Yevamot 9a (ט.) — the Talmud in English

And likewise

the judges of the Sanhedrin are not obligated

to bring a bull for an olah offering and a goat for a sin-offering for their erroneous ruling

in the matter of idolatry.

For example, if they erroneously ruled that a particular form of idolatrous worship, which is not prohibited, is permitted.

Rather, for

a ruling concerning

a matter for which one is liable to karet for intentional transgression, and

for

a sin-offering for its unwitting transgression.

For example, if the Great Sanhedrin ruled that one of the four forms of idolatrous worship for which one is liable to karet is not prohibited.

However, if they erroneously ruled that there is no prohibition against an act whose violation is punishable by a prohibition, but not by karet—for example, if they ruled that there is no prohibition against kissing or embracing an idol—they are not obligated to bring the offering for an erroneous ruling.

And we learn this through the gezerah shavah of “upon it” and “upon it” from the prohibition against a wife’s sister, as will be explained below.

And we also learned

in another Mishna in tractate Horayot:

For every mitzva in the Torah for which one is liable to karet for intentional transgression and to a sin-offering for unwitting transgression

[except for idolatry], the following applies:

If the sinner is an

individual,

who sinned unwittingly and acted because of his own error, rather than because of a ruling of the court, he

brings a female sheep or female goat

as a sin-offering.

And if the sinner is a

nasi,

he brings a special offering unlike any other found among the offerings of an individual: he

brings a male goat

as a sin-offering [whereas all other sinners bring a female animal as a sin-offering].

And if the anointed priest and the court ruled erroneously and sinned,

the anointed priest and the court

bring a bull.

When do these matters apply? With regard to the other mitzvot.

But

if

with regard to

the unwitting transgression of

idolatry:

an individual, a nasi, and

the

anointed priest

bring a female goat

as a sin-offering.

And the

community brings a bull and a goat: a

bull for an olah offering and a goat for a sin-offering.

And we raised a question concerning this:

From where are these matters derived,

that the Torah requires a sin-offering for an unwitting transgression only when the unwitting transgression involved a matter for which one is liable to karet for intentional transgression?

As the Sages taught:

It is stated in Leviticus [chapter 4], in the passage concerning the sin-offering for an unwitting transgression resulting from an erroneous ruling of the court concerning the other mitzvot [and not idolatry]:

“And the sin becomes known, that they sinned concerning it.”

Rabbi says: It is stated here,

in the passage concerning the sin-offering of the Sanhedrin,

“concerning it.”

And it is stated there,

in the passage concerning forbidden sexual relations: “And a woman to her sister you shall not take, to make her a rival, to uncover her nakedness

upon it

during her lifetime.”

And the word “upon it” is superfluous, available for a gezerah shavah:

Just as there,

in the passage concerning forbidden sexual relations, the sin involves

a matter for which one is liable to karet for intentional transgression and to a sin-offering for unwitting transgression,

so too here,

in the passage concerning the sin-offering, the court is obligated to bring a bull as a sin-offering only when its erroneous ruling involved

a matter for which one is liable to karet for intentional transgression and to a sin-offering for unwitting transgression.

Two passages concerning a sin-offering are stated in the Torah.

The first is in Leviticus, concerning the sin-offering that one who acts unwittingly is obligated to bring for “all the mitzvot” whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

The second is in Numbers, concerning the sin-offering that one who unwittingly sins in the matter of idolatry is obligated to bring.

We have found this with regard to the community

[This offering is called by reference to the community because the court is obligated to bring it only when the majority of the community stumbles in the matter and sins unwittingly as a result of its ruling]: We find that they are obligated to bring the bull for an erroneous communal ruling only when the unwitting transgression involved a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

The bull that the

anointed

priest brings—

from where do we know that the anointed High Priest is obligated to bring it only when he erred in a ruling issued for himself and unwittingly committed a transgression whose intentional violation is punishable by karet?

As it is written concerning

the

anointed

[Leviticus 4]: “If the priest sins

to the guilt of the people”—

behold,

the verse equated the law of the sin-offering of the

anointed

priest, so that his law would be

like

the sin-offering of the

community,

which is brought only for an unwitting transgression involving a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

The sin-offering of an

individual and

the goat of a

nasi—

from where do we know that they are brought only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet?

It is derived

through a gezerah shavah of

“mitzvot

mitzvot.”

For both the sin-offering brought for the other mitzvot and the sin-offering for idolatry, it is stated: “From all the mitzvot of the Lord that one shall not do.”

And likewise

one is not obligated to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting transgression

in the matter of idolatry—

but only for a matter for which one is liable to karet for intentional transgression and to a sin-offering for unwitting transgression.

And the Gemara explains:

The bull for an olah offering and the goat for a sin-offering that the

community brings for idolatry are brought only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

For it derives this through a gezerah shavah of

“from the eyes of”

the assembly

—

“from the eyes of

the assembly”—the expressions stated concerning the offering for the other mitzvot and the offering for idolatry.

An individual, a nasi, and the anointed priest

[Numbers 15] are derived

from “And if one soul.”

One individual, one nasi, and one anointed priest

are all included.

According to the principle that the

vav

stated at the beginning of a verse

adds to the preceding matter,

which was stated before it,

the second matter, which is

“the lower”,

and includes an individual, a nasi, and the anointed priest,

is derived

from

the matter preceding it,

the

“upper”,

which is the communal offering for an erroneous ruling concerning idolatry.

And the communal offering for idolatry is learned through a gezerah shavah from the communal offering for all the mitzvot.

And the Rabbis—

from where do they derive this reasoning?

