Yevamot 78a — the Talmud in English

A second-generation Egyptian,

who is disqualified from entering the congregation,

by what will he become pure?!

That is to say: whom may he marry permissibly, so that the third generation will be permitted to enter the congregation?!

Rather, certainly the Torah prohibited even Egyptian females from entering the congregation of the Lord, and consequently they are permitted to marry an Egyptian, since they too are among those disqualified from the congregation. And when a second-generation Egyptian marries a second-generation Egyptian woman, the child will be a third-generation Egyptian, and the statement of the verse will be fulfilled: “Children who will be born to them, the third generation may enter their congregation.”

And we raise an objection against this: Even if Rabbi Yehuda held that Egyptian females who converted are permitted to enter the congregation but are prohibited to the converted Egyptian males, the verse “the third generation [Egyptian] may enter their congregation” would properly be fulfilled—

for

perhaps

the verse is not speaking of children born to him permissibly, but rather

if he transgressed

the Egyptian or the Edomite against his prohibition

and married

[and married] an Israelite woman, or a convert from his own nation or from another nation; concerning this the Torah said: those children who will be born to him are permitted.

And the Gemara rejects this:

“If

he transgressed and married” —

the verse did not write this

[it is not the way of the verse to write this], since it is not common for a person to transgress and marry.

And necessarily the verse is speaking of a permissible manner, such as when he married a second-generation Egyptian woman, since she is disqualified from entering the congregation and is permitted to an Egyptian.

And the Gemara wonders about this: Is it so that the verse speaks only of permissible marriages?

But a mamzer is “if

he — his father — transgressed and married,” for he was created through a transgression,

and

nevertheless

the verse wrote it?!

And we answer:

“If

he transgressed and married,” where the verse comes

for the prohibition

of one born from these forbidden marriages — indeed

it wrote

the verse.

But

“if

he transgressed and married,” when the subject is

for the permission

of one born from these forbidden marriages,

the verse did not write

it.

And we raise an objection against this:

What of one who remarries his divorced wife,

after she married another, concerning whom it is written: “Her first husband who sent her away may not again take her to be his wife after she has been defiled [by marrying another], for it is an abomination.”

And we derive from the restrictive word “she”: only she is an abomination, but her children — who were born to him from her after he remarried his divorced wife in prohibition — are not abominations.

And here this is a case of

“if

he transgressed and married” —

for the permission

of the children.

And

nevertheless

the verse wrote it

?!

And we answer:

There,

in the case of one who remarries his divorced wife,

because of the essence of the prohibition —

it is that

the verse wrote it, to teach us that if he transgressed and married her, she is an abomination; therefore the Torah took this manner.

it, to teach that if he transgressed and married her, she is an abomination. Therefore, the Torah chose this formulation.

The Sages taught:

It is written concerning an Egyptian and an Edomite: “Children” who will be born to them; the third generation may enter their congregation.

And the beraita interprets the verse:

If “children

[who will be born]”

is stated, why is “generations

[the third generation]” stated?

And if “generations”

” is stated,

is stated, why are children stated?

That is to say: It would have been sufficient for it to say only: “A third-generation child may enter their congregation,” and no more.

Or it should say: “The third generation may enter their congregation,” and no more!

For

if it had stated

only

“children” and had not stated

also

“generations,” but the verse had said: “A third-generation child may enter” —

but the verse had said: “A third-generation child shall enter”—

I would say: The first child

born to an Egyptian,

and likewise the

likewise the

second

child, his brother, the first, is the one who is

prohibited. But a

. But a

third child

who will be born to him is

permitted

to enter the congregation.

Therefore “generations” was stated

to inform us that all his children are prohibited, and only his grandchildren are permitted.

And if

only

“generations”

had been

stated and not

also

“children”

, but

“generations” had been stated, and the verse had said: “The third generation may enter their congregation” —

but the verse had said: “The third generation shall enter the congregation of the Lord”—

I would say

that this is the meaning of the verse: only

those who stood at Mount Sinai

and their children were prohibited as Egyptians and Edomites. But Egyptians and Edomites were not prohibited to the third generation of those who stood at Mount Sinai.

Therefore “children” was stated.

And now the Gemara interprets the word “to them,” which is written twice in the verse, “Children who will be born to them; the third generation may enter their congregation”:

“To them”

one comes to teach:

from them,

from the Egyptian convert himself,

count

the number of generations: he himself is the first generation, his son is the second generation, and with his son’s son you say: “The third generation may enter their congregation.”

“To them”

the second comes to teach:

follow their disqualification!

That is to say: If these disqualified persons became intermingled with qualified persons — for example, an Egyptian married an Israelite woman, or an Israelite married an Egyptian woman — follow them, and the child is disqualified until the third generation.

And the Gemara adds and interprets the verse:

And it was necessary to write: “to them”

to tell you: count from them.

And it was necessary to write

children

“who will be born,”

which implies that you count from the children.

