Yoma 42b (מב:) — the Talmud in English

For

“for a safeguard concerning the water of sprinkling” is written

with regard to the water into which the ashes of the cow were placed [Numbers 19:9]. And “safeguard” means preservation, indicating that they require preservation until he sprinkles from them.

Rather

it must be said that the verses concerning slaughter and burning came

to exclude the casting of cedar wood, hyssop, and crimson wool

into the burning of the cow.

For

these labors

are not the body of the cow itself

, since they are not labors performed on the cow itself. Therefore, distraction does not invalidate them.

The Gemara now cites additional amoraim who disputed the matter of the slaughter of the red cow by a non-kohen:

It was stated: The slaughter of the cow

red

by a non-kohen:

Rabbi Ami said: It is valid

in accordance with Shmuel],

and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said: It is invalid [in accordance with Rav], and

in accordance with Rav ], and

Ulla said: It is valid.

And some say

and others say] that Ulla said it is

invalid.

Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba raised an objection

against those who hold that the slaughter of the cow by a non-kohen is valid,

to support Rav

in order to prove Rav’s view [that the slaughter of the cow by a non-kohen is invalid]:

The sprinkling of the water of the red cow is valid only when the one performing the sprinkling was a man, but a woman’s sprinkling is invalid. As it is stated [Numbers 19:18]: “And a pure man shall take hyssop and dip it in the water, and sprinkle.” And the Sages interpreted: “A man”—but not a woman.

And the sprinkling is valid only by day, but not at night, as it is stated [Numbers 19]: “He shall purify himself with it on the third day.”

And it was taught in a beraita:

I have derived only the sprinkling of its water

of the red cow

which is not valid when performed by a woman as it is when performed by a man,

that it is valid specifically when performed by a man,

and which is valid only by day

and not at night.

From where is it derived to include

the

slaughter

of the cow,

the receiving of its blood

in a vessel,

the sprinkling of its blood

before its burning, seven times toward the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,

its burning, and the casting of cedar wood, hyssop, and crimson wool

into the burning?

From where is it derived that all these procedures have the same status as the sprinkling of its water, and are valid only by day?

The verse states

, for this reason it is stated concerning the red cow:

“Torah” [“This is the statute of the Torah,” ibid., verse 2]. This teaches us that there is one Torah [one law] for all its procedures. And just as the sprinkling of its water is invalid at night, so too the other procedures are invalid at night.

“This is the statute of the Torah,” there, verse 2 ]. This teaches that there is one Torah [one law] for all its procedures. Just as the sprinkling of its water is invalid at night, so too the other procedures are invalid at night.

One might

derive from the word “Torah”

even

additional procedures mentioned with regard to the red cow, such as:

gathering its ashes and filling the water

from the vessel,

and sanctification

placing the ashes into the water, so that they too are invalid at night!?

The verse states,

for this reason it is stated concerning the red cow:

“This

is the statute of the Torah”—the written law in this passage must be fulfilled as it is, without adding laws that were not stated in it. This excludes the gathering of the ashes, the filling of the water, and the sanctification, which are not invalid at night.

And what did you see that led you to include

from the word “Torah”

these [the slaughter, receiving of its blood, sprinkling of its blood, burning, and casting of cedar wood, hyssop, and crimson wool],

which are invalid at night,

and to exclude

and exclude from the word “this”

these,

the gathering of its ashes, filling the water, and sanctification? And why should we not say the opposite?

After the verse included “

Torah,”

and excluded “

this,” without explaining what it came to include and what it came to exclude, we must determine the matter on our own.

You say: We derive

that all

the procedures

are invalid at night

from the sprinkling of its water

of the red cow, concerning which it is explicitly stated that it is invalid at night.

And we must determine which procedures most closely resemble sprinkling, and include them through the word “Torah”; and which procedures do not resemble sprinkling as closely, and exclude them through the word “this.”

Just as,

like

the sprinkling of its water

of the red cow, which

is not valid when performed by a woman as it is when performed by a man, and is valid only by day.

I will likewise include the slaughter, the receiving of its blood, the sprinkling of its blood, its burning, and the casting of cedar wood, hyssop, and crimson wool,

which,

since they are not

valid

valid when performed by a woman as they are when performed by a man,

they resemble the sprinkling of its water in this respect, and therefore they too

are valid only by day.

And I exclude

the

gathering of its ashes, the filling of the water, and the sanctification.

All of these,

since they are valid when performed by a woman as they are when performed by a man,

do not resemble the sprinkling of the cow’s water in this regard. Therefore, we exclude them, so that they are

valid both by day and by night.

This concludes the words of the beraita cited by Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba in order to refute Shmuel, who holds that the slaughter of the cow is valid when performed by a non-kohen. The Gemara now clarifies how it is established that the beraita contradicts Shmuel:

And we considered the matter:

And this—what refutation is it

what contradiction of Shmuel’s words is presented by this beraita?

If you say,

if Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba’s proof is

from

the fact

that the procedures

of slaughter, receiving its blood, and the like

are invalid when performed by a woman,

and from this there is proof that they are

also invalid when performed by a non-kohen

because wherever a non-kohen is valid, a woman is also valid; here, since a woman is invalid, it necessarily follows that a non-kohen is also invalid].

This is no proof.

For

the sprinkling of its water proves that procedures can be invalid when performed by a woman and

nevertheless

valid when performed by a non-kohen.

And the same should apply to its slaughter: although it is invalid when performed by a woman, it is valid when performed by a non-kohen!

