Zevachim 100a (ק.) — the Talmud in English

It is not difficult:

Here,

the beraita in which we learned: An onen does not send his Paschal offering,

is referring to a case where his deceased relative died on the fourteenth and was buried on the fourteenth.

Here,

the Mishna in which we learned: An onen immerses and eats his Paschal offering in the evening,

is referring to a case where his deceased relative died on the thirteenth and was buried on the fourteenth;

and the distinction is as follows:

If his deceased relative died on the fourteenth and was buried on the fourteenth,

he does not send his Paschal offering, because

the day of death,

which is by Torah law,

takes hold of

even

its night by Torah law.

If his deceased relative died on the thirteenth and was buried on the fourteenth,

he immerses and eats his Paschal offering in the evening, because

the day of burial,

which is

by rabbinic law, takes hold of its night only by rabbinic law,

and the Sages were lenient in a case involving karet.

He said

to him,

Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari,

who had explained Rabbi Shimon’s statement as referring to the night of the day of burial:

But rather,

according to your words, this is difficult:

That which was taught

in the beraita cited above:

Rabbi Shimon said to him,

to Rabbi Yehuda, who had said: The mourning of the night following the day of death is by Torah law:

Know

that the mourning of the night is by rabbinic law,

for they said: An onen immerses and eats his Paschal offering in the evening, but not sacred offerings.

But if it is as you say—that Rabbi Shimon likewise said that an onen sends his Paschal offering only on the day of burial—

let him say

to Rabbi Shimon:

I am speaking to you of the day of death, which is by Torah law, and you respond to me concerning the day of burial, which is by rabbinic law—

that is, I too spoke only of the night of the day of death, which is by Torah law, and you answer me from the night of the day of burial, concerning which I too concede that it is only by rabbinic law!?

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult

to accept Rav Mari’s answer.

The fourth answer:

Abaye said: It is not difficult

to reconcile the contradiction between the Mishna in Pesaḥim and the beraita, because:

Here,

the beraita that prohibits an onen from sending his Paschal offering is referring to a case where

the deceased died

relative of his

before midday

on the eve of Passover.

Here,

the Mishna that permits an onen to send his Paschal offering is referring to a case where

the deceased died

relative of his

after midday

on the eve of Passover; and the distinction is as follows:

If his relative died

before midday, for

he had

not yet become fit for the Paschal offering

[he was not yet eligible for the Paschal offering],

mourning takes hold of him,

that is, his mourning prohibits him from bringing the Paschal offering.

But if his relative died

after midday, for

he had already

become fit for the Paschal offering, mourning does not take hold of him

to prohibit him from bringing the Paschal offering.

The Gemara asks:

And from where do you say that the distinction is relevant

[what is the source for this distinction]

between before midday and after midday?

As it was taught:

It is written [Leviticus 21]: “Say to the priests, the sons of Aaron: No one shall defile himself for a dead person among his people. Except for his close relative who is near to him: for his mother, for his father, for his son, for his daughter, and for his brother; and for his virgin sister who is near to him, who has not been married, for her he shall defile himself.”

And the beraita expounds: “

For her

[for his virgin sister]

he shall defile himself,”

it is a mitzva.

But if

he does not wish

to defile himself for his sister or for one of the other close relatives,

they defile him against his will.

And there was an incident involving Yosef the priest, whose wife died on the eve of Passover, and he did not wish to defile himself for her; so his fellow priests conferred and rendered him impure against his will.

And we raise a contradiction, for this beraita apparently teaches that, because of the mitzva of defiling oneself for close relatives, they nullify the mitzva of the Paschal offering; this contradicts another beraita taught concerning a nazirite, where it is stated that this is not so [and from the resolution of the contradiction, the distinction between before midday and after midday is established]: It is written in the passage concerning a nazirite [Numbers 6]: “All the days that he abstains for the sake of the Lord, he shall not come near a dead person. For his father, or for his mother, or for his brother, or for his sister, he shall not defile himself for them when they die, for the crown of his God is upon his head.”

“A soul”—these are the close relatives.

“A dead person”—these are the distant relatives.

“For his father” [this comes to teach]: He may not defile himself for his father, but he does defile himself for a met mitzva [a dead person for whom there is no one to attend to his burial].

“For his mother” [this comes to teach]: If he was a priest and a nazirite, it is for his mother that he may not defile himself, but he does defile himself for a met mitzva [that is, even though he possesses two sanctities, nevertheless he defiles himself for a met mitzva].

“For his brother” [this comes to teach]: If he was a High Priest and a nazirite, it is for his brother that he may not defile himself, but he does defile himself for a met mitzva [that is, even though he possesses two sanctities—and moreover, he possesses the additional sanctity of a High Priest—nevertheless he defiles himself for a met mitzva].

“

And for his sister”

why is this stated:

“And for his sister”

If it does not apply to the nazirite, apply it to another matter:

If one went to slaughter his Paschal offering, the neglect of which incurs karet,

and to circumcise his son

[or he was going to circumcise his son so that he would be able to fulfill the mitzva of the Paschal offering, since the circumcision of one’s sons prevents him from partaking of the Paschal offering],

and he heard that one of his close relatives had died,

might he defile himself

for him?

