Yevamot 56b — the Talmud in English

And he illumined our eyes from our Mishna,

he brought a proof for his words from our Mishna, and Rav Sheshet [who was himself sightless] illumined our eyes in understanding the Mishna:

A. A Jewish woman who committed adultery willingly while married to her husband is forbidden to him.

For it is stated in the section of Naso: “If any man’s wife goes astray and commits a trespass against him, and a man lies with her carnally, and it is hidden from the eyes of her husband, and she is secluded

and she is defiled,

and there is no witness against her, and she was not seized”—that is, she committed adultery willingly and not under duress. “

And she is defiled”—the verse teaches that she is impure to her husband, to forbid her to him when she committed adultery willingly.

B. The early authorities wrote in our sugya that the basis of the prohibition of a sota to her husband is because she is a “harlot”: “His wife, a harlot, is forbidden to every person, just as an ordinary harlot is forbidden to a kohen” [the wording of the Ritva; and see also the Rashba].

And the Torah also stated in the section concerning one who remarries his divorced wife after she married another: “

Her first husband, who sent her away, may not again take her to be his wife after she has been defiled.”

This verse teaches a prohibition by lav for the husband, to keep with him a woman who committed adultery and became defiled while married to him.

C. The word

“and she became defiled”

was written three times in the section of sota.

And the Sages expounded: one defilement is to forbid her to her husband, one defilement is to forbid her forever to the man who had intercourse with her, and one defilement is to disqualify her from eating teruma and from marrying into the kehunah.

D. A Jewish woman who was raped while married to her husband is not forbidden to him, for the Torah stated: “And she was not seized”; the verse teaches that if she was “seized,” meaning that intercourse was forced upon her, she did not become defiled to her husband.

E. With regard to a kohen’s wife who was raped, the two leshonot below in the Gemara disagree whether she is forbidden to her kohen husband.

The reason to forbid her is because the Torah stated with regard to a Jewish woman, “

and she

was not seized,” implying: she alone, and not another, is not forbidden to her husband if she was forced. This excludes a kohen’s wife, who is forbidden to her husband even if she was seized and intercourse was forced upon her.

Likewise, according to this side, a Jewish woman who was raped while married is forbidden to a kohen: if her Jewish husband dies, she is forbidden to marry him by reason of being a “harlot.”

F. All women forbidden by the prohibitions of forbidden sexual relations with whom intercourse occurred become “harlots” and are disqualified from marrying a kohen.

Likewise, a married woman with whom intercourse occurred becomes a “harlot”; however, there is a distinction between them with regard to adultery under duress:

With regard to a married woman:

It will be explained in our sugya that the two leshonot in the Gemara disagree whether there is a prohibition upon her because of being a “harlot” or not.

With regard to the other forbidden relations:

According to Tosafot and the Baal HaMaor in our sugya, it is obvious that they become harlots even when intercourse was forced upon them.

But according to the Ritva [at the beginning of his words], it is obvious that none of the women forbidden by the other sexual prohibitions become harlots when they were forced, and only with regard to a married woman is there room to forbid her to the kohenhood because of being a harlot even when intercourse was forced upon her, because of the severity of adultery by a married woman.

And Rav Sheshet said:

A Jewish woman who was raped—

even though

she is

permitted to her husband,

she is

disqualified from the kehunah.

And the tanna taught this;

Rav Sheshet brought a proof from our Mishna for his words, that our tanna too taught this in our Mishna:

For we learned: One who has intercourse with his yevama, whether unwittingly, whether deliberately, whether under duress, whether willingly—whether one who performs initial penetration or one who completes the intercourse—acquires her. And he did not distinguish between one intercourse and another.

And likewise, one who has intercourse with any of the women forbidden by the sexual prohibitions stated in the Torah or with disqualified women—

he disqualifies her [from the kehunah].

And Rav Sheshet infers:

What is “and likewise

”? With regard to which manner of intercourse mentioned previously, in the first clause, did the tanna intend to say “and likewise”—namely, that such intercourse also disqualifies in the case of forbidden relations, just as it acquires in yibum?

