Zevachim 114a (קיד.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

Granted, in the case of an animal that committed bestiality or was the object of bestiality

it is understandable that the exclusion from “before the Tabernacle of the Lord” was necessary, because

you can find

that it was initially fit to be sacrificed, for example,

if he consecrated it initially and only afterward it committed bestiality,

and it became disqualified. Therefore, it cannot be excluded by the phrase “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” since the verse could have been interpreted as follows: “but to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it”—at that time, when it was still fit to be brought—and now he sacrifices it outside: he is liable.

Rather,

it is still difficult:

an animal designated for idolatrous use or worshipped,

which were also excluded by the Mishna from “before the Tabernacle of the Lord.” These disqualifications cannot be presented as cases in which he consecrated the animals first and afterward designated or worshipped them, since the prohibition of designation or worship does not take effect after he consecrated them and they no longer belong to him, as

a person cannot render forbidden an item that does not belong to him!

Rather, necessarily, the case is one in which they were designated or worshipped before their consecration. If so, they were never fit for sacrifice, and they could be excluded by “to the entrance”; why, then, was the exclusion from the verse “before the Tabernacle of the Lord” necessary?

And we answer: even in the case of an animal designated for idolatrous use or worshipped, the exclusion was stated with regard to a case in which he consecrated it and afterward designated or worshipped it, and initially it was fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. There is a case in which designation or worship takes effect even after the animal has been consecrated:

in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, and according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says that offerings of lesser sanctity are the property of their owners.

Therefore, the owners can render them forbidden through designation or worship even after they have been consecrated.

As it was taught:

It is stated with regard to a guilt-offering for robbery [which is brought by one who denies owing another person money and swears falsely to him, and afterward admits],

“And he commits a trespass against the Lord

and denies his fellow’s claim.” And we expound the words “against the Lord and denies his fellow’s claim” as imposing liability for a guilt-offering in the case of matters that involve both the Lord and his fellow:

to include offerings of lesser sanctity,

for which he is liable to bring a guilt-offering for robbery if he denied possessing them, because

they are his property; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

The same applies to their being considered his property with regard to his ability to render them forbidden through designation or worship. Therefore, it is necessary to exclude them by “before the Lord” in a case where they became forbidden after their consecration.

The Gemara details all the animals disqualified for sacrifice that the Mishna exempted from liability for sacrificing outside because of the exclusion “before the Tabernacle of the Lord,” explaining how there could be a case in which they were fit for sacrifice and only afterward became disqualified:

an animal that committed bestiality or was the object of bestiality —

the matter of sexual transgression

is the reason for their disqualification, and it takes effect even with regard to consecrated offerings, although they no longer belong to him.

An animal designated for idolatrous use or worshipped,

although its disqualification is due to

idolatry

and does not take effect upon an item that does not belong to him, nevertheless,

in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity

the disqualification takes effect, as stated above.

The payment given to a prostitute and the price of a dog

does not take effect with regard to offerings that were already consecrated, and it is therefore impossible for their consecration to precede their disqualification. Similarly,

a hybrid

and

an animal born by caesarean section

cannot have their consecration precede their disqualification, since from the moment of their birth they are disqualified for sacrifice. The exclusion is necessary only

for the offspring of consecrated animals,

whose mother was consecrated as an offering. Consequently, while they were still in their mother’s womb, they were fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting and sacrificed together with their mother. It follows that their consecration preceded their disqualification, since it is only once they are born that the disqualification prevents them from being sacrificed together with their mother. Therefore, they cannot be excluded by the verse “he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” and the Mishna had to exclude them by the verse “before the Tabernacle of the Lord.”

There is no reason to wonder how the disqualification of the payment given to a prostitute and the price of a dog could take effect upon the offspring of consecrated animals, since such a disqualification cannot take effect upon consecrated animals, as they do not belong to him. Rather,

he holds

that the tanna of our Mishna maintains that

the offspring of consecrated animals

are

consecrated only upon their coming into existence,

at their birth;

they are consecrated

only at their birth, when sanctity as an offering takes effect upon them, and not while they are still in their mother’s womb. The case is one in which he designated them as the payment given to a prostitute or the price of a dog while they were still embryos. The disqualification then takes effect, since they had not yet been consecrated. Although they had not yet been consecrated while they were embryos, they are considered fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting together with their mother, and therefore a verse is necessary to exclude them.

The Sages and Rabbi Shimon disagreed in our Mishna concerning one who slaughters outside an offering that is currently disqualified but will become fit at a later time. According to the Sages, he is entirely exempt; according to Rabbi Shimon, he violates a prohibition, but is exempt from karet.

