit later; therefore, the Mishna needed to say that the Sages and Rabbi Shimon also dispute concerning one who sacrifices turtledoves outside.

And if it taught

that their dispute is only concerning

turtledoves,

I might have said that Rabbi Shimon makes one liable for a negative commandment only in their case,

because they were not fit

initially

and were rejected

afterward—rather, they were never fit, since their time had not yet arrived—and their rejection is not so severe; therefore, one is liable for them for violating a negative commandment outside.

But animals with temporary blemishes,

which became fit and were rejected,

and their rejection is more severe, since they had been fit before they were rejected,

I might have said that Rabbi Shimon agrees with the Sages

that one does not violate a negative commandment through slaughtering them, even though they will be fit later. It teaches us that Rabbi Shimon disputes even in their case.

And if it taught these two,

I might have said that the Sages exempt from a negative commandment specifically in their cases,

because

animals with temporary blemishes and turtledoves that have not yet reached their time

have a bodily disqualification

and it is a strong disqualification.

But that one and its offspring, whose disqualification comes to them from elsewhere,

for the cause of their disqualification is not within them, but rather because he slaughtered their mother or offspring on that same day, and it is a weak disqualification,

I might have said that the Sages agree

with Rabbi Shimon

that one who slaughters them violates a negative commandment. Therefore,

it is necessary

to include the section concerning that one and its offspring, to teach us that the Sages dispute even in this case.

We learned in the Mishna:

“As Rabbi Shimon would say:

whatever is fit to come after a period of time is subject to a negative commandment, but there is no karet for it.”

And we inquire about it:

What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason?

From where did he learn that one who slaughters outside a disqualified offering violates a negative commandment because it will be fit later?

And we answer:

Rabbi Ilaa said in the name of Reish Lakish: For the verse says, “You shall not do according to all that we are doing here today,

every man whatever is right in his eyes.” And this is its interpretation:

Moses said to Israel: When you enter the Land

of Israel, and you will then be permitted for every individual to sacrifice on a private altar, during the first fourteen years of the conquest and division of the Land of Israel, and there “you shall not do,” you shall not sacrifice every individual’s obligatory offerings as we sacrifice them today in the Tabernacle in the wilderness, but rather “every man whatever is right in his eyes”; therefore, only

“what is right,” you shall sacrifice

there—that is, offerings of vows and freewill offerings, which are not obligatory for him, but are offerings that he “deems right” to volunteer. But

obligatory offerings, you shall not sacrifice

at all as individuals, even on a communal public altar.

And later in the verse it says: “For you have not yet come to the resting place,” which is Shiloh, where they rested then from conquering and dividing; that is, you shall not sacrifice obligatory offerings during the time of the conquest [when the Tabernacle is at Gilgal] until you come to Shiloh, when you will be permitted to sacrifice your obligatory offerings.

It follows that every obligatory offering that an individual had in the days of

Gilgal, with regard to

the days of

Shiloh, lacks its proper time.

For during the time of Gilgal he cannot sacrifice them anywhere, except later, when they come to Shiloh.

And Moses said to them, “You shall not do”

them at Gilgal. From here Rabbi Shimon learned that one who slaughters outside an offering that is not presently fit but will be fit later violates a negative commandment, for one who slaughters obligatory offerings at Gilgal is considered like one who slaughters outside: the place for sacrificing these offerings inside is Shiloh. And although they are presently disqualified, he is warned concerning them by the negative commandment of “you shall not do,” since they will be fit later at Shiloh. From here he learned that anyone who slaughters an offering lacking its proper time outside violates this negative commandment.

And we raise an objection:

Rabbi Jeremiah said to Rabbi Zeira: If so

that obligatory offerings at Gilgal are called offerings whose time has not yet arrived, and one transgresses concerning them the prohibition of “You shall not do so,”