Is it not

speaking of the beginning of the Mishna, where we learned: One who has intercourse with his yevama, whether unwittingly, whether deliberately, whether under duress, whether willingly?

And it implies that with regard to forbidden relations as well, the intercourse that disqualifies her, making her a harlot, is intercourse in every manner,

whether unwittingly or deliberately, whether under duress or willingly—

and it teaches

at the end of the Mishna that he

disqualifies her

through such intercourse from the kehunah.

And it is demonstrated from our Mishna that even a married woman, who is included among the forbidden relations, is forbidden to a kohen even when intercourse was forced upon her while she was married, with a stranger.

The Gemara rejects Rav Sheshet’s proof from our Mishna:

No!

You have no proof from our Mishna that a married woman is forbidden to the kehunah even when she committed adultery under duress.

For when the tanna said “and likewise” in our Mishna, he did not say this with regard to intercourse under duress.

Rather,

what is “and likewise

»? —

?”—With regard to initial penetration!

And its intent is to say: just as with regard to the intercourse of acquisition in yibum, “whether one who performs initial penetration or one who completes the intercourse—he acquires her,” so too with regard to disqualification from the kehunah, “whether one who performs initial penetration or one who completes the intercourse with one of the forbidden relations or with one of the women disqualified from the kehunah—he disqualifies her.”

The Gemara is astonished at the explanation that we explained in the Mishna, that “and likewise” comes to teach about disqualification from the kehunah through initial penetration, and that the Mishna speaks of disqualification through initial penetration and not of intercourse with a married woman under duress, thereby refuting Rav Sheshet’s proof:

Initial penetration of whom

is the tanna of the Mishna coming to teach us that it disqualifies from the kehunah?

If you say

ordinary initial penetration

of the forbidden relations,

did the tanna come to teach us that initial penetration disqualifies them, just as it acquires in yibum?

This cannot be said, for:

Does this mean

that you wish to say

that

initial penetration in

forbidden relations—

we learn

it

from yevama?

Do we learn the law of disqualification through initial penetration in the case of forbidden relations from yevama, so that the tanna comes to say that even with forbidden relations initial penetration disqualifies, just as it acquires in yibum?!

But

on the contrary,

the learning is the reverse!

For the fact that even mere initial penetration acquires her in

yibum—

we learn

it

from

the initial penetration stated with regard to

forbidden relations!

For the essence of initial penetration,

which is considered intercourse, is

with forbidden relations

because it is

written

in the Torah! As explained in the sugya above. Therefore, it is impossible to explain our Mishna as saying: initial penetration acquires in yevama, and “likewise” initial penetration disqualifies in the case of forbidden relations.

If so, Rav Sheshet’s proof from our Mishna returns.

The Gemara rejects Rav Sheshet’s proof from our Mishna in another manner:

Rather, what is “and likewise

” that we learned in our Mishna? The tanna is not speaking of intercourse under duress. Rather,

a

kind of intercourse

not in the usual manner with the forbidden relations

is what he said “and likewise.”

For previously we learned with regard to yevama: “And he did not distinguish between one intercourse and another,” meaning that even intercourse not in the usual manner acquires her. Therefore the tanna added “and likewise” with regard to intercourse not in the usual manner with the forbidden relations, to say that with the forbidden relations, too, intercourse not in the usual manner disqualifies.

The Gemara is still astonished: Do we learn that intercourse not in the usual manner disqualifies in the case of forbidden relations from yevama, so that the tanna says: just as intercourse not in the usual manner is effective for acquiring in yevama, so it disqualifies in the case of forbidden relations?!

But

on the contrary! The essence

of the law that intercourse not in the usual manner is considered like intercourse in the usual manner is learned from the verse, “And you shall not lie with a male

the lyings of a woman,”

which implies that there are two lyings that are forbidden: one lying in the usual manner, and one not in the usual manner—

and this verse is

in the

section of

forbidden relations written!

