Yoma 42b — the Talmud in English

For

“for a safeguard concerning the waters of sprinkling” is written

with regard to the water into which the ashes of the cow were placed [there, verse 9]. And “safeguard” means preservation, indicating that they require preservation until he sprinkles from them.

Rather

one must say that the verses concerning the slaughter and the burning came

to exclude the casting of cedar wood, hyssop, and crimson wool

into the burning of the cow.

For

these acts

are not the body of the cow

, for they are not acts performed on the cow itself. Therefore, distraction of attention does not invalidate them.

Now the Gemara brings additional amoraim who disputed concerning the slaughter of the red cow by a non-koen:

It was stated: The slaughter of the cow

red

by a non-koen:

Rabbi Ami said: It is valid

like Shmuel],

and Rabbi Yitzchak Nappa said: It is invalid [like Rav],

in accordance with Rav ], and

and Ulla said: It is valid.

And some say

—others say that Ulla said

it is invalid.

Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba raised an objection

against those who hold that the slaughter of the cow by a non-koen is valid,

to support Rav

in order to prove the position of Rav [that the slaughter of the cow by a non-koen is invalid]:

The sprinkling of the waters of the red cow is valid only when the one who sprinkles was a man, but the sprinkling by a woman is invalid. For it is stated [Numbers 19:18]: “And he shall take hyssop and dip it in the water, a pure man, and sprinkle.” And the Sages expounded: “A man,” and not a woman.

And the sprinkling is valid only during the day, but not at night, as it is stated [Numbers 19]: “He shall cleanse himself with it on the third day.”

And it was taught in a beraita:

I have only [learned this concerning] the sprinkling of its waters

of the red cow

that they are not valid through a woman as through a man,

that they are valid specifically through a man,

and are valid only during the day

and not at night.

From where [is it derived] to include

the

slaughter

of the cow,

the receiving of its blood

in a vessel,

the sprinkling of its blood

before its burning, seven times toward the front of the Tent of Meeting,

its burning, and the casting of cedar wood, hyssop, and crimson wool

into the burning?

From where [is it derived] that all these acts have the same law as the sprinkling of its waters, and are valid only during the day?

The verse states

for this reason it is stated concerning the red cow:

“Instruction” [“This is the statute of the instruction”; there, verse 2]. This teaches us that there is one instruction [one law] for all its acts. And just as the sprinkling of its waters is invalid at night, so the other acts are invalid at night.

“This is the statute of the Torah,” there, verse 2 ]. This teaches that there is one Torah [one law] for all its procedures. Just as the sprinkling of its water is invalid at night, so too the other procedures are invalid at night.

One might say that I include

from the word “instruction”

even

additional acts that were stated concerning the red cow, such as

gathering its ashes and filling [the vessel] with water

from the vessel,

and sanctification

placing the ashes in the water, so that they too are invalid at night!?

The verse states,

for this reason it is stated concerning the red cow

“This

is the statute of the instruction”—that the verse in this passage must be upheld as it is, and laws not stated in it must not be added. This excludes the gathering of the ashes, the filling of the water, and the sanctification, which are not invalid at night.

And what did you see to include

from the word “instruction”

these [its slaughter, the receiving of its blood, the sprinkling of its blood, its burning, and the casting of cedar wood, hyssop, and crimson wool]

which are invalid at night,

and to exclude

by limiting from the word “this”

these,

the gathering of its ashes, the filling of the water, and the sanctification? And why should we not say the opposite?

After the verse included “

instruction,”

and excluded “

this,” without explaining what it came to include and what it came to exclude, we must reason about the matter on our own.

You have said: We indeed learn

all the acts

in their entirety

to be invalid at night

from the sprinkling of its waters

of the red cow, concerning which it is explicitly stated that it is invalid at night.

And we must see which acts are more similar to sprinkling, and include them through “instruction”; and which acts are not as similar to sprinkling, and exclude them through “this.”

Just as

the

sprinkling of its waters

of the red cow

is not valid through a woman as through a man, and is valid only during the day.

I will likewise bring in its slaughter, the receiving of its blood, the sprinkling of its blood, its burning, and the casting of cedar wood, hyssop, and crimson wool,

which

since they are not

valid

valid through a woman as through a man,

they are similar in this respect to the sprinkling of its waters, and therefore they too

are valid only during the day.

And I exclude

the

gathering of its ashes, the filling of the water, and the sanctification.

For all these,

since they are valid through a woman as through a man,

they are not similar to the sprinkling of the waters of the cow in this matter. Therefore, we exclude them, so that they are

valid also during the day and at night.

Thus far are the words of the beraita brought by Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba in order to refute Shmuel’s words, for he holds that the slaughter of the cow is valid by a non-koen. And now the Gemara clarifies from where it follows that the beraita contradicts Shmuel’s words:

And we examined it:

And this—what refutation is it

—what is the contradiction to Shmuel’s words from this beraita?

If you say,

that Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba’s proof is

from

the fact

that the acts

of slaughter, receiving its blood, and the like are

invalid through a woman,

and from here there is proof that they are

also invalid through a non-koen [because wherever a non-koen is valid, a woman is also valid; and here, since a woman is invalid, necessarily a non-koen is also invalid].

because wherever a non-kohen is valid, a woman is also valid; here, since a woman is invalid, it necessarily follows that a non-kohen is invalid as well ],

This is not a proof.

For

the sprinkling of its waters proves that they are invalid through a woman, and

nevertheless

valid through a non-koen.

