Yevamot 9a — the Talmud in English

And likewise

likewise

not

are the judges of the Sanhedrin obligated to bring a bull for an olah and a goat for a sin-offering for their mistaken ruling

in idolatry.

And this is, for example, when they mistakenly ruled concerning a particular service of idolatry that it contains no prohibition.

But only for

a ruling concerning

a matter for which one is liable to karet for its intentional violation, and

for

its unwitting violation, a sin-offering.

And this is, for example, when the Great Court ruled that one of the four services of idolatry, for which one is liable to karet, is not prohibited.

But if they mistakenly ruled that there is no prohibition in a service whose violation is punishable by a negative commandment and not by karet, as, for example, if they ruled that there is no prohibition against kissing or embracing an object of idolatry, they are not liable for the bull of an erroneous ruling.

And this matter we learn by a gezerah shavah of “upon it” and “upon it” from a man’s sister, as will be explained below.

And we also learned in

another Mishna in tractate Horayot:

Every mitzva in the Torah for which one is liable to karet for its intentional violation and a sin-offering for its unwitting violation

[except for idolatry], behold:

If the sinner is an

individual,

who acted unwittingly and performed the act because of his mistake, and not because of a ruling of the court, he

brings a female sheep or a female goat

for a sin-offering.

And if the sinner is a

nasi,

he brings a special offering, the like of which is not found among all the offerings of an individual—he

brings a goat

a male goat for a sin-offering [whereas all the other sinners bring a female animal for a sin-offering].

And if they ruled mistakenly and sinned,

the anointed one and the court—they

bring a bull.

When are these words said? With regard to the other mitzvot.

But

if

with regard to

the unwitting violation of

idolatry:

an individual, a nasi, and

the

anointed kohen—they

bring a female goat

for a sin-offering.

And the

community brings a bull and a goat—

a bull for an olah and a goat for a sin-offering.

And we raised the matter:

From where are these words

that the Torah said to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting violation of a prohibition only if the unwitting violation was concerning a matter for which one is liable to karet for its intentional violation?

As the Sages taught:

It is stated in Leviticus [in chapter 4], in the passage concerning the sin-offering for the unwitting violation in which the court mistakenly ruled concerning the other mitzvot [and not concerning idolatry]:

“And the sin concerning which they sinned shall become known.”

Rabbi says: It is stated here,

in the passage concerning the sin-offering of the Sanhedrin,

“concerning it.”

And it is stated there,

in the passage concerning forbidden sexual relations: “And a woman to her sister you shall not take, to make her a rival, to uncover her nakedness

concerning her

during her lifetime.”

And “concerning it” is a superfluous word, available for a gezerah shavah:

Just as there,

in the passage concerning forbidden sexual relations, the sin is concerning

a matter for which one is liable to karet for its intentional violation and a sin-offering for its unwitting violation.

So too here,

in the passage concerning the sin-offering, the court is not liable to bring a bull as a sin-offering unless their unwitting ruling was concerning

a matter for which one is liable to karet for its intentional violation and a sin-offering for its unwitting violation.

Two passages are stated in the Torah concerning a sin-offering.

The first, in Leviticus, deals with the sin-offering that one who acts unwittingly is obligated to bring for “all the mitzvot” whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

And the second, in Numbers, deals with the sin-offering that one who unwittingly violates the sin of idolatry is obligated to bring.

We have found this concerning the community

[this offering is called by the name of the community because the court is liable to bring it only if the majority of the community stumbled in the matter and violated it unwittingly because of their ruling], that they are not obligated to bring the bull of an erroneous ruling unless the unwitting violation was concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

The bull for which the

anointed

kohen is liable—from where do we know that the anointed High Priest is liable for it only if he erred in his ruling for himself and unwittingly committed a sin whose intentional violation is punishable by karet?