If so, we do not need a teaching that intercourse not in the usual manner is considered intercourse from the acquisition of yevama through intercourse not in the usual manner.

And it is not possible that the intent of the tanna in our Mishna is to say that intercourse not in the usual manner acquires in yevama, and “likewise” intercourse not in the usual manner disqualifies her in the case of forbidden relations.

If so, Rav Sheshet’s proof from our Mishna returns.

The Gemara rejects the proof from our Mishna through another explanation:

Rather, what is “and likewise

» —

a

kind of intercourse

not in the usual manner with those liable for lavs

with regard to the kehunah.

For example, a widow to a High Kohen, and a divorced woman to an ordinary kohen. Since these lav prohibitions were not written in the section of forbidden relations, and “the lyings of a woman” was not stated with regard to them, they are “the disqualified women” taught in the final clause of our Mishna.

And the tanna came to say that just as intercourse not in the usual manner acquires in yevama, so intercourse not in the usual manner with women disqualified from the kehunah, who are liable for lavs, disqualifies them with the disqualification of halalut.

And now the Gemara explains the law of a kohen’s wife who was raped while married—

Rabba said: A kohen’s wife who was raped,

her

husband,

who is a kohen—

is flogged because of her

if he has intercourse with her,

because of

the prohibition of

a harlot.

And we ask:

Because of being a harlot, yes—

That is, do you mean that a kohen’s wife who committed adultery under duress is such that her kohen husband is flogged because of her only because of the prohibition of a harlot to the kehunah?

But

because of

the lav of

defilement,

of a woman who committed adultery while married,

not

is he flogged because of her when she committed adultery under duress while married to him?!

And is he not also flogged because of the verse, “Her first husband may not again take her after she has been defiled,” from which the Sages expounded above [11b] that there is a lav prohibition against a woman who committed adultery while married and thereby became defiled?!

И отвечаем:

We answer:

Say thus: her kohen husband is flogged because of her

also because of being a harlot!

That is, he is flogged because of her because of the prohibition of the kehunah, in addition to the fact that he is flogged because of her because of “her first husband may not again take her after she has been defiled.”

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection

to Rabba’s words, who said: A kohen’s wife who committed adultery under duress, her husband is “flogged” because of her on account of being a harlot, from what was taught in a beraita:

It is stated in the section of sota: “If any man’s wife goes astray and commits a trespass against him, and a man lies with her carnally, and it is hidden from the eyes of her husband, and she is secluded, and she is defiled, and there is no witness against her.” “

And she was not seized.”

The verse teaches:

“And she

”—which is an exclusion, that only “she,” the Jewish woman, is the one with regard to whom it is stated:

A. If she

was not seized,

but committed adultery willingly—she is

forbidden.

B.

But

if she

was seized,

meaning that she committed adultery under duress—she is

permitted

to her Jewish husband.

But

there is

for you

another woman

who, even though she was seized,

and intercourse was forced upon her, she is

forbidden

to her husband.

And which is she?—

This is a kohen’s wife.

Rabbi Zeira assumed that through the exposition of “and she was not seized,” adultery under duress was excluded from the general lav of “her first husband may not again take her after she has been defiled.”

And this exclusion applies both to the wife of an Israelite and to the wife of a kohen.

And from now on, the entire prohibition of the wife of a kohen who was violated under coercion is only because of the exclusion conveyed by the word “and she,” stated in the passage of the sota, which teaches that only the wife of an Israelite who was seized is permitted, but the wife of a kohen is prohibited.

But it does not return the wife of a kohen who committed adultery under coercion to the general prohibition of “Her first husband, who sent her away, may not again take her to be his wife after she has been defiled.”

And

since this is the teaching derived, how can you say that her kohen husband is flogged because of her, on account of zona?

For the teaching of the prohibition of the kohen with regard to his wife who committed adultery under coercion is only in the category of a “prohibition derived from a positive commandment.”

