Zevachim 106a (קו.) — the Talmud in English

Here too,

the place where the bulls that are burned are burned is

to the east of Jerusalem.

And we explain:

and according to the Rabbis,

who expound this verse with regard to the impurity of garments, and do not derive the matter through the gezeira shava,

where,

in what place and on which side of Jerusalem

do they burn

the bulls that are burned?

As it was taught in a beraita: Where are

the bulls that are burned

burned, to the north

of

Jerusalem,

because all the rites of a sin-offering are performed on the northern side,

outside the three camps.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: They are burned at the place of the ashes.

It is necessary that some of the ashes of the altar first be placed there, so that the place would already be called the place of “the pouring out of the ashes.”

” It follows that the first tanna holds that the bulls must indeed be burned to the north of Jerusalem, but he is not particular that there first be ashes at that location.

Rava said: Who

is the first tanna

who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili

and holds that it is not necessary for ashes to have been there first?

It is Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov.

As it was taught in a beraita:

It is stated in the passage concerning the burning of the bull of the anointed priest:

“It shall be burned at the place of the pouring out of the ashes.”

This implies that we require

there to be ashes

before the bull is burned.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says:

The verse comes to teach us

that its place,

the place of the ashes,

be sloped.

That is, the place must be in the form of an incline, so that the ashes can be poured out there. It follows that he holds that it is not necessary for ashes to have been there previously.

Abaye said to him: Perhaps

only

with regard to whether its place must be sloped do

the first tanna and Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov disagree. But with regard to whether ashes must have been there previously, Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov also agrees that this is necessary. He merely requires in addition that its place be sloped. If so, there is no proof that Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov is the one who disagrees with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

The Sages taught: The one who burns and the one who attends to the needs of the burning render garments impure. But the one who kindles the fire

for the purpose of the burning,

nor the one who arranges the pyre

for the burning of the cow

renders garments impure.

This tanna holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, that garments do not become impure until the fire has caught in them.

And who is the one who burns

who renders garments impure?

It is the one who assists during the burning.

For example, one who turns over the flesh, one who throws on wood, and one who turns over and rakes the coals.

And the tanna explains:

One might have thought that even once

the limbs

have become ashes,

still

the ash

the ash

renders garments

and the one who burns

them

shall wash his garments.” Only when he burns

them,

when they are still the bulls that are burned, do they

render garments impure; once they become ashes, they do not render garments impure.

Because the ashes of the bulls are not called “them

” Rabbi Shimon says: “Them” render

garments impure, but

once it has melted,

when

the flesh has dissolved, it does not render garments impure.

What is the practical difference between them,

what is the difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon?

Rava said: The difference between them is a case where it has become charred.

The flesh has become charred, which is considered like flesh that has melted, but it is not yet ashes. According to the first tanna, we apply to it the term “them,” and it renders garments impure until it becomes ashes. But according to Rabbi Shimon, it does not render garments impure, because from the moment it becomes charred it is no longer called a bull.

We shall return to you, chapter “Tevul Yom.”

Mishna:

1.

The one who slaughters and the one who offers

sacrificial animals

in

a place that is

outside

the wall of the Temple courtyard — is liable for two offerings. For one, he is

liable for the slaughter

because he slaughtered sacrificial animals outside;

and

for one, he is

liable for the offering

of sacrificial animals and burning them outside.

And even if he performed both acts in a single period of unawareness—whether he did not know that they were sacrificial animals or did not know that the place where he slaughtered and offered them was outside the Temple courtyard—he is liable for two offerings, because slaughtering and offering are two distinct categories of transgression, like eating forbidden fat and blood.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says:

Only if he

slaughtered inside and offered outside

is he

liable,

because he offered outside a valid offering that had been slaughtered properly inside. But if he

slaughtered

an offering

outside

and that offering became disqualified for offering because it had been slaughtered outside, and he

offered

it

outside,

he is

exempt

for the offering, because

he offered only a disqualified matter

and one is liable only for offering an offering that was fit to be offered inside. For the reason for liability for offering outside is that the verse says, “He shall not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”; this verse concerns a valid offering, which can be brought and offered at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and not a disqualified offering that was rendered unfit by its slaughtering outside.

The Sages said to him

to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: According to your statement, how is one who slaughters inside and offers it outside liable? For

even one who slaughters inside and offers outside—

once he takes it out

the offering that was slaughtered inside,

he disqualifies it

because of “that which has gone out”?

Rather, it must necessarily be that the Torah imposed liability for offering outside even when one offers an offering that was disqualified. If so, the same applies to an offering slaughtered outside: one is liable for offering it outside.

B.

Similarly, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis disagreed concerning the law of

an impure person who ate

sacrificial meat:

Whether

he ate meat of

impure sacrificial status, whether

he ate meat of

pure sacrificial status, he is liable

for eating it intentionally with karet, and for eating it unwittingly he must bring a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says:

Only a person

who is impure and ate

meat of

pure sacrificial status is liable

for eating it.

But

a person

who is impure and ate

meat of

impure sacrificial status is exempt

for eating it, because

he ate only an impure matter.

The Sages said to him

to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: But

even an impure person who ate the

sacrificial meat

that was pure,

you should not make him liable, for

once he touched it

the impure person touched the pure meat before eating it,

he rendered it impure.

And if you hold him liable even though it became impure before the eating, you should likewise hold him liable even if it had previously become impure through others.

3.

And

a person

who is pure and ate

meat of a sacrificial offering

that was impure—

is exempt

from the punishment of karet for eating it [but he is liable to lashes by Torah law],

as he is not liable

for karet for eating sacrificial meat in a state of impurity

unless it is the impurity of the body,

as they derived above [43a] from the verse, “And the person who eats, while his impurity is upon him.” The liability for karet applies only to impurity that can depart from him; impurity that departs is only the impurity of a person’s body, which can be purified in a ritual bath, and not the impurity of meat, which can never be purified.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The one who slaughters and offers sacrificial animals outside is liable.

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted, offering

sacrificial animals outside

is written

with

a punishment and is written

with

a prohibition,

and therefore one who performed it unwittingly must bring a sin-offering.

The punishment—

as it is written: “And he shall not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting

to make it an offering to the Lord—and that man shall be cut off from among his people.”

The prohibition—

as it is written: “Take care for yourself lest you offer your burnt offerings

in every place,”

and concerning that which Rabbi Avin said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: Wherever it says

in the Torah

“take care,” “lest,” or “do not,” it is only a

prohibition,

and since it says “take care lest you offer,” it follows that one violates a prohibition.

And since intentionally one is subject to the prohibition and the punishment of karet, for doing it unwittingly one must bring a sin-offering, since a sin-offering is required only for a matter whose intentional violation incurs karet and which has a prohibition.

But slaughtering

sacrificial animals outside—why is one liable for it to bring a sin-offering, when—

Granted, the punishment,

we find

that it is written

concerning it: “And

he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting

and that man shall be cut off from among his people.”

But the prohibition

for one who slaughters sacrificial animals outside,

from where do we derive it?

For since we do not find a prohibition concerning slaughtering, how can we make him liable to bring a sin-offering?

And we answer: The prohibition is included in what

the verse says: “And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices to the goat-demons

after whom they stray.” It follows that Scripture warned against slaughtering sacrificial animals outside.

And we challenge this: How can a prohibition be derived from this verse? For

this

verse

is needed for that which Rabbi Elazar taught.

As Rabbi Elazar said: From where is it derived that one who slaughters an animal for Markulis is liable

to execution, even though the service of Markulis is performed in a degrading manner, by stoning it with stones, whereas this person served it honorably, by slaughtering an animal, which is not its customary manner of worship? And from where is it derived that he is also liable to execution for this manner of worship?

As it is written: “And they shall no longer slaughter their sacrifices.” If it does not refer to

the customary manner of

worship, for

we have already

derived

that the customary worship of Markulis, by stoning, is punishable by stoning

from “

lest you seek out their gods, saying:

How do they worship

these nations their gods, and I too shall do likewise,”

then apply it to

the worship of Markulis

not in its customary manner,

by slaughtering!

If so, it is difficult: How can we derive from the verse “And they shall no longer slaughter” a prohibition against one who slaughters sacrificial animals outside, when it is needed to teach that one is also liable for an act of idolatry performed not in its customary manner?

And we answer:

Rabba said:

This verse teaches both matters:

Read it as: “And they shall not slaughter

their sacrifices,” and this is a prohibition against one who slaughters sacrificial animals outside, as it is written adjacent to that passage.

And also read it as: “And no longer

their sacrifices,” teaching that one who slaughters for Markulis is liable to execution, even though it was worshipped not in its customary manner.

And we challenge this:

And

behold,

still

it is impossible to derive from this verse a prohibition against one who slaughters sacrificial animals outside from the words “and they shall not slaughter,” for

it is needed for that which was taught in a beraita:

Until here,

up to the verse “And they shall no longer slaughter,” which is stated with regard to the punishment of karet for slaughtering outside and offering outside,

it,

the verse,

speaks of sacrificial animals that one consecrated during the time when private altars were prohibited,

namely, from the time the Tabernacle was erected and worship on private altars was prohibited,

and offered during the time when private altars were prohibited.

And it is necessary to say that the verse speaks of these sacrificial animals,