And the same law applies to its slaughter: although it is invalid through a woman, it is valid through a non-koen!

Abaye said: This is its refutation,

this is how Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba intended to raise an objection from the beraita against Shmuel’s words:

For it is explained in the beraita that we know that the slaughter of the cow, the receiving of its blood, and the like are invalid through a woman [from the verses explicitly stated concerning them, and there is no need to learn this from the sprinkling of its waters] . And indeed,

what is the reason for a woman,

from where did we know that a woman is invalid for slaughter? It is because it is stated concerning the slaughter of the cow: “And you shall give it to Eleazar the koen, and he shall slaughter it before him.” And we learn that specifically

“Eleazar”

is fit to slaughter,

but not a woman.

And from here there is proof for Rav, who interpreted the verse “and he shall slaughter it before him” to mean that Eleazar himself is the slaughterer.

For according to Shmuel, who says that a non-koen slaughtered while Eleazar watched, the Torah did not state that the slaughterer is Eleazar. And we have no basis for excluding a woman from the slaughter of the cow.

And since the verse “and he shall slaughter it” speaks of Eleazar, according to Rav, and the beraita learned from here: “Eleazar, but not a woman,” the same applies with regard to

a non-koen also

we should expound: specifically

Eleazar, but not a non-koen!

In accordance with Rav, and not in accordance with Shmuel’s words.

And incidentally, since the Gemara discusses who is fit for the slaughter of the red cow, it brings a statement of Ulla concerning all the acts performed with the red cow: who is fit to perform them:

Ulla said:

When we examine

all

the passage of

the cow,

the red cow, we find that this passage

in its entirety “indicates

and immediately removes from the indication.”

That is, one may not interpret all its matters in the same manner, according to the order of the acts mentioned in it.

Rather, some of the verses must be interpreted in such a manner that the meaning of the verse concerning one act comes to alter the meaning of the verse concerning the preceding act.

That is, the verse comes to alter the law of this act from the law governing the act that preceded it.

And

some of the verses must be interpreted in such a manner that they

“indicate

automatically.”

The meaning of the verse speaking of one act is identical to what was stated in the preceding verse [concerning the act that preceded it].

That is, this matter can be known automatically, even without the verse explicitly explaining it.

And Ulla arranges the teachings that are to be derived in the order of the acts of the red cow. From the order of his teachings, one can learn which verse excludes from the rule of its fellow, and which matter is “indicated automatically.”

A. It is stated in the passage of the red cow [Numbers 19:2]: “And they shall take for you a red cow

and you shall give it to Eleazar the koen.”

The word “it” is superfluous. The Sages expounded from it: specifically

“it,”

the first red cow that the Children of Israel made in the wilderness, you shall give

to Eleazar,

who was the deputy of the High Koen, so that he would perform its acts,

but not for later generations.

For the cows that later generations will make, you shall not give

to Eleazar [that is, the deputy], but to another koen.

And the tannaim disputed

who that other koen is to whom a red cow is given for later generations:

Some say—

for later generations specifically

through the High Koen,

and not through his deputy.

And some say—

for later generations even

through an ordinary koen,

and a deputy is not required.

And we explain the reason for the two opinions:

Granted, according to the one who says “for later generations—

through an ordinary koen,”

his reason is

sound.

For since the Torah said concerning the first cow that they made in the wilderness, “And you shall give it to Eleazar,” automatically, for the other generations, since it was not explicitly stated in the Torah that it is given to the High Koen or to his deputy, all koanim are fit for it.

But according to the one who says “for later generations

specifically

through the High Koen,” -

from where does he derive this!?

From where does he say that the Torah did not qualify the other koanim for later generations?

And we answer: the tanna who holds that for later generations it is specifically through the High Koen

derived

—he learned from his teachers that a gzera shava is to be expounded:

“statute

—statute” from Yom Kippur.

The law of the procedures of the red cow is derived from the law of the Yom Kippur service because “statute” is stated with regard to both.]

For the law of the acts of the red cow is learned from the law of the service of Yom Kippur, because “statute” is stated concerning both. And just as the acts of Yom Kippur are performed specifically by the High Koen, so too the acts of the red cow are performed specifically by the High Koen.

B. Ulla continues to expound the verse in the order of the service of Yom Kippur:

“And he shall bring it

outside the camp.”

Here too, the word “it” is superfluous: to say that he should bring only it,

so that he should not bring

a cow

of another kind with it.

As we learned

as we learned in tractate Parah [3:7]:

If

the

red

cow

the red

did not wish to leave

the camp,

they do not bring out with it

a

black

cow [so that the red cow would leave together with it ], in order

that those who see

the cow

would not say: They slaughtered a black one.

And

likewise

they do not bring out with it an additional red cow,

in order

that those who see

will not say

two [

two cows]

were slaughtered.

Rabbi says: This is not the reason,

the reason given by the first tanna is not correct.

Rather,

the fact that it is forbidden by Torah law to bring out another cow with it is

because it is stated, “And he shall bring

“And he shall take out

it,”

which indicates that he should bring only it

alone.

And we raise a difficulty:

But the first tanna—

is “it” not written!?

It indicates “it alone”; why, then, did the first tanna need to prohibit this on account of a rabbinic decree?

And we answer:

Who is the first tanna,

who is the first tanna in the Mishna?

It is Rabbi Shimon, who expounds the reason of the verse,

for he expounds the reasons of matters that we learned explicitly in the Torah. And he too agrees that this prohibition is from the Torah.

What is the difference between them -

what is the practical halakhic difference between them?