Yevamot 61b (סא:) — the Talmud in English

And the latter clause speaks only of kohanim,

as it says: “a zona”—

kohanim

alone

are commanded,

as they were commanded to remain prohibited to her.

But

if it referred to all

Israel,

they would not be commanded

to prohibit themselves to a zona.

And

for this reason, it states

also at the beginning of the Mishna

kohen.

Rav Huna said: What is the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that an aylonit is a zona?

As it is written: “They ate, but were not satisfied; they acted wantonly, but did not increase”.

And he expounds it from the expression: “And you shall spread out westward and eastward and northward and southward” [Maharav Ranshburg].

And from here they derived that

every act of intercourse that does not involve spreading out,

that is, procreation,

is nothing other than intercourse in prostitution.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Eliezer says: A kohen may not marry a minor,

and the beraita proceeds to explain the rationale.

Rav Ḥisda said to Rabba: Go,

examine it,

since

this evening

Rav Huna will ask you [go and examine the rationale of Rabbi Eliezer, who prohibits a kohen from marrying a minor, because this evening Rav Huna will ask you for the rationale of the matter]!

Rabba went out,

Rabba

examined it,

and explained the rationale:

Rabbi Eliezer follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir in one respect, and follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in another.

The Gemara explains:

He follows

Rabbi Eliezer

Rabbi Meir

in that

he is concerned

that Rabbi Meir is concerned

about the minority.

Here there is a minority of women who are ayloniyot [as explained later in the sugya], and therefore one must be concerned, when a minor marries, that perhaps she is an aylonit.

And

if indeed she is an aylonit, she is prohibited to a kohen.

Because

he also follows

Rabbi Eliezer

Rabbi Yehuda, who says: An aylonit—

is a zona!

The Gemara raises two objections to Rabba’s explanation: First,

and Rabbi Meir—

who is concerned about the minority of ayloniyot—

does he follow

Rabbi Eliezer?!

But it was taught in a beraita: A minor boy and a minor girl [or: a minor girl]

—

may neither perform ḥalitza nor enter into yibbum; these are the words of Rabbi Meir,

and the rationale is explained there.

They said to Rabbi Meir:

Indeed,

you have spoken well that

the minor boy or minor girl

may not perform ḥalitza.

For

“man” is written in the passage,

as it is stated: “But if ‘the man’ does not wish to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up to the gate, to the elders, and remove his shoe.”

And we challenge this:

We derive the status of the

woman from that of the man,

as it is written: “But if the man does not wish to take his yevama, then his yevama shall go up” [Rashi below, 105b].

And from this analogy we learn that a woman, too, may not perform ḥalitza while she is a minor.

Rather, what is the rationale

for your holding that a minor boy and minor girl

may not enter into yibbum?

He said to them,

Rabbi Meir:

A minor boy

may not enter into yibbum—

lest he be found to be a eunuch.

And

a minor girl

may not enter into yibbum—

lest she be found to be an aylonit.

And they will consequently have engaged in intercourse with a forbidden relation,

that of a brother’s wife.

For the Torah said in the passage concerning yibbum: “And it shall be that the firstborn son whom she bears shall be established in the name of his deceased brother, so that his name shall not be blotted out from Israel.” And the Sages expounded: “Whom she bears”—this excludes an aylonit, who does not bear children. “His name shall not be blotted out”—this excludes a eunuch, whose name is already blotted out [above, 24a].

“Whom she bears”—to exclude an aylonit, who cannot give birth.

“So that his name shall not be erased”—to exclude a sterile man, whose name is erased [above, 24a].

The Gemara concludes its proof that Rabbi Eliezer does not follow Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority of ayloniyot:

And

behold,

it was taught in a beraita: A minor girl may enter into yibbum but may not perform ḥalitza; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

This proves that, since Rabbi Eliezer says that a minor girl may enter into yibbum, he is not concerned about the minority of ayloniyot. How, then, can you say that Rabbi Eliezer follows Rabbi Meir, who is concerned about the minority?!

