Yevamot 78a (עח.) — the Talmud in English

A second-generation Egyptian,

who is disqualified from entering the congregation,

by what means can he become pure?!

That is: Whom may he marry permissibly, thereby permitting the third generation to enter the congregation?!

Rather, it is certain that the Torah also prohibited Egyptian women from entering the congregation of the Lord, and consequently they are permitted to marry Egyptian men, since they too are among those disqualified from entering the congregation. And when a second-generation Egyptian marries a second-generation Egyptian woman, the child will be a third-generation Egyptian, and the statement of the verse will be fulfilled: “The children who are born to them, the third generation shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord.”

And we challenge this: Even if Rabbi Yehuda held that Egyptian women who converted are permitted to enter the congregation but are prohibited to converted Egyptian men, the verse would still be properly fulfilled: “The third generation [of Egyptians] shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord”—

for

perhaps

the verse is not speaking of children born to him permissibly, but rather

if he transgressed

the prohibition,

and married

a Jewish woman or a female convert from his own nation or from another nation, the Torah stated with regard to this: Those children born to him are permitted.

The Gemara rejects this:

“If he transgressed

and married” —

the verse would not write this

for Scripture does not ordinarily write about something that is uncommon, since it is unlikely that a person will transgress and marry.

It necessarily follows that the verse is speaking of a permissible marriage, such as when he married a second-generation Egyptian woman, since she is disqualified from entering the congregation and is permitted to an Egyptian man.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning this: Is the verse speaking only of permissible marriages?

After all, a mamzer is “if he transgressed

—his father—and married,” since he was conceived through a transgression,

and

nevertheless

the verse wrote about him?!

And we answer:

“If he transgressed

and married,” in a context in which the verse comes

to prohibit

one born from such a forbidden marriage—indeed, it

wrote

the verse.

But

“if he transgressed

and married,” when the subject under discussion is

to permit

one born from such a forbidden marriage,

the verse did not write

it.

We challenge this:

What of one who remarries his divorced wife

after she married another man, as it is written concerning her: “Her first husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife after she has been defiled [by marrying another], for that is an abomination.”

And we derive from the exclusionary term “she”: Only she is an abomination, but her children—whom he fathers with her after remarrying his divorced wife in violation of the prohibition—are not abominations.

Here, then, this is a case of

“if he transgressed,

and married”—

to permit

the children.

And

nevertheless

the verse wrote about it

?!

And we answer:

There,

in the case of one who remarries his divorced wife,

because of the fundamental prohibition—it is that the verse

wrote about

it, in order to teach us that if he transgressed and married her, she is an abomination; therefore the Torah presented this case.

it, to teach that if he transgressed and married her, she is an abomination. Therefore, the Torah chose this formulation.

The Sages taught:

With regard to an Egyptian and an Edomite it is written: “The children who are born to them, the third generation shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord.”

And the beraita interprets the verse:

If “children

[who are born]” is stated,

why is “generations

[the third generation]” stated?

And if “generations”

” is stated,

is stated, why is “children” stated?

That is: It would have sufficed for the verse to say only: “A third-generation child shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord,” and no more.

Or it could have said: “The third generation shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord,” and no more!

For

if it had stated

only

“children” and had not stated

also

“generations,”

but the verse had said: “A third-generation child shall enter”—

I would have said: The first child

born to an Egyptian

and

likewise the

second

child, the first one's brother, is

prohibited.

But a

third

child who is born to him is

permitted

to enter the congregation.

Therefore “generations” was stated,

to teach us that all his children are prohibited, and only his children's children are permitted.

And if

only

“generations”

had

been stated and not

also

“children,”

but the verse had

stated: “The third generation shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord”—

but the verse had said: “The third generation shall enter the congregation of the Lord”—

I would have said

that this is the meaning of the verse: Only

those who stood at Mount Sinai

and their children were prohibited as Egyptians and Edomites. But Egyptians and Edomites were not prohibited to the third generation of those who stood at Mount Sinai.

Therefore “children” was stated.

And now the Gemara interprets the word “for them,” which is written twice in the verse: “The children who are born to them, the third generation shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord”:

“For them”

one occurrence comes to teach:

from them,

from the Egyptian convert himself,

count

the number of generations: He himself is the first generation, his son is the second generation, and his grandson is called “the third generation shall enter for them into the congregation of the Lord.”