Their dispute was taught with regard to three cases: a.

animals with transient blemishes;

b. turtledoves that have not yet reached the proper age; c.

the same animal and its offspring.

The Gemara explains:

They are all necessary

in order to teach us their dispute in all three cases:

Had it taught

the dispute only with regard to

animals with transient blemishes,

I would have said that the Sages exempt him only in their case

because they are repulsive

while they have their blemishes, and are not fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.

But in the case of turtledoves, which are not repulsive, I would say that the Sages agree with him

—

with Rabbi Shimon

—that he violates a prohibition, since they will be fit at a later time. Therefore, the Mishna had to state that the Sages and Rabbi Shimon also disagree concerning one who sacrifices turtledoves outside.

And had it taught

their dispute only with regard to

turtledoves,

I would have said that Rabbi Shimon imposes liability for a prohibition only in their case,

because they were never fit

initially

and were rejected

afterward; rather, they were never fit at all, since their proper time had not yet arrived, and their rejection is therefore not so severe. Consequently, one is liable for sacrificing them outside in violation of a prohibition.

But in the case of animals with transient blemishes,

which were fit and then rejected,

their rejection is more severe, since they had been fit before they were rejected.

I would say that Rabbi Shimon agrees with the Sages

that one does not violate a prohibition by slaughtering them, even though they will be fit at a later time. The Mishna therefore teaches us that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Sages in their case as well.

And had it taught only these two cases,

I would have said that the Sages exempt from the prohibition only in their cases,

because

animals with transient blemishes and turtledoves that have not yet reached the proper age

have an intrinsic disqualification

and their disqualification is a strong one.

But in the case of the same animal and its offspring, whose disqualification comes from an external factor,

since the cause of their disqualification is not inherent in them, but rather that their mother or offspring was slaughtered on that same day, their disqualification is a weak one,

I would say that the Sages agree

with Rabbi Shimon

that one who slaughters them violates a prohibition. Therefore,

it is necessary

to include the case of the same animal and its offspring, to teach us that the Sages disagree in this case as well.

We learned in the Mishna:

“As Rabbi Shimon would say:

Any offering that will be fit to be brought at a later time entails a violation of a prohibition, but does not entail karet.”

And we inquire:

What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason?

From where did he derive that one who slaughters outside an offering that is currently disqualified violates a prohibition because it will be fit at a later time?

And we answer:

Rabbi Ila’a said that Reish Lakish said: The verse states: “You shall not do according to everything that we are doing here today,

each man whatever is proper in his eyes.” And this is its interpretation:

Moses said to Israel: When you enter the Land

of Israel, and each individual will then be permitted to sacrifice on a private altar, during the first fourteen years of the conquest and division of the Land of Israel, the meaning of “you shall not do” there is: You shall not sacrifice each individual’s obligatory offerings in the manner in which we sacrifice them today in the Tabernacle in the wilderness. Rather, “each man whatever is proper in his eyes”; therefore, only

“what is proper,” you shall sacrifice

there—namely, offerings of vows and freewill offerings, which he is not obligated to bring, but which are offerings that he finds “proper” in his eyes to donate. But

obligatory offerings, you shall not sacrifice

at all as individuals, even on a public altar.

And further in the verse it states: “For you have not yet come to the resting place,” which is Shiloh, where they rested after the conquest and division. This means: You shall not sacrifice obligatory offerings during the period of the conquest [when the Tabernacle was located at Gilgal], until you come to Shiloh, when you will be permitted to sacrifice your obligatory offerings.

It follows that every obligatory offering that an individual was required to bring in the days of

Gilgal, in relation to

the days of

Shiloh, lacked its proper time.

For during the period of Gilgal he could not sacrifice such offerings anywhere; they would become fit only later, when they came to Shiloh.

And Moses said to them: “You shall not do”

these offerings at Gilgal. From this Rabbi Shimon learned that one who slaughters outside an offering that is not currently fit but will be fit at a later time violates a prohibition. For one who slaughters obligatory offerings at Gilgal is considered to be slaughtering outside, since the place where these offerings are to be sacrificed inside is Shiloh. Although they are currently disqualified, one is warned against them by the prohibition of “you shall not do,” since they will be fit later at Shiloh. From here he derived that anyone who slaughters outside an offering that lacks its proper time violates this prohibition.

And we ask:

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: If so,

that obligatory offerings at Gilgal are called offerings whose time has not yet arrived and one transgresses with regard to them the prohibition of “You shall not do,”