Second, there is another objection to Rabba’s explanation:

and Rabbi Yehuda—

who prohibits a kohen from marrying an aylonit—

does Rabbi Eliezer follow

him?!

But it was taught in a beraita: “A zona”

mentioned in the Torah is

a zona

[a woman who strays from her husband],

as its name indicates!

That is, the only zona is a woman who commits adultery while married, straying from her husband to others,

these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer.

Rabbi Akiva says: “A zona”—

this is

a woman

who is promiscuous,

who makes herself available to every man [but an unmarried woman who engages in intercourse once is not a zona].

Rabbi Mattia ben Ḥarash says: Even

if her husband warned her not to seclude herself with another man, and she went and secluded herself, and

her husband went

to the Great Sanhedrin in order

to give her to drink

the water of a sota,

and he had intercourse with her on the way,

after she had become prohibited to him under the laws of a sota—he has thereby

made her

thereby

a zona, since she had intercourse with one prohibited to her.

Rabbi Yehuda says: “A zona”—

this is an aylonit

[and he is the first tanna of our Mishna].

And the Sages say: The only zona is a convert, an emancipated woman, or one who had intercourse in a licentious manner,

[and these are the words of the Sages in our Mishna].

Rabbi Elazar says: An unmarried man who has intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage,

even once—

makes her a zona.

It is therefore evident that Rabbi Eliezer follows neither Rabbi Meir nor Rabbi Yehuda.

We must therefore seek a new rationale for his statement that a kohen may not marry a minor.

Rather—

because of these objections to Rabba’s explanation of Rabbi Eliezer’s words—

Rav Adda bar Ahava said

to explain Rabbi Eliezer’s rationale for prohibiting a kohen from marrying a minor:

Here we are dealing with a High Priest,

who is prohibited from marrying a minor because of the prohibition against marrying a woman who has had intercourse previously. For

when does he acquire her

the High Priest [when does the minor become his wife by Torah law]? Only

when she grows up,

since the kiddushin of a minor have no legal effect.

Thus, when she grows up and becomes his wife, she

has already had intercourse,

because of the acts of intercourse he had with her when she was a minor. Those acts are merely acts of seduction, and she becomes prohibited to him under the law concerning one who seduces his own wife, who is prohibited to him.

Rava said: This is senseless [literally, “without heart”],

there is no rationale or logic to this statement of yours!

For, in any event, in what manner does Rabbi Eliezer prohibit a High Priest from marrying a minor?

If

it is referring to a case

where her father betrothed her,

and her father betrothed her, as he is entitled to betroth his minor daughter, then already

from that moment

[the moment he betrothed her],

he acquired her,

she is his wife by Torah law, and she is not one whom he himself seduced.

And if she betrothed herself

[she betrothed herself without her father], is it possible to say that

Rabbi Eliezer

alone holds that he may not marry her,

but not the Rabbis?!

Surely, in such a case even the Rabbis agree that she is prohibited to a High Priest, since she has had intercourse previously. How, then, did the tanna of the beraita say: “Rabbi Eliezer says” that a kohen may not marry a minor, implying that the Sages do not agree with him?!

Rather, Rava said,

this is how Rabbi Eliezer’s words should be explained:

Actually,

Rabbi Eliezer is speaking

of an ordinary kohen.

And

he is prohibited from marrying a minor because

we are concerned lest,

because she lacks understanding, she

be seduced

and commit adultery

with another man

after he marries her, thereby becoming prohibited to him, while he is unaware of it.

We challenge this:

If so,

if you are concerned that she may commit adultery because she is a minor,

an Israelite

should likewise not marry a minor because of this concern!

And we answer:

The seduction of a minor

who lacks understanding

is considered coercion.

And in the case of coercion involving an Israelite,

it is

permitted

to her husband.

But a kohen may not marry her, since she is prohibited to him even if she had intercourse under coercion.

Rav Pappa said,

this is how Rabbi Eliezer’s words should be explained:

Here

we are dealing with a High Priest

as the subject of the discussion.