And so that the verses will not contradict one another, you must explain it as follows:

If the Merciful One had written “who will be born”

alone,

I would have said: Count from their children;

therefore

the Merciful One wrote “to them”

to tell you: count from the Egyptian convert himself.

And if the Merciful One had written “to them”

alone,

I would have said: An Egyptian woman who was pregnant and converted, she and her son are one

generation, and only the son of the fetus would be permitted.

Therefore

the Merciful One wrote:

children

“who will be born”

to them; the third generation will enter, which implies: every birth from the time of conversion onward we count as a generation.

We further interpret:

And it was necessary to write “to them” here,

concerning an Egyptian and an Edomite, to teach you: follow their disqualification,

and it was necessary

also

to write: “to him” concerning a mamzer

[“even the tenth generation may not enter ‘to him’ into the congregation of the Lord forever], in order to teach: follow his disqualification; and if a mamzer married a fit woman, the child is disqualified.

If the Merciful One had written

only

here,

concerning an Egyptian and an Edomite, that one follows their disqualification, I would have said that this applies specifically to an Egyptian and Edomite convert,

because the convert comes

from a drop

of disqualified seed

of a gentile.

But a mamzer, who comes from fit seed,

since he comes from an Israelite,

perhaps not

will we follow the disqualified one.

And if the Merciful One had written

only

concerning a mamzer

that one follows the disqualified one, I would have said:

because a mamzer is not fit

to

ever enter the congregation,

therefore the Torah was stringent with him;

but here,

concerning an Egyptian and an Edomite, who are permitted after three generations,

perhaps not

will we follow the disqualified one.

Therefore:

it is necessary.

The following teaching is explained according to the method of the Ramban, the Rashba, and the Ritva in our discussion.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Even though they said in the beraita concerning an Egyptian and concerning a mamzer: follow their disqualification, all this applies only when his intercourse is a transgression, such as an Israelite who married an Egyptian woman, or an Egyptian who married an Israelite woman.

But when his intercourse is not a transgression, one always follows the male; and therefore:

A second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman,

since his intercourse is permissible, as both of them are disqualified from the congregation,

his son is a third-generation child

and is permitted to enter the congregation.

Rashi also has words above, 76b, s.v. “I will marry off” [and he wrote similarly in Sotah 9a] and in other places. Later authorities struggled with understanding his method in interpreting our teaching. See the explanation of the Vilna Gaon in Even HaEzer, section 4, subsection 6; in Sha’ar HaMelekh, chapter 14 of the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse; and in Pnei Yehoshua and Mekaneh in Kiddushin there. And see further Rashi’s wording above, s.v. “to them — follow their disqualification”: “It implies, follow them, that if they became intermingled with qualified persons,” such as an Egyptian who married an Israelite woman, etc.; thus he was precise to say “became intermingled with qualified persons,” and not “became intermingled with disqualified persons,” because in the latter case one does not say “follow their disqualification”; and this implies not in accordance with Tosafot’s understanding of Rashi’s words in Kiddushin 67a. It is apparent that he holds

— Rabbi Yoḥanan — that wherever there is no transgression,

after him

— his father —

we cast him!

Rav Yosef raised an objection

against this

to Rav Yosef:

Rabbi Tarfon says: Mamzerim can become purified,

so that their children will not be mamzerim like them!

How so: A mamzer who married

[the wording of the Mishna]

a slave woman,

behold,

the child is a slave

and is not a mamzer;

if he emancipated him, he is found to be free,

that is to say: he is a free man like all free men, and there is no disqualification in him at all.

It is apparent that after her

— his mother —

we cast him

[and see additional explanation in the notes ]?! And we answer:

There is a difference there, for the verse says: “The woman and her children shall belong to her master”,

it is a scriptural decree that the child of a slave woman is like the slave woman.

Rava raised an objection

to the words of Rabba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said: A second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman, his son is third-generation:

But it was taught in a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda said: I had a colleague, Minyamin, an Egyptian convert, among the students of Rabbi Akiva, and he said: I am a first-generation Egyptian, and I married a first-generation Egyptian woman; I will marry off my son

who is a second-generation Egyptian

to a second-generation Egyptian woman, so that my grandson

who is a third-generation Egyptian

will be fit to enter the congregation.

And if it enters your mind

that it is as Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

we cast him after his father,

and even when his mother is a first-generation Egyptian woman, if his father is a second-generation Egyptian then his son is third-generation, then

even

a

first-generation Egyptian woman

could Minyamin marry off to his son, so that his grandson would be fit to enter the congregation?!

And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Rabbi: Teach:

I will marry off my son to a

first-generation Egyptian woman,

for even in this manner his grandson will be third-generation and fit to enter the congregation.

When Rav Dimi came, he said: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A second-generation Egyptian who married a first-generation Egyptian woman,

although according to the principle “follow their disqualification” one should not specifically follow the disqualified mother, since there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, nevertheless

her son is second-generation

and is prohibited from entering the congregation.