And

a prohibition derived from a positive commandment—

it is a prohibition of

a positive commandment,

and it is not a prohibition for which one is flogged!

Rabba said:

He answered

Rabba,

that one should not say in accordance with the words of Rabbi Zeira, but rather:

All—

all women who commit adultery while married, whether under coercion or willingly—

were included in

the prohibition of

“zona”

for a kohen, concerning which it is stated, “They shall not take.”

And

when Scripture specified for you, with regard to the wife of an Israelite, “and she was not seized,” that she is prohibited, by implication

you learn from this,

that the wife of a kohen remains as she stands!

For even if she committed adultery under coercion, she is included among the zona prohibited to her husband by the prohibition of “Her first husband, who sent her away, may not again take her to be his wife after she has been defiled” [and see the additional explanation in the notes].

And the Gemara brings a second formulation:

Some say:

This is what Rabba said, and this is what Rabbi Zeira responded to him:

Rabba said: The wife of a kohen who was violated—

her husband is flogged because of her on account of defilement.

As it is stated: “Her first husband, who sent her away, may not again take her to be his wife after she has been defiled.”

And the Gemara infers:

Because of defilement, yes—

he is flogged.

But

because of zona,

he

is not

flogged.

It follows that a wife of a kohen who had intercourse

under

coercion—

we do not apply to her

the prohibition of

“zona”

with regard to the priesthood.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection

to Rabba’s words, who said that her husband is flogged because of her on account of defilement, from what was taught:

“And she was not seized”—

rather, she committed adultery willingly; she is

prohibited

to her husband.

If she was seized

under coercion—she is

permitted

to her husband!

And

however,

there is

another woman

who, although she was not seized,

is

prohibited, and who is she?—

?—

This is the wife of a kohen!

And

behold, a

prohibition derived from a positive commandment is

only a prohibition of

a positive commandment, and one is not flogged for it; so how can you say that her husband is “flogged” because of her on account of defilement?!

—and one does not receive lashes for it. How, then, can you say that her husband “receives lashes” because of her on account of defilement?!

Rabba said:

He answered

Rabba: All were included in “Her first husband, who sent her away, may not again take her,”

“after she has been defiled,”

to be flogged because of her on account of defilement.

with regard to receiving lashes because of her on account of defilement.

And

when Scripture specified for you, with regard to the wife of an Israelite, “and she

was not seized”,

she is

prohibited,

from which you learn:

If she was seized—

permitted.

By implication

you learn from this

that the wife of a kohen—

remains as she stands,

so that one is flogged because of her on account of defilement even if she committed adultery under coercion.

Mishna:

The explanation below of this Mishna follows Rashi’s second interpretation.

A. It has already been explained that, according to Torah law, an Israelite woman is permitted to eat teruma from the time of her betrothal to a kohen, but by rabbinic decree she does not eat.

B. Once the time of the marriage arrived—which is twelve months from the time the husband demanded her, in order that she prepare herself with ornaments—she eats teruma even by rabbinic law, according to our Mishna, which follows the First Mishna that we learned in Ketubot. C. A woman “who is being kept for a prohibited intercourse,” that is, a woman who looks forward to and awaits [like “a woman awaiting a levirate marriage,” and like “and his father kept the matter”; see Rashi, Sota 18b], designated to experience intercourse that disqualifies her from teruma, is disqualified from eating teruma so long as she is being kept for this intercourse, according to Rabbi Meir, who is the first tanna of our Mishna.

D. The disqualification of “the woman who is being kept for a prohibited intercourse” from eating teruma applies both to her husband’s teruma, if she was an Israelite woman married to a kohen, and to her father’s household’s teruma, if she was the daughter of a kohen being kept for an Israelite; and this disqualification is rabbinic [Tosafot 57b, s.v. Rav, according to Rashi’s method].

Therefore, a woman who is being kept for a prohibited intercourse, such as:

A.

a widow

betrothed

to the High kohen,

or

a divorcee or a woman released by halitza

betrothed

to an ordinary kohen

in violation of the prohibition.