“For them”

the second occurrence comes to teach:

Follow their disqualification!

That is: If these disqualified persons became assimilated among those who are fit, for example, an Egyptian who married an Israelite woman, or an Israelite who married an Egyptian woman, follow them, and the child remains disqualified until the third generation.

The Gemara adds and interprets the verse:

And it was necessary for the Merciful One to write: “for them,”

to tell you: Count from them.

And it was necessary for the Merciful One to write

“children”

“who are born,”

which indicates that you count from the children.

And so that the verses should not contradict one another, you must interpret them as follows:

If the Merciful One had written “who are born”

alone,

I would have thought: Count from their children.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote “for them,”

to tell you: Count from the Egyptian convert himself.

And if the Merciful One had written “for them”

alone,

I would have thought: A pregnant Egyptian woman who converted, she and her child are one

generation, and only the child of the fetus would be permitted.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote:

children

“who are born”

to them; the third generation shall enter, which indicates that every birth from the time of conversion onward is counted as a generation.

We further interpret:

And it was necessary to write “for them” here,

with regard to an Egyptian and an Edomite, to teach you: Follow their disqualification;

and it was necessary

also

to write: “to him” with regard to a mamzer

—“even the tenth generation shall not enter for him into the congregation of the Lord forever”—in order to teach: Follow his disqualification. If a mamzer marries a fit woman, the child is disqualified.

If the Merciful One had written

only

here,

with regard to an Egyptian and an Edomite, that one follows their disqualification, I would have thought that this applies specifically to an Egyptian or Edomite convert,

because the convert comes

from

a disqualified drop

of a gentile.

But a mamzer, who comes from a fit drop,

since he comes from a Jew,

I might say not

follow the disqualified parent.

And if the Merciful One had written

only

with regard to a mamzer,

that one follows the disqualified parent, I would have thought:

Because a mamzer is not fit

to

enter the congregation ever,

the Torah was therefore stringent with him;

but here,

with regard to an Egyptian and an Edomite, who become permitted after three generations,

I might say not

follow the disqualified parent.

Therefore:

It is necessary to state both cases.

The following teaching is explained according to the approach of the Ramban, the Rashba, and the Ritva in our discussion.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Although they stated in the beraita, with regard to an Egyptian and with regard to a mamzer, “Follow their disqualification,” this applies only when his intercourse involves a transgression, such as an Israelite who married an Egyptian woman or an Egyptian who married an Israelite woman.

But when his intercourse does not involve a transgression, one always follows the male; and therefore:

When a second-generation Egyptian marries a first-generation Egyptian woman,

since his intercourse is permissible, as both are disqualified from entering the congregation,

his child is third-generation

and is permitted to enter the congregation.

Apparently, he holds

that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds: Wherever there is no transgression—

we assign him to his father,

his father’s status,

and determine his status accordingly!

Rav Yosef raised an objection

to this

from the following:

Rabbi Tarfon says: Mamzerim can become purified,

so that their children will not be mamzerim like them!

How so? A mamzer who married

[the language of the Mishna]

a maidservant,

then

the child is a slave

and is not a mamzer;

if he emancipated him, he becomes a free man,

that is: He is a free man like other free men and has no disqualifying status at all.

Apparently, we assign him to her,

his mother,

and determine his status accordingly [see the additional explanation in the notes ]?!

And we answer:

It is different there, for the verse states: “The woman and her children shall be her master’s.”

It is a decree of the verse that the child of a maidservant has the status of a maidservant.

Rava raised an objection

to the words of Rabba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: A second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman has a third-generation child:

But it was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda said: I had a colleague among the students of Rabbi Akiva, Minyamin, a converted Egyptian, and he said: I am a first-generation Egyptian, and I married a first-generation Egyptian woman. I will marry off my son

who is a second-generation Egyptian

to a second-generation Egyptian woman, so that my grandson

who is a third-generation Egyptian

will be fit to enter the congregation.

And if it enters your mind

that it is as Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

We assign him to his father,

and even when his mother is a first-generation Egyptian woman, if his father is a second-generation Egyptian, his son is third-generation, then

even

an

first-generation Egyptian woman as well

Minyamin could marry off to his son, so that his grandson would be fit to enter the congregation?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi: Teach

that he said: I will marry off my son to a

first-generation

Egyptian woman, for even in this manner his grandson will be third-generation and fit to enter the congregation.

