Yoma 84b — the Talmud in English

Come and hear:

with regard to applying a substance on Shabbat for one who suffers in his mouth, the Sages concede. From this:

as Rabba bar Shmuel taught:

A pregnant woman who smelled

food on Yom Kippur, and became endangered—

they feed her until her soul returns.

And one whom a mad dog bit—

they feed him from its liver.

And one who suffers in his mouth—

they apply a substance for him on Shabbat.

The words of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, who said them in the name of Rabbi Matya ben חרש.

And the Sages say: In this

alone do we concede to him that it is a remedy,

but not in

another

remedy.

“In this”

to which the Sages concede to him—

with regard to what

remedy?

If you say, with regard to the pregnant woman,

whom they feed on Yom Kippur—is it not

obvious

that the Sages concede in this matter? For

a pregnant woman

who became endangered,

is there anyone who says that they do not

feed her? And did Rabbi Matya ben חרש say it, so that you should say that the Sages concede to him concerning it?

Rather, is it not—

with regard to the substance,

concerning the remedy of the substance for one who suffers in his mouth on Shabbat, that they concede. But not concerning feeding him from the liver, for they explicitly disputed him in the Mishna.

And we conclude: Indeed,

infer from it.

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna also indicates

that the Sages concede concerning the remedy of one who suffers in his mouth on Shabbat, from what it teaches in it:

And Rabbi Matya ben חרש further said: One who suffers in his mouth, they apply a substance for him on Shabbat.

And the Rabbis did not dispute him.

And if it were so that the Rabbis disputed him—

let us combine

the two remedies

and teach them together, and let the Rabbis dispute in the latter clause

concerning both of them.

And we conclude:

infer from it.

It was taught in the Mishna: They apply a substance for him on Shabbat

because it is a possible danger to life.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

Why

does our Mishna need to repeat

again

and

say: And every possible danger to life overrides Shabbat!

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

To teach us that

not

only when there is

a possibility

that he will die from the illness on

this Shabbat alone did they say

that it is permitted to violate this Shabbat for him.

Rather, even

if now the

possibility

is that perhaps he will die on

another Shabbat,

while on this Shabbat it is certain that he will live, it is permitted to violate this Shabbat in order to save him from the possibility of death on another Shabbat.

What are the circumstances?

For example, they estimated

for his cure that he should take it

for eight days,

for a period of eight days,

and the first day

for taking the remedy is

Shabbat.

Lest you say: Let him delay

taking the remedy

until evening,

at the conclusion of Shabbat,

so that we should not violate

violate

two Shabbatot for him,

but only one Shabbat.

It teaches us

that he must take it immediately, on the first Shabbat.

It was taught likewise: They heat hot water for a sick person on Shabbat, whether to give it to him to drink

the hot water

or to restore him

to strengthen him through bathing in hot water.

And not

only when he is in danger on

this Shabbat alone did they say

that it is permitted to heat it for him,

but

even if his danger will be

on another Shabbat,

it is permitted to violate this Shabbat for him.

And we do not say:

Since his danger on the coming Shabbat is not certain but only a possibility,

let us wait for him, perhaps he will recover.

Rather, they heat it for him immediately.

Because a possible danger to life overrides Shabbat.

And it is not only a possibility

of danger on

this Shabbat

that it overrides,

but even a possibility on another Shabbat.

And these acts are not performed,

of violating Shabbat for the purpose of saving a sick person,

neither by gentiles nor by Samaritans, but by the eminent among Israel.

And we do not say,

that one may rely upon permission for them to

perform these acts

of violating Shabbat for the purpose of saving lives,

not according to

the understanding of

women and not according to

the understanding of

Samaritans.

But they combine

the women and the Samaritans

with another opinion.

For if two Israelites say that it is necessary to violate Shabbat for this sick person, and three Israelites say that there is no need to violate it for him, the opinion of the woman or the Samaritan joins the two, and the matter becomes an evenly balanced doubt, and they violate Shabbat for him.

The Sages taught: They engage in rescue

they perform every act of rescue necessary for

rescue

of

a life on Shabbat.

And the one who is zealous

to save on Shabbat:

a.

Behold, this one is praiseworthy.

b.

And he does not need to obtain permission from the court

in order to violate Shabbat through the acts of rescue.

How so?

If he saw a baby who fell into the sea—

he spreads a net and brings him up.

And the one who is zealous

to save him:

a.

Behold, this one is praiseworthy.

b.

And he does not need to obtain permission from the court.

And the Gemara infers from the superfluity of the matter that although the tan-nay had already written “Behold, this one is praiseworthy,” the tan-nay needed to add “and he does not need to obtain permission from the court,” to teach us that it is permitted for him to spread a net to save the baby,

even though he is also catching fish

together with the baby.

And the beraita continues:

If he saw a baby who fell into a pit—

he removes a row of stones

from the edge of the pit so that it will be convenient to enter the pit and bring him up,

and brings him up.

And the one who is zealous is praiseworthy, and he does not need to obtain permission from the court.

And here too the Gemara infers from the superfluity of the matter: it is permitted for him to remove the row of stones for the purpose of the rescue,

even though he is making a step

thereby making a step into the pit [an act that is forbidden to perform on Shabbat because of the labor of building].

And the beraita continues:

If he saw that a door was locked in front of a baby—

he breaks it and takes him out.

And the one who is zealous is praiseworthy, and he does not need to obtain permission from the court.

And the Gemara infers as before:

and even though he intends to break it into splinters.