They derive it from what Rabbi Joshua used to recite

to

his son

: Rabbi Joshua

It is written in the passage of Shelach [Numbers 15]:

“One Torah shall there be for you, for one who acts unwittingly.”

And afterward it is stated:

“But the soul that acts defiantly.”

The entire Torah was likened to idolatry—

Just as idolatry

is

a matter for which one is liable to karet for intentional transgression and to a sin-offering for unwitting transgression, so too every matter for which one is liable to karet for intentional transgression and to a sin-offering for unwitting transgression.

We have found this with regard to an individual, a nasi, and the anointed priest, both concerning idolatry and concerning the other mitzvot,

that they are liable only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

The offering of the

community for idolatry—

from where

do we know that the community is liable to bring it only when the court’s erroneous ruling concerned a type of worship whose intentional violation is punishable by karet?

The verse states

later:

“And if one soul.”

And the upper matter,

the communal offering for idolatry,

is derived from the lower matter,

the offering of an individual.

But the community, with regard to the other mitzvot—

from where do we know this?

It derives “from the eyes of

the assembly—from the eyes of

the eyes.”

And Rabbi: What does he do with this “One Torah”?

He requires it for that which was taught: Since we find that the verse distinguished between individuals

who worship

idols and

the many

[the inhabitants of an idolatrous city] who worship idols,

individuals

are judged

by stoning,

which is the most severe form of execution;

therefore their property escapes confiscation,

as the property of an individual who worshipped an idol is not destroyed.

But

the many

are judged

by

the execution of the

sword,

which is not as severe as execution by stoning;

therefore their property is destroyed.

Could

just as we distinguished between individuals and the many with regard to the punishment for intentional action, we

distinguish

also

with regard to their offerings,

for their unwitting transgression in the matter of idolatry, and since their intentional punishment is more severe, their unwitting offering should be more severe than that of an individual, so that each of them would not bring a goat as the other individuals do?

The verse therefore states

in the passage concerning the sin-offering for an unwitting transgression in the matter of idolatry:

“One Torah shall there be for you.”

Rav Helkiah of Hagrunya raised an objection against this: The reason is that the Merciful One wrote, “One Torah shall there be for you.”

Had this not been so—

I would have said that we should distinguish

between them with regard to their offerings.

What should they bring,

what special offering should the inhabitants of an idolatrous city, who are numerous, bring for their unwitting sin?

Let them bring,

let them bring a

bull—

that is what the community brings for the other mitzvot!

Let them bring a

female sheep—

that is what an individual brings for the other mitzvot!

Let them bring a

goat—

that is what a nasi brings for the other mitzvot!

Let them bring a

bull for an olah offering and a goat for a sin-offering—

that is what the community brings for idolatry!

Rather, what

might you say? Let them bring a

female goat.

An individual as well—

that is his offering!

And we answer: Nevertheless,

it was necessary

to derive this from “One Torah.”

For

it might enter your mind to say: Since the community, when it issues an erroneous ruling

concerning idolatry,

brings a bull for an olah offering

instead of the bull for a sin-offering that it brings for an erroneous ruling concerning the other mitzvot,

and a goat for a sin-offering,

they,

the inhabitants of an idolatrous city who sinned unwittingly,

should likewise bring the reverse,

an offering different from the one brought for the other mitzvot.

Alternatively,

even if no different offering could be found for them, they would be in the category of one who

“requires

an offering

but has no remedy”—

and would bring no offering at all.

It teaches us

“One Torah,” that they bring an offering according to the law of individuals.

He said

—

Levi asked Rabbi: Why particularly did he teach

in our Mishna

fifteen

women who exempt their rival wives?

Let him teach sixteen

women who exempt their rival wives!?

He said to him,

Rabbi said to Levi:

It seems to me that he has no

[you have no]

brain in his skull

[in your skull].

For

what do you have in mind

by saying, “Sixteen women exempt their rival wives”?

Because in your view, the tanna should also have taught the case of the erva of

his mother,

who is

his father’s raped woman,

whom his paternal brother married—she being permitted to him—and then he died, so that she fell before him for yibbum.

[The phrase “his father’s raped woman” was used because a woman married to his father cannot have valid kiddushin with any of the brothers, and therefore his paternal brother could not have married her.]

This is not a difficulty.

For

his mother,

who is

his father’s raped woman, is the subject of

a dispute

between Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis,

as to whether the other brothers are permitted to marry her.

And since Rabbi Judah prohibits her from marrying the other brothers by a prohibition, according to his opinion it is impossible for her to fall before him for yibbum as the paternal brother of his mother, his father’s raped woman.

And the tanna does not discuss a matter subject to dispute

in our Mishna; the tanna did not wish to state an erva who cannot fall for yibbum according to Rabbi Judah, but only according to the Rabbis.

And we refute this:

And

if

not,

does the tanna not also discuss a matter subject to dispute?

But

there are women prohibited to the yavam by

“a prohibition of mitzva” and

by

“a prohibition of sanctity”,

who are subject to prohibitions,

and Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis dispute

whether they exempt their rival wives, like those liable to karet, or not;

and

nevertheless,

he teaches

them below, in the second chapter, in a Mishna [20a]!?

And we answer:

In this chapter,

in this chapter of ours,

we are saying

that the tanna does not discuss a matter subject to dispute.

And we refute this:

But

we stated a dispute in this very chapter:

As we learned:

Beit Shammai permit the rival wives to the brothers, and Beit Hillel prohibit them!

And we answer: Everyone knows that the statement of

Beit Shammai in opposition to Beit Hillel

is not a Mishna!

Therefore, citing the words of Beit Shammai does not constitute the inclusion of a matter subject to dispute.

And we raise another objection:

But

we find that the tanna did include in this chapter a matter subject to dispute. And that is: