Yoma 84b (פד:) — the Talmud in English

Come and hear:

With regard to placing a drug on Shabbat for one who suffers pain in his mouth, the Sages concede that it is permitted. From what

Rabba bar Shmuel taught:

A pregnant woman who smelled

food on Yom Kippur and became endangered—

she is fed until her soul is restored.

And one who was bitten by a mad dog—

he is fed from the lobe of its liver.

And one who suffers pain in his mouth—

a drug may be placed in his mouth on Shabbat.

These are the words of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, who said them in the name of Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash.

And the Sages say: In this case

alone do we concede to him that it is a remedy,

but not another

remedy

. “

In this case,”

that the Sages concede to him—

with regard to what

remedy?

If you say: With regard to the pregnant woman,

whom they feed on Yom Kippur—is it not

obvious

that the Sages concede this? For

a pregnant woman

who became endangered,

is there anyone who says that they do not

feed her? And did Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash say it, so that you would say that the Sages concede it to him?

Rather, is it not

with regard to the drug,

that they concede the remedy of the drug for one who suffers pain in his mouth on Shabbat, but not the feeding of him from the lobe of the liver, as they explicitly disagreed with him in the Mishna?

And we conclude: Indeed,

learn from it.

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna also proves

that the Sages concede with regard to the remedy for one who suffers pain in his mouth on Shabbat, from that which it teaches:

And Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash further said: One who suffers pain in his mouth, a drug may be placed in his mouth on Shabbat.

And the Rabbis did not disagree with him.

And if it is so that the Rabbis disagree with him—

let them combine

the two remedies

and teach them together, and let the Rabbis disagree in the final clause

with regard to both of them.

And we conclude:

learn from it.

The Mishna teaches: A drug may be placed in his mouth on Shabbat,

because it is a possible danger to life.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

Why do I need

our Mishna to repeat

again

and

say: And any possible danger to life overrides Shabbat!?

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

To teach us that

not

only when there is

a possibility

that he will die from the illness on

this Shabbat alone did they say

that it is permitted to desecrate this Shabbat for him.

Rather, even

if now there is

a possibility

that he may die on

another Shabbat,

and on this Shabbat it is certain that he will live, it is permitted to desecrate this Shabbat in order to save him from the possibility of death on another Shabbat.

What are the circumstances?

For example, they estimated

that for his recovery he must take it

for eight days,

over the course of eight days,

and the first day

on which he must take the medicine is

Shabbat.

Lest you say: Let him delay

taking the medicine

until evening,

at the conclusion of Shabbat,

so that we will not desecrate

Shabbat

for him on two Shabbatot,

but only one Shabbat.

It teaches us

that he must take it immediately, on the first Shabbat.

It was taught likewise in a beraita: They heat hot water for a sick person on Shabbat, whether to give it to him to drink

the hot water

or to restore his strength

by bathing him in hot water.

And not

only when he is in danger on

this Shabbat alone did they say

that it is permitted to heat water for him,

but

even if his danger will be

on another Shabbat,

it is permitted to desecrate this Shabbat for him.

And we do not say:

Since his danger on the coming Shabbat is not certain but only a possibility,

let us wait for him, perhaps he will recover.

Rather, we heat water for him immediately.

Because a possible danger to life overrides Shabbat.

And it is not only a possibility

of danger on

this Shabbat

that overrides it,

but even a possibility on another Shabbat.

And these things are not performed

—the acts of desecrating Shabbat for the sake of saving a sick person—

by means of gentiles or by means of Samaritans, but by means of the leading members of Israel.

And we do not say:

We do not rely on permitting them to

perform these things

of desecrating Shabbat for the sake of saving a life,

on the basis of

the understanding of

women or on the basis of

the understanding of

Samaritans.

But they may join

the women and the Samaritans

to another opinion.

For if two Israelites say that it is necessary to desecrate Shabbat for this sick person, while three Israelites say that it is not necessary to desecrate it for him, the opinion of the woman or the Samaritan joins the opinion of the two, and the matter becomes an even uncertainty, and they desecrate Shabbat for him.

The Sages taught: One who acts to remove

performs every act of rescue necessary for

the removal

the saving of

a life on Shabbat.

And one who acts swiftly

to save him on Shabbat:

a.

Behold, he is praiseworthy.

b.

And he need not obtain permission from the court

in order to desecrate Shabbat through the rescue operations.

What are the circumstances?

If he saw a baby who fell into the sea—

he spreads a net and brings him up.

And one who acts swiftly

to save him:

a.

Behold, he is praiseworthy.

b.

And he need not obtain permission from the court.

The Gemara infers from the redundancy that although the tanna had already written, “He is praiseworthy,” it was necessary for the tanna to add, “And he need not obtain permission from the court,” to teach us that he is permitted to spread a net to save the baby,

even though he is also catching fish

together with the baby.

And the beraita continues:

If he saw a baby who fell into a pit—

he removes a row of stones

on the edge of the pit, so that it will be easy to enter the pit and bring him up,

and brings him up.

And one who acts swiftly is praiseworthy, and he need not obtain permission from the court.

Here too, the Gemara infers from the redundancy: He is permitted to remove the row of stones for the sake of the rescue,

even though he is constructing a step,

thereby making a step into the pit [an act that is prohibited on Shabbat because of the labor of building].

And the beraita continues:

If he saw that a door had been locked in front of a baby—

he breaks it and takes him out.