As it is written concerning the

anointed

the

kohen [Leviticus 4]: “If the kohen sins

to the guilt of the people”—

behold,

the verse equated the law of the sin-offering of the

anointed

kohen,

so that his law shall be

like

the sin-offering of the

community, which comes only for an unwitting violation concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

The sin-offering of an

individual and

the goat of a

nasi—from where do we know that they bring it only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet?

It is derived; the matter is learned by a gezerah shavah of

“mitzvot”

“mitzvot.”

For both in the sin-offering that comes for the other mitzvot and in the sin-offering for idolatry it is stated: “From all the mitzvot of the Lord that shall not be done.”

And

likewise

not

are they obligated to bring a sin-offering for an unwitting violation

in idolatry—

only for a matter for which one is liable to karet for its intentional violation and a sin-offering for its unwitting violation.

And the Gemara explains:

The bull for an olah and the goat for a sin-offering that the

community brings for idolatry come only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

For it

learns by a gezerah shavah

“from the eyes of

the congregation”—

“from the eyes of

the congregation,” which are stated in the offering for the other mitzvot and in the offering for idolatry.

An individual, a nasi, and an anointed one—

[Numbers 15] are learned

from “and if one soul.”

One individual, one nasi, and one anointed one—

are included.

According to the rule that the

vav

stated at the beginning of the verse is

an addition to the first matter,

which was stated before it,

and it teaches

the second matter, which is the

“lower”,

and which includes the individual, the nasi, and the anointed kohen,

from

the matter before it, the

“higher”,

which is the offering of the community for an erroneous ruling in idolatry.

And the community’s offering for idolatry is learned by a gezerah shavah from the community’s offering for all the mitzvot.

And the Rabbis—

from where do they derive this reasoning?

They derive it from what he would recite

what Rabbi Yehoshua would recite

to his son:

It is written in the passage of Shelach [Numbers 15]:

“One Torah shall there be for you, for one who acts unwittingly.”

And afterward it is stated:

“But the soul that acts defiantly.”

The entire Torah was likened to idolatry—

Just as idolatry

is

a matter for which one is liable to karet for its intentional violation and a sin-offering for its unwitting violation, so too every matter for which one is liable to karet for its intentional violation and a sin-offering for its unwitting violation.

We have found concerning an individual, a nasi, and an anointed one, both with regard to idolatry and with regard to the other mitzvot,

that he is liable only for a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet.

An offering of the

community for idolatry—

from where

do we know that the community is liable for it only if the court’s mistaken ruling was concerning a type of service for which one is liable to karet for its intentional violation?

The verse says

below:

“And if one soul.”

And let the higher

offering, the community’s offering for idolatry,

be learned from the lower,

from the individual.

But the community, with regard to the other mitzvot—

from where?

It learns “from the eyes of

the congregation—from the eyes of

the congregation.”

And Rabbi, this “one Torah”—

what does he do with it?

He requires it for that which was taught: Since we find that Scripture differentiated between

individuals

who worship idolatry

and the many

[the inhabitants of an idolatrous city] who worship idolatry,

individuals

are judged

by stoning,

which is the most severe death—

therefore their property escapes,

for the property of an individual who worshiped idolatry is not destroyed.

But

the many

are judged

by

the death of the

sword,

which is not as severe as death by stoning;

therefore their property is lost.

It might be thought

that just as we differentiated between individuals and the many with regard to punishment for acting intentionally,

we should differentiate

also

with regard to their offerings,

for their unwitting violation of idolatry; and since their punishment when intentional is more severe, their offering when unwitting should be more severe than that of an individual, and they should not each bring a goat like other individuals?

The verse states

in the passage concerning the sin-offering for an unwitting violation of idolatry:

“One Torah shall there be for you.”

Rav Helkiah of Hagrunya objected to it: The reason is that the Merciful One wrote, “One Torah shall there be for you.”

Had it not been so—

I would have said, let us differentiate

between them with regard to their offerings.