You must say: He may not defile himself!

Even though he is obligated to become impure for his close relatives, since he would incur karet through the mitzva of the Paschal offering.

One might have thought that just as he may not become impure for his sister, so too he may not become impure for a met mitzva. Therefore, the verse states “

and for his sister,”

it is for his sister that he may not become impure, but he does become impure for a met mitzva,

even though the mitzva of the Paschal offering will thereby be nullified.

In any event, it is clear from this beraita that the obligation of the Paschal offering prohibits him from becoming impure. If so, this beraita presents a difficulty to the preceding beraita, which explained that the mitzva of the Paschal offering does not override the obligation to become impure for close relatives!?

Rather, is it not that it follows

that the obligation of the Paschal offering prohibits him from becoming impure, and that the reason for the first beraita is mourning? For when his close relative dies, he is an onen, and an onen does not send his Paschal offering. Therefore, he becomes impure for close relatives even on the eve of Passover, because his mourning has excluded him from the Paschal offering. Accordingly, the contradiction between the beraitot is resolved:

Here,

the first beraita, which obligates him to become impure for close relatives even on the eve of Passover, is referring to a case where his relative died

before midday,

when his mourning excludes him from performing the Paschal offering. Therefore, he becomes impure for close relatives even on the eve of Passover, because in any event he cannot perform the Paschal offering.

Here,

the second beraita, which prohibits him from becoming impure even for close relatives so that the mitzva of the Paschal offering will not be nullified, is referring to a case where his relative died

after midday,

when his mourning does not prevent him from performing the Paschal offering, since he became obligated in the Paschal offering before the mourning took hold of him. Therefore, he may not become impure for his relative, so that the mitzva of the Paschal offering will not be nullified.

Thus, the distinction explained above with regard to mourning—between before midday and after midday—is established by means of the contradiction between the beraitot.

the second beraita, which prohibits him from defiling himself even for close relatives so that the mitzva of the Paschal offering will not be nullified, is speaking of a case in which the relative died

after midday,

when his mourning does not prevent him from bringing the Paschal offering, since he became obligated in the Paschal offering before the mourning took hold of him. Therefore, he may not defile himself for his relative, so that the mitzva of the Paschal offering will not be nullified.

Thus, the contradiction between the beraitot establishes the distinction explained above with regard to mourning: between a death before midday and a death after midday.

And we challenge this:

From where

that this is the resolution of the contradiction between the beraitot concerning impurity contracted through relatives on Pesach, as you said, and that one should therefore learn from here that aninut prevents one from offering the Pesach offering when it took effect upon him before midday, but does not prevent him from offering the Pesach offering after midday,

Perhaps I will say to you that in both this and that case [the two beraitot]

the situation is that his deceased relative died

after midday,

and the contradiction between the beraitot is resolved as follows:

And this—

the second beraita, which prohibits him from contracting impurity through his relatives so that the mitzva of the Pesach offering will not be nullified—

is the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael,

who disagrees with what is stated in the first beraita, that there is an obligation to contract impurity through relatives; therefore, he does not contract impurity through them when doing so would nullify the mitzva of the Pesach offering.

And this—

the first beraita, which obligates him to contract impurity through relatives even though the mitzva of the Pesach offering will thereby be nullified—

is the opinion of Rabbi Akiva,

who holds that “he shall contract impurity for her” is a mitzva; and since it is a mitzva, he contracts impurity through relatives even though the mitzva of the Pesach offering will thereby be nullified,

and once again you cannot learn from the contradiction between the beraitot that there is a distinction with regard to aninut on Pesach between one who became an onen before midday and one who became an onen after midday!? And

as it was taught:

“He shall contract impurity for her” is

optional; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: It is obligatory.

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

to interpret the second beraita as the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael,

as

the

opening clause of that be

raita

is taught by Rabbi Akiva [that is, Rabbi Akiva is the one who stated the opening clause of the beraita].

for the opening clause of the beraita is stated by Rabbi Akiva].

As it was taught: Rabbi Akiva says:

“A person”—

these are the relatives.

“Who has died”—

these are the more distant relatives.

“For his father”—

he may not contract impurity for his father, but he may contract impurity for an unattended corpse.

“For his mother”—

if he were a kohen and a nazirite, it is for his mother that he may not contract impurity, but he may contract impurity for an unattended corpse.

“For his brother”—

if he were the High Priest and a nazirite, it is for his brother that he may not contract impurity, but he may contract impurity for an unattended corpse.

“And for his sister”—

why is this stated? If one went to slaughter his Pesach offering and circumcise his son, and he heard that a person had died for him, one might have thought that he should contract impurity. You say: He shall not contract impurity.

One might have thought that just as he may not contract impurity for his sister, so too he may not contract impurity for an unattended corpse. Therefore, the verse states

“and for his sister”:

it is for his sister that he may not contract impurity, but he may contract impurity for an unattended corpse.