And this tanna is

the one who prohibited a minor to a High Priest on the basis of a scriptural decree:

As it was taught in a beraita:

It is written concerning a High Priest: “For only

a virgin

from his people shall he take as a wife.”

One might have thought

that a High Priest could marry a

minor,

since she too is a virgin.

The verse states: “a woman,”

but not a minor, who is not called a woman.

If it says “a woman”,

one might have thought

that he could marry even

a mature woman?

The verse states: “a virgin.”

A virgin, but not a mature woman, some of whose signs of virginity have disappeared.

How is this resolved?

His wife must have left

the status of a minor

but not yet entered the status of full maturity.

This is a maiden.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said

to explain Rabbi Eliezer’s words:

Here we are dealing with a High Priest, and

this tanna is:

As it was taught in a beraita:

It is written: “For only

a virgin

from his people shall he take as a wife.”

“Virgin” means only a maiden.

And so it says

concerning Rebecca:

“And the maiden was very fair to look upon, a virgin.”

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Elazar says: An unmarried man who has intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the sake of marriage—

makes her a zona!

Rav Amram said: The halakha does not follow Rabbi Elazar.

Mishna:

A person may not desist

from procreation unless he has

two

sons.

And with what children does a person fulfill the mitzva of procreation?

Beit Shammai say: Two males.

But not one male and one female. The Gemara will explain their rationale.

And Beit Hillel say: One male and one female.

As it is stated

concerning the creation of the world: “This is the book of the generations of Adam. On the day that God created man”—

male and female He created them.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: A person may not desist from procreation unless he has children.

The Gemara infers from the wording of the Mishna, which states: “A person may not desist from procreation unless he has children,” rather than: “A person may not desist from [taking] a wife unless he has children”:

This means

that

if he has children,

only

from procreation

is he

exempt.

But

from

marrying

a wife he is not exempt; rather, a person must marry a woman, only he need not seek specifically a woman capable of bearing children.

This supports

This supports

our Mishna

in support of Rav Naḥman in the name of Shmuel, who said: Even though a person has several children,

he is nevertheless

prohibited from remaining without a wife.

As it is stated: “It is not good for man to be alone.”

Some say,

that our Mishna should be inferred to mean the opposite of Shmuel’s ruling:

If he has children—

he is exempt from procreation, and he is also exempt from having a wife.

We inquire about this:

Shall we say that

our Mishna is

a refutation of Rav Naḥman in the name of Shmuel,

who holds that even a person who has fulfilled the mitzva of procreation may not remain without a wife?!

And we answer:

No,

not as you inferred—that once he has children he no longer needs to marry a wife. Rather:

If

he has no children—

he marries a woman capable of bearing children

[fit to bear sons].

And if

he has children—

he marries a woman who is not capable of bearing children.

But he may not remain without a wife.

However, even when he has sons, it is a mitzva incumbent upon him to marry a woman capable of bearing children.

And there is

a practical difference

between one who has sons and one who does not have sons, with regard to

selling a Torah scroll for the sake of having children.

For this should not be done unless he has no sons and cannot find a wife unless he sells the Torah scroll he owns, in order to cover his wedding expenses.

But if he has sons, he should not sell a Torah scroll for the sake of marrying a woman capable of bearing children; rather, he should marry a woman who has no children [this was explained according to the second interpretation of Tosafot].

We learned in the Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: Two males:

And we raise an objection:

What is the reasoning of Beit Shammai?

And we answer:

We derive it from Moses,

who separated from his wife [as explained below] after he had two sons.

as it is written: “The sons of Moses

Gershom and Eliezer.”

And

the rationale of

Beit Hillel,

who hold that the mitzva of procreation is fulfilled with a male and a female, is that

we derive it from the creation of the world

[from Adam and Eve], concerning whom it is stated: “Male and female He created them.”

And we challenge:

But Beit Shammai—

should derive it

[they too should derive it]

from the creation of the world?!

And we answer:

One does not derive a ruling from what is possible—

such as any man who has two sons, for whom it is possible to marry one of the other women in the world—