When Rav Dimi came, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman,

although, according to the principle of “follow their disqualification,” one should not necessarily follow the disqualified mother, since there is kiddushin and no transgression, nevertheless

his child is second-generation

and is prohibited from entering the congregation.

Apparently, we assign him to his mother

[we follow his mother].

And it entered Abaye’s mind that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason, according to Rav Dimi, is that “a fetus is a limb of its mother,” and the father’s seed is not taken into consideration [Ritva] , and therefore:

Abaye said to him:

One who designates an animal as his sin-offering, and it is lost, and he designates another in its place and achieves atonement through it—there is a halakha given to Moses at Sinai that the first animal must be put to death. It is called a sin-offering whose owner achieved atonement through another, one of the five sin-offerings that are put to death.

One who designates an animal as his sin-offering, and it becomes pregnant and gives birth, its offspring must be put to death. This is a “sin-offering’s offspring,” which is also one of the five sin-offerings that are put to death by a halakha given to Moses at Sinai.

But regarding that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one designated a pregnant sin-offering

and it gave birth, if he wishes, he achieves atonement through it,

and the offspring grazes until it develops a disqualifying blemish;

if he wishes, he achieves atonement through its offspring,

and its mother grazes until she develops a disqualifying blemish—according to your understanding of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that “a fetus is a limb of its mother,” this is difficult; for:

If you grant

that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds:

“A fetus is not a limb of its mother”—

then what he said is understandable: “If he wishes, he achieves atonement through its offspring,” and we do not treat the offspring as a “sin-offering’s offspring,” which is among the sin-offerings that are put to death, because a separate sanctity took effect upon the fetus ,

and

it is considered—

the designation of the mother and the fetus—

like one who designates two sin-offerings for responsibility,

so that if one is lost, he can achieve atonement through the other.

And

after all,

Rav Oshaya said: One who designated two sin-offerings for responsibility achieves atonement through one of them, and the other grazes

until it develops a disqualifying blemish [a blemish occurs in it] and becomes non-sacred.

But if you say: “A fetus is a limb of its mother,” it is considered a “sin-offering’s offspring.”

A sin-offering’s offspring—

then

it goes to its death!

Rav Dimi fell silent

.

He said to him,

Abaye to Rav Dimi:

Perhaps

Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason is not that a fetus is a limb of its mother. Rather, the reason that when a second-generation Egyptian marries a first-generation Egyptian woman, the child follows the mother and is a second-generation Egyptian, is that

it is different there,

with regard to an Egyptian,

as it is written, “who are born”; the verse made it dependent upon birth,

that is: The child follows the mother.

Rav Dimi said to

Abaye:

Karkefana

[an important person]!

I saw your teacher’s head

[I saw Rabba, your teacher, who studied before Rabbi Yoḥanan, Tosafot]

between the pillars

[between the pillars of the beit-midrash]

when he said

[when he said]

this teaching in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

which I reported in his name.

That is: This explanation that you gave of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words is not your own; rather, you heard it from Rabba, your teacher, who heard it from Rabbi Yoḥanan himself.

And we challenge this:

The reason is that “who are born” is written; but

in general,

we assign him to his father,

and we do not say that a fetus is a limb of its mother.

Rather, concerning that which Rava said: A gentile woman who was pregnant and converted, her son,

when he is born,

does not require immersion,

because his mother’s immersion sufficed for him —

Raise an objection for yourself: since a fetus is considered its mother's thigh,

why does the

fetus

not require immersion

when it is born?!

And if you would say:

The mother's immersion does not benefit the fetus. Rather, the fetus's own immersion while it is still in its mother's womb benefits it; and although its mother's body separates it from the water, this is not considered an intervening substance

because of Rabbi Yitzḥak's principle.

As Rabbi Yitzḥak said: By Torah law, if most of the body

of the person immersing had something on it that separates it from the water

and he is particular about it

([that is, the person immersing is bothered by it, Rashi, Eruvin]), it

separates.

But

if most

[and certainly if only a minority]

is something about which he is not particular, it does not separate.

Accordingly, the same applies to a fetus that is not particular about the intervening substance, since this is the natural way in which a fetus develops [Rashi]; therefore, it does not separate.