Abaye said: This is its refutation,

this is how Rabbi Yehoshua bar Abba intended to challenge Shmuel’s words from the beraita:

The beraita clearly indicates that we know that the slaughter of the cow, the receiving of its blood, and the like are invalid when performed by a woman [from the verses explicitly stated concerning them, and there is no need to derive this from the sprinkling of its water] . Indeed,

what is the reason that a woman

is invalid? From where do we know that a woman is invalid for the slaughter? It is because it is stated concerning the slaughter of the cow: “And you shall give it to Eleazar the kohen, and he shall slaughter it before him.” And we derive that specifically

“Eleazar”

is fit to slaughter,

but not a woman.

And this is proof for Rav, who interpreted the verse “and he shall slaughter it before him” to mean that Eleazar himself is the slaughterer.

For according to Shmuel, who says that a non-kohen slaughtered it and Eleazar watched, the Torah did not state that the slaughterer was Eleazar. And we have no basis for excluding a woman from the slaughter of the cow.

And since the verse “and he shall slaughter it” refers to Eleazar, in accordance with Rav’s view, and the beraita derived from here: “Eleazar, but not a woman,” the same applies with regard to

a non-kohen as well

—we shall derive: specifically

Eleazar, but not a non-kohen!

In accordance with Rav’s view and contrary to Shmuel’s words.

And in the course of discussing who is qualified to slaughter the red cow, the Gemara cites a statement of Ulla concerning all the procedures performed with the red cow—who is qualified to perform them:

Ulla said:

When we examine

the entire

passage of

the

red cow, we find that this passage

in its entirety, “implies

and immediately excludes.”

That is, its entire subject matter cannot be interpreted uniformly, according to the order of the procedures mentioned in it.

Rather, some of the verses must be interpreted in a manner whereby the meaning of the verse concerning one procedure comes to alter the meaning of the verse concerning the preceding procedure.

That is, the verse comes to change the law of this procedure from the law governing the procedure that preceded it.

And

some of the verses must be interpreted in a manner whereby they

“imply

automatically.”

The meaning of the verse concerning one procedure is identical to what was stated in the preceding verse [concerning the preceding procedure].

That is, this matter can be known automatically, even without the verse stating it explicitly.

And Ulla arranges the derivations according to the order of the procedures of the red cow. From the order of his derivations, it can be determined which verse excludes one procedure from the category of another, and which one “implies automatically.”

1. It is stated in the passage of the red cow [Numbers 19:2]: “And they shall take for you a red cow.”

“And you shall give it to Eleazar the kohen.”

The word “it” is superfluous. The Sages derived from it: specifically

“it,”

the first red cow made by the Children of Israel in the wilderness, shall you give

to Eleazar,

who was the deputy of the High Priest, so that he would perform its procedures.

But not for future generations.

The cows made by later generations shall not be given

to Eleazar [that is,

the deputy], but to another kohen.

The tannaim disputed who this other kohen is to whom a red cow is given for future generations:

Some say—for future generations, specifically

by

the High Priest,

and not by his deputy.

And some say—for future generations, even

by

an ordinary kohen,

and a deputy is not required.

We explain the rationale of the two opinions:

Granted, according to the one who says, “For future generations—

by an ordinary kohen,”

his reasoning is

sound.

Since the Torah said concerning the first cow made in the wilderness, “And you shall give it to Eleazar,” it follows automatically that in subsequent generations, since the Torah did not explicitly state that it is to be given to the High Priest or his deputy, all kohanim are qualified for it.

But according to the one who says, “For future generations

specifically

by the High Priest,”

from where does he derive this!?

What is his basis for saying that the Torah did not qualify the other kohanim for future generations?

And we answer: The tanna who holds that for future generations it is specifically performed by the High Priest

derived

this from his teachers, who taught that a gezerah shavah should be expounded:

“statute”

“statute” from Yom Kippur.

[For the law of the procedures of the red cow is derived from the law of the Yom Kippur service, because “statute” is stated with regard to both.]

And just as the procedures of Yom Kippur are performed specifically by the High Priest, so too the procedures of the red cow are performed specifically by the High Priest.

2. Ulla continues to expound the verse according to the order of the Yom Kippur service:

“And he shall take it

outside the camp.”

Here too, the word “it” is superfluous, teaching that he should take out only that cow,

and should not take out

a

different cow with it.

As we learned

in tractate Parah [3:7]:

If

the

red

cow

the red

did not want to leave

the camp,

they may not take out with it

a

black cow

with the intention that the red cow would leave together with it ], in order

that those who see

the

black cow would not say: They slaughtered it.

And

likewise,

they may not take out with it an additional red cow,

in order

that those who see

them would not say that there are

two

two cows] that were

slaughtered.

Rabbi says: This is not the reason for the matter,

the rationale given by the first tanna is not correct.

Rather,

the reason that it is prohibited by Torah law to take out another cow with it is

because it is stated, “And he shall take out

“it,”

it,”

which implies that he should take out only it

alone.

And we challenge this:

But according to the first tanna—

is “it” not written!?

It implies “it alone,” so why did the first tanna need to prohibit this as a rabbinic decree?

And we answer:

Who is the first tanna

in the Mishna?

It is Rabbi Shimon, who expounds the rationale of the verse,

as he expounds the reasons for matters that we learned explicitly in the Torah. He too agrees that this prohibition is by Torah law.

What is the practical halakhic difference between them -

what is the difference in halakha in practice between them?