And one who acts swiftly is praiseworthy, and he need not obtain permission from the court.

And the Gemara infers as before:

Even though he intends to break it into splinters

—to break wooden boards or wooden sticks from the door.

And the beraita continues:

They extinguish

the fire that endangers life,

and stop

its progress by placing vessels filled with water in its path

because of a fire on Shabbat.

And one who acts swiftly is praiseworthy, and he need not obtain permission from the court.

And the Gemara infers:

Even though he is lowering the embers,

as he lowers the coals in order to use them.

And it is necessary,

to teach us in all these distinctions of law that he need not come and obtain permission from the court:

For had it taught us

the rescue of a baby from the

sea,

that he need not go to the court and obtain permission, I would say that this is permitted specifically there,

because in the meantime

while he goes and requests permission,

he will be gone,

and the baby will be lost and drown in the sea.

But

when the baby fell into a

pit, where he is sitting,

as he sits there,

say: He may not

save him without obtaining permission.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach us the permission to save him without obtaining permission when he falls into a pit.

And had it taught us the case of a pit—

because he is terrified,

as the child is terrified from fear, and it is dangerous for him.

But in the case of a locked door—

one might have said that he may not break it without obtaining permission from the court, since

it is possible

that the desecration of Shabbat could be avoided, for example,

if he sat on this side,

if he sat on the other side of the door

and entertained him,

and rattled something for the baby

with walnuts,

with walnuts, thereby calming him until the conclusion of Shabbat.

Therefore,

it is necessary

for the beraita to teach us that because of the possible danger to the baby, he need not be concerned that it may be prohibited to break the door without permission from the court; rather, he should immediately hurry to break it, without concern.

The Gemara explains the words of the beraita: “

They extinguish and stop”—

why do I need

it to teach this?

Even if

the danger posed by the fire is not to the people of the courtyard in which the fire began, but there is concern for

the

people of

another courtyard,

it is permitted to extinguish it without obtaining permission.

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In matters of saving a life, they did not follow the majority.

Rather, even where there is a minority of Israelites and a majority of gentiles, and it is unknown whether the person requiring rescue is Jewish or a gentile, they desecrate Shabbat for him.

And the Gemara asks:

What are the circumstances

in which they do not follow the majority in matters of saving a life?

If you say

that a collapse fell upon one of ten people,

and there are nine Israelites and one gentile among them,

and they do not know upon whom the collapse fell—

they are a majority of Israelites!

Alternatively, if it is half and half,

five gentiles and five Israelites, Shmuel’s ruling is unnecessary, since this is an even uncertainty—and

in a possible danger to life, one rules leniently.

Rather, there are nine gentiles and one Israelite.

This too is obvious

that they are obligated to save him even without Shmuel’s ruling, because

it would be

that one person

“fixed”

in his place.

And

the principle is that in

any

matter that is

fixed,

where it did not separate from the majority but the uncertainty arose in the place where it was located, one does not follow the majority; rather,

it is considered like half and half!

And we answer:

It is necessary

here to speak of a case

where they all separated

from the group

to another courtyard,

and as they separated, a collapse fell upon one of them, so that the uncertainty arose not in the place where they were fixed but at the time of their separation.

Lest you say: Anyone who separates—

separates from the majority,

as in every uncertainty in which something separated from the majority, and according to this principle we would say that the one upon whom the collapse fell separated from the majority of gentiles.

It teaches us that in matters of saving a life they did not follow the majority,

and because of the uncertainty that he may be the Israelite minority, they desecrate Shabbat to save him.

And we challenge this:

Is that so?

Is it possible that when they separated to another courtyard and the collapse fell at the time of their separation into the other courtyard, they do not follow the majority and rescue him?

But Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of nine gentiles and one Israelite,

and a collapse fell upon one of them on Shabbat, only if they were all

in the same courtyard—

they remove

the collapse from upon him.

But if the collapse fell

in another courtyard,

and we do not know which of the people from the first courtyard was present in the other courtyard when the collapse fell—

they do not remove it,

since it has not been established for us that an Israelite was in the other courtyard.

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

This

—Shmuel’s ruling that they remove the collapse—speaks of a case

where they all separated

to another courtyard, so that the presence of an Israelite was established in the other courtyard. Shmuel teaches us that in matters of saving a life one does not follow the majority even in a case of separation, despite the possibility of saying that anything that separates separates from the majority.

This

—Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling that they do not remove the collapse if it fell in another courtyard—speaks of a case

where only

some

of them

separated from the ten into the other courtyard. Since the presence of an Israelite was not established there, and it is also possible to say that anything that separates separates from the majority, they do not remove the collapse.

And we raised a difficulty:

And did Shmuel say this,

that in matters of saving a life one does not follow the majority?

But we learned:

A city in which there are Israelites and gentiles, and

an abandoned baby was found in it.

If the majority

of those dwelling in that city are

gentiles—

the baby is

a gentile.

And if the majority are Israelites—

he is

an Israelite.

If there were

half

Israelites

and half

gentiles, he is a possible

Israelite.

And Rav said: They taught

in the Mishna that if the majority of the city’s inhabitants are Israelites, he is considered a definite Israelite,

but

only with regard to

sustaining him; but with regard to establishing his lineage,

and if he is a girl, whether she may be permitted to marry a kohen—

no,

they do not consider him an Israelite of established lineage, because they instituted an elevated standard with regard to lineage, until it is possible to rely on two “majorities.”