What should they bring,

what special offering should the many inhabitants of an idolatrous city bring for their unwitting sin?

Let them bring

bring a

bull—

it is the community, with regard to the other mitzvot, that brings it!

Let them bring a

female sheep—

it is the individual, with regard to the other mitzvot, who brings it!

Let them bring a

goat—

it is the nasi, with regard to the other mitzvot, who brings it!

Let them bring a

bull for an olah and a goat for a sin-offering—

it is the community, with regard to idolatry, that brings it!

Rather, what—perhaps you will say that they should bring a

female goat.

An individual too—

that is his offering!

And we answer: Nevertheless, it was

necessary

for the teaching of “one Torah.”

For

it might enter your mind to say: Since the community, for a mistaken ruling

in idolatry,

brings a bull for an olah

instead of the bull for a sin-offering that they bring for a ruling concerning the other mitzvot,

and a goat for a sin-offering,

they—

the inhabitants of the idolatrous city who acted unwittingly—

should likewise bring the reverse,

an offering different from what they bring for the other mitzvot.

Alternatively, even if no different offering is found for them, they are in the category of one who is

“in need of

an offering

and has no remedy.” They would bring no offering at all.

It teaches us

“one Torah”: that they bring according to the law of individuals.

He said

Lévi asked Rabbi:

Why specifically did he teach

in our Mishna

fifteen

women who exempt their rivals?

Let him teach sixteen

women who exempt their rivals!?

He said to him

Rabbi said to Lévi:

It seems to me that he has no

[you have no]

brain in his skull

[in your skull].

For

what is your reasoning

in saying, “sixteen women who exempt their rivals”?

Because according to your view, the tannaitic authority should also teach the forbidden relation of his

mother, who is his

father’s raped woman,

and his brother from his father married her, which is permitted to him, and he died, and she fell before him for levirate marriage.

[And it specified “his father’s raped woman,” because with regard to his father’s wife there is no validity to betrothal for any of the brothers, and his brother from his father could not marry her.]

This is not a difficulty.

For

his mother, who is

his

father’s raped woman—

it is the dispute

of Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis

whether it is permitted for the other brothers to marry her.

And since Rabbi Yehuda prohibits her from marrying the other brothers by a negative commandment, according to him it is impossible that she should fall before him for levirate marriage from his brother who was his mother’s son and his father’s raped woman.

And in a dispute he does not deal

with the tannaitic authority in our Mishna, and the tannaitic authority did not wish to state a forbidden relation that cannot fall for levirate marriage according to Rabbi Yehuda, but only according to the Rabbis.

And we refute this:

And

if the tannaitic authority

does not

also discuss a matter that is subject to dispute?

But

we find the women who are forbidden to the yavam with

“a prohibition of a mitzva” and

with

“a prohibition of sanctity,”

who are liable for negative commandments,

concerning whom Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis dispute,

whether they exempt their rivals like those liable for karet or not,

and

nevertheless

he teaches

them below, in the second chapter, in the Mishna [20a]!?

“a prohibition of sanctity”,

who are subject to prohibitions,

and Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis dispute

whether they exempt their rival wives, like those liable to karet, or not;

and

nevertheless,

he teaches

them below, in the second chapter, in a Mishna [20a]!?

And we answer:

In our chapter,

in this chapter of ours,

we are saying that he does not deal with a matter subject to dispute.

And we refute this:

But

we stated a dispute in our chapter:

As we learned:

Beit Shammai permit the rivals to the brothers, and Beit Hillel prohibit them!

And we answer: Everyone knows that the words of

Beit Shammai in a place where Beit Hillel—

are not a Mishna!

Therefore, bringing the words of Beit Shammai does not constitute bringing a matter subject to dispute.

And we further refute this:

But

we find that the tannaitic authority brought in this very chapter a matter subject to dispute. And it is:

we find that the tanna did include in this chapter a matter subject to dispute. And that is: