Yevamot 68b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises an objection against the answer that from “and no stranger shall eat holy things” one should learn the prohibition of the negative commandment for a kohen’s daughter who marries an Israelite:

Behold,

that

verse—“and no stranger shall eat holy things”—

is needed for its own matter, for a literal stranger, that he should not eat teruma; and from where do you have to learn from this verse concerning a kohen’s daughter who is not a stranger?!

And we answer:

two “and no stranger” are written.

A. “And no stranger shall eat holy things.” And from this verse it is impossible to learn concerning an Israelite woman who marries a kohen, since she is not a stranger.

B. “And she shall return to her father’s house as in her youth; from her father’s bread she shall eat, and no stranger shall eat of it.” And the meaning of the verse is: if she has not yet returned, she shall not eat, and she is forbidden by a negative commandment.

And still we raise an objection: behold,

it is needed—“and no stranger shall eat of it”—

for that which Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina taught, who learned from this verse that an onen is permitted to eat teruma?!

For Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina said: “And every stranger

shall not eat of it”—behold, you have learned:

I told you ‘strangerness’

to forbid eating teruma,

but not mourning.

It follows that we have no negative commandment concerning an Israelite woman who marries a kohen except from “and a kohen’s daughter, when she shall be to a stranger”; and still, from where do we know that a woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her thereby becomes disqualified?!

And we answer: the principal purpose of the verse “and no stranger shall eat of it” is to teach concerning an Israelite woman who marries a kohen, that she is subject to a negative commandment.

And

when

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina

said that an onen is permitted to eat teruma,

from “stranger”

“and no stranger” is it derived—that is, from the superfluity of “and every” we learn that an onen is permitted to eat teruma.

Rabbi

And therefore the verse “and a kohen’s daughter, when she shall be to a stranger” remains, to teach concerning a woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her, that she is disqualified.

And still we raise an objection: how shall we learn from “and a kohen’s daughter, when she shall be to a stranger” concerning a woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her? Behold,

it is needed—

for this verse—

for that which was taught:

Just as a kohen’s daughter eats teruma, so does she eat the breast and the thigh, which are given to the kohen from every peace-offering, as the verse says: “And the breast of the waving and the thigh of the uplifting, which was waved and which was lifted up, you shall eat, you [Aaron the kohen] and your sons and your daughters with you.” When she—

a kohen’s daughter who married an Israelite—

returns

to her father’s house when she has become widowed or divorced, she

returns

only

to teruma, and

she does not return to the breast and the thigh, but she is forbidden to eat them even after she has become widowed or divorced, just as she became forbidden to eat them from the time she became betrothed to an Israelite.

And Rav Hisda said that Ravina bar Rav Sheila said: What is the verse?

As it is written: “And a kohen’s daughter, when she shall be to a stranger—

she shall not eat of the consecrated offerings’ teruma,”

teaching you that she

shall not eat

of

the lifted portion from the consecrated offerings,

that is, the breast and the thigh.

Rather, she remains forbidden to eat these portions even after being widowed or divorced, just as she became forbidden to eat them from the time she became betrothed to an Israelite.

And we answer: the principal purpose of this verse is to teach concerning teruma that a woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her thereby becomes disqualified. Nevertheless, from this verse you also learn the law that she does not return to the breast and the thigh, because:

If so—that the verse comes only to disqualify her from teruma when she has intercourse with one forbidden to her—

the verse should write: “She shall not eat of the consecrated offerings,”

and we would understand on our own that it is speaking about teruma, since the entire passage is speaking about teruma.

What is “of the consecrated offerings’ teruma”?

You can learn from it two things:

A. A woman who has intercourse with someone who is a stranger and disqualified in relation to her—he disqualifies her from teruma.

B. When she returns, she returns to teruma, but she does not return to the breast and the thigh.

And now that we know that “and a kohen’s daughter, when she shall be to a stranger” comes to teach that a woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her—“she shall not eat of the consecrated offerings’ teruma”—the Gemara proceeds to explain the other details stated in the beraita concerning this disqualification, and the other laws in it:

We find

a kohen’s daughter [a kohen’s daughter] who is disqualified from teruma, for this is the principal matter of the verse;

A Levite woman and an Israelite woman—

from where do we know

that they too become disqualified? And we explain:

as Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav

below, to expound the superfluous letter vav in the word

“daughter,”

as it is written “and a daughter

of a kohen, when she shall be a widow or divorced,” in order to learn from it concerning another matter.

that a female kohen—a daughter of a kohen—is disqualified from teruma, since this is the principal teaching of the verse.