It is apparent: We cast him after his mother

[we follow his mother].

And it occurred to Abaye that Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason, according to Rav Dimi, was that “a fetus is the thigh of its mother,” and we do not take into consideration the father’s seed [Ritva]. And therefore:

Abaye said to him:

One who designates an animal for his sin-offering, and it was lost, and he designated another in its place and obtained atonement through it: it is a tradition given to Moses at Sinai that the animal goes to death. It is called a sin-offering whose owners obtained atonement through another, and it is one of the five sin-offerings that go to death.

One who designates an animal for his sin-offering, and it became pregnant and gave birth: its offspring goes to death. This is a “sin-offering’s offspring,” which is also one of the five sin-offerings that go to death by a tradition given to Moses at Sinai.

But concerning that which Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he designated a pregnant sin-offering

and it gave birth, if he wishes, he obtains atonement through it,

and the offspring grazes until it develops a disqualifying blemish;

if he wishes, he obtains atonement through its offspring,

and its mother grazes until she develops a disqualifying blemish — according to your understanding of Rabbi Yoḥanan, that “a fetus is the thigh of its mother,” let this be difficult to you. For:

If you grant

that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds:

“a fetus is not the thigh of its mother” —

it is understandable that he said: “If he wishes, he obtains atonement through its offspring,” and we do not judge the offspring as a “sin-offering’s offspring,” which is among the sin-offerings that go to death, because a separate sanctity took effect upon the fetus ,

and

it would be

— the designation of the mother and the fetus —

like one who designates two sin-offerings for responsibility,

so that if one is lost, he obtains atonement through the other.

And

behold,

Rav Oshaya said: If he designated two sin-offerings for responsibility, he obtains atonement through one of them, and the second grazes

until it develops a disqualifying blemish [a blemish occurs in it] and becomes ordinary.

But if you say: “A fetus is the thigh of its mother,” it would be a “sin-offering’s offspring.”

A sin-offering’s offspring —

behold,

it goes to death!

Rav Dimi was silent

.

He said to him

Abaye to Rav Dimi:

Perhaps

Rabbi Yoḥanan’s reason is not that a fetus is the thigh of its mother. Rather, the reason in the case of a second-generation Egyptian who marries a first-generation Egyptian woman, that the child follows the mother and is a second-generation Egyptian, is

different there

concerning an Egyptian,

for it is written, “who will be born”; the verse made it dependent upon birth,

that is to say: follow the mother.

And the reason Rav Dimi did not state this innovation, which is an innovation toward permission, and the power of a lenient ruling is preferable, is that he took the case in which Rabba bar bar Ḥana had spoken. Rav Dimi said to him

to Abaye:

Karkefana

[an important person]!

I saw your head

[I saw Rabba, your teacher, who studied before Rabbi Yoḥanan, Tosafot]

between the pillars

[between the pillars of the beit-midrash]

when he said

[when he said]

this teaching of Rabbi Yoḥanan

that I stated in his name.

That is to say: This interpretation that you gave of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words is not your own; rather, you heard it from Rabba, your teacher, who heard it from Rabbi Yoḥanan himself.

And we raise an objection:

The reason is that it is written, “who will be born”; but

in general,

we cast him after his father,

and we do not say: a fetus is the thigh of its mother.

Rather, concerning that which Rava said: A gentile woman who was pregnant and converted, her son,

when he is born,

does not require immersion,

because his mother’s immersion availed for him —

Rashi’s wording implies that the child’s conversion is a separate conversion, but that his mother’s immersion avails for him. The later authorities discussed this matter at length. In the Collections of Rabbeinu Ḥayyim HaLevi it is explained that even according to the one who says that a fetus is not the thigh of its mother, and there is an immersion of the mother for her child, it is all one act of conversion, and the child cannot protest when he grows up; this is unlike a minor convert whom his father immersed, who can protest once he grows up. However, the Avnei Miluim, in section 4, wrote that according to the one who says that a fetus is not the thigh of its mother, he can protest when he becomes an adult. You can challenge this for yourself: since the fetus is not its mother's thigh -

why is it not necessary

the fetus

to undergo immersion

when it is born?!

And if you say:

The immersion of its mother does not avail the fetus; rather, it is the immersion of the fetus itself while it is still in its mother's womb that avails it, and although its mother's body interposes between it and the water, it is not considered an interposition

because of Rabbi Isaac.

For Rabbi Isaac said: By Torah law, the majority

of the body of one immersing who had something upon him that interposes between him and the water

and he is particular about it [the immerser is distressed by it, Rashi, Eruvin], is

([that is, the person immersing is bothered by it, Rashi, Eruvin]), it

an interposition.

But

the majority [

and all the more so, the minority]

about which he is not particular is not an interposition

And accordingly, the same law applies to a fetus that is not particular about the interposition, since this is the manner of a fetus's growth [Rashi]; therefore, this is not an interposition.