To break wooden boards or wooden sticks from the door.

And the beraita continues:

They extinguish

the fire that endangers life,

and interrupt

its progress by placing vessels with water in its path

because of the fire on Shabbat.

And the one who is zealous is praiseworthy, and he does not need to obtain permission from the court.

And the Gemara infers:

and even though he is lowering the embers,

lowering the coals for his use of them.

And it is necessary,

to teach us in all these distinctions of law that he does not need to come and obtain permission from the court:

For if it had taught us

the rescue of a baby from the

sea,

that he does not need to go to the court and obtain permission, I would say that only there is the matter permitted,

because meanwhile,

in the interim, until he goes and requests permission,

he is lost,

the baby will become lost and drown in the sea.

But

when the baby fell into the

pit, and is sitting

in it,

say: no,

let him not save him without obtaining permission.

Therefore

it is necessary

to teach us the permission to save without obtaining permission in the case of one who fell into a pit.

And if it had taught us the pit—

because he is frightened,

for the child is terrified from fear, and it is a danger for him.

But a locked door—

it might have been said that he should not break it without obtaining permission from the court, since

it is possible

that one can avoid violating Shabbat, for example

that he is sitting on this side

sitting on the other side of the door

and making noise for him

and rattling it for the baby

with nuts,

with nuts, and calming him thereby until the conclusion of Shabbat.

Therefore

it is necessary

for the beraita to teach us that because of the possible danger to the baby, he need not fear that perhaps it is forbidden to break the door without permission from the court; rather, he should hurry immediately to break it, without concern.

And the Gemara explains the words of the beraita:

“They extinguish and interrupt”—

why

does it need to teach us this?

That even

if the danger from the fire is not to the people of this courtyard in which the fire started, but there is concern for

the

people of

another courtyard,

it is permitted to extinguish it without obtaining permission.

Rav Yosef said in the name of Rav Yehuda, who said in the name of Shmuel: In rescue of life, they did not follow the majority.

Rather, even in a place where there is a minority of Israelites and a majority of gentiles, and it is not known whether the person who needs to be saved is Jewish or a gentile, they violate Shabbat for him.

And the Gemara asks:

What are the circumstances

in which they do not follow the majority in rescue of life?

If you say

that a collapse fell on one of ten people, and

there are nine Israelites and one gentile among them,

and they do not know upon whom the collapse fell—

they are mostly Israelites!

Alternatively, if it is half and half,

five gentiles and five Israelites, there is no need for Shmuel’s ruling, since this is an evenly balanced doubt—

and in a possible danger to life, one is lenient.

Rather, there are nine gentiles and one Israelite.

This too is obvious

that they are obligated to save him, even without Shmuel’s ruling, because

it is

that one

“fixed”

in its place.

And

the rule is that in

every

matter that is

fixed,

which was not separated from the majority, but the doubt arose concerning it in the place where it was found, one does not follow the majority, but

it is considered like half and half!

And we answer:

It is necessary

here, it is speaking

where they all separated

from their place

to another courtyard,

and at the time of their separation a collapse fell upon one of them, and the doubt arose not in the place of their fixed location but at the time of their separation.

Lest you say: Every one who separates—

separates from the majority,

as in every doubt in which there was separation from the majority, and according to this rule we would say that the one upon whom the collapse fell separated from the majority of gentiles.

It teaches us that, in rescue of life, they did not follow the majority,

and because of the doubt that perhaps he is the Israelite minority, they violate Shabbat for him to save him.

And we challenge this:

Is that so!

Is it possible that when they separated to another courtyard and the collapse fell at the time of their separation to the other courtyard, they do not follow the majority and save him?

But did Rabbi Asi not say in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Nine gentiles and one Israelite,

and a collapse fell upon one of them on Shabbat, only if they were all

in the same courtyard—

they engage in rescue,

removing the collapse from upon him.

But if the collapse fell

in another courtyard,

and we do not know which of the people of the first courtyard was present at the time the collapse fell in the other courtyard—

they do not engage in rescue,

since it has not been established for us that there was an Israelite in the other courtyard.

And we answer:

This is not difficult.

This—

Shmuel’s ruling, that they engage in rescue, is speaking

where they all separated

to another courtyard, so that an Israelite was also established in the other courtyard. And Shmuel teaches us that in rescue of life one does not follow the majority even in a case of separation, despite the possibility of saying that every separated object separated from the majority.

This—

Rabbi Yohanan’s ruling, that they do not engage in rescue if the collapse fell in another courtyard, is speaking

where

only

some of them

of the ten separated to the other courtyard; and since an Israelite was not established there, and it is also possible to say that every separated object separated from the majority, they do not engage in rescue.

And we raised a difficulty:

And did Shmuel say this,

that in rescue of life one does not follow the majority?

But we learned:

A city in which there are Israelites and gentiles, and

a baby cast there is found.

If the majority

of the residents of that city are

gentiles—

then the baby is

a gentile.

And if the majority are Israelites—

then he is

an Israelite.

If there were in it

half

Israelites

and half

gentiles—then he is a doubtful

Israelite.

And Rav said: They taught this only

in the Mishna, that if the majority in it are Israelites, he is considered as certainly an Israelite,

but

with regard

to sustaining him; but with regard to assigning him lineage,

and if he is a daughter, she should be permitted to marry a koen—

no,

we do not consider him a genealogically established Israelite, for they imposed a higher standard concerning lineage, until it is possible to rely upon two “majorities.”