Here too,

we expound the superfluous letter vav in the word

“daughter,”

as it is written

“and a daughter

of a kohen, when she shall be to a stranger, she shall not eat of the consecrated offerings’ teruma,” in order to teach you that even a Levite woman and an Israelite woman become disqualified through intercourse with one forbidden to them.

And we wonder:

According to whom,

do we hold?

According to Rabbi Akiva, who expounds the additional letters

vavs,

as we find that he said, “I expound ‘daughter and daughter”?!

And we answer:

You may even say: the Rabbis

hold this.

Since this is not an exposition from the superfluity of the letter vav alone, but rather

the entire “and a daughter

of a kohen, when she shall be to a stranger”

is a superfluous verse.

For it should have said: “And when a kohen acquires a person, the acquisition of his money, he shall eat of it; and those born in his house, they shall eat of his bread. And when she shall be to a stranger—she shall not eat of the consecrated offerings’ teruma.” Why, then, did the verse say, “and a daughter of a kohen”?

Rather, it comes to teach also concerning a kohen’s daughter who is a Levite woman or an Israelite woman, who has intercourse with one forbidden to her, that he disqualifies her.

And the Gemara adds to explain the source of another detail in this law:

And we answer:

We find

that a woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her becomes disqualified

from teruma.

For the priesthood,

to forbid her to marry a kohen—

from where do we know this?

And the Gemara is astonished at the question:

The verse could have said: “And if a kohen acquires a person, the property of his money, he may eat of it; and those born in his household may eat of his bread. But if she becomes married to a non-priest, she may not eat of the sacred offerings’ teruma.” Why, then, did the Torah say “and the daughter of a kohen”?

Rather, it teaches also that a female Levite or Israelite who has intercourse with a man disqualified for her becomes disqualified. The Gemara adds another source for a further detail of this law:

Is it really so,

that

a Levite woman and an Israelite woman—

who were mentioned in the beraita as disqualified, and whom we learned from the superfluous “and daughter”—

are not

for the purpose of disqualification

from the priesthood that we include them?!

Surely they were certainly included to become disqualified concerning the priesthood.

For if they were included for teruma,

there is room to wonder: are a Levite woman and an Israelite woman

daughters who are fit to eat teruma

that you need to disqualify them from teruma through intercourse with one forbidden to them?!

And the Gemara answers, with astonishment at the astonishment:

Why not—does eating teruma not apply to a Levite woman and an Israelite woman?!

After all,

you find it, that she

eats—

a Levite woman or an Israelite woman—

for the sake of her son,

whom she has from a kohen, and it is necessary to teach us that she is disqualified from eating teruma when she has intercourse with one forbidden to her?!

And the Gemara rejects the possibility that the inclusion comes to include a Levite woman and an Israelite woman concerning teruma:

For a Levite woman or an Israelite woman who eats

for the sake of her son—

it is a kal va-chomer

that she should become disqualified, from a kohen’s daughter, who becomes disqualified from eating teruma:

And just as a kohen’s daughter [a kohen’s daughter],

who eats through the sanctity of her own person [by virtue of her own sanctity as a kohen’s daughter she eats teruma], and nevertheless

it disqualifies her,

intercourse with one forbidden to her, from eating teruma—

a Levite woman and an Israelite woman, who eat only for the sake of their son,

and have no inherent sanctity,

is it not all the more so

that they should become disqualified from eating teruma when they have intercourse with one forbidden to them?!

And since it is a kal va-chomer, we do not need the inclusion of “and daughter” to include a Levite woman and an Israelite woman as becoming disqualified from teruma; and it follows that you learn that a woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her is disqualified from the priesthood.

The Gemara rejects the kal va-chomer:

And it is this—

this very reasoning by which you distinguish between a kohen’s daughter, who has inherent sanctity, and a Levite woman and an Israelite woman, who eat for the sake of the son—

that provides grounds

to say: on the contrary, these should not become disqualified from eating teruma:

For specifically

a kohen’s daughter, whose body is sanctified, it is that

he disqualifies her, the one forbidden to her, and profanes her sanctity; therefore she does not eat teruma.

But

this one, a Levite woman or an Israelite woman, who eats for the sake of the son,

whose body is not sanctified—

he does not disqualify her, the one forbidden to her, through his intercourse.