Whether she was an Israelite woman, who now comes to eat teruma by virtue of being the wife of a kohen, or whether she was the daughter of a kohen who eats her father’s household’s teruma—

Since the intercourse of these men makes the woman a halala and disqualifies her—

already

from the time of betrothal they shall not eat

the women

of teruma,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

That is: If they are Israelite women, then even though the time of their marriages has arrived, they do not eat teruma.

And if they are daughters of a kohen, they become disqualified from eating their father’s household’s teruma as soon as they are betrothed.

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon declare fit

the woman “being kept for a prohibited intercourse” with regard to teruma, and she is not disqualified until she experiences intercourse and becomes a halala.

And therefore:

A. If they were Israelite women, then once the time of their marriages arrived, they eat teruma by virtue of their husbands. And if they were daughters of a kohen, they are not disqualified from eating their father’s household’s teruma until they marry, experience intercourse, and become halalot.

B. Rabbi Meir agrees with Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon that the disqualification of “the woman being kept for a prohibited intercourse” applies only so long as she is in fact being kept for a prohibited intercourse. But once she ceases to be kept for it, she is not disqualified with regard to a kohen or teruma unless she has experienced intercourse.

Therefore, all agree that only if

they became widows or were divorced

these women prohibited to their kohen husbands

after marriage [

after marriage and intercourse], then they are

disqualified

for a kohen and from eating their father’s household’s teruma if they were daughters of a kohen, since they became halalot and were disqualified.

But if they became widows or were divorced

after betrothal,

when they had not yet experienced intercourse and had not become halalot, they are

fit

to marry a kohen when they become widows [but not if they were divorced, for then they were disqualified for a kohen by virtue of the divorce], and fit to eat their father’s household’s teruma if they were daughters of a kohen.

Gemara:

It was taught: Rabbi Meir said

another reason concerning an Israelite woman whose betrothal is a prohibited betrothal—for example, a widow to a High kohen, or a divorcee or a woman released by halitza to an ordinary kohen—that she should not eat teruma by virtue of her husband:

A kal va-chomer

it is:

And if the betrothals of

an Israelite woman who married an Israelite, which are betrothals of

permission, do not enable

the woman to eat teruma—these betrothals, which

are prohibited betrothals,

,

all the more so

will not be effective to enable her to eat teruma.

They said to him

to Rabbi Meir: One cannot compare the betrothal of an Israelite woman to an Israelite to the betrothal of a disqualified woman to a kohen, because:

It is not so if you said this with regard to permissible betrothals,

that they do not enable one to eat teruma,

for he does not have

her husband, who is an Israelite,

the ability to enable her to eat elsewhere.

Can you say this with regard to prohibited betrothals

to a kohen,

for he does have

her husband, who is a kohen,

the ability to enable her to eat elsewhere,

when the betrothal is not a prohibited betrothal.

A petzu’a daka [whose testicles were injured] is prohibited from entering the congregation, as it is stated: “A petzu’a daka shall not enter the congregation of the Lord.” And the woman who experiences intercourse with him is disqualified from eating teruma, for this intercourse is included in “And if a daughter of a kohen becomes a wife to a foreign man, she shall not eat of the sacred offerings,” and since the man who experienced intercourse with her is the disqualified and foreign one, she became the wife of a “foreign man,” and was disqualified through his intercourse.

Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya:

A petzu’a daka who is a kohen and betrothed an Israelite woman: we have arrived at the dispute of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon.

For

according to Rabbi Meir, who says

that a woman

being kept for an intercourse

that is

prohibited

by

Torah law,

does not eat

[she does not eat] teruma—

This one too does not eat

by virtue of her husband, the priest,

for she is being kept for the intercourse of the man with crushed testicles, and he disqualifies her from eating teruma when he has intercourse with her.

But

according to Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, who say:

even the one being kept for

a biblically prohibited intercourse—

she eats,