And by virtue of this rejection, we indeed explain that the inclusion “and daughter” comes to disqualify from eating teruma the Levite woman and the Israelite woman who eat teruma for the sake of the son. But we have no source to disqualify from marrying into the priesthood a woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her.

Rather,

to disqualify a woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her, so that she should be disqualified from marrying

into the priesthood,

we should learn it by a

kal va-chomer from a divorcee,

who is disqualified from the priesthood.

And this is the teaching:

And just as a divorcee, who is permitted to eat teruma, is nevertheless

forbidden to marry

into the priesthood—

this woman who has intercourse with one forbidden to her, and

is forbidden to eat teruma—

is it not the case that she shall be

disqualified from the priesthood?!

And we wonder:

Do we issue a warning from an inference [from a kal va-chomer]?

That is: can a complete negative commandment come through a kal va-chomer? Yet it is established for us that one does not issue a warning from an inference!

And we answer: the teaching from the kal va-chomer is only

a mere clarification of the matter, that the prohibition of “and a kohen’s daughter, when she shall be to a stranger” is disqualification from the priesthood just as from teruma, because eating teruma is by virtue of priestly sanctity.

we derive it through

Here the Gemara returns to the substance of the law: a woman who has intercourse with anyone who is forbidden to her thereby becomes disqualified from the priesthood and from teruma, and to the source of the law, which is from the verse “and a kohen’s daughter, when she shall be to a stranger, she shall not eat of the consecrated offerings’ teruma.”

And we raise an objection:

But perhaps the verse did not disqualify this woman who

has intercourse with one forbidden to her, but only a woman who had intercourse with

those liable to karet, with whom betrothal does not take effect.

forbidden

But a woman who has intercourse with those liable to negative commandments, with whom betrothal does take effect—as all those mentioned in the beraita—from where do we know that they disqualify?

And we answer: “And a kohen’s daughter

And it follows that those in whom there is validity [with whom betrothal takes effect] are included, whereas those liable to karet are not subject to validity. And we ask:

when she shall be

to a stranger”—

the Merciful One said.

is it not logical that she

should be

disqualified from the priesthood?!

And we ask:

Can a prohibition be established through an inference

from an a-fortiori inference?

That is, can a full Torah prohibition be established through an a-fortiori inference? But we have an established principle that a prohibition is not established through an inference alone!

And we answer: The inference from the a-fortiori argument is merely

a clarification of the matter,

that the prohibition in “and if the daughter of a kohen becomes married to a non-priest” disqualifies her from the priesthood just as it disqualifies her from teruma, because eating teruma is a result of priestly sanctity.

Here the Gemara returns to the basic law: a woman who has intercourse with anyone who is disqualified for her becomes disqualified from the priesthood and from teruma. It also returns to the source of the law, the verse: “And if the daughter of a kohen becomes married to a non-priest, she may not eat of the sacred offerings’ teruma.”

And we ask:

But perhaps

And it is implied:

those in whom there is havaya [with whom betrothal takes effect].

But

those liable to karet—

they are not people of havaya.

And we raise an objection:

If so, that you expound “when she shall be” concerning those in whom there is havaya, then one should say the opposite: the Torah disqualified only one who had intercourse with someone with whom betrothal takes effect.

But

an idolater and a slave [and the same applies to those liable to karet ],

who are not people of havaya and betrothal, — should they not be disqualified the women from teruma through their intercourse?!

The implication is:

Those with whom the status of marriage exists

—with whom betrothal can take effect—

whereas

those liable to excision

are not people with whom the status of marriage exists.

And we ask:

If so, if you expound “when she becomes” as referring to those with whom betrothal is valid, one could say the opposite: The Torah disqualified only a woman who had intercourse with one with whom betrothal takes effect.

If so,

if you expound the phrase “when she becomes married” as referring to people with whom the status of marriage exists, then perhaps the opposite should be said: The Torah disqualifies only a woman who has intercourse with one with whom betrothal does take effect.

But

a gentile and a slave

—and the same applies to those liable to excision— who are not people with whom the status of marriage and betrothal exists,

should not disqualify

women from teruma through intercourse with them!

And we explain:

these —

a gentile, a slave, and those liable for karet —

disqualify

from eating teruma

on the basis of Rabbi Ishmael.

For Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Ishmael: From where [do we derive] that a gentile or a slave who had relations with a daughter of Israel, or with a daughter of a kohen or a Levite, disqualified her?

As it is stated: “And a daughter of a kohen, when she becomes a widow or divorced

and returns to her father’s house.”

And it would have sufficed for him to